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ABSTRACT
Insider dealing has been in the public eye for many years now. The
impact of Big Bang and the growth of financial conglomerates has, however,
propelled the practice to the very forefront of regulatory concern. Regulators
are faced with a dilemma: financial conglomerates bring with them many economic
benefits, but they also accentuate the problem of insider dealing, in that the
greater availability of inside information within these open ended financial
houses, increases the scope for its misuse. Regulators must ensure that the
regulation imposed does not overly impede the benefits to be gained from
conglomeration; yet they must ensure that regulation is sufficiently stringent
to provide a fair market place. The Chinese Wall - a self-styled mechanism
consisting of policies procedures designed to stop the flow of inside
information within financial conglomerates - is singled out for special
treatment. The legal and policy problems associated with the use of the
mechansim are reviewed. These revolve around two main issues:
(i) Is the Wall an effective policy device to rebut allegations of insider
dealing in a financial conglomerate where Arm A is dealing in shares in
Company X while arm B has information pertaining to Company X.
(ii) If the Chinese Wall actually works, does the operation of the mechanism
give rise to breach of fiduciary obligations ie. to what extent does the
operation of the Chinese Wall in conglomerates modify traditional
fiduciary law.
The conclusion reached is that the Chinese Wall offers regulators the
best solution to the problem of conflicts of interest and obligation in fully
fledged financial conglomerates. The Wall must, however, be 'strengthened' to
prevent, for example, a coroprate fiduciary dealing for its own account where
another department within the conglomerate has a material interest in the
transaction. At common law, the courts ought to, and probably would, accept
this approach. However in an action brought under the SIB rulebook, and the
rulebooks made thereunder, it would seem that the courts are bound to accept a
Wall per se (ie. without being strengthened) as valid. To the extent that
this differs from what ought to be the position at common law, the SIB
rulebook should be modified.
A tentative import of economic analysis is used to complement the largely
legal analysis. In this way it is hoped to gain a better grasp of the policy
issues under study.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial markets world wide have been undergoing a process of rapid
change. This is especially evident in the U.K., where the deregulation of
commissions, epitomised by Big Bang, usherred in a new era which completely
revolutionised the provision of financial services on the London markets. The
old single capacity system was discarded in favour of a new dual capacity
regime whereby financial intermediaries could operate in a number of different
capacities. The formation of financial conglomerates, marked best by the
erosion of the traditional division between banking and securities business
caused a major headache for regulators concerned with the proliferation of
conflicts both of interest and duty and the increased potential for their
abuse.
The Financial Services Act 1986 represented the authorities response to
the new market regime. It aimed to establish siseif_regulation within a
statutory framework" and to make the London markets a clean place to do
business. Under the Act powers provided for the erection of Chinese Walls to
segregate the flow of price sensitive information between different departments
within the one financial house. The SIB have made wide use of these powers.
Indeed the main means of regulating conflicts of interest generally and insider
dealing in particular within the context of financial conglomerates, is through
the use of these in-house Walls.
Existing reseach has been primarily U.S. based and centres mainly on the
use of Chinese Walls within either the context of banks er Se, or, (and this
has been true only more recently) in the context of multi-functional securities
firms; but never both. The reason for this is that in the U.S., the Glass-
Steagall Act 1933 prohibits the formation of fully fledged bank-securities
(
related financial conglomerates. British research into the legal and policy
problems associated with the use of the mechanism has not been much in
evidence, with all but a few notable exceptions. However even here the
analysis has been set in a pre-big bang context where the range of financial
services on offer was substantially less. With this in mind it seems
appropriate that a new study be undertaken.
In an arena where the regulatory trends are ceaselessly fluid it is not
suprising that some of factual analysis contained in the thesis is already
dated, but this does not detract from the importance of the underlying policy
and legal questions which have yet to be resolved. The law is stated as of 1
November 1988 although occassionally it has been possible to add material after
that date.
Chapter One, outlines the context of the study, considering first the
processes of deregulation and reregulation and in particular one aspect of
each: on the one hand the growth of financial conglomerates, and on the other
the regulation of conflicts of interest accentuated by conglomeration. The
methodology of the study is also explained. Chapter Two pays special attention
to deregulation in the U.K. and paints an overview of the new regulatory regime
adopted in Britain. Conflicts of both interest and duty, highlighted by the
fusion of banking and securities business, are then given treatment. Emphasis
is placed on one conflict - insider dealing - and special emphasis is placed on
the appropriate regulatory response to corporate insider dealing in financial
conglomerates. Chapter Three explores the economic conundrum of insider
dealing. It surveys the classic literature on the subject and comes to the
general conclusion that insider dealing is an economic "bad" and as a result
ought to be regulated. Chapter Four then goes on to explain the legislative
and regulatory prohibitions placed upon insider dealing both here in the U.K.
(Xiii)
and in the U.S.
Chapter Five looks at one particular means of regulating insider dealing
in the context of financial conglomerates, that is, by means of the Chinese
Wall isolation technique. The chapter addresses the question of what sort of
policies and procedures actually constitute the Chinese Wall. Some fairly
novel and as yet unresolved legal questions are considered in Chapter Six.
This chapter examines the common law position of the Wall mechanism and draws
on case law from the U.K., the Commonwealth and the U.S. Chapter Seven reviews
official recognition of the mechanism as expressed in statutory provisions and
the regulatory measures which have evolved therefrom in both the U.S and the
U.K. Chapter Eight offers a policy assessment of the mechanism. The analysis
is couched in terms of the suitability of the Chinese Wall when compared with
other competing regulatory options. When considering the Wall, special
emphasis is placed on whether the mechanism works and on how it is enforced.
Finally, Chapter Nine offers a summary of the salient points of the
thesis concluding that despite a number of serious reservations about the
adequacy of the Chinese Wall both from an enforcement point of view and from a
legal angle, the Wall represents the most appropriate regulatory mechanism
available to regulatory authorities in their attempts to control the flow of
price sensitive information in financial conglomerates. As a result judges at
common law should, in certain circumstances permit financial conglomerates to
rely on the device: (1) as a defence to rebut the imputation that information
held by one arm of a conglomerate is not held by another and (2) to satsify the
rigors of strict fiduciary obligations. These special circumstances are
outlined.
i 'I)
CHAPTER ONE: SETTING THE SCENE
Deregulation and Re-regulation: The International Environment
The processes of deregulation and re-regulation are assuming greater
importance in financial markets world-wide. When formulating policy,
governments are being put under increasing pressure to ensure that their
financial sectors do not lag behind either the needs of the economy as a whole,
or the rigours of a fast changing international financial environment.
The policy goals which governments seek to secure include: investor
confidence, consumer protection, safety and soundness among financial
institutions, efficiency, competition, and the need to ensure that economic
power does not become concentrated in the hands of any one sector of the
financial services industry. 1 Almost invariably these goals conflict and as a
consequence some form of "trade-off" between the competing needs of
deregulation and re-regulation is required. 2 The terms deregulation and
1. See, the list of objectives underlying the U.K. Governments regulation
of the U.K. financial markets in, Financial Services in the United Kin gdom: A
Framework for Investor Protection (1985), Cmnd. 9432, para. 3.1 (hereinafter
the "White Paper"). The objectives are clearly stated as: efficiency,
competitiveness, confidence and flexibility.
2. See, D. Lomax, "Financial Supervision and Regulation", (1987) August
in National Westminister Bank Quarterly Review, at p.3. Therein he states that
although "[t]here is no inherent conflict between the maintenance of effective
regulation and supervision on the one hand ... and competition and efficient
markets [on the other, it is, however,] not always easy to achieve these
objectives at the same time." Indeed, Liewellyn cites a practical conflict for
policy makers in that - "Consumers demand the benefits of regulation but at the
same time require services to be provided competitively." 	 Llewellyn,
"Competition and the Regulatory Mix", (1987) August in National Westminister
Bank Ouarterlv Review 9, at p.9.
1
re-regulation do not lend themselves to easy definition. 3 They can rarely,
if ever, be considered as two opposing forces, for more often than not both
processes run hand in hand. The trend in financial markets today is, however,
towards a process of deregulation in the form of financial diversification.4
This is being achieved by giving market forces a freer reign in the shaping of
market operations.5
What is Financial Deregulation?
Financial deregulation can mean any or all of the following: first, the
removal of price restrictions - eg., the deregulation of fixed commissions in
favour of a more competitive commission scheme. This took place in the U.S. in
May 1975 and on the UK Stock Exchange in October 1986. Secondly, the removal
of geographic limitations or cross-border barriers through developments in
technology and the development of a 24 hour global market. Thirdly, the
removal of le gal constraints and other self-imposed restrictive barriers
separating banks from other financial institutions. And finally product
diversification and the introduction of new products and financial instruments
brought about by technological change or competitive pressures.
3. Liewellyn doubts the practicability of the term deregulation. Supra,
note 2 (at p.4) he writes "[T]he fashionable term "deregulation" is at best
ambiguous but in truth a misnomer and not an accurate description of what is
happening either in this country or elsewhere." For what is happening	 ,
accompanying text at note 5 et seq.
4. But Llewellyn, commenting on the state of affairs in the U.K.
financial sector, says su pra, note 2 (at p.9), "While institutions are
broadening their range of financial services ... the way each sector of
business is conducted is becoming more explicitly regulated."
5. Supra, note 1, at para. 3.2. "Market forces provide the	 g means of
ensuring that an industry meets the needs of its customers." (emphasis added).
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Why is Dere gulation Takin g Place?
Three reasons may be given to explain why deregulation is taking place:
It could be argued that there is a greater confidence among policy makers and
market participants concerning the ability of the market mechanism to secure
many of the aforementioned policy objectives and to challenge the
appropriateness of certain forms of pre-existing financial sector regulatory
measures. Similarly pressures from certain sectors within the financial
services industry itself have pushed towards deregulation. For example, the
formation of financial conglomerates in the U.K. was a response by market
participants to embrace market forces rather than the outcome of a specific
government policy. The same is true in the U.S where the banking sector has
been eager for some time now to find loopholes in the Glass-Steagall Act 1933
(which segregates to a large extent the banking and securities business) and
expand into other, more profitable, areas of financial service activity. The
desire to diversify has been prompted by a need to boost dwindling profit
margins in an increasingly competitive traditional banking sector. 6 Then
lastly, technology, innovation and the internationalisation of the securities
markets has created an environment where new products and financial packages
are forcing highly regulated centers to lessen restrictions inhibiting
competition in order to attract more business.
These factors have led to a situation where in the U.K., for example, the
division between commercial and investment banking has largely been eroded.
The tendency then has been towards greater reliance upon market forces and
competitive freedom - a shifting of the emphasis in the way governments aim to
6. Securities firms, who fear that increased competition from banks will
be detrimental to their market status, are among those most eager to resist an
expansion in the banking domain.
3
trade-off the aforementioned public policy goals and in the regulatory means by
which these goals are to be secured.
The Regulatory Paradox: The Trend Towards New Regulatory Measures
Despite this present day tendency in financial markets towards a more
laissez faire environment, the forces of deregulation and reregulation create
what might be called a "regulatory paradox". 7 While deregulation refers to the
breaking down of barriers that inhibit competition, impede efficiency, and
restrict consumer choice, governments nonetheless acknowledge that some policy
goals are too important to be left solely to market forces. New regulatory
measures are therefore necessary. 8 Easterbrook, observes:9
Regulation displaces competition. Displacement is the purpose,
indeed the definition of regulation ... Sometimes legislation may be
justified as necessary to correct "imperfections" in the markets, but
in most cases regulation is designed to defeat the market altogether
Essentially this regulation is the supervision of conflicts of interest and
7. LiewylIn alludes to this suora, note 2, at p.4, where he writes:
"What is happening is that the re gulatory mix is changing. ft is for this
reason that re-regulation is a more appropriate term than de-regulation for, in
many ways, the regulatory environment is becoming more formal and detailed. At
the same time institutions are being given more freedom over the type of
business they may conduct. It is not clear on balance whether this creates a
more or less regulated financial system than before." (emphasis in the
original)
8. JIjJ, at p.7, "[InJ any financial system regulation is a varying mix
of law, self-regulatory arrangements, moral suasion and self-imposed
constraints ... IDe-regulation on the other hand is about the changing mix of
these components. What is happening in the U.K. is that for each sector the
the regulatory matrix is changing." (emphasis in the original)
9. "Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism", (1983) 26 Journal of Law
and Economics, 23, at p.23.
4
other risks that arise out of the process of deregulation.'° Buxton, rightly,
suggests that polices of both regulation or deregulation are neither incompat-
ible nor exclusive. He writes:''
financial deregulation embraces a wide range of relaxations
which have one thing in common: relevant authorities have allowed
the market to change its participants or products ... [but this does
not mean] that the resultant markets or products are unregulated.
Deregulation, then, is allowed but limits are placed upon it. Although
the market might well exhibit the characteristics of a deregulated market place
there is, nonetheless, a counter-trend towards new regulatory measures aimed at
protecting investors and securing the safety and soundness of financial
institutions. These factors point to a need for reregulation superimposed upon
any underlying tendency towards competitive freedom. Indeed as Llewylln
12
says:
the process of various forms of de-regulation is enabling financial
institutions across the board to widen their range of services while
at the same time the authorities are imposing a more stringent
regulatory environment with respect to the conduct of each of their
particular areas of activity.
The reason for this is the fear that unchecked deregulation could be conducive
to systemic risk and market abuse. Consequently, set against a backdrop of
deregulation, it may be helpful to isolate a number of different types of rule
which regulators have adopted in order to resolve the delicate balancing
process between an extremely complicated set of policy goals.
10. , Lleweylln, who makes a helpful distinction between regulation
and supervision: "[B]y regulation is meant a body of specific rules or agreed
behaviour, either imposed by some government or other external agency or self -
imposed by explicit or implicit agreement within the industry, that limits the
activities and business operation of financial institutions. Supervision is
the process of monitoring that institutions are conducting their business
either in accordance with regulations or more generally in a prudent manner."
Gilbart Lectures on Banking 1986 The Regulation and Supervision of Financial
Institutions, (Institute of Bankers 1986) at p.9.
11. Buxton, Financial Dere gulation, The proceedings of a conference held
by the David Hume Institute (Ed. R. Dale), May 1986 published by Woodhead-
Faulkner Cambridge 1986 at p.14.
12. , Liewellyn sur'rp, note 2, at p.9.
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(A) Prudential Rules: prudential supervision is essential to help ensure
the safety and soundness of financial institutions. A prime example would be
the imposition of capital adequacy requirements.
(B) Competitive Re gulation: here the aim is to ensure that competition is
not eliminated or seriously hampered by the formation of cartels - anti-trust
laws in the U.S. are perhaps the best, or most typical, example of this.
(C) Regulations related to Concentration of Economic Power: the concern
here is to prevent certain sectors of the financial markets from being
"dominated" by other sectors of the industry or indeed certain individuals.
Again, the U.S., where concern over the concentration of economic power is most
strong, provides a good example of this Sort of regulatory measure; there
controls have been imposed on Inter-State banking.
(D) Consumer Protection Rules: an example of this type of regulation is
the Securities and Investments Board's (SIB) compensation scheme. Under this
scheme investors who are the victims of an abuse receive compensation provided
the infringement falls within the SIB's jurisdictional powers.
(E) Conflict of Interest Rules: financial institutions hold a unique
position of trust in handling funds belonging to the public. As a consequence,
it is a prerequisite for the smooth running of the financial markets that there
exists within its confines trust, confidence and integrity. The close
proximity within which these financial institutions operate, coupled with the
very special nature of financial services themselves, makes the industry
notorious for the prevalance of what are commonly known as conflict of interest
6
situations. The aim here is to require firms to make full disclosure of the
nature of the conflict and to release as soon as is feasible the relevant
information in order to increase transparency and thus redress information
assymetry. When this is done the investor can then make informed investment
decisions about which shares to buy. Disclosure requirements are a key example
of this type of regulation.'3
Despite the shift in emphasis from regulation to deregulation there still
remains an entrenched reliance upon regulatory measures. This "counter trend",
as it could be called, is an attempt by governments to secure the confidence of
the investing public in the financial markets. Even though the process of
deregulation strips the market place of various forms of regulatory barriers it
must be remembered that these markets do not operate in a regulatory void.
Indeed caught up in this reshaping process is the need to tighten loopholes
through new regulatory activity. Thus, the global movement away from re-
regulation towards deregulation is essentially a switch from one type of
regulation to another - the moving away from "barrier" or "prohibitive" types
of solutions to those based on competitive freedom.
The Resultant Effecis of both Deregulation and Re-regulation
One Asoect of Dere gulation - Financial Conglomerates
Though deregulation is a difficult concept to define, the reshaping
process which has developed as a result of it is readily apparent. Perhaps the
most important outcome of deregulation in the U.K. has been the emergence of a
13.	 , infra Chapter Eight at note 71 and accompanying text.
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new corporate creature - the financial conglomerate. Today it is now possible
for the one financial house to undertake a range of financial services which
include stock-broking, market-making, banking, corporate finance and investment
management. The merging together of different financial institutions in this
way to form "one-stop multi-service financial supermarkets" would not have been
possible but for the relaxation of certain types of regulatory barriers. Most
significant of all has been the fact that it is now possible for banks to
engage in a full range of securities related business, a practice which had
hitherto been avoided in the U.K. through the imposition of self-imposed
constraints. In the U.S, by contrast, such mixing of banking and securities
related business has largely been held in check by the Giass-Steagall Act 1933.
However, in recent years especially, that Act has been crumbling as a result of
a number of judicial decisions favouring relaxations in the legislative
prohibitions contained in the Statute.l3a
Why the Move Towards Financial Conglomerates?
The rationale underlying the formation of such conglomerates has never
been soundly established. Maycock highlights two reasons for their
development 14 - economies of scale, and diversification with a view to
spreading risk. He traces their history, forming initially around the deposit
banks and later branching Out to include hire purchase and finance houses. The
termination of Selective Credit Control in favour of Competition and Credit
Control and the removal of the "corset" in 1980 enabled clearing banks to move
13a.	 , R Karmel, "Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections", (1980)
97 Banking Law Journal 631; and Securities Industry Association, "Public Policy
Issues Raised By Bank Securities Activities", (1983) 20 San Die go Law Review
339.
14. See generally, Maycock, Financial Con glomerates: The New Phenomenon,
Aldershot, Gower c1986. See also, Sir Timothy Bevan, "Banking Conglomerates -
Revolution or Evolution?", (1985) August Barclays Bank Review 56.
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into areas previously denied them while relaxations in a range of regulatory
constraints in the run up to "Big Bang" paved the way for further expansion.
Bevan, meanwhile, suggests the reasons could be three-fold: a need to
offer a full range of financial services to customers for fear of losing out to
competitors; established international connections; and pre-existing strong
links with the securities business. These factors, he argues, created a
situation where many clearing banks were well placed to expand. But whatever
the reasons put forward, it is certain that the development of financial
conglomerates could not have been fully completed without the radical changes
brought about by "Big Bang", and deregulation in general. It was only when the
restrictive regulatory apparatus, with its traditional segregation of financial
functions, was finally dismantled that conglomerates could firmly establish
themselves. Financial conglomerates, and their use of the Chinese Wall
regulatory mechanism occupy an integral part of this study.
Goodhart has written that 15
the breaking down of compartmentalisation is allowing financial
intermediaries to take advantage of economies of scale and scope to
move towards being "one stop financial supermarkets" with a fuller
range of financial services provided in-house. Exactly how extensive
such economies may be is uncertain, especially in the early days of
mergers between commercial banks, investment banks and securities
dealers ... Increased competition and the added complexity of
financial activities have added to perceived risk. Where risk has
increased need for capital to provide a buffer against loss ... the
removal of the old protective barriers led to a rush by the smaller
players to merge with new, bigger partners both to benefit from
economies of scale and scope and to augment their capital base
sufficiently to meet the requirements of the new more demanding
market context ... Whereas once the Stock Exchange was dominated by
relatively small lightly capitalised partnerships, the likely future
is that trading will become much more concentrated in the hands of a
limited number of massive financial conglomerates. While the
institutions rushing for the exit have been the small British firms,
the institutions entering these markets - in addition to a number of
15. Goodhart, "The Economics of 'Big Bang" , (1987) Summer Midland Bank
Review, 6 at p.7.
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major British banks - have been the comparatively enormous foreign
houses.
Such changes, however, have not been without problems. The fusion of
many diverse financial services (in particularly banking and securities
business) within the one conglomerate have given rise to two inter-related
problems. First, the safety and soundness of a financial institution (and the
financial system generally) may be put in jeopardy; and secondly, those who are
consumers of financial services risk being treated unfairly because of the
increased likelihood that conflict of interest situations will be abused. It
is this second problem which forms the context of this study.
One AsDect of Re gulation or Re-re gulation - Conflicts of Interest and the
Chinese Wall
The regulation of conflicts of both duty and interest, accentuated by the
growth of financial conglomerates, necessitates careful consideration in the
light of the increased potential for abuse from within the different 'arms' of
financial conglomertates. The importance of the question is suitably high-
lighted by a quotation from the government's White Paper on "Financial Services
in the United Kingdom". There it was stated that
The rapid increase in the number of firms engaging in more than one
type of investment business and the blurring of demarcation lines
(for example, between brokers and jobbers) have made it more
important than ever that investors are adequately protected against
abuses aing from conflicts of interest within investment
business.
A search for an appropriate regulatory response to this problem is
therefore required. This search represents a central issue in this thesis
where various regulatory options are explored. Special emphasis, however, is
given to the Chinese Wall isolation technique.
16. The "White Paper" supra, note 1 at p.14.
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Methodology
Introduction
The methodology adopted in this thesis attempts a fusion of economic and
legal analyses to form a progressive technique for solving various policy
problems associated with the regulation of the U.K. financial markets. It lays
special emphasis on the coro prate misuse of inside information by financial
conglomerates and focuses more particularly on the use, by various regulatory
authorities, of the Chinese Wall mechanism in stopping the flow of inside
information within the conglomerate context.
As an enhancement of this interdisciplinary approach, and as an
alternative testing ground for its application, use is made of comparative
legal analysis by considering authorities in other jurisdictions, primarily the
U.S.A. Two methodologies are combined then, in the hope of gaining a better
understanding of the problems, public policies and possible solutions to the
misuse, by financial conglomerates, of inside information.
Law and Economics
There have been many views expressed about the technique known loosely as
the "economic approach to law" 17 . The result has been that there is much
17. There is now a well developed literature applying economics to legal
problems. See generally, Guido Calabresi "The New Economic Analysis of Law:
Scholarship, Sophistry or Self-Indulgence?" Proceedin gs of the British Academy
LXVIII; Ogus and Veijanoski, Readings in the Economics of Law and Regulation
1984 Oxford University Press; W.Z. Hirsch, , Law and Economics -An
Introductory Analysis, New York: (1979); Burrows and Veijanoski, The Economic
Approach to Law, London: 1981; R.A. Posner, (1977), Economic Anal ysis of Law,
2nd ed., Boston: Little-brown.
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confusion as to exactly what this new mode of analysis is and where it can be
validly and usefully applied. Numerous attempts have been made to classify the
various "schools" of economics and law,' 8 but convenient though these are, it
must be remembered that the effective use of any interdisciplinary approach
varies significantly according to how, where and why it is being applied.19
The aim here is to consider the legal and economic dimensions of the
Chinese Wall, and to a lesser extent the regulatory context within which the
device is set. Consequently it would seem that some form of combination of
law/economic analysis is appropriate, given this general field of study.2°
What sort of economic approach to law then is intended for analytical use in
this thesis?
18.	 , Kievorick, "Law and Economic Theory: An Economist's View" (1975)
65 Am. Econ. Rev. 237. There he attempts a threefold classification of the
input an economic thoerist can make to law: Firstly, there are those instances
when economic concepts become important in understanding some aspect of a
particular legal case even though the case may not be overtly economic in
origin. Here Kievorick sees the economist as fulfilling the role of
"technician". The economist "takes the problem facing the legal decision maker
framed the way the legal decision maker has posed it, and brings his expertise
to bear in dealing with a specific part of the case." Secondly, acting now as
"supertechnician", the economist "takes the problem as set by the lawyer or
legal decision maker, but in this instance the entire structure of the problem
area has economic roots." If the situation is one that can plausibly be
described as the accomplishment of fairly well defined economic goals then the
"economist [may] be called upon to evaluate and give advice about the best ways
of achieving the specified objectives ... [N]ow the problem he is addressing is
in its own terms economic in nature." In the third and, as he sees it, last
role, the economist is "the propounder of a new vocabulary ... he no longer
takes the problem as framed by the lawyer ... [but poses it in his economic
terms] ... He provides thereby, a different way of looking at the legal issue
which yields alternative explanations of how current law came to be what it is
and new proposals for new law."
19. Posner, su pra, note 17 at p.15 writes, "The application of economics
to law is not itself either new or controversial. What is new and controvers-
ial is the variety of problems in the world of law to which economics is being
applied".
20. Burrows and Veijanoski su pra, note 17, at p.2 write that "the
marrying of economics and law is not new. "Economic approaches" they argue,
"can be found in [both] the works of ... Bentham (1789) [and] Marx (1867)".
It is their impression that the economic study of law and institutions within
society fell into disrepute in the period 1920-1960, except in those areas
where "the law had obvious economic objectives and/or effects".
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The Tentative A pplication of Law and Economics
It is this writer's view that, when referring to the interdisciplinary
use of law and economics, he has no particular "brand"2 ' or "mix" of economics
and law in mind except that which he prefers to call the "tentative application
of economics to law". This approach though somewhat vague is nonetheless
important. It is based on the assumption that the use of economics as an
explanatory tool in the field of legal analysis has its limitations, but that
notwithstanding the diversity of the economic approaches to law which exists
there can be extracted and applied a core of well tried and tested economic
concepts. The analysis draws particular attention to the limitations of
economics and law as applied to those problems with no obvious economic origin
and suggests a "tentative" application of economic analyses to those areas
which do.
Thus, this writer adheres to no particular school of economics and law,
neither does he claim that the economic analysis of law is the only, or even
the best, way of analysing legal phenomena - for that is not the aim of this
thesis. In slightly different terms what is being propounded here is the idea
that even if "non market" legal topics, where no economic root is discernable,
cannot be analysed by applying law and economics22 (there being heated debate
21. $, for example, the work of Richard Posner. His book, supra note
17, is one of the seminal texts on the study of law and economics. Therein he
offers a comprehensive theory of law using traditional economic analysis as
applied to law in both a positive and a normative way.
22. Since the 1960's the economic approach has been applied increasingly
in those areas where no obvious economic root can be discerned. The thrust of
this work has been largely North American. See, for example, Chalmers and
Shelton, "An Economic Analysis of Riot Participation", (1975) 13, No.3,
Economic Inquiry , 322; Becker, Landes and Michael, "An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability", (1977) 85, No. 6, Journal of Political Economy, 1141.
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gingerly crossing the minefield of interdisciplinary study.
The limitations on such an approach are twofold. First, the divergences
in the nature of the two subjects themselves cause a great many problems. What
may initially appear as "fruitful collaboration" could, on closer inspection of
the principal tenets of law and economics as self-contained disciplines, seem
incongruous. Hirsch illustrates this point well. 3° For him law embodies ideas
of justice, entitlements and obligations, that is - "how a given size of pie is
divided". Economics on the other hand is largely normative being more
concerned with "the efficient use of resources to produce the largest pie".
Following this analysis through, Hirsch outlines the lawyer's concept of the
"reasonable man" and the economist's idea of the "rational man" and points out
that they are very different.3'
Although it may unfair to draw hard and fast conclusions based upon such
divergences, it is true nonetheless that these concepts play a discernable role
in each discipline. The reasonable man is distinguished by three fundamental
characteristics :- "he behaves in a reasonably prudent manner - he will act
with fair regard to others - any other conduct [he engages in] is subnormal or
devient." 3	By contrast, rational man is an egotist - he maximises his own
self interest and has "only limited concern" for the welfare of others.
Secondly, lawyers and economists approach problems from different
perspectives. 32 The lawyer advocates formal legal propositions which he
supports with reasoned arguments. 33 His approach, so it would seem, goes little
30. , Hirsch, supra,	 note 17, at preface xi et sea.
31. 1kJ, p .	 et sea.
31a. Ibid.
32. See generally , Burrows and Veljanoski, sura, note 17.
33. p.14 et sea.
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further than this for he may feel he has no need to! More often than not, he
is criticised by the economist for adopting an "ad hoc" approach which is, when
applied, "pragmatic" and ,,anecdotaln33a According to the economist, he tackles
an issue with "unsupported empirical assumptions" or with empirical research
,,33b
which often lacks statistical rigor . 	 The economist, on the other hand,
likes to set definite goals. He asks questions such as - have the objectives
of law been attained ? - if not - what are the likely effects of the law going
to be ? - and - have these effects actually occurred?	 The economist is, by
and large concerned with the overall picture, prefering to analyse the inter-
relationship between the main actors in his area of study. 35
 In essence,
therefore, he attempts to reveal the trade-offs between various competing
goals. In so doing he aims to establish a "framework in which the assumptions
are clearly stated and used to derive a consistent, even if somewhat simplistic
analysis of the issue under study." 36 In turn the lawyer focuses criticism on
the economist's essentially theoretical approach where assumptions are
unrealistic and where, as a consequence, they lead "to conclusions that are
subject to overwhelming qualifications." 37 Similarly lawyers dislike the
economic theorists' overt "calculatedness" whereby human conduct is subjected
to, and subsequently given, quantification and rational explanation.
The lawyers' attacks may, to some extent, be countered, because the
economist is actively engaged in probably the best developed of all the social
sciences, there is a consensus among economists about the subject's more
33a. I1i
33b. Ibid.
34. J1J.L. at p.8.
35. jJj, at p.14.
36. But see, Posner su pra, note 17, at p.13, where he argues that
for lawyers or for that matter anyone else "to criticise a theory on the ground
that its assumptions are unrealistic is to committ a fundamental methodological
error."
37. Supra, note 32, at p.14.
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fundamental techniques even if there is a diversity in the conclusions that are
drawn from them.38 From this the economist derives essentially two comparative
advantages over the lawyer: The first is that the economist is "blessed" with
what Coase calls the "measuring rod of money". 39
 The second is the economist's
statistical training in answering questions which are capable of quantificat-
ion. Empirical studies are not only interesting but valuable. After all,
write Burrows and Veljanoski40? "the law must ultimately be evaluated in
in terms of its success in achieving its goals and not purely in terms of its
formal legalist structure". Lastly, lawyers, who are generally unfamiliar with
scientific enquiry, tend to reject any form of legal analysis which reduces to
a greater level of abstraction that which they have devised.
By virtue, then, of the fundamental differences in the two disciplines
themselves, it is inevitable that these problems will carry through to the
tentative application of economics to law. Nonetheless the approach can still
be used when it attempts to emphasise "those aspects of law it has [al
4l.	 .	 .
comparative advantage in dealing with . It is the aim of this thesis, in
order to maximise this advantage, to focus on an area - financial regulation -
where law and economics do interface and where their intersection is one of
clear economic dimensions. Ogus and Yeljanoski express grave reservations
concerning the fact that the field of regulation in general has been
"shamefully neglected", not only in terms of interdisciplinary analysis, but
also in terms of traditional legal scholarship. 42 Consequently, an inter-
disciplinary study of one regulatory option - the Chinese Wall - which is of
great practical relevance to the financial sector seems appropriate.
38. Burrows and Veljanoski simrp note 32, at p.14.
39. Sura, note 26, at p.209.
40. Suora, note 17, at p.8.
41. SuDra, note 32, at p.14.
42. SuDra, note 17, in Preface.
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(b) Terminology and Definitions
Inherent in the use of economic analysis as a complement to traditional
legal scholarship is the fact that it invests in a new vocabulary. Therefore
new terminology - opportunity cost, synergies, externality etc. - will be
43
encountered.
Economics can be and has been defined in many ways. One view central to
the lawyer/economist is that, in a world where, on the one hand, resources (all
of which have alternative uses) are limited through scarcity and where on the
other hand, there exists the insatiable human desire to consume those resources,
then inevitably, trade-offs and choices must somehow be made. Such a definit-
ion, therefore, makes economics the science or study of human choice.44
While the lawyers' definition of law may be stated as being a command backed up
by a sanction45 the economists' view is something quite different. Hirsch
46
writes:
[Ljaws are authorative directives that impose costs and benefits on
participants in a transaction and in the process alter incentives
[essentially therefore the making of laws is not costless] ...their
drafting and enforcement require [the use of] real resources and
involve the trading-off of certain costs and benefits to determine
given policy objectives.
The assumption in this mode of analysis is, says Posner47 , that man's actions
can be explained as if he were:
43. Rather than attach abstract definitions to these terms within this
section it is intended to provide explanations as and when the concepts are
encountered in the text. Ogus and Veijanoski, suDra, note 17 (preface) comment
that this new vocabulary and its "technical content" is a formidable obstacle
to the would-be inter-disciplinary scholar.
44. See, both L.C.Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Si gnificance of
Economic Science (1932), and Posner, suDra note 17 at p.3, who hold very much
to this view. It has, however, been attacked by some scholars for being too
wide. See generally, for example, Coase, su pra note 26.
45. See generally, the writings of the legal philosopher Austen.
46. , Hirsch, supra note 17, at p.1.
47. Supra note 17, at p.3.
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a rational maximiser of his ends in life, his satisfactions -
what we shall call his self interest ... [Pjeople respond to
incentives ... if a person's surroundings change in such a way that
he will increase his satisfactions by altering his behaviour he will
do so.
The Tentative Arrnroach: An ApDlication
An application of this analysis is, for example, where the temptation for
a conglomerate (ultimately controlled by individuals) to trade on inside
information arises from the financial incentives accruing to it (and ultimately
the controllers). However the rational wealth maximising company may refrain
from such conduct even if there are strong incentives to use the information.
This will occur where the corporate controllers perceive that the long run loss
to the company's wealth (and to a greater or lesser extent their own - it may
depend on a number of things) is likely to be greater than the short-term
profits. There are indeed many factors that would operate to make insider
dealing less attractive to a company and its directors. These range from, on
the one hand, market forces eg. the desire to maintain an unblemished reputat-
ion, to, on the other, formal sanctions eg. prosecution at law. As regards the
latter, it is essential that anti-insider dealing law and other self regulatory
rules prohibiting the practice are analysed from the perspective of how they
alter the incentives to engage in the illegal conduct.
It is significant to note that Professor Gower, in his study of Investor
Protection in the financial markets, 	 did not employ	 any	 significant
law/economics cost-benefit analysis. In fact he doubted the feasibility of
such an approach.48 This has been criticised by authorities such as Goodhart
48.	 , Review of Investor Protection. Re port: Part 1 (1984), Cmnd.
9125, para. 1.16 (hereinafter cited as the "Gower Report").
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and Veljanoski. Goodhart writes:49
There was little enough discussion of the rationale for the proposed
panolpy of regulation in the Gower Report ... There was none at all
in the subsequent Financial Services Bill and the accompanying paper
from the SIB, Reu1ation of Investment Business, which simply set out
the proposed clauses to be enacted and the regulatory framework to be
adopted without any attempt at justification. Even so the tone of
the SIB document was less exclusive and restrictive.
Equally Veijanoski says:5°
Indeed ... Gower (Cmnd 9125 [19841) ... failed to consider the costs
and benefits of [his] proposals for reform, nor did [he] systematic-
ally consider the economic ramifications of the problems put to
[him].
The Tentative ApDroach: a Conclusion
It could be argued that a purely economic approach cannot provide a
comprehensive treatment of financial market regulation or any part thereof
primarily because economics is at best a technique that is both partial and
complementary to other disciplines. However the tentative application of
economics to law overcomes this hurdle by taking elements of both approaches in
order to provide alternative perspectives from which to view the one problem.
The application of regulatory alternatives requires governments to make policy
choices and to trade-off their policy goals, not only in a reasoned and cost-
effective way, but with regard to issues of fairness and the continued
confidence of investors in the financial sector. One regulatory structure in
particular - the Chinese Wall - is be analysed to see whether it provides the
49. , C. Goodhart, "What is the Purpose of Regulating Financial
Services?" (1986) mimeo., London School of Economics, at p.29.
50. , Veljanoski's et i research proposal: "The Law and Economics of
Insolvency with Particular Reference to Fraudulent Trading", at p.2. See also,
suora, note 19, p.1-13 especially, p.7-10. This represents one of the most
stinging criticisms of Gower's approach to date. He contrasts the Gower and
Cork Committee reports with that of the Peacock Committee's report on the
financing of the BBC which incorporated substantial economic analysis. He also
notes that Gower's "narrow" approach would not have been tolerated in the U.S.
Veljanoski's criticisms would thus seem to merit attention.
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most attractive regulatory solution for governments and regulatory authorities
reviewing this area.
It is suggested, therefore, that in pursuit of this endeavour the
tentative interdisciplinary use of law and economics is a viable and effective
alternative academic approach to that of traditional legal scholarship. Indeed
this technique, when supplemented by a comparative legal viewpoint would seem
to have much to commend itself.
Comtarative Legal Analysis
Comparative legal analysis forms a well recognised branch of traditional
legal scholarship and is increasingly becoming a focus of legal study in its
own right. It is proposed in the course of this work to use the USA as a
comparison to analyse the recent regulatory stance adopted in the U.K. with
regard to the use of the Chinese Wall technique in financial firms.
The comparative approach is of great help in this sort of study. Indeed
Rider does not think that it is, "feasible to discuss anti-insider trading law
without reference to the U.S. experience or elsewhere".5 ' He writes
51athat
there is a long history of regulation in the U.S. and Ethel
Commonwealth [giving rise to]... a considerable amount of experience
[which] British lawyers [would do well to] make reference to.
Continuing with this view, he says, "given the internationalisation of the
51. B.A.K. Rider, The Re gulation of Insider Tradin g. (Unpublished Ph.D
thesis London University, 1979), at p.217.
51a. ftiL
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securities market knowledge of other jurisdictions is vital".52
The comparative approach has both strengths and weaknesses. The
technique's most overt strength centres on the alternative insight that it
affords into similar, if not identical, problem areas. This alternative
viewpoint is useful in itself from three perspectives: First, relevant case law
provides a testing ground where the government and regulatory authorities can
tailor regulatory reform in the light of judicial assessment of regulatory
developments. Secondly, it may be useful to review the operation of a differ-
ent regulatory regime ie. one which to a greater or lesser degree relies on
market forces and self-regulation to police it. Issues that may have looked
problematical in theory can be compared to see whether they are of consequence
in practice. Some means of weighing up the costs and benefits of such an
approach is therefore capabable of being employed. Lastly, a comparative
approach may be useful, not only from the legal norms that embody policy, but
also from the policy angle that underpins law. For example, informed debate on
proposed new regulatory structures tends to highlight the crucial policy
questions that must be answered and the means by which competing public policy
goals are to be traded off against one another and yet, at the same time,
housed within a satisfactory regulatory framework.53
The comparative approach may be said to have three failings. The first,
which provides a backdrop against which any further criticism may be set, is
52. Ibid.
53. See generally , Canadian Financial Institutions, A Report of the
Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, November 1985; The
Regulation of Financial Institutions: Proposals for Discussion (and Technical
Supplement) June 1985; Department of Finance Canada Release, Policy Framework
For Canada's Financial Institutions Tabled in Parliament, December 18th, 1986.
Many of the policy questions considered here are often directly applicable to
the U.K. and indeed elsewhere.
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probably the most important. It relates to the difference in the two jurisdict-
ions being compared. This "difference" refers not to the difference in the law
of the actual topic under study (for that is to confuse the weakness in the
technique with the whole rational for undertaking a comparative approach - if
the law is not different why compare?). Instead the problem arises when there
is a difference in the law that surrounds the topic under review -eg. UK
insider dealing law may be X because of A; meanwhile, U.S. insider dealing law
may be Y because of B : it is pointless to compare X and Y without also con-
sidering elements of A and B. The fact that the surrounding law in the other
jurisdiction is different is apt to weaken, sometimes substantially, the whole
comparative law approach. Consequently, large-scale transposing of one set of
legal rules from one jurisdiction to another cannot be done without considering
the implications of the relevant surrounding law.
As for the second weakness there is a direct link with the first. Here
the difficulty revolves around the different constitutional arrangements
operative in the two jurisdictions being compared. On the one hand there is
the precedential weight of a case cited - ie., can it be overruled and by whom?
Inherent in this is some understanding of the jurisdiction's court structure.
On the other hand, it is necessary to appreciate those cases where State law
has been applied and those where Federal law has primacy.
The third weakness is a fundamental one - various institutional
differences in the operation and segregation of the many sectors that go to
make up the financial services industry. This is a legacy of historic
inception, piecemeal development and political expediency. The Glass-Steagall
Act in the U.S, separating to a large extent the banking and securities
business, is one such example.
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But despite these weaknesses it seems that a comparative analysis of the
U.S. with the U.K. regarding the regulation of the corporate misuse of inside
information via Chinese Walls and the whole validity of the segregation
approach in general, is of substantial benefit.
Summary
Though deregulation, in the sense that barriers are being broken down, is
undeniably an increasing characteristic of events in financial markets world-
wide, it is not the whole picture of what is happening. In Britain at least,
and to a greater or lesser extent in other financial centres also, this
deregulatory trend has been accompanied by new regulatory developments to
ensure that deregulation does not go too far. Chapter One considers aspects of
this paradoxical deregulatory Ire-regulation phenomenon. On the one hand, the
transformation of formerly compartmentalised financial institutions into
virtually open ended financial conglomerates offering a range of financial
services to an extent not known before. On the other hand, the search for an
appropriate regulatory solution to the now accentuated problem of both
conflicts of duty and interest and the possible misuse of inside information
within financial conglomerates. The "Chinese Wall" mechanism is singled out as
a possible regulatory solution to this problem. The study uses a methodology
which combines elements of traditional legal scholarship with a tentative
import of economic analysis. In this way it is hoped that a more coherent and
fruitful picture will emerge on the appropriateness of the Wall technique and
its use within financial conglomerates.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT ABUSE
Deregulation in the U.K The Big Bang
In the U.K., what initially began as a restructuring of the London Stock
Exchange became a much wider cause embracing every sector of the financial
community. "Big Bang", as it became known, was characterised by three main
factors:' first, the termination of the single capacity system of trading in
favour of a new dual capacity regime; secondly the movement away from fixed
commissions towards a more competitive commission scheme; and lastly, the
removal of outside ownership restrictions of member firms of the Stock Exchange
Assocation. These events paved the way for the formation of financial
conglomerates and made inevitable concern over the increased potential for
conflict abuse. Fears revolved more around the fact that potential conflict
situations were being compounded rather than being created by conglomerates,
and that these conflicts would be increasingly and more easily abused. It was
clear, therefore, that a new regulatory framework governing conglomerates would
be necessary.
The U.K's sensitivity towards conflicts of interest was reflected in part
by the division of functions on the Stock Exchange. Up until 26 October 1986
the London Stock Exchange was characterised by the system of trading known as
"single capacity". Very broadly, members fell into two groups of partnership:
on the one hand there were "jobbers", who specialised in buying and selling
shares, and on the other there were "brokers", who specialised in performing
1. For a helpful review of Big Bang, see, CAE Goodhart, "The Economics
of 'Big Bang", (1987) Summer Midland Bank Review, pp.6-15, and sources cited
therein. See also, P.D.Jackson, "Change in the Stock Exchange and the
Regulation of the City", (1986) 7 No.3 LfR pp.90-96.
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share deals on the behalf of the public. As part of the "Big Bang" this system
was discarded in favour of a dual capacity regime in which the two jobs were
fused together.
The old system had certain advantages. Members benefited from both the
restricted entry and competition controls. This, in turn, allowed many of them
to earn oligopolistic profits.2 Furthermore, the integrity of the profession
was maintained by offering membership only to those who were willing to abide by
prescibed standards. Investors benefited too from the segregated system, in
that specialised compartmentalisation ensured that management was expert in the
narrow range of financial services offered. The incentive to abuse conflicts
of interest was significantly reduced, whilst limited membership guaranteed a
self-perpetuating standard of good behaviour. The authorities benefited also
in that there was an established and sufficiently flexible regulatory machinery
with participating members generally similar in terms of capital adequacy and
profitability. Moreover, provision was made for any firm that might become
financial insolvent; in this way systemic risk was largely averted.
The Pressures For Structural Change
Notwithstanding these advantages the compartmentalisation of the
financial system into self-regulatory clubs suffered from many of the general
drawbacks that characterise most oligopolistic arrangements. The system was
very costly in terms of how resouces where employed and inefficient in the
sense that there was a failure to develop new products and technologies.
As well as this the Stock Exchange rule-book denied significant
2. Goodhart,	 6.
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structural reform. In particular, it prevented the U.K regime from developing
along the same lines as the other major financial markets. In overseas centres
market participants had become grouped into well capitalised corporate entities
engaging in dual functions quite distinct from their U.K. counterparts.
Although it was the traditional policy of the Stock Exchange to allow only
partnerships to come into membership, a new rule was introduced in 1982 that
allowed members to become limited companies and to have an outside share
ownership of up to 29.9%. But despite this member firms could not be owned by
a single non-member and could not therefore become part of wider groupings - a
fact which meant that the London exchange had, in some senses, closed its doors
to the rest of the international community.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s the Japanese and the Americans began to
develop their own sophisticated global markets. Gradually London began to
struggle as a financial centre and when in 1979 the newly elected Conservative
Government abolished exchange controls it became apparent that some form of
restructuring of the Stock Exchange and the financial sector in general was
3
necessary.
The catalyst for change was the "Agreement" between the Government and
the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange's rules, regulations and codes of
conduct came to the attention of the Director General of Fair Trading as early
as 1976 and indeed two years later proceedings were brought against it. The
Office of Fair Trading contended that some of the Stock Exchange rules were in
breach of the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act as being restrictive of competition
unless the Exchange could prove otherwise. A Government initiative broke the
3. With the removal of exchange controls in 1979 it became clear that
London was losing out to other centres such as New York even in the trading of
U.K. shares.
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deadlock and a compromise of Sorts was reached in 1983 with the Stock Exchange
agreeing to amend its rule book provided the case against it was dropped.
Contained within this "Agreement", as it became known, existed a
commitment on the part of the Stock Exchange to abolish fixed commissions in
favour of a more competitive regime. Since 1911 fixed commissions had remained
the linch-pin of the separation between brokers and jobbers - the system known
as single capacity. The commencement of negotiated commissions, however, meant
that it was likely that the conduct of business between brokers and jobbers
would alter radically. It was believed that under the proposed arrangements
brokers would accept deals that they had not "matched" through a jobber with
the result that jobbers would probably receive less business and find it more
difficult to compete. Similarly, the pressures which negotiated commissions
would exert on the single capacity were also thought to be too much for it to
sustain and that it too should be dismantled. There emerged in its place a
dual capacity regime whereby financial intermediaries could fulfill the the
functions of both broker and jobber simultaneously.
In addition to the above reforms the Stock Exchange adopted other
measures in an attempt to maintain its international competitiveness. The
first step was to help broaden the capital base of many of its members. On 1
March, 1986, the 29.9% ceiling which had been imposed on the outside ownership
of Stock Exchange firms was abolished altogether. This allowed a single non-
member to own 100% of a member firm, despite the fact that membership was still
only open to individuals on a partnership basis. The fear of a rival market
developing outside of the Exchange and the desire to attract the American and
Japanese securities houses (whose participation was crucial in the Stock
Exchange's fight to become a world leader) proved too much however and further
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rule changes were hurriedly made to allow corporate houses not only to own
firms but also to become full members themselves.
The aggregation of these moves had more profound effects than, arguably,
anyone at the time fully envisaged, for they marked a momentous turning point
in the market structure, operation and management of the whole U.K. financial
sector. Quite remarkably, within the space of a few months, the industry
reshaped and refashioned itself in advance of 27 October 1986 upon which day
("Big Bang day") the deregulation of commissions was to take place. Massive
well capitalised and incorporated financial conglomerates, bringing under the
one roof a multiplicity of financial services - stock-broking, market-making,
insurance and insurance broking, banking, investment management, corporate
finance etc., - began to appear. Most importantly in the U.K., the
traditionally self-enforced, and for some, archaic separation between the
banking and securities industries was finally broken down, discarded in favour
of a more open and competitive regime.
The New Regulatory Fraineworic The Financial Services Act - A Response to the
"Big Bang", Conglomerates and Conflicts of Interest..
The structural changes which were at the heart of "deregulation in the
U.K. necessitated a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework which
had been in operation to ensure investor confidence in the financial markets.
4Indeed, as Goodhart observed:
The breakdown of the old, oligopolistic, single capacity, club-like,
cartelised system and its transformation into the new multi-function,
intensely competitive system, ... [required an equivalent trans-
formation of the regulatory system.
4. SuDra, note 1, at p.15.
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The need for regulatory change had been mooted for some time.
The Need For Regulatory Change
In pre-Big Bang times there existed the widespread belief that the
existing regulatory framework was not only propping up an inefficient system
but that it was also outmoded and fast becoming inadequate for the protection
of investors. Indeed, up until the advent of the Financial Services Act 1986,
regulation had been decidedly piecemeal "combining a variety of Government
measures with a large degree of self-regulation". 5
 The most important piece
of legislation was the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 (PF(I) Act).
Other legislation included several Companies Acts, the Banking Act 1979 and
more general statute law such as the law of theft and fraud, insolvency law and
the limited use of civil sanctions.
The Statutory intention of the PF(I) Act was to protect investors against
fraud in investments dealings. This was attempted in two main ways: First, by
"ensuring [that] dealers in securities, unless otherwise authorised, required a
6licence from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) - these would be
refused if the applicants were not considered "fit and proper"; and secondly,
s.13 of the Act made it an offence to knowingly make a misstatement in an
investments deal. Welcome though these provisions were, they did not cater for
activities such as investment management or investment advice in areas other
than in securities dealings. As well as this, no provision was made for
5. Securities and Investments Board, Financial Services - A Guide to the
New Regulatory
 System, (Booklet 1986) at p.1. Indeed, one authority,
Schmittoff has contended that by the mid-seventies there was virtually no
effective investor protection law in the U.K. at all.
6. Ibid.
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transactions in the expanding Futures and Options markets. Thus the PF(I) Act
provided both "outdated" and "incomplete" protection for investors needs.7
Among the Government non-self-regulatory bodies designed to implement
legislation in this general field were the Bank of England, the Director of
Public Prosecutions Office, the Metropolitan Police Fraud department, and the
DTI.8 Meanwhile the self-regulatory framework, dominated largely at this
time by the extra legal rules of the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and
the Council of the Stock Exchange, was generally in not much better shape.
Coupled with this came the framework's inability to meet the sophisticated
demands of the large institutional investors.
In 1981, the Conservative Government commissioned Professor LCB Gower to
undertake an inquiry into the degree of protection afforded to investors in all
areas of the financial industry.9 His efforts, more than anyone else's, were
instrumental in the setting up of the City's new regulatory structure. Yet
even his findings were not well received by the financial community.'°
Underlying all of this, a number of scandals, the most notable being the
"Lloyds affair", emerged. The resultant backlash of unwelcomed public
attention forced the Government, who where already in a legislative frame of
7. See Financial Services in the United Kin gdom: A Framework for Investor
Protection (1985), Cmnd. 9432, at para. 1.2, (hereinafter the "White Paper").
8. Of these, the latter two where especially criticised for their poor
records of arrest and/or inactivity - records perhaps best viewed in the light
of the legislation they sought to enforce, the complexity of the offences they
where obliged to detect and last, but by no means least, the limited resources,
in terms of finance, manpower and expertise made available to them.
9. Review of Investor Protection. Reoort: Part I Cmnd.9l25, 1985
(hereinafter cited as "The Gower Report").
10. Gower's proposals have not found favour with some leading academics.
See, B. Rider's comments in an article by Clive Woolman, The Financial Times
15 April 1989, p.14 (Gower's achievements were "too much of a one-man show").
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mind, to act swiftly. The DTI had begun a work of its own even before Gower
11had presented his findings.	 As well as this there was the Marshall Field
Report' 2
 and the Sir Martin Jacomb Report,' 3 both of which in effect proposed a
modified version of Gower's findings. An acceptable set of ideas was eventually
agreed. These were largely embraced in the Government's White Paper (Cmnd 9432)
and embodied in the Financial Service Bill, which after ammendment passed into
law as the Financial Service Act 1986.14
The Financial Service Act 1986 and the SIB Rule-book
Following the government's overhaul of the U.K. financial sector
traditional self-regulation has given way to "practioner based" and "statute
-backed" regulation.' 5 The legislative machinery chosen for regulating
the "investment business regime" is the Financial Services Act 1986.16
Essentially the aim of the FSA 1986 is to prevent fraud y the City and fraud
the City' 7 and effect overall efficiency in the financial markets.' 8 In
pursuit of this wide powers are given to the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry, which may, and indeed have been, transferred to a "designated
11. See, the White Paper.
12. Date
13. Date
14. The Act came into operation in piece-meal fashion.
15. The more popularly term is that of "self-regulation within a
statutory framework".
16. For commentaries on the Act, see, Rider et al, Guide to the
Financial Services Act 1986, Bicester: CCH Editions, c1987. A. Whittaker and
G. Morse, The Financial Services Act 1986 a guide to the new law, Butterworths
1987. A.J. Wedgewood et al, A Guide to the Financial Services Act 1986,
London, Financial Training Publications, 1986.
17. This comment was made by Professor R. Jack during a Plenary
Discussion on "The Financial Services Revolution: New Challenges and
Opportunities". B.A.A. Conference, Glasgow University, April 15th, 1987.
18. SIB booklet Supra, note 5, at p.3.
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agency" 19 known as the Securities and Investments Board (SIB).2° This "agency"
operates through a number of Self-Regulatory Organisations (SRO's) recognised
by it, 2 ' is subject to the Jurisdiction of the Courts22and is exempt from
liability for damages for acts and omissions in the discharge of its
23functions.	 The members of the Governing committee of the SIB are appointed
by the Secretary of State and the Govenor of the Bank of England acting jointly.
Those who want to carry out investment business must first seek
authorisation. 24 This may be had through two main channels, either by apply-
ing directly to the SIB or by applying indirectly through Self Regulatory
Organisation's (SRO's). 25 The effect of non-authorisation is that the market
operator commits a criminal offence 26
 with the result that the transaction(s)
becomes unenforceable. Some categories, however, are exempt from
27
authorisation, for example the Bank of England. 	 The rules and codes of
practices of an SRO must ensure that its members are "fit and proper persons"
19. S. 114 of the Act.
20. The SIB is a Private Company and not a Government Department, funded
from the financial Services Industry and not the "public purse".
21. These are: First, The Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory
Organisation (LAUTRO). Secondly, The Investment Management Regulatory
Organisation (IMRO). Thirdly, The Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers
(AFBD). Fourthly, The Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers
Regulatory Association (FIMBA). Finally, The Combination of Stock Exchange and
International Securities Regulatory Organisation to form The Securities
Association (TSA). This latter SRO is by far the most important.
22. S. 188 of the Act.
23. S. 187 (3) of the Act.
24. S. 9 (1) of the Act.
25. There are some other means of obtaining authorisation. For example,
holding a certificate issued by a Recognised Professional Body (s.15(1)). This
is a body which regulates a profession that is not wholly involved in invest-
ment business. Or alternatively, being a person established in another Member
State of the EEC provided certain conditions are satisfied (, s.31).
26. A sentence of up to two years imprisonment may be imposed on
convicted offenders.
27. See, (s.35); Others include:- Appointed Representatives (ie., a
person employed by an authorised person) (s.44); Recognised Investment
Exchanges (RIE) (s.36-37, Sch. 4).
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to carry on an investment business 28 and "in particular that they meet the
standards of honesty, competence and solvency." As well as this, there must
also be fair and reasonable admission, expulsion and disciplinary procedures.29
The rules and regulations made by the SIB for the protection of investors
29a
must comply with the principles embodied in Schedule 8 of the 1986 Act.
Rules made by SRO's are required to afford investor protection at least
equivalent to that offered by the SIB rules. This is known as the principle of
equivalence. In the final analysis the SIB is subject to the oversight of the
Secretary of State while SRO's fall under the auspice of the Board. It is
important to note that, although the SIB derives its powers from Parliament30
its rules do not require Parliamentary approval.
In sum then, the the method of control over businesses offering invest-
ment advice of one form or another (and indeed the many conflicts of interest
that ensue from conglomeration) is one whereby Parliament through the Financial
Services Act delegates power to the Secetary of State who in turn delegates his
rule-making responsibilities to the SIB. The SIB confers recognition to SRO's
and to these the vast bulk of investment businesses seek authorisation.
However this sub-sub-delegation of wide supervisory powers to SRO's does not
effectively establish a system of self-regulation, because the principle of
equivalence operates to ensure that the SIB retains significant control.
Commenting on this new financial framework, even though at a time when it
was still in its formative stages, Professor Goodhart observed, from an economic
28. See, Sch. 2-1 of the Act.
29. See, Sch. 2-2) of the Act
29a. See, Appendix I which contains Schedule 8.
30. According to s. 114(11) the SIB's rules must be approved by
Parliament
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point of view that:3'
While there has been much new legislation [to cope with the new
market structure] ... it is arguable how well it has been designed.
In particular, insufficient attention has been paid to the
comparative costs and modalities of alternative methods of achieving
the - not always specified - objectives of such regulation.
Conflicts Of Interest and Duty
Conflicts of both interest and duty have traditionally been of great
concern to regulators. Big Bang has heightened rather than alleviated this
problem. Let us look first at the problem of conflicts of interest.
I. Conflicts of Interest
A conflict of interest32 occurs where there is an actual or potential
preferment of one's own interest to that of another person's interest where the
former owes some type of duty to the latter. 33 "The underlying principle of
equity", says Pennington:34
is that a person who acts as a representative of another is in a
conflict of interest situation if, either at the time when he accepts
appointment or subsequently while he acts as a representative, there
is a material interest of his own or of a third person for whom he
also acts, and the pursuit or protection of that interest would
create a substantial risk that he may not act in the best way to
31. Sura, note 1, at p.15.
32. There is now extensive literature on conflicts of interest in the
financial services industry. See generally , Mayer, Conflicts of Interest in
Dealer-Broker Firms Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1975; N.Woolfson,
Conflicts of Interest: Investment Bankin g, 1976; Schotland, Introduction, in
Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities Markets,
(Twentieth Century Fund) 1980. For an excellent U.K. perspective, g,
Conflicts of Interest in the Chan ging Financial World (Ed. by R.M. Goode),
Institute of Bankers 1986 and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary
College, University of London.
33. K. Bialkin, in "Conflicts of Interest and the Regulation of
Securities, A Panel Discussion", (1973) 28 Business Law yer 545, at p.545. He
does not think it necessary for a fiduciary relationship to exist before a
conflict of interest to arise as a matter of law, custom or business.
34. Goode, su pra note 1, at p.2.
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pursue or protect the interest of the person he represents.
Conflicts of interest cannot be avoided. They are part and parcel of everyday
life. It is important to note that there is nothing inherently wrong with a
conflict of interest situation; the issue is whether such a situation is
handled properly - if the conflict situation is treated impartially or fairly
35then everything is fine - if it is abused then there is a problem.
It would seem beyond doubt that there exists within the financial service
36industry a high incidence of conflict of interest situations.	 It would also
seem true to say that there exists a perceived notion within and without the
industry that these situations are abused. In the context of the financial
markets a potential conflict may be said to exist where, for example, a
conglomerate when managing a client affairs "has a choice between two solutions
for a deal, one choice which is preferable from its own point of view while the
other represents a better deal for the client." 37 A conflict of interest
situation also exists if the conglomerate "carries out activities involving two
different groups of customers and it has to strike a balance between the
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respective interests of the two customer groups. 	 The wider the range of
financial services on offer the greater the danger that these conflict situat-
ions will occur and perhaps be abused.39
35. R. Schotland, "Alternative Views on Regulating Conflicts of Interest
in the Financial Firm", Issues in Financial Regulation (1980), (Ed. by Franklin
Edwards) at p.125. Schotland says: "When abuses do occur, there are always
losses in fairness, and there may be losses in economic efficiency."	 , note
41 and accompanying text.
36. , Rider, "Conflicts of Interest and the Chinese Wall", in The
Regulation of the U.K. Securities Industr y, (Ed. BAK Rider) Oyez 1979, at p.
81.
37. OECD Report: Financial Market Trends, "Conflicts of Interest in
Banking and Finance and their Control and Management", November 1987.
38. Ibid.
39. , the Gower Report, Part I, at para. 6.30.
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Why are Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry so
Important?
Conflicts abound because it is efficient, despite the trend towards
specialisation, to have one entity - either individual or corporate - undertake
a number of potentially conflicting functions. However, if conflicts of
interest are unavoidable, and often go unregulated in other business spheres,
the question may be asked why the "mixing" of different financial services and
in particular banking and securities business should be of such concern?
In fact two reasons may be advanced to explain why Governments have
continually regarded conflicts of interest in the financial sector with more
40
concern than those in the non-financial sectors of the economy.
	
The first is
that the financial institutions (and the Banks in particular) that go to make
up the financial services industry are "special institutions" and hold a
special position within both the economy (this might be called the "efficiency
principle") and society (this might be called the "equity principle").
With regard to the efficiency principle the argument runs as follows: The
financial services industry is regarded as being fundamentally different from
all other industries. At an economic level when a conflict of interest
situation becomes abused the tendency is for that abuse to distort the
efficient allocation of resources within the economy. No longer are the
impartial forces of the market place brought to bear on business activity but
40.	 , the comment by Kay in, "Banking Deregulation in Europe", (1987)
April Economic Polic y 64, at p.98. He writes: "In its historical origins,
banking regulation is political rather than economic in motivation. Much of it
derives from a popular mistrust of finance, ... borne of lack of comprehension
or an inclination. These political arguments are bolstered by an economic
belief that the supply of money may have a macro-economic significance".
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instead transactions are concluded at an extra cost to society. The end result
is reduced efficiency and a false level of profitability not sustainable in the
long term under true market conditions for those financial institutions
involved in such practices.
The equity principle on the other hand is based on the proposition that
financial markets rely, overwhelmingly, on both the confidence of (i) those who
invest in them and (ii) of the general public whose trust is placed in the
integrity of the financial institutions who, by and large, constitute the
market. If this trust is abused confidence can and will be shaken. In an area
where there is already a perceived notion among sceptics that the trust reposed
in financial intemediaries is often abused, no Government can afford to ignore
those situations where abuse is likely to occur. As we shall see, conflicts of
interest left unregulated do not inspire confidence.
Then secondly, as Shotland argues, the nature of financial services
themselves are inherently special. 41 This, he says, is because of the need for
confidentiality between intermediary and client and because an investor is
generally unable to assess the worth of the variety of services available to
him.4 la This gives the seller a unique opportunity to exploit the situation.
But as Gower points out in his report, the idea is "not to prevent the investor
from making a fool of himself, but [rather to prevent himi from being made a
fool of."42 In short, because the nature of financial services are special
41. Supra, note 35 at p.129.
41a.	 , at p.130. See also, Kay, su pra, note 40, at p.99, where he
writes: "One reason for regulating banks is the existence of information
assymetries between buyer and sellers." Information assymetry is the economists
way of describing a situation where one person is in possession of more
information than another; quite obviously such situations are common place.
42. The Gower Report, Part 1, at para 1.16.
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there is, as a consequence, a special need for fairness.
With the growth of financial conglomerates in the U.K. conflicts of
interest in the financial services industry are inescapable. Some way of
accommodating them must therefore be found. Different perspectives can
initially be taken.
One option is to take the view that conflict of interest situations are
handled properly and that abuse is rare. Abuses that do occassionally come to
light are wrongly sensationalised as being common place rather than being
merely one off incidents. This approach emphasises that abuse is rare simply
because the idea of a fiduciary relationship (a relationship where there is a
special duty of trust and care), and the consequent fiduciary law that has
developed to protect this Sort of relationship, would neither have evolved nor
survived until to-day. Nonetheless, as Schotland suggests, merely because
abuses are one off, or as he puts it "episodic", it does not necessarily follow
that they should not receive regulatory attention.43
An alternative viewpoint, and one that seems to command the attention of
some economists and policy makers, is that it is unhelpful to aggregate and
treat all conflict situations in the same way. Here the emphasis is on the
need to isolate and treat differently each conflict of interest situation. The
question then becomes - is there a real likelihood that this conflict
situation, though capable of abuse in theory, will be abused in practice? When
this sort of question is asked it becomes apparent that not all conflicts of
interest are of equal importance or concern.
43.	 , Schotland, su pra note 35.
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By and large those conflicts that in practice have no tendency to be
abused do not merit the deployment of scarce resources in order to eliminate
them. The reason for this is that in the long term the incentive to exploit a
conflict of interest may not exist. Thus more often than not a financial
institution will not risk the long term profits bound up in honest work and
good reputation for the short term gains to be had from, say, trading on the
basis of inside information. The "invisible hand" of market forces will mean
that when faced with a conflict a financial intermediary will handle that
situation in a scrupulously fair way, for the market will impose such a
discipline. The problem here, however, is that market foces may be limited
and, particularly in the context of the financial services industry, most
conflicts occur where the rigours of competition are not as strong as they
might otherwise be.
Notwithstanding the above, a third, more radical perspective exists: it
could be argued that there are situations where not only will conflicts be
tolerated but so too will be their abuse. Essentially the question becomes -
what is the total cost of the abuse ? - who bears that cost - individuals or
society, and in what proportions? If the cost of abuse is less than the cost
of implementing and enforcing regulatory structures in preventing the abuse
there seems to be, prima facie, a case for doing nothing - at least on a
preventive level. Other alternatives include expending resources on limiting
the abuse or even facilitating redress when such abuses take place. This
might be the way an economist would analyse the situation. There are, however,
two problems with this approach: (a) the overriding need for confidence might
be compromised and (b) fairness is made a secondary consideration.
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TyDes of Conflict of Interest in Banking and Securities Business44
In Britain today with the merging together of the banking and securities
business under the guise of financial conglomerates, nine types of conflict of
interest may be identified. 45 This debate follows very closely the one
surrounding the enactment of the Glass Steagall Act in the U.S. in 1934 when
banking and securities activities were to a large extent prohibited. This Act
still remains in force today. Very broadly, these nine conflicts can be split
46into three groups
A. Conflicts involving safety and soundness
B. Customer or selling conflicts
C. Conflicts involving the misuse of inside information.
Though separated in this way each of the nine conflicts are related to
situations where either: one party has more information than another -
information assymetry; or one party has a monopoly power; or indeed where both
these two factors are simultaneously present.
44. For a more extensive debate on this see, su pra note 37 Report by the
OECD and more generally Walter, I, (Ed) Dere gulating Wall Street, 1985 (here-
inafter "Deregulating Wall Street").
45. The folowing discussion is based largely, though not solely, on that
presented in Deregulating Wall Street at p.208 et sea., There, the author
simplifies many of the conflicts originally identified in the O peration of the
National and Federal Reserve Bankin g System: Hearin gs Dursuant to S. Res. 71
Before a Suncomm. of Senate Subcomm. on Bankin g and Currency. 71st cong.. 3d
Sess. 999 (1931) at 1063-1064.
46. Deregulating Wall Street, su pra note 44, at p. 209.
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A. Conflicts Involving The Safety and Soundness of Financial Institutions
It is proposed to explain the conflict situations with the aid of
hypothetical examples within which the conflict is shown to be abused.
1. Imprudent Bank Loans to Third Parties to Support the Price of a
Security
Facts: A commercial bank becomes affiliated with a securities firm. The
securities firm acts as an underwriter for a number of various companies (an
underwriter buys all residue shares not taken up in the share issue they have
promoted). Conflict: Because the bank is affiliated with the securities firm it
has an interest in the success of the underwriting activity. The bank could
then make loans to third party investors contingent upon all or part of the
loan being used to purchase shares in those companies underwritten by the
securities affiliate. This could not only distort the free interplay of market
forces but also jeopardise bank assets.
2. Imprudent Loans to Issuers of Shares Underwritten by the Banks
Securities affiliate
Facts: Company X gets a bank's securities affiliate to underwrite its new issue
of shares. The affiliate advises investors to buy some of the issue. The issue
fails. Conflict: The bank could then make imprudent loans to Company X to keep
it from failing. It may do this to prevent the securities affiliate from being
sued by those who invested in Company X on the basis of its negligent advice.
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3. The Bank Might Make Direct Loans to its Securities Division
Facts: Limits are placed on how much the bank can lend to its securities
division. Conflict: The bank may be able to circumvent these ceilings by
lending to a third party who subsequently re-lends to the securities division.
B. Customer or Sellin g Conflicts
4. The Promotional Role of The Investment Banker-V-The Commercial
Banker's Obligation to Provide Disinterested Advice
Facts: The role of an investment banker is primarily promotional while the
commercial banker is under an obligation to provide disinterested advice.
Conflict: Once bankers have a direct/indirect stake in the activities of a
securities affiliate, investment advice to customers will no longer be
impartial. The fear is that a bank might promote shares in companies
underwritten by its own securities affiliate, even when more profitable
investments are available elsewhere.
5. Using Bank Securities Affiliates to Make New Share Issues to Repay
Unprofirable Loans
This is a form of debt restructuring. Facts: A bank makes an unsound loan to a
customer. Conflict: To avoid suffering a loss the bank induces the customer to
use its securities affiliate to make a new share issue. As a result the bank
is able to recoup the loan and the securities affiliate earns an underwriting
fee.
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6. The Likelihood of Economic Tie-ins From the Different Divisions Within
the Conglomerate
Facts: A conglomerate, offering a wide variety of financial services, develops
around a bank. Conflict: It could then "force" its various customers, through
economic tie-ins, to use the services of other divisions of the conglomerate
when needing advice for other financial matters. Usually the bank would
threaten to ration credit to those customers who refused.
7. Where the Securities Division Places its Unsold Securities in the
Bank's Trust Accounts
Facts: The securities division of a conglomerate holds a number of poor quality
securities on its books. These can only be sold off at a loss. Conflict: To
avoid such losses the securities firm may seek to place these at a suitable
price in other parts of the conglomerate structure - perhaps in the trust
accounts of the commercial bank. However, this conflict is unlikely to occur
because a number of legal and regulatory constraints usually operate to
neutralise this sort of activity.
8. Director Interlocks Between the Banking Division of a Conglomerate
and Other Non-financial Firms
Facts: A Bank director is on the board of another firm. Conflict As a
consequence decisions made in the boardroom - what bank to approach for loans
or which underwriter to use - might be influenced by the presence and voting
powers of bank directors.
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C. Conflicts Involving the Misuse of Inside Information
9. Informational Advantages Regarding Customers
Facts: Under the new "Big Bang" arrangements, a banking and securities house
become affiliated. The securities "arm" underwrite a share issue for Company X
in the course of which "unpublished price-sensitive information" about the
company is obtained. Conflict: There is ample opportunity for this information
to be acquired and used by other divisions within the conglomerate. For
example, it may be used by the banking "arm" to the advantage of favoured
customers or indeed for the banks own account. The result is an unfair
competitive advantage.47
Conflicts of Interest Distin guished From Other Forms of Market Abuse
Though conflict of interest situations are diverse in form, they can,
however, be distinguished from other types of market place misconduct such as
bribery, embezzlement, fraud etc. These are "blatant abuses", says Schotland,
which invoke criminal sanctions.48 Conflicts of interest on the other hand "are
H49
almost entirely left for civil sanctions . 	 He outlines two reasons why this
is so. First, encapsulated in the very nature of a conflict is the whole idea
of two competing and conflicting interests that are legitimately present.
Secondly, conflict of interest abuse, being shrouded in secrecy, is not easy to
47. Admittedly, legal constraints again operate to weaken the incentive
to abuse this conflict. In the U.K. these are formally embodied in the
Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. Other regulatory and
legislative constraints are also operative - these are briefly referred to in
the following section under "Conflicts of Duty" and given treatment elsewhere
in this thesis (see especially Chapter Four for an overview of the CSA 1985).
48. SuDra, note 35 at p.128.
49. Ibid.
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detect still less proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Nonetheless he does go
on to outline one conflict of interest situation - the misuse of inside
information - where this general rule does not apply. This thesis aims to look
at the misuse of inside information in financial conglomerates and more
importantly to consider the appropriate regulatory response to that question.
It is proposed to concentrate on the issue of insider dealing because of
the probable: extent of such trading ie. the degree to which insider dealing
occurs; the damage it causes both: economically, through the disuption of the
efficient allocation of scarce economic resources 50, and socially, through
losses in public confidence in the operation of the financial markets; and
finally the problem of detection - self evident from the low levels of
prosecutions over the last nine years. At the centre of the discussion is the
question of whether the Chinese Wall is an appropriate, valid, and effective
regulatory mechanism for neutralizing the increased potential for conflict
abuse in conglomerates and one in which these corporate entities may generally
place reliance upon. The credibility of the mechanism from a policy and legal
point of view is therefore placed under scrutiny.
The misuse of inside information (or insider dealing as it is more
commonly known) can occur in many different situations. In this general
context the abuse is governed, under British law, by the Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 - similar provisions have been in force since 1980.
The growth of financial conglomerates has caused insider dealing to be a more
urgent and immediate problem. This is because the mixing together of financial
services has increased the scope for trading on the basis of inside (or price
sensitive) information. Extra legal sanctions and new regulatory measures may
50.	 , infra at Chapter Three for a full treatment of this question.
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therefore be needed to deal with what is now a more urgent and pressing problem.
Despite this, some jurisdictions, for example, West Germany, impose no
formal legal sanctions either criminal or civil on those who indulge in insider
dealing. This is in direct contrast to the U.S. where a statutory prohibition
has, in theory, been in existence since as far back as J93451
The "crime" of insider dealing in relation to the efficacy of the Chinese
Wall can be given treatment using the methodology employed by Becker in his
52
economic study of crime and punishment. 	 There Becker couched his analysis
in terms of an "expected rate of return" likely to be derived from committing a
criminal offence. If the costs of an activity exceed the benefits, rational
economic man will maximise his total satisfactions by chosing not to engage in
it. Analysed within Becker's framework, insider dealing yields sizeable profits
especially when set against the low risk of detection. 53 This coupled with
the minimal outlay in terms of resources, time and indeed effort, results in
enticing rewards. Where such factors are present one would expect the crime to
attract profit-maximising individuals.
Today, however, the balance of the equation favouring the exploitation of
inside information is changing. The lure of profits are as appealing as ever
but the perceived, if not actual, risks of being caught have increased. The
sophistication and determination of both the SIB and DTI have alerted insider's
5!. See, infra Chapter Four: Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act
1934 at note 132 and accompanying text.
52. See, Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach", (1968) 76
I. Pol. Econ. 169.
53. One reason for this low detection rate, as Gower rightly points out,
is because of the "off-shore" problem whereby deals are placed through
countries where the rules regarding the transfer of funds happen to be very
lax.	 , the "Gower Report" sura note 9, at para. 1.19.
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fears of being prosecuted. The greater use of computers has brought more
"transparency" to the market place, transactors being readily discovered.54
Despite all this, there are those who in a corporate or individual capacity
will always feel compelled to break the law.
II. Conflicts of Duty
What Duties Do Financial Con glomerates Owe?
With the move towards financial conglomerates and the housing of a number
of financial services within the one firm, there has inevitably followed the
problem of conflict of duties. 55 A financial conglomerate can be said to have
three potential duties:-
I. A duty to retain confidential information obtained from a corporate client
- governed by the law of breach of confidence.56
2. A duty to the investing public not to trade on the basis of unpublished
price sensitive information (commonly referred to as inside information)
for its own account or to "tip" (pass on inside information) clients in its
advisory capacity - governed by the CSA 1985 (as amended) and other
regulatory mechanisms such as the Takeover Panel.
3. A fiduciary duty to take advantage of sources of information reasonably
available. This duty is embodied in the "shingle theory" whereby a
financial intermediary in a fiduciary position has a duty to have an
54. , infra Chapter Eight at note 45 and accompanying text.
55. The Gower Report recognised the inseparability of conflicts of duty
and interest. Supra note 9, at para. 6.30: where he writes "Conflicts of
interest and duty cannot be avoided."
56. For a brief review of the law of confidence see infra Chapter Four
at note 99 and accompanying text.
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adequately informed basis for his recommednations. The duty is merely an
amalgam of fiduciary duties at common law requring an agent to act in the
best interests of his principal. 57 One of the clearest statements of the
duty has been made in a U.S. case:
A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of
securities in that by his position he implicitly represents he has an
adequate basis for the opinions he renders ... He cannot recommend a
security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for such
recommendation ... By his recommendation he implies that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation
rests on 5 ie conclusions based on that investigation. (footnote
omitted)
Thus, a multi-service firm in receipt of inside information from an
issuer of publicly traded securities may find itself in a position where: (1)
actual compliance with its disclosure obligations to its retail customers under
fiduciary law causes it to be liable in an action for breach of confidence to
its corporate clients and guilty of tipping in violation of anti-insider
dealing laws; and where: (2) a failure to tip could cause any recommendation it
makes to be without an adequate basis in view of all information known at law
by the firm about the issuer.
With the emergence of multi functional financial firms in the U.S., and
more particularly in the U.K., is it possible to reconcile these potentially
conflicting duties by using a Chinese Wall?
57. See generally, infra Chapter Six.
58. In Hanle y v.	 , 415 F. 2d 589, (2d. Cir. 1969) at p596-7. The
SEC has also stated on several occasions that it does not believe that
fiduciary duties under state law extend the responsibilities of the fiduciary
to violating Federal law.
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Summary
Chapter Two draws attention to three areas. First, to the structural
changes and pressures which led up to "Big Bang"; secondly, to the need for a
new regulatory framework as well as the broad principles of that framework; and
lastly, to the increased potential for abuse with regard to both conflicts of
duty and interest resulting from the merging together of financial intermediaries,
especially banks and securities houses, under the one corporate roof. These
conflict situations are given treatment, making clear that one of the greatest
concerns with the growth of financial conglomerates is the problem of conflict
abuse and potentially irreconcilable conflicting duties. Undoubtedly this is
part of a wide problem which economists relate to information assymetries and
59
agency costs.
The misuse of inside information within the new conglomerate structure is
singled out for specific analysis. This conflict abuse, as will be made clear
later, is to be considered not only with a view to regulation by formal law but
also by the regulatory technique know as the "Chinese Wall". In subsequent
chapters the Wall mechanism will be questioned as to its suitablity in
preventing the passage of inside information within conglomerates and in
resolving the more general problems associated with both conflicts of duty and
interest as they arise with corporate entities of this sort.
59.	 , suora note 41a. See also, Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of
Financial Economics (1976), pp305-360.
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CHAPTER THREE: INSIDER DEALING - THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Introduction What is Insider Dealing and Who is an Insider?
It is necessary from the very outset of this discussion to clarify two
crucial issues. First, the main thrust of the thesis is concerned with insider
dealing on impersonal stock exchange markets and not with face to face
transactions. Secondly, the thesis, in so far as it covers insider dealing,
analyses the practice within the context of financial conglomerates; as such,
it adopts an approach which might appropriately be termed the unorthodox view'
as opposed to what could be called the traditional view. 2
 The topic is
approached in this way for three reasons: first, scant academic treatment has
been afforded to insider dealing in the corporate context; secondly, it is
within this context that the Chinese Wall mechanism is applied 3; and lastly,
new rules have only recently been drawn up by the SIB dealing with the misuse
of inside information in financial conglomerates in the aftermath of "Big
"4Bang.
The Traditional View of Insider Dealing
The traditional view of insider dealing is succintly outlined by Hannigan
who defines the practice as "... the use by an insider of price-sensitive
information (known to him but not generally, and which he has acquired by
1. See, note 7 and accompanying text.
2. See, note 5 and accompanying text.
3. , King and Roell "Insider Trading" (April 1988) Economic Polic y 163
at p.165, who point out that "Regulation should ... make life as difficult as
possible for the less reputable players who trade on inside information
obtained by breaching their fiduciary [duties] or breaking 'Chinese Walls'."
4. , Rule 3.10 of the SIB rule-book. For a discussion of this rule
, infra Chapter Seven at note 61 and accompanying text.
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virtue of his position) to trade to his advantage in the shares of hi
company." 5
 Most of the traditional legal anaysis of the topic adopts this
approach.6 Therefore, from the traditional viewpoint of insider dealing, it
is generally assumed that the company director is the insider, that he deals on
5. Farrar, Company Law, (1st edn., Butterworths 1985) at p.344,
(emphasis added).
6. But compare, Painter's definition which gives more leeway (see
Painter, Federal Re gulation of Insider Tradin g (1968 Supp. 1974,) 2-3 -
"Insider Trading arises wherever persons ... having fiduciary responsibilities,
purchase or sell shares and the transactions are wholly or in part motivated by
inside information acquired in the performance of their functions as a
fiduciary" (tippees would also be covered in the sense that they would be
liable for knowingly participating in a breach of trust and held liable as
constructive trustees	 D. Prentice, "Insider Trading" (1975) CLP 83, at
p.88. Prentice, (iki.. at p.83), offers Painter's definition but tackles his
exposition from the perspective of the director being the "archetypal" insider.
He goes on to write that directors in possesion of inside information may be
held accountable to the company for any profit made from the use of
confidential information acquired in the course of their duties. "The company",
in the context of which Prentice writes, is the one for whom the director is
the employee. This can be inferred from Prentice's article because he quotes
as authority for the above proposition the cases of Re gal (Hastings) Ltd. v.
Gulliver [19421 1 All E.R. 378. and Phi pps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46, cases
which support the misuse of a corporate opportunity doctrine (, Farrar,
supra note 5 at p.339-344). He also quotes the American case of Diamond v.
Oreamuno 248 N.E. 2d 910 (1968) which is also on the point of directors of the
company using information about the fate of the company to whom they belong.
He does, however, note that "third parties who have no direct relationship with
the company may be accountable in equity for profits derived from insider
trading." (see p.83). Henry Manne, meanwhile, gives a pervasive definition to
insider trading. He sees it as "corporate officers, directors, and employees
dealing in the shares of corporations". See, Manne, Insider Tradin g and the
Stock Exchange, (New York: Free Press 1966), at p.1 (hereinafter "ITSM"). His
definition in "Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information", (Winter
1985), 4 Cato Journal 933 at p.933) is even more wide-ranging: insider trading
is "the exploitation of non publicized information about shares of publically
traded corporations." The general tone of Manne's work, however, assumes that
deals will be undertaken by insiders within the company from which the inside
information emanates (hence his "insider trading as appropriate compensation
for entrepreneurs" argument). This is probably because such a scenario is
viewed as the most common form of insider dealing. He does, nonetheless,
recognise that insider traders may deal on information that does not "belong"
to the company for whom they work. Such information is acquired either in the
course of duty (as in the case of a financial intermediary) or bought or
exchanged with other insiders (, p.63 of ITSM). For example, Director D of
D Company deals on information about X Company either because Director D of D
Company is performing a service for X Company or because Director X of X
Company is exchanging information with Director D. At p.67 of ITSM Manne
recognises that the financial services industry is ripe for the exchange of
inside information. He does not, however, give serious attention to this, the
unorthodox view, discussed herein.
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his own behalf, and that he (and this is the most crucial distinction) deals in
the shares of the com pany whose emDloyee he is.
The Unorthodox View of Insider Dealing
The underlying assumption of the unorthodox view of insider dealing is
that the financial conglomerate itself, through the directors or other
corporate personnel, is the insider or quasi insider. These directors do not
deal on information generated b y the financial conglomerate but rather on
information acQuired b y the financial conglomerate. There are, however, a
number of exceptions: for example, where the market-making arm makes it known
throughout the conglomerate that it is "long" or "short" of a particular
security. 7 This information could of itself be considered to be highly price
sensitive and in certain circumstances might constitute a breach of the the
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
However, the more typical example in the unorthodox context is where one
arm of the conglomerate deals on inside information about another company (for
example, a client of another division of the conglomerate) to whom there is
owed a duty of confidence. 8 In the context of a financial conglomerate, this
might concern information, say, in the corporate finance arm which could be
used by the investment arm for its own account dealing. This view has been
given very little treatment in the literature.
Therefore, in the unorthodox view, the company, or rather individuals on
the conglomerate's behalf, deal on inside information acquired in the course of
7. , Hannigan, Insider Dealing (London Kiuwer: 1988) at p. 147.
There she discusses a conglomerates research recommendations.
8. , infra Chapter Four at note 99 and accompanying text.
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the business about either another company - for example, maybe an investment
banking client on the verge of announcing an increase in expected profits - or
information "leaked" by one arm of the conglomerate about a long or short
position it has taken as market-maker on specific shares and which it would
like to off-load into the accounts of customers in the conglomerate's
investment division; alternatively, it might involve the leaking of information
that one arm of the conglomerate is acting for an offeror in a take-over
negotiation. The conglomerate (individual directors on the conglomerate's
9	 ..	 .behalf) does not ever deal in its own shares; instead it uses information
generated by clients of the conglomerate (or information generated from within
the conglomerate itself) to make profits or cut losses by trading with the
public or even giving advice to clients at a time when it (ie. the conglomerate)
has access to unpublished price-sensitive information pertaining to other
publicly traded securities.
Economics v. Law: Different In puts = Different Outcomes
Despite the fact that it is the unorthodox view of insider dealing (and
the appropriateness of the Chinese Wall within that context) which is analysed
in this thesis, a helpful prerequisite might be to consider the general issue
of trading on the basis of inside information per se. In this task it is
necessary to to review the policy arguments for and against the prohibition of
such trading even in those areas where the debate seems more applicable to the
traditional view of insider dealing. 10 In any case, it is on the traditional
view that the policy debate has essentially focused.
9. See, infra Chapter Six, at note 93 and accompanying text which refers
to the "directing mind and will" of the company.
10. In other words, for the purposes of the policy discussion which
occupies this chapter no significance is made of the distinction between the
traditional and unorthodox views of insider dealing.
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It would seem that the dispute over the costs and benefits of the
regulation of insider dealing is largely, though not totally, one of a
difference in the approach used to analyse the problem. It tends to be the
case that the approach used - either economic or legal - colours the
conclusions derived. Very simplistically, those who favour prohibitions on
insider dealing tend to take a lawyer's perspective while those who do not tend
to adopt an economist's approach with an expansive view of market forces. It
may be helpful therefore to engage in a law/economics discussion by way of
background to the debate. This is what Manne, a lawyer/economist and ardent
proponent of unfettered insider dealing, does. Moreover, as Kay, in a fashion
uncharacteristic of U.K. lawyers, writes:
it would be unwise to introduce a prohibition on insider trading
before some attempt to prognosticate the economic repercussions of
such a prohibition has been made. A cost-benefit approach may well
yield a qifferent result form a purely moral one. (footnote
omitted).
Those Who Argue against Prohibition: The Deregulators12
Henry Manne is undoubtedly the most vociferous and longstanding advocate
of unfettered insider dealing. He is joined by others such as Canton and
Fischel who believe that "The desirability of insider trading is ultimately an
empirical question".' 3 Notwithstanding a great deal of recent literature on the
subject, Henry Manne's 1966 book remains the most thorough and widely quoted
11. Maurice Kay, "The Justice Report", (1973) 36 MLR 185 at p.189.
12. The term "deregulators" is used by Stephen Bainbridge, in "The
Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma", (1986) 38 University
of Florida Law Review 35, to categorise those favouring a more liberal
regulatory approach to insider dealing. Conversely, the term "regulators" is
used by way of reference to those in favour of a more strictly regulated
regime.
13. See, Carlton and Fischel, "The Regulation of Insider Trading",
(1985) 35 Stanford Law Review 857 at p.866.
55
statement of the case against prohibiting insider dealing.' 4 His work is
explained, defended, and substantiated in numerous journals and other pub-.
lications dating from 1966 until the present day.' 5 Manne's arguments have
both a legal and an economic basis to them. The emphasis, however, is
overwhelmingly on economic analysis to explain why no regulatory restrictions
should be imposed on the practice. Manne believes that "the debatable aspects
of insider trading are capable of resolution through tools of economic
analysis."' 6 His is a view that discounts the harm and highlights the gain from
what is generally taken to be bad practice. He does not, however, take a
solely economic view, for though he asks questions such as - can insider
dealing be prevented and at what financial and social cost?' 7 - he argues too
that there are also legal reasons for not prohibiting the practice, in that
insider dealing is hard to define and that a law which is not applied and
cannot be enforced might well be considered to be a bad law.
At its simplest level, Manne maintains that insider dealing has many
positive aspects and very few, if any, negative. His arguments are cogent and
forcefully put. Upon tracing the history of insider dealing he notes that the
Pecora hearings in Congress in 1933-34 produced the first real condemnation of
the practice. There the conduct of those who admitted to insider dealing was
14. Manne, Insider Tradin g on the Stock Market, (New York: Free Press
1966), hereinafter "ITSM".
15. , Manne, "In Defence of Insider Trading" (1966b) 44 (6) Harvard
Business Review 113. Manne, "What's so bad about Insider Trading" (Jan-Feb
1967) 15 Challen ge 14. Manne, "Insider Trading and the Law Professors" (1970)
23 Vanderbilt Law Review 547. Manne, "Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure
Under Federal Securities Laws", in Wall Street in Transition: The Emerging
System and its Im pact on the Econom y (New York University Press 1974). Manne,
"Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information" (Winter 1985) 4 Cato
Journal 933.16.S, Manne, Vand. L Rev. su pra., note 15, at p.548.
17. , Harvard Business Review, su prp note 15, at p.113. See also,
Vanderbilt Law Review, su pra note 15, at p.553 et sea. where he discusses the
question of "partial enforcement" in depth.
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described as "immoral", "unscrupulous", "unfair", a "betrayal of fiduciary
duties" etc.' 8 Manne's main grievance is with the fact that "the debate has
remained essentially moralistic" 9 in that "Judges and lawyers have failed to
probe beyond a sense of moral outrage". He suggests that such an analysis is
for the "intelectually bankrupt" 2° - hence his tendency to engage in an
economic analysis of the problem. The conclusion he and others reach is that
insider dealing is socially and economically desirable. This is so for a
number of reasons.
The Positive Effects of Insider Dealing
1. Most A ppropriate Means of Rewarding Entrepreneurs
That insider dealing is the most appropriate means of rewarding entre-
preneurs is one of Manne's main arguments in favour of the unfettered use
of inside information. He rejects the suggestion that salary is a satisfactory
reward to entrepreneurs and argues that the opportunity to trade on the basis
of inside information should be seen as part of a compensation package to
encourage innovation.2 ' Carlton and Fischel also consider the practice from
22	 .this view-point.	 They argue that insider dealing by managers and other
employees in the securities of their own firms based on superior knowledge is
an adequate way of compensating corporate personnel. They suggest that the
allocation of valuable property rights in information would be better left to
18. , Stock Exchan ge Practices. Hearin gs before the Committee on
Banking
 and Currency, U.S. Senate, 73rd Congress, 1st session.
19. , Harvard Business Review, su pra, note 15, at p. 113.
20. Ibid.
21. In ITSM he referred only to entrepreneurs but subsequent articles
have relaxed this condition. Compare, Kirpe, "Manne's Insider Trading Thesis
and Other Failures of Conservative Economics", (Winter 1985) 4 Cato Journal 945
at p.947.
22. Supra, note 13.
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private contractual negotiations rather than formal law.23 Two advantages, in
their view, follow from permitting insider dealing on this basis: (1) it avoids
24the cost of re-negotiating working conditions;	 and (2) it Sorts out superior
managers from inferior ones. Regarding the latter, the argument is as follows:
managers who are permitted to trade on inside information have an incentive to
acquire and develop valuable information. Creating valuable information
involves risk. It is difficult for firms to identify those who are good
managers and those who are not overly risk averse. Basing a manager's compen-
sation package on the use of inside information helps identify the better
25
managers.
Manne too favours private contractual negotiations because the firm is
given a choice of how it will provide compensation for its corporate personnel.
He sees internal policing as the most suitable means of ensuring that insider
dealing only compensates those whom the company wants. 26 Implicit in Manne's
idea of internal policing then must be the use of some sort of isolation
27
technique akin to the Chinese Wall. 	 The Operation and enforcement of this
internal mechanism obviously imposes a cost which must be met.
Manne and his supporters see the use of inside information as a reward to
23. at p.862.
24. at p.870. But is this really a significant cost?
25. jjj, at p.871.
26. But see, Roy Schotland, "Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market", (1967) 53 Vir g inia Law Review 1425 at p.
1456, who argues that insider dealing could get out of control.
27. There is, however, a crucial distinction, in that by virtue of the
thrust of Manne's argument, he is referring to companies allowing their own
personnel to trade on the basis of inside information which the company has
generated about the price of its	 securities. The concept of a Chinese
Wall, by contrast, is where a financial intermediary erects an information
barrier to Stop the flow of inside information which it holds on trust for
clients who have legitimately divulged the information to the conglomerate in
the course of a fiduciary or other relationship.
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entrepreneurs and other corporate employees for their initiative and ingenuity,
a perk, as it were, for the role they fulfil within the economic system. The
argument with regard to the entrepreneur runs thus: entrepreneurs are vital to
a free market economy - they need to be recognised and rewarded as such -
insider trading provides the only effective compensation scheme for
entrepreneurial services in large corporations." 28 In the Vanderbilt Law
Review he writes "if any service presently being purchased by the corporation
is compensated more highly, then more of that service will be offered." 29
 He
finds it hard to understand why it is unfair or unjust or immoral to allow a
voluntary arrangement in which individuals are given additional incentives to
produce more of a valuable commodity by sharing in the new value of the
commodity they produce. His conclusion, therefore is that insider dealing
should be allowed and indeed encouraged.
2. The Efficient Stock Market Argument
Manne, taking a very broad view which is much criticised by his
opponents, sees the stock market largely as "a complex arrangement for the
,,30
marketing of information. 	 Moreover, and somewhat melodramatically, he
suggests that "[p]eople pressing for the rule barring insider trading may
inadvertently be tampering with one of the well-springs of American pros-
31	 .	 .perity.	 Rider and Ffrench outline how this could be so. They write that
capitalism is based on a market hypothesis in which supply and demand curves
are rarely met. Such inequalities are inherent in a free capitalistic society.
One inevitable inequality will therefore be information. This is an aspect of
28. For a detailed analysis of this proposition,
	 , Manne, Harvard
Business Review, su pra note 15, at p.116 et sea.
29. Su pra, note 15.
30. , Manne, ITSM, su pra note 14, at p.47.
31. at p.110.
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the "risk factor". To eliminate insider dealing and equalise the availability
of material information would tend to de-stablise capitalism.32
Manne argues, this time with much agreement among even his critics, that
the more efficient a stock market functions the better off everyone is. The
primary reason offered is because capital is allocated to its highest return
uses, and from this is derived the greatest individual and social utility.
Other reasons are that it has a direct effect on investment decisions, the
market for corporate control and the market for managers. 33 But although it
has been conceded by pro regulators such as Kirpe, that prohibitions on insider
dealing could well decrease market efficiency, he hits back by quoting Dean
Bayliss Manning who argues, "[T]he one thing that is clear about securities
regulation is that, whatever the SEC is all about and whatever regulations are
all about, they are not about efficiency."34
The efficient stock market argument involves:
(a) Market S peed - the speed with which markets integrate new information into
the market price of a security. Manne writes "[I]nsider trading will always
push stock prices in the correct direction. That is, the effect of insider
dealing will always be to move a share's price towards the level correctly
M 5	 .reflecting all the real facts about the company. 	 Thus, if insider
dealing enables "everything known about the company whether public or not to be
32. See, Rider and Ffrench, The Re gulation of Insider Trading , pxii
(Macmillan: 1979).
33. See, Manne, Cato Journal, su pra, note 15, at p.935.
34. Jj, at p. 948. It is interesting to note that Manne thinks that
the stock market in the US is efficient despite anti-insider dealing laws
because so much insider dealing continues to go undetected.
35. at p.935.
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reflected in the price of that company's shares" 36 then investors (outsiders)
are unlikely to undertake investments 'blind-sided' by developments not yet
reflected in the current prices of the shares. Insiders therefore reduce the
luck factor and outsiders as a consequence get a fairer deal. 37 As Moran says,
How rapidly mispricing is corrected when insiders trade depends on
the reaction of the market price to the insider's trades and the
timeliness of disclosure once the insider has traded. Insider
trading on undisclosed information causes a more gradual adjustment
in share prices than if the information is made public (Manne, 1966,
p.87). The timing of the disclosure is often prescribed by
convention, however, and disclosure laws are not fully enforced, so
insiders can usually trade in advance of an announcement (Manne,
1966, pp.103-104). Thus, prices begin adjustin g earlier when insiders
trade on their information. Once their trades are completed.
insiders'incentives are to disclose the information. Therefore the
interval required for stock prices to adjust to new gformation is
reduced when insiders trade (Demsetz, 1969a, p.14) 	 (emphasis added)
(b) Market Accuracy - this relates to issues of (i) disclosure of information
and (ii) smoothness in market operations. With regard to (i) Manne asks
whether full disclosure is in anyway feasible. He concludes, for practical
reasons, that it is not. 39 In relation to (ii) Manne also argues that insider
dealing helps smooth out fluctuations in stock market prices. This idea is
perhaps best explained by Manne in Vanderbilt Law Review 40 where he suggests
that gradual movements in share prices caused by insider trading are preferable
to the eratic jumps in prices brought about by enforced disclosure. The reason
36. , J Cottrell, "Insider Dealing in the United States - III: The De-
regulation Issue" (1986) February 14 NU 150.
37. , D. Seligman, "An Economic Defence of Insider Trading",
(September 1983) 108 Fortune 47 at p.48.
38. Mark J. Moran, (1984) (U.S.) "Insider Trading in the Stock Market:
An Empirical Test of the Damage to Outsiders", Working Paper No. 39, Center for
the Study of American Business, Washington University, Missouri - cited in
Report to the Minister of Justice b y the Securities Commission on Insider
Trading (1987) Volume I (hereinafter the "New Zealand Report").
39. , Manne, Vand. L. Rev,, su pra, note 15, at p.570. This is an
important outcome to arrive at because it forms the basis of a further argument
outlined in more detail later by Carlton and Fischel (, infra note 50 and
accompanying text on: Insider Dealing Benefits The Firm ...).
40. At p.574. See also, Manne, Harvard Business Review, supra, note 15,
at p.115.
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for this is that if there is no insider trading "those who transact only a few
moments apart may get very different prices and will view the market as
performing unfairly". 41 The example that Manne uses is as follows:
Let us assume that a stock is selling at $50, with undisclosed good
news which will ultimatel y cause the stock to sell for $60, and that
no factors other than the good news will affect the price.
Suppose, further, that with insider trading the price of the
shares rises graduall y to $60. The average price at which shares
sell during this period is somewhere in the neighbourhood of $55
(more or less depending on the shape of the time-price curve). At
$60, anyone who has held his shares will have received the full
benefit of the new information whether it is disclosed to him or not.
This advantage to the ultimate holder remains even if we effectively
prevent insider trading.
Without insider trading, however, the position of those who sell
during the time required for the price to rise form $50 to $60 is
radically altered. No longer do they receive an average price of
$55. Assuming that the ultimate disclosure is made at the same time
under either rule, they receive only $50 for their shares without
insider trading. 42 In short, they get less than they would with
insider trading.	 (emphasis in the original).
There is evidence to suggest, however, that even this argument is
incorrect. Manne indeed admits it himself. In his Cato Journal article,43
where he refers to insiders buying shares before important new information
about the company is disclosed publicly, he writes, "[tJhat kind of trading may
have some impact, but we cannot be sure p priori how much impact it will
actually have, if it will have any at all."44 He comes to this conclusion
because of the assumption nowadays that the demand curve for a company's stock
is extremely elastic. He continues "[tjhus even large purchases of stock will
not necessarily have an immediate and noticeable effect on its price since
other stocks are seen as perfect substitutes."45
41. , Cottrell, su pra note 36 at p.1S1. See also, Moran, su pra note
38. The two arguments are inter-connected.
42. Manne, Harvard Business Review, su pra note 15, at p.115.
43. , Manne, Cato Journal, su pra, note 15, at p.938.
44. Ji45. jjL
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Similarly, in a widely recognised study conducted by Professor Wu, the
findings were that a "substantial impact of insider trading on stock prices
,,46
could not be expected.	 Moreover, Schotland attacks Manne s notion that
smooth gradual movements are preferable to sudden jumps. 47 Schotland argues
that "unfettered insider trading is unlikely to make the market "smoother",
[and] that even if it had some tendency to do so, the "smoothness" that might
be gained is not worth its cost". 8 More significantly he notes, "[b]oth
economists and the 'fairness-minded' will prefer ... a market characterised by
informed transactions with sharp price shifts when the information changes,
rather than one characterised by many uninformed transactions".49
3. Benefits the Firm in Whose Shares Insider Dealin g Takes Place
The alternative to unfettered insider dealing, argue Canton and Fischel,
is disclosure. 50 Disclosure has many benefits but "complete disclosure,
however, would not be optimal. [It] is costly and at some point the costs will
outweigh the benefits of increased disclosure." 5 ' There are several reasons why
communicating information through insider dealing may be of benefit to the
firm. Carlton and Fischel's most persuasive argument in this respect is that
through insider dealing a firm could convey information it could not feasibly
announce publicly because an announcement would - (1) destroy the value of the
46. , Wu, "Corporate Insider Trading in the Stock Market 1957-1961"
(1965) 2 Nat'l Bank Rev, 373, at p.385.
47. Schotland, suora note 26, at p.1446.
48. I1
49. LJ
50. , su pra note 13, at p. 867.
51. Ibid.
63
information, 52
 (2) be too expensive, (3) be not believable and (4) or (owing to
uncertainty of informtion) expose the firm to liability because it was found
after the fact to be incorrect. Insider dealing in this respect is controlled
by restricting the number of traders who have access to information, a
technique which they believe is easier than trying to control how much
information is announced over a given period of time.53
Enforcement: The SEC and Other Critics Are Misguided
4. Enforcement Problems
Manne attacks the whole philosophy that underlies any attempt to enforce
rules prohibiting insider dealing. 54 His main argument here is that enforcement
agencies (and here he is referring in this respect to the SEC, though how
applicable it is to the SIB is uncertain - see below footnote 9) assume perfect
enforcement - that full and timely disclosure rules will be perfectly enforced.
"Enforcement" he says "will be imperfect at best". 55 He argues that the insider
dealing debate turns on "the efficiency with which a rule against such trading
can be enforced." He maintains that effective enforcement requires unacceptable
policing measures and therefore only partial enforcement is feasible. This
fact, he maintains, has important political and economic effects. When
resources are limited they will inevitably be focused on those least in favour
52. The example given here is: "It would not be in the investors'
interests to disclose, for example, that a confidential study revealed the
presence of valuable mineral ore deposits on land the firm intends to
purchase." at p. 867-868.
53. Again this implies the use of some sort of internal screening
procedure to ensure that the information is acquired by only those elligible to
receive it and use it. Such procedures would not amount to a Chinese Wall in
the sense referred to throughtout this thesis.
54. , Manne, Vanderbilt Law Review, suora, note 15, at p.552 et seq.
See also, Manne, Cato Journal, supra, note 15, at p. 936 et seq.
55. , Manne, Vanderbilt Law Review, su pra, note 15, at p.552.
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with the enforcement agency.56
Manne writes, "some potential violators are more risk averse than others.
People who value their reputations highly will not take the risk of being
charged by the SEC, and they will pull out of the competition for "illegal"
information. 57 Therefore those who are "sharp operators" will move in. "[TJhe
absence of the more high-minded participants from the segment of the [market]
makes it ... much more lucrative and attractive for those we want least to
encourage." He concludes, "Partial enforcement ... gives a completely
,,58
unwarranted advantage to those against whom the law is not enforced.
Another one of Manne's arguments concerns the cost of enforcement.
Manne maintains that "we [cannot] ... talk intelligibly about the costs and
benefits of the SEC's rule [lOb-5] without at least noting the high compliance
and escape costs from rules against insider trading. The lawyers advising
corporations, shareholders and others today on how to avoid the risks of an SEC
complaint do not come cheaply. Furthermore, the fact that there is so much
money potentially [to be had] means that people will use inefficient devices to
exploit the information if straight-forward methods are [easily detectedl."59
A further proposition that Manne advances is that the SEC's attempt to
56. The SIB favours the idea that in the U.K. there will be a high level
of self-policing and self-enforcement because of the increased market
competition. This, it believes, will give competitors the incentive
(especially market-makers) to "inform" the regulatory authorities about
suspected market abuse.
57. See, Manne Cato Journal, su pra, note 15 at p. 942.
58. However, if an activity is deemed unacceptable, it would seem that
even partial enforcement would be preferable to no enforcement at all. It is
important therefore to build into the legal disincentives that exist a heavy
penalty to compensate for the difficulty of detection. 	 , Becker, infra
Chapter Two at note 52 and accompanying text.
59. , Manne, Cato Journal, su pra, note 15, at p. 936.
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regulate insider dealing is misconceived. First he notes that the SEC has given
convincing evidence of its own inability to police its rules against insider
trading especially where foreign funding of such trades is involved.60
"The ability to detect the practice will always be difficult, and when the
gains that can be realized from the practice, discounted by the risk of being
apprehended, are compared to the potential costs, many people will have the
incentive to trade on inside information."61
Secondly, there is a more fundamental reason why there can never be a
rule against the profitable use of inside information in the stock market. It
is Manne's opinion that "many people who exploit new information do not buy
additional stock: rather, they simply do not sell"62 He points out that a
failure to sell is flQi a violation of the SEC's Rule lOb-. 5 purely because there
has been no securities transaction. Somewhat extravagant is Manne's claim that
,,63
not selling [may] ... be the dominant method of using inside information.
It is very questionable whether Manne's "negative" insider dealing
conception (that is, not selling because of access to inside information) is a
dominant or even significant means of insider dealing. People and corporate
entities who use inside information do so to make money. The best means of
doing this is to actively trade on the information acquired even though it
means running the risk of being prosecuted. It is accepted, however, that as
the risks of insider dealing gradually increase, this form of "trading" may
become more popular.
60. at p.937.
61. Again this will depend not merely on the risk of detection but
also on the penalty when detected.
62. Ibid.
63.
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Manne launches one more attack on the SEC which, he says, is politically
grounded. He uses George Stigler's "interest theory" of regulation and asks
the crucial question - "who is benefited most by an anti-insider trading rule?"
Manne writes, "Look for the supporters of the rule and you will have a good
idea of who benefits from it."64 The suggestion here is that the SEC itself is
the beneficiary of the prohibition on insider dealing and not society.
Insider Dealin g Does Not Cause Harm
5. Victimless Crime
According to Manne "[t]he most fundamental economic proposition in the
whole topic of insider trading is that no shareholder is harmed by a rule of
law that allows the exploitation of nonpublicized information about shares of
publicly traded corporations." 65 Put simply what Manne is getting at here is
that insider dealing is a "victimless crime". Supporting Manne's argument,
Moran writes, "... insiders' profits are not outsiders' losses but evidence of
more efficient resource allocation."66 As Manne says, "no one with an important
interest is being deprived of his interest when insiders are allowed to
trade".67 In his view just because someone does not make as much money on the
sale of a share as they would otherwise have done does not make them victims in
the true sense simply because nothing has been stolen from them. He writes,
"[t]he modern academic literature now recognizes that there is no significant
economic harm to any identifiable group of investors from insider trading".68
64. J..ki., at p.943.
65. at p.933.
66. Moran, suora note 38.
67. See, Manne, Harvard Business Review, suora note 14, at p.110.
68. See, Manne, Cato Journal, su pra note 15, at p.934.
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Daniel Seligman, 69who takes a pragmatic view supporting Manne, points out that
no one knows whether those hurt by insider trading are more numerous than those
hurt by trading before inside facts have impacted the market, so that they are
price-takers taking a faulty price. Meanwhile, Prentice notes that "[w]hile a
shareholder who deals with an insider may have a justifiable sense of grievance
if at the time the insider is in possession of confidential information there
is no way in which this sense of grievance can be translated into a causal
,,70
connection showing loss attributable to the insider s trading.
Similarly even if some identifiable group could be seen to be "victims"
70
would it not be necessary, asks Manne,	 to consider whether the economy would
be hurt more by prohibiting the conduct? This is a classic example of the
difference in approach between the economist and the lawyer.
6. The Victim Receives Better Price Because the Insider is in the Market
On page 114 of ITSM Manne takes as an example the case were the long term
investor (the one, he says, we should be most keen to protect) is the person
who actually sells to the insider. He argues that prohibitions on insider
dealing prevent investors from profiting as much as they would if the practice
were allowed. First of all Manne assumes that the investor is actually
selling for reasons other than to make a quick profit, ie. he trades on a time
basis and would be selling in any event irrespective of the insider trader and
69.S, SuDra note 37.
70. , Prentice, supra note 6, at p.91.
70.	 Manne, Harvard Business Review, suora note 15, at p.113.
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without being influenced by the price of the security in question. 71
 Manne
suggests that the outsider may actually benefit from the insider's trades
because if the insider is buying on the basis of as yet undisclosed good news
the outsider may get a higher price than he might otherwise simply due to the
fact that the insider has entered the market.72
Manne and his supporters have been enterprising in their attempts to
present the case in favour of the deregulation of insider dealing. However,
some of the arguments outlined by the deregulators may be said to be flawed or
weak in a number of respects. In putting forward the counter-arguments, the
rebutal has been split into five main headings. First, there is the issue of
fairness. Linked to this is the important public perception of the integrity
of the market place if insider dealing is left unchecked. Secondly, there is
the moral and ethical side of the practice to be considered. Thirdly, the idea
that insider dealing is a victimless crime is challenged. Fourthly, it is
suggested, by using a number of arguments, that insider dealing is actually an
inefficient distributor of scarce resources. Then finally, some miscellanoeus
arguments are outlined.
71. , J Cottrell, supra, note 36, at p.152 who rejects this
assumption.
72. "Justice" quote a similar example: "when a director buys on the
market in the knowledge of a forthcoming bid for the company, the seller of the
shares would probably have put up his shares for sale anyway and the price he
gets may infact have been slightly raised by the fact that the director is in
the market as a buyer." Justice, Report on Insider Trading (1972) para.2.
However, it could be argued that this analysis misses the point. After all it
is easy to give examples where individual outsiders benefit form the activity
of insiders; the fact remains, however, that the expected rate of return to
outsiders on stock market investments (even to the large institutional
investors such as pensions funds and mutual funds etc.,) is lowered. In other
words the profits are "creamed off" by Insiders. If this view is correct then
the victims are all those constituting the market other than insiders'.
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Those Who Favour Prohibition: The Regulators
There are a number of policy issues underlying the proscription of
insider dealing:
Insider Dealin g is Unfair and Damages the Integrity of the Market
The idea that insider dealing is unfair commands broad support because it
is widely believed that insiders take advantage of outsiders. There are a
number of related arguments here.
I. A False Economic Logic
First of all, there is the argument advanced by Kirpe and supported by
others, such as Schotland and Cottrell, that Manne's economic analysis excludes
issues of fairness and integrity. 73 Kirpe attacks the underlying philosophy of
Manne's essentially economic approach. He writes, "Manne and his supporters
are guilty of a fault ... [in that] they assume that man is a single-faceted
individual, engaged solely in maximising personal financial gain [with no
thought for] fairness, honesty, respect for law, self-respect, consideration
for others and so on.74
Schotland makes the point that even given Manne's premise "[wjhen we
engage in economic analysis we do not banish permanently the legal and moral
aspects of the problem analysed. It is precisely in order to make sounder
legal judgements and to evaluate their cost that we bring economic analysis to
73. Kirpe, supra note 21, at 948; Schotland su pra note 26, at p.1438;
and Cottrell, supra note 36, at p.151.
74. Ibid.
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a problem like insider trading." 75
 Manne fails to note argues Schotland,
"what our constraints on insider trading actually gain us, both economically
and in terms of the quality of our society and our human relationships."76
2. Fairness and Ineq uality of Bargainin g Power
What Hannigan describes as the "equity" argument also fits under this
77general heading of unfairness. 	 She relates the argument to what American
commentators have come to call "market egalitarianism". This is simply the
idea that the law should try to ensure that all individuals in the market are
placed on an equal footing, in so far as that is possible. The belief here is
that anyone making a trade based on superior information is in effect "stealing"
from other market participants by acting before all other investors. The same
argument was offered as the underlying policy rational by the Second Circuit in
the celebrated case of of the S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sul phur Co.78 There it
was said:
All investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation
in the securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that
all members of the investing public should be subject to identical
risks ... [I]niquities based upon unequal access to knowledge should
not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of
the Congressional concern in the area, remain in force. (at p.848)
Carried to its logical extreme, this doctrine would eliminate the use of all
"informational advantages". Canton and Fischel draw a distinction between the
legal and economic definitions of insider dealing: insider dealing from an
economic point of view is trading by parties who are better informed than
their trading partners. Thus, insider dealing defined in this way includes
75. See, Schotland supra note 26, at p.1438.
76. at p.1439. Likewise Cottrell, suora note 36 at p. 151 writes
that "Manne fails to balance the possible economic gains of totally unregulated
insider trading against [important issues like] fairness and integrity."
77. Farrar, supra note 5, at p.354.
78. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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all trades where information is asymmetric (ie where one party has more
information than the other). Insider dealing in this sense need not be illegal
- the law has never attempted to prohibit all trading by knowledgeable
•	 .	 79insiders.
Economists, meanwhile, have argued that superior information legally
obtained is fundamental to trading activity and efficiency in the stock market.
Consequently, they argue that trying to ensure complete equality of information
is dangerous because most trading involves some degree of assymetry of
information. In fact, "Legitimate research gives some traders informational
advantages and their earnings serve as compensation for their efforts." The
problem with the "market egalitarian" argument, writes Prentice, is that "It
fails to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate exploitation of non-
public infromation." 8° What is more, says Kirpe, "[i]t is impractical in
a profit-making society to require everyone to give up his informational
advantage against his counterpart in bargaining"81
Furthermore, as the SEC has recently stated: "[i]nsider trading in
publicly traded securities undermines the expectations of fairness and honesty
that underlie public confidence in [the] nation's securities markets". 82 In the
document the Commission then goes on to argue for the need to encourage
79. , sutra note 13 at p.860. The widely held view is that traders
should not deal on the basis of an information advantage which is largely
unerodable.	 , Brudney, "Insiders Outsiders and Informational Advantages"
(1979) 93 Harv L Rev 332 at p.353-368 where he advocates the view that the
trading prohibition should only operate where the insider possesses an
"unerodable information advantage", ie. a position of access which others are
unable lawfully to obtain.
80. Prentice, sura note 6, at p.92.
81. , Kirpe, supra note 21, at p.951.
82. , Memorandum of the securities and Exchan ge Commission in support
of the Insider Tradin g Sanctions Act of 1984. H.R. Rep. No. 355. 99th Con g.. 2d
Sess. 21 (1984).
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legitimate information gathering and dissemination so as to promote the
efficient operation of the nation's securities markets. Throughout it was
eager to reject a "parity of information theory". The aim instead was to
foster the gaining of information advantages through conduct amounting to
"skill", "foresight" and "industry" rather than by conduct constituting
"secreting", "stealing" and "purloining".83
3. Fp irness;on g ressiona1 Concern about the Inte grity of the Market and
Confidence in the Mark
Schotland makes the point that Congress has expressed an overriding
concern for fairness in that the Securities Exchange Act 1934 calls for "fair
dealing" in no less than six sections, twice calls for "fair and orderly
markets" and cites the protection of investors as one of its dominant goals.84
Kirpe writes:85
Protection of the markets against unfairness is ultimately the
justification for the regulation of insider trading and this concern
outweighs the slight adverse effect it may have on the efficiency of
the securities markets.
Similarly, that fairness is the overriding concern in the financial markets is
confirmed by Bomberg who argues that "the loss of efficiency that comes from
insider trading laws is a price worth paying in order to have a fairer market."86
Kirpe suggests the real victim of insider dealing is society. He writes:
[Insider] trading runs the risk of destroying an important public
interest, namely, confidence in the nations securities markets. Our
strong ... markets ... is one of the strongest supports of ... [the]
economy. A true reading of the early history of the federal
securities legislation is that it was intended to restore public87
confidence in the securities markets after the 1929 debacle."
83. , United States v. CarDenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. , sunra note 26, at p.1438.
85. , Kirpe, surp note 21.
86. Wall Street Journal 18 November 1986 p.15.
87. , Kirpe, suprp note 21, at p.954.
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The fact is that the perception, whether correct or not, that unfairness
exists, undermines public confidence in the capital markets. A "fair" market is
crucial otherwise the public will not invest in it. Former SEC Commissioner
Barbara Thomas has said that insider trading "destroys the belief that they
[the investing public] have an equal chance to the profit." This, she says,
"makes investors relucant to invest in the stock market." 88	Kirpe provides an
analogy:
Informed persons may be willing to gamble in professional casinos
even if they know that the odds are rigged to provide a percentage
for the house, but they will act differently if they know or suspect
that the house is marking the carcor controlling the roulette
wheel by means of a secret pedal.
In the U.K. and elsewhere the same view is very much prevalent. Insider dealing,
says R. Alexander, (Chairman of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers):9°
gravely weakens the integrity of the financial markets. That feeling
has been increasingly emphasised by the wider diffusion of share
ownership which has been the consequence of the privatisation of some
of our formerly nationalised industries. To the small investor the
idea that someone working in the City is using inside information to
deal in what ought to be a uniformly informed market is quite
repugnant. The integrity of the City of London as a financial centre
is a crucial element to its success and reputation.
Manne is criticised for assuming that people sell their shares for exogenous
reasons irrespective of whether or not they perceive insiders to be operating
in the market. His opponents argue that people will be unwilling to buy and
sell so freely if they think that they may soon become the "victims" of insider
dealing. Consequently, if the public refrain from investing the result is
"that the market becomes less liquid, and thus less able to fuel the expanding
88. Sup ra, note 37, at p.47.
89. , Kirpe, su pra note 21, at p.954. This analogy assumes investment
to be a game of chance. The reluctance to participate will apply 	 fortoria
if, as many think, it is a game of skill.
90. Paper delivered to the New Zealand Law Conference, Christchurch,
October 1987.
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demands of free enterprise."91 Indeed as the recent New Zealand Report on
Insider Trading states:92
A market in which abnormal profits accrue to insiders on a perceptible
scale is unattractive to outsiders ... It seems to us that a market
economy depends upon the confidence investors have in the perceived
fairness of the market process. Policies directed to widespread
public shareholding in companies are therefore likely to be subverted
by condoning insider trading.
There is, however, no evidence to show that investors are fleeing the
market, at least in the U.S. As Prentice points out, "public confidence in
the market is a product of complex psychological and economic factors and the
fact that insider trading is taking place will only have a tangential, if any,
bearing on it."93 In any case, the argument that investors will refrain from
investing because of insider dealing has greater application to American
conditions than to those in the U.K. because in the latter the bulk of
investment in the market is institutional. However even here, it could be
suggested, that this is so because U.K investors are more troubled by the fact
that some investors operate with superior knowledge and rather than be forced
out of the market altogether they tend to use institutional intermediaries such
as Pensions Funds.94
4. Fairness and Cost
As the report by the New Zealand Securities Commission on Insider
Trading states, "[nb-one attempts to describe insider trading as fair. When
91. , supra note 37, at p.47.
92. See, New Zealand Report, su pra note 38, at p. 27
93. See, Prentice, su pra note 6, at p.91.
94. jj1. But notwithstanding even this: "where insider trading has been
proscribed there is no evidence that it had any impact on stock market trading
patterns by enticing into the market those who previously been reluctant to
invest." (Ibid. at p.89). Yet this still leaves the question of how such
evidence could actually be obtained.
75
fairness is raised, the argument moves to some countervailing considerations,
usually costs, or alternative solutions." 95
 This is illustrated by a quotation
96from the "deregulators', Carlton and Fischel, who comment:
if it is known that insiders cannot trade, the gains from discovering
non-public information would be high and brokers would have an
incentive to expend resources to uncover it. In fact the only effect
a ban on insider trading might have is that brokers rather than
insiders reap the gains from inside information. While this may be
inefficient because brokers can only become informed at a high cost,
the informed/uninformed trader problem remains. Smart brokers pose
the same problem as smart insiders.
However as the New Zealand Commission Report concludes, "[olur view is that
considerations of fairness are not always subordinate to considerations of cost
especially where the totality of costs is not brought into account. The costs
of discovering "non-public information" are not the only costs at stake in the
argument. To assess the total costs, one would need to consider the costs of
equity capital at large, including an element for the risk of loss in a market
seen as unfair ... In pursuing a systematic analysis of the practice, we
record that we have seen no dissent from the view that insider trading is
"97
unfair.
Insider Dealin g is Morall y and Ethicall y Wrong
Again the New Zealand Report observes, "[m]oralist theories express
judgements upon the behaviour of the insider through a range of condemnations
from disloyalty, dishonesty to fraud and theft." 98 Insider dealing is "an area
of law", says Woodhouse J (as he was then), "where the courts can and should
95. Report to the Minister of Justice b y the (New Zealand) Securities
Commission pn Insider Tradin g , (1987) Vol. 1 at p.16 (hereinafter the "New
Zealand Report").
96. Carlton, D.W. and D.R. Fischel, "The Regulation of Insider Trading",
(April 1983) Universit y
 of Chicago Law School Workin g Paper as cited in New
Zealand Report, su pra note 95 Vol. I, at para. 4.4.2.
97. Suprp note 95 at para. 4.4.3
98. at p.12
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find some practical means of giving effect to commercial morality in the cases
that come before them	 Others have been more forthright, saying,
"[m]orality is indivisible, though culpability may have degrees. Insider
dealing, which in its nature is theft from the innocent and unsuspecting, is
immoral" 0° Counter-arguments can, of course, be put,'° 2 but:
these and other responses ... do not answer the moral question. The
shift to different questions - proof, enforceability and economic
efficiency. In our opinion the moralist coiyijnnation of insider
trading is, on moral grounds, unanswerable.
"Probably the primary justification for proscribing insider trading is
that it is unethical", writes Prentice, and though this may be an "inadequate
and emotive basis on which to regulate the practice ... [it still remains the
,,104	 .	 .	 .
most widely] accepted . 	 That insider dealing is unethical was a conclusion
which Justice also came to. In their Report they claimed that insider dealing
was contrary to "good business ethics" and that anyone holding a position of
trust in a company should not use confidential information. In their opinion
good business ethics needed to be backed up by legal sanctions.'°5
This approach is very much like the "fidelity" argument outlined by
106Hannigan as applied to the traditional way of looking at insider dealing.
The fidelity argument, says Hannigan, looks at the problem from the point of
view of where the information has come from and the position of the person who
is using it. Adopting a very strict traditional approach to the problem, she
99. Coleman v. Myers [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225 at p.324.
100. The Times, 18 November 1986. Similarly, the Chairman of the Panel
on Takeovers and Mergers, Mr. Robert Alexander Q.C. has stated that insider
dealing is "wholly offensive to public morality, and gravely weakens the
integrity of the fi,ncial markets", suora note 90.
102. Suora, note 95, at para 4.3.2 where these are outlined.
103. Thjd, at para. 4.3.3.
104. Su pra, note 6, at p.92.
105. Suora, note 72, at para.3.
106. Su pra, note 5, at p.345.
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writes:
The insider has acquired [the informationi from the privileged
position in which the shareholders have placed him. Loyalty to the
company should preclude that insider from taking that information
which belongs to the company (she acknowledges that some dispute
still exists as to whether information can belong to a company) and
using it to his own advantage. Where the insider is a director,
there is the additional factor that he is in a fiduciary relationship
vis-a-vis the company and his appropriation of the information and
his profiting therefrom is incompatible with that relationship.
In other words the fidelity, or fiduciary, theory maintains that a person in a
position of trust cannot benefit form a personal interest which derives from
that position unless he first receives the informed consent of his
108beneficiaries.
Insider Dealin g is Not Victimless
Where insider dealing is involved all net benefits must equal net losses.
As Roell and King point out, "Any profit accruing to an insider must, of
necessity, be offset by a loss to all other market participants taken
together." Wang writes, "[d]espite the suggestions of some commentators that
market participants are generally not harmed by inside trading, each act of
inside trading does in fact harm other individuals. With a purchase of an
existing issue of securities, someone has less of that issue; with a sale of an
existing issue someone ultimately acquires more of that issue."°9
He continues, "Although the average American may not think in terms of
the cost of capital ... he probably has a visceral reaction that inside trading
107. , footnotes omitted.
108. For a fuller discussion on this, see generally, Chapter Six at note
56 and accompanying text.
109. , Wang, "Trading on Material Non-Public Information on Impersonal
Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who can Sue Whom Under S.E.C. Rule lOb-5?", (1981)
54 Southern California Law Review 1217 at p.1234.
78
definitely harms someone else in the market and may harm the issuer. This
reaction is absolutely correct. In short, any public antipathy toward inside
trading has a valid foundation." 10 "For this reason alone", Wang maintains,
"an inside trader should be forced to disgorge his gains, and this type of
misconduct should be deterred."
But who exactly is hurt? Herzel and Katz point out that "insider trading
lacks credible plaintiffs, not victims. The two are not the same."' 12 This
theme is extended by Roell and King who remark:''3
[f]or legal purposes it is hard to identify the victim. Is it the
person who sold shares to the insider? Surely not: he would in all
likelihood have sold them anyway. Indeed, he benefits from any
upward pressure exerted by insider dealing. Is the loser, then, the
person who would have bought if the insider had not? And who might
this be?
In practice the direct victim of insider trading is most likely
to be the market maker with whom he trades.
Likewise Goodhart observes:' 14
Sometimes [insider dealingj ... is even referred to as a "victimless
crime". That is actually incorrect. The operations of insider
traders effectively cause losses to market-makers with whom they
deal. In order to recoup such losses, market makers have to widen
their spreads that they charge all other investors, including those
wishing to speculate but not privy to inside information. The
ultimate victims, therefore, are the ordinary investors who have to
pay indirectly higher transactions charges for the gains of the
insiders. So there are real benefits to be obtained in preventing
it,
Wang outlines how this damage/harm to the market-maker, if it does occur, may
be calculated. It is necessary to compare the market-makers actual portfolio
of investments at the time of the disclosure of the inside information with the
110. at p.1248.111.1j
112. Herzel and Kratz, "Insider Trading: Who Losses?", (1987) 165 Lloyds
Bank Review 15.
113. King and Roell, "Insider Trading" (April 1988), Economic Policy
163, at p.168 et seci.
114. Goodhart, "The Economics of 'Big Bang'", (1987) Summer Midland Bank
Review 6, at p. 10.
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portfolio he could have had in the absence of the inside trade. Unfortunately,
says Wang, this is impossible to determine, because a market-maker does not
have complete control over his portfolio in that he is always required to make
a market. Therefore the market-maker may well be harmed but he cannot prove
that it was the inside trade that caused him to be so.1 .15	 Nonetheless the
question remains as to whether an insider should "be allowed to pass on a loss
to another, or take a profit by taking advantage of privileged information, in
•	 .	 .	 .	 .116the absence of any compelling reason of public policy justifying it .
	 If the
answer is no, then it is not necessary to establish loss or injury to an
individual or group. It would seem then that the market maker is most at risk
from the inside trade. Thus the market maker in the short term and society in
the long term are the losers, It is the market maker who is induced to make a
market when insiders are purchasing shares and they are nudging upwards. Even
if it is accepted that the market maker is able to diversify his portfolio and
thus spread the risk and the loss, the resultant loss in efficiency throughout
the market is a loss which is passed on to the investor and society as a whole.
115. Suor, note 109 at p.1233-1234. But 	 , King and Roell supra, note
12 (at p.169) who show how market-makers need not necessarily lose out whenever
they deal with an insider. "Such market-makers may benefit second hand, Like
the bookie quoted in Anthony Harris in the Financial Times (December 6, 1986),
who welcomes losing money to one particularly successful punter. 'He's my most
valuable client. I always shorten the odds when he bets, it saves me a
fortune.' In a case like this, the market maker who executes deals for an
informed trader is able to re-arrange his price quotes accordingly so that for
a time he trades only on the more profitable side of the market. Thus, the
losses resulting from the presence of the informed traders are effectively
transferred for the initial victim to other market makers ... In theory, any
information that is shared, and known to be shared, by two or more risk neutral
market makers engaged in price competition will be more fully incorporated in
their price quotes, and command no bid-ask premium. Thus provided market
making is competitive, ordinary investors are protected by the quick
dissemination of information among market makers. Regulations are designed to
take this into account. For example the Insider Dealing Act specifically
exempts Stock Exchange jobbers (that is, market makers) from prohibitions on
the use of inside information."
116. Rider & Ffrench, su pra note 32, at p.3.
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Insider Dealing is an Inefficient use of Resources
Again a number of arguments fall under the general heading of efficiency,
but before looking at them it might be helpful to precede the discussion with a
comment from the New Zealand Report where it was said:7
We have examined the question whether it is feasible to test the
efficiency arguments by econometric means. Cost/benefit analysis
requires data about both. The requisite data is not available, and
it is never likely to become available ... Overall, do the economic
benefits of insider trading exceed the costs? ... There is no
empirical research that we can accept as reliable. Our opinion,
therefore, reflects our judgement of an untested, and we believe,
untestable, problem. Our own view is that the costs to the economy
of insider trading exceed the benefits, but it seems to be impossible
to quantify either costs or benefits over any period of time
[Alternatively] do the economic benefits of attempting to prevent
insider trading exceed the costs? In our view, yes, but we cannot
quantify them and we believe that no-one can. Our conclusion is that
economic efficiency theories, carefully examined, support the
prohibition of insider trading. (footnote omitted)
1. Incentive to Delay the Disclosure of Valuable Information
Some authorities believe that insider dealing tempts managers to delay
the public disclosure of valuable information) 18 The efficiency argument
looks at the effect on the market of non-disclosure and self-dealing by the
insider.U9 As already noted the aim of any stock market is to rapidly
assimilate all available information about a company and almost immediately
reflect that in the shares of the company. Investors should be able to
identify those companies where their capital is most needed and will be most
profitably used. This enables resources to be efficiently allocated and not
"wasted" in companies which are going into decline. An efficient stock market
117. SuDra, note 95, at p.28.
118. , for example, Mendelson, "The Economics of Insider Trading
Reconsidered" (1969) 117 U Pa L Rev 470, PP.473-476; and Farrar, suora note 5
at p. 345.
119. Supra, note 5, at p.345.
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therefore is necessary to ensure an efficient use of capital. If, however,
there is information of a price-sensitive nature available which is not
disclosed, and on the basis of which only some people are trading, then they
are distorting the market. In other words the price at which those shares are
being traded is an artifical one. When this fact becomes apparent public
confidence in the stock market is also reduced.
The argument is essentially that insiders have, absent tough laws, a
strong incentive to keep information from the public so that they can first
build up a position. Indeed it is the opinion of Jim Olsen that insiders can
"accumulate quite a substantial position in stock without running up the price
or otherwise attracting notice." 12° Only when a system operates whereby no
one can benefit personally from keeping information from the market-place is
there a strong incentive to announce it as soon as it makes business sense to
do so.
2. The Cost of Collecting Inside Information
The very collection of inside information involves a social cost in that
the resources used to "capture" inside infromation could have been used for the
benefit of society as a whole. 121 But more importantly insider dealing may
well increase the cost for a firm needing to raise capital.' 22
 Wang attributes
this argument to Mendelson.' 23
 Simply stated the argument is that the cost of
capital of a corporation with management that trades on inside infromation will
120. , Wall Street Journal 18 Nov 1986.
121. See, Harold Demantz "Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock
Market", in Economic Policy and the Regulation of CorDorate Securities, ed.
Henry Manne (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969).
122. Su pra note 109, at p.1229. 	 also Carlton and Fischel su pra note
13 at p.857-858. They outline, though do not advocate, this argument.
123. , Mendelson, su pra note 118, at p. 477-78.
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be higher than a corporation with management that does not engage in such
trading. Canton and Fischel give an example of how and why this could happen.
They take two firms, A and B, which are identical in all respects except that A
prohibits the trading of its shares based on inside information. Firm B, on
the otherhand, does not prohibit insider dealing. Insiders are open to trade
freely on its shares.' 24 The writers then ask the all important question "which
firm will survive?" They observe, "despite the deceptive simplicity of this
question, it has no obvious answer. The consensus ... appears to be that
[firm A] will survive because it eliminates various perceived harmful effects
of insider trading. Thus, investors would pay less for shares in B. The
managers of B, in order to maximise the value of B shares, would have to adopt
[a no insider dealing policy]". The difficulty with this hypothesis, say
Canton and Fischel is "that it appears to be contradicted by the actions of
125firms.
Similarly, Prentice is critical of the view that insider dealing will
impair the marketability of a company's shares. He finds it "not particularly
convincing ... [because the] acceptability of a company's securities will be
primarily a function of a company's profitability and not whether management
was indulging in insider trading".' 26
 Indeed, although no one has conducted
rigorous empirical research in this area, "it is generally believed that firms
have made little, if any, attempt to prohibit insider trading, at least up
until very recently ... numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that
insider trading is widespread and very profitable".'27
124. Sura, note 13, at p. 856-858.
125. ibiL
126. Prentice, supra, note 6, at p.90-91.
127. Ibid.
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Professor Brudney, however, argues that if outside investors do not know
which corporations have managers who trade on inside information, some members
of the public will refrain from investment altogether, while others will incurr
costs to avoid dealing with executives with nonpublic information. This, then,
would raise the cost of capital for public corporations generally.'28
3. Not a Good Com pensatory Device
Manne, himself, admits to the fact that there are practical limits on the
"extent to which market exploitation is feasible 29
	First, it is unpredict-
able. Infact Manne believes that the opportunity to exploit inside information
comes only "once every 10 years for each listed company".' 3° Then secondly,
it is dangerous in so far as there are other factors that the insider might not
know. An information leak, for example, would have a bearing on the extent to
which others who possess the information have already been buying - or
selling. Thirdly, the time period to capture the information may be too small
to make it worthwhile. Similarly, the entrepreneur may lack the credit and
capital facilities to capitalise on the opportunity.131
Alternatively it could be argued that insider dealing over-compensates
entrepreneurs. Given that it is very difficult to determine what constitutes
the entrepreneurial act 132 the insider has complete freedom over the amount of
128. See, Brudney, su pra note 79, at p.355-356. Wang argues that though
both viewpoints seem plausible.
	
, Wang, su pra note 109, at p.1229. However
he goes on to point Out that another commentator has argued that ethical
managers do not publicize their abstention from insider dealing.	 , Dooley,
"Enforcement of Insider trading Restrictions" (1980) 66 Va L Rev 1, at p.48.
129. $, Manne, ITSM, suprp note 14, at p.78.
130. thicL,, at p.110.
131. , Manne, Harvard Business Review, su pra note 15, at p.115.
132. , Hetherington, "Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, (1967)
Wis L Rev 720, at pp. 727-730.
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his compensation. 133 He is not required to account to anyone. A similar
argument could be advanced that insider dealing also over-compensates managers.
4. Creates Perverse Incentives b y Allowin g Mana gers to Profit on Bad News
as Well as Good.
A manager who generates "bad" news may make profits by trading on the
basis of that bad news. This creates a problem in that there is no
justification why a manager's compensation package should be supplemented to
the detriment of the corporation as a whole or its shareholders. Indeed an
incentive should ideally operate to deter a manager from creating any form of
shock news.' 34 Instead legitimising insider dealing would encourage managers to
invest in risky projects	 This would inturn impede correct decision-making.135
Other Arguments
1. Discharg in g the Burden of Proof
Schotland argues that the burden of proof lies with those who seek to
alter the status quo: "The securities laws have been with us for more than a
generation and are so deeply woven into the fabric of our securities markets
change is not to be undertaken simply because the defence of the status
quo is inarticulate.' 36 Indeed he believes that it is "paradoxical that we
should be urged to reverse the views and law with which we have moved into to-
133. , Schotland, suora note 26, at p. 1454.
134. , Schotland, suora note 26, at p. 1453; Easterbrook, "Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information"
(1981) Sii Ct Rev 309, at p.332.
135. Supra, note 36, at p.152.
136. , Schotland, supra note 26, at p.1439-1440.
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137day's prosperity."
2. International Comity
With the advent of international securities trading there is a growing
momentum towards the harmonisation of securities laws worldwide.' 38 As the New
Zealand Report states: [the laws of various countries] ... indicate the
standards of behaviour expected in other markets. They show, we believe, a
consensus of international opinion, notwithstanding that there are significant
,,l39differences.
Summary
By way of summary then, Chapter Three, as its title suggests, discusses
the nature of insider dealing by way of a law/ economics assessment. This
assessment was at best speculative. While a number of the deregulatory
arguments were outlined, the conclusion derived was that insider dealing should
be regulated. No outright basis could be provided for this conclusion, owing
not only to the speculative nature of the inquiry but also because conclusive
data does not exist and indeed is not likely ever to exist. As a result, the
analysis followed closely that of the leading authorities, whereupon it was
ultimately argued that the long term interests of society were best served by a
set of regulatory arrangements designed to deter at all levels the misuse of
137. Ibid.
138. See, supra note 38, at para. 4.9 et sea.
139. Ibid.
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inside information.' 40
 As we shall see, not only does this involve detailed
statutory initiatives (as outlined in the following chapter) prohibiting
insider dealing, but also the effective implementation of other institutional
arrangements such as Chinese Walls (discussed in Chapter Five and thereafter).
140. The feeling that insider dealing is wrong because it impairs
investor confidence in the capital markets is perhaps the most plausible
explanation for outlawing the practice, even if the argument is based on
suggestive evidence. Indeed for Rider & Ffrench, su pra note 32, at p.xiii, "it
matters very little whether the reaction of the investing public is logical or
illogical if investor confidence is lost."
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CHAPTER FOLJR DETAILED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF
INSIDER DEALING IN BOTh THE U.K. AND THE U.S.
Introduction
As shown in Chapter Three, assessing the costs and benefits of insider
dealing is by no means a straightforward task. The conclusion arrived at was
that the practice should be regulated. This chapter reviews the legislative
approach adopted here in the U.K. and the U.S. to prohibit such conduct.'
Regulation in this area involves a complex assessment of the various
merits and demerits of the range of regulatory instruments that are potentially
available. For example, the regulation of insider dealing might include: (i)
formal regulation by law or alternatively (ii) self-regulation by the relevant
professional bodies. The current fashion, however, is (iii) an amalgam of
both, otherwise known as self-regulation within a statutory framework. These
possible routes are considered below
(i) Formal Regulation at Law
The traditional "public interest" justification for the use of formal
statutory measures in the regulation of financial markets arises from the need
to protect the public from what are perceived to be inefficiencies or unfair
1. The analysis hereinafter is largely aimed at regulatory options
prohibiting insider dealing per Se. As a result of this "blanket" approach,
conglomerates are necessarily covered. Attention is focused on how this
general regulation may be applied to the conglomerate context. In the following
chapter however, a more specific regulatory measure - the Chinese Wall -
strictly applicable to conglomerates is given consideration as an integral and
essential back-up to the "blanket" approach.
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market practices. 2
 Formal regulation takes the form of technically prohibitive
statements of law. While these may clarify much of the law relating to what is
legitimate and what is illegitimate conduct there are many disadvantages with
this approach. It is often: (a) cumbersome, because the whole weight of the
judicial system is brought to bear; (b) time consuming, because of the
bureaucracy involved; (c) inefficient, because of the huge resources expended
in detecting and penalising abuse; and (d) ineffective, because of the
difficulty of detecting abuse and the high standard of proof required for a
successful prosecution. As a result formal regulation is often supplemented by
self-regulatory measures.
(ii) Self-Regulation
Despite the fact that formal law lays down a minimum standard of
protection, this standard may not be enough. Self-regulation is therefore a
necessary additional safeguard to cover the myriad of circumstances neither
envisaged nor covered by legislation. 3 It also serves to maintain confidence
and deter abuse. Moreover, regulation from within professional bodies is often
2. The "public interest" theory of regulation has come under increasing
criticism of late and has to a large extent become superceded by what has been
called the "capture theory of regulation" ie., regulation which operates for
the benefit of the group regulated. For a comprehensive survey of the
literature regulation, see, R.A. Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation",
(1974) 5 Bell J. Ecoji. 335-51.
3. The merits of self regulation have been expounded by one commentator:
"Self-regulation ... can be persuasive and subtle in its conditioning influence
over business practices and business morality. By and large, governments can
operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves untouched large areas
of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of government regulation but in
fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery
of the law in the realm of ethics and morality. Into these larger areas, self-
government alone can effectively reach. For these reasons, such regulation is
by far the most preferable course from all viewpoints ... self discipline is
always more welcome than discipline imposed from above." R.W. Jennings, "Self-
Regulation in the Securities markets: The Role of the Securities Exchange
Commission", (1964) 29 Law and ContemD prary PrpbIem 663, at 678.
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considered to be a more effective method of control offering a number of
advantages. It is extremely flexible; informality means that new loopholes can
be speedily plugged and that needless expense and the unweildly judicial
process can be neatly by-passed. Furthermore practitioners can bring their own
specialist skills to bear not only in outlining practices to be avoided but
also in unravelling complex questions of fact when sitting in judgement. 4 There
exists a self-interest among the regulating profession to keep the reputations
of their businesses untarnished and actively seek out abuses rather than punish
offenders after an incident has occured. But probably one of the most outright
advantages of self-regulation is that the regulated must obey not only the
letter of the self-regulatory codes but also the spirit.5
(iii) Self-Re gulation Within p Statutory Framework
Despite some of the obvious advantages of professional self-scrutiny,
concern that much is brushed beneath the carpet has traditionally been at the
centre of the mistrust of this system of control. The recent trend, therefore,
has been to combine elements of both formal regulation and self-regulation to
form a practitioner-based, statute-backed system of supervision. This "self-
regulation within a statutory framework" as it has become known is designed to
capture the benefits of both types of regulation without many of the ensuing
drawbacks.
4. In discussing self-regulation in its Report the SEC observed: "...
persons on the scene and familiar with the intracies of securities and markets
from daily and full time pursuit of the business can more readily perceive and
comprehend some types of problems, and more promptly devise solutions than a
governmental agency which, however great its collective knowledge and skill,
may be able to concern itself only intermittently with specifc problems, may
become aware of them only after the event, and often must defer decision and
action until thorough investigation or study has been completed. 9
 SEC Report of
the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong. 1st Sess.
pt.4, pp. 693 -703 at 694.
5. , for example, the Preamble to the Takeover Code.
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In Britain, for example, under the new investor protection regime, formal
legal principles have been outlined by the legislature. 6 The responsibility for
drawing up more detailed rules has fallen to the appropriate minister who has
himself been given the authority to delegate them to a "neutral" body - the
SIB. The SIB's powers ultimately hinge on approval of the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry. The SIB operates through a number of self-regulatory
agencies which apply equivalent rules to their associated members. While much
of the day-to-day regulation is soley in the hands of practitioners, the
overseeing of this supervision is the responsibility of the government's own
designated SIB agency. The SIB, despite being largely autonomous, may be
divested of its powers at the government's discretion.
Notwithstanding the recent introduction of the regulatory measures
covering conduct in the financial markets in the FSA 1986, other legislation
ancillary to the new market regime is, and has for some time been, in
operation. For a number of years insider dealing, whether it be in the
corporate/unorthodox context 7 or individual/traditional 8 context, has
been governed by a range of legal sanctions. These are now considered.
I. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER DEALING IN THE U.K.
Formal Legal Rules
The practice of insider dealing can occur in many different circumstances.
6. For a more detailed description of the system currently in operation
in the U.K., see, infra Chapter Two at note 16 and accompanying text.
7. See, infra Chapter Three at note 1 and accompanying text.
8. at note 2.
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In this general context the conduct is governed by formal legal rules the most
important of which are contained in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act 1985 (hereinafter "CSA 1985").
In the U.K. insider dealing is regulated, inter alia, by both common law
and statute law (SIB rules regulating the conduct will be given specific
treatment in Chapter Seven, although the extent to which the SIB is involved in
providing a civil remedy is analysed below). The relevant legislation is: (a)
The Companies Act 1985, (b) The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985,
and (c) The Financial Services Act 1986.
The Companies Act 1985 requires a general policy of disclosure of
insiders' interests while the CSA 1985 outlines the substantive elements of the
offence. It is by far the most important piece of legislation, but only
provides for criminal penalties and not civil remedies. The Financial Services
Act 1986, meantime, significantly enhances the investigative powers of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and has further spawned a detailed rule-
book drawn up by the City's regulatory rule-making body - the SIB. The right
of a private investor to bring a civil law action against any person who has
contravened the rules and regulations of the SIB, (some of which include the
misuse of inside information) a Self Regulatory Organisation (SRO) or a
recognised professional body, is now established under s.62 of the 1986 Act.'°
This right has, however, been postponed pending review.'' In the interim,
therefore, a civil remedy lies only at common law and under s.61 of the FSA.
9. For the most recent text on the regulation of insider dealing see
Hannigan, Insider Dealing (London) 1988. See also, Rider, Insider Trading
(London) 1983; and Prentice, The Comnanies Act 1980 Chapter 16 (1980).
10. , SIB press release entitled "Insider Trading Could Lead to Civil
Damages" 28 January 1987.
11. For a more detailed discussion on this infra note 117 and accompany-
ing text.
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A. The Companies Act 1985 - Disclosure
Prior to 1980, when insider dealing first became a statutory offence by
virtue of Part V of the 1980 Companies Act, the legislative means of curtailing
the practice was limited to disclosure provisions contained in general
companies legislation. These provisions required directors and other primary
insiders to disclose their holdings and dealings in the company with whom they
were connected by way of employment. Today similar provisions can be found in
the Companies Act 1985. Section 323, for example, prohibits a director from
dealing in options of the securities of his company and in other companies
within the same group. Section 324 specifies that directors and shareholders
of the company in question and its related companies must be disclosed, while
s.325 makes it obligatory for the company to keep a record of all of its
director's interests. These provisions are extended by s. 323 and 328 to
include the disclosure of interests held by spouses and children, definitions
of which are given in s.327. Furthermore s.329 obliges the company to inform
the Stock Exchange of the interests specified in ss.323-327. This information
may be made available to the public.
B. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 - Prohibition
The Companies Act 1985 adopts a policy of disclosure to guard against
insider dealing. The CSA 1985, meanwhile, contains the substantive body of
legislative provisions prohibiting the practice. A concise statutory definition
of insider dealing is not offered in the Act, but conduct constituting the
crime may be described as:
the conscious exploitation of confidential information to make a
profit or avoid a loss by dealing in securities at a price which
would have been materially altered by the publication of that
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12information.
Who is a Primary Insider?
The CSA 1985 covers both what is called primary insider dealing (dealing
on the basis of price-sensitive information acquired in breach of a fiduciary
position) and secondary insider dealing or "tippee trading" (trading on the
basis of price sensitive information acquired from a primary insider). Primary
insider dealing is described in the 1985 Act as dealing 13 as principal or agent
on a recognised exchange' 4 where either the insider deals in the securities'5
of the company 16
 with which he is connected by virtue of employment or contract
of service j he deals in the securities of a related company' 7 about which he
has insider knowledge because of his connection with the first company.17a
Under the Act an insider must be an individual' 8 who is, or has been in
the previous six months, "knowingly connected" with the company in question or
12. , Mehigan The 1ndeendent 29 December 1986.
13. To deal is to buy or sell or agree to buy or sell any securities.
, s.13 (1) and ss(1A) of the CSA 1985 as amended by s.176 of the FSA 1986.
14. This includes the Stock Exchange and dealing through an Investment
Exchange. However, s.4 makes it clear that deals in "advertised securities in
the "over the counter" market are also covered. Face-to-face transactions do
not come within the ambit of the Act.
15. Securities are defined in s.12 and include listed, non-listed and
advertised securities.
16. "Company" is defined as any company whether or not a company within
the meaning of the Companies Act 1985.
17. "Related Company", in relation to a company, means any body corporate
which is that company's subsiduary or holding company, or subsidiary of that
comPany'sa holding company." 	 , s.1I(b) CSA.
17	 It is not necessary to prove that the insider actually used the
information - merely that he dealt at a time when the information was in his
possession
18. A company cannot commit an offence under the Act, except perhaps for
aiding and abetting. If a transaction is carried out in the name of the
company those acting for it would be liable. As Mehigan, suDra note 12 says:
"This is not a loophole but a sensible realisation that even if the company is
the benificary of a deal then there must exist individuals who caused it to be
so."
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a related company (such as a subsidiary of the first company) by virtue of
being either a director, officer, or employee of the first company or a related
company. The provisions also encompass (1) those who have, or have had within
the last six months, a business or professional relationship with the first
company or a related company and (2) someone who has been employed by such
persons. Directors are automatically connected. Officers, employees and those
who fall into the two groups outlined above are covered if it would be
reasonable to expect them to have gained access to inside information.
The Act therefore embraces a very comprehensive group of people ranging
from directors and company employees through to the company auditors, solicitors,
accountants, bankers and brokers.'9
What is Inside Information?
It is important to emphasise that there are two types of "inside
information" which any statutory attempt to define the term must take
cognisance of. On the one hand there is information which is intrinsic to the
company known as corporate information, eg. where the company itself is about
to announce an increase in profits or a takeover bid. On the other there is
information which may be said to be external to the company and which is
commonly referred to as market information. An example might be where there is
advanced knowledge that a brokerage firm is about to publish a favourable
research report about a company. How has the CSA attempted to embrace this
19. It is important to reiterate that the individual must not only be
connected with the first company or its related company but also know that he
is so connected. The test, therefore, is a subjective one ie., did the individ-
ual know he was connected and jj ought he reasonably to have known that he was
so connected. Subjective elements such as these make prosecution all the more
difficult.
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distinction?
Under the CSA 1985 a primary insider, by virtue of his connection2° must
deal and know that he is dealing on the basis of a particular type of
information referred to as "unpublished price-sensitive information", where it
would not be reasonable for a person in his position to disclose such
information other than with a view to the proper performance of his duties.
The test with regard to the type of information is a subjective one, ie.
whether the defendant knew that the information was of a type proscribed by the
Act and not whether he ought reasonably to have known. By contrast, the test
with reference to the disclosure of such information is an objective one, ie.
would it be reasonable to expect the defendant not to have disclosed the
information in the proper performance of his duties.2'
S.1O, defines "unpublished price-sensitive" information as information
which:
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly
or indirectly) to that company, that is to say, is not of a general
nature relating or of concern to that company; and
(b) is not generally known to those persons who are accustomed or
would be likely to deal in those securities but which would if it
were generally known to them be likely to materially affect the price
of those securities.
The section relates only to information which is: specific, not generally known
and likely to materially affect the price of the securities in question. There
is, however, no guidance in the legislation as to what these terms actually
mean.
20. If the inside information comes to a primary insider in a way which
is unconnected with his position there is nothing in s.l prohibiting him from
exploiting it.
21. therefore, that the CSA recognises that it is possible for
unpublished price-sensitive information to be disclosed (ie. communicated) if
it is done so in the proper performance of the insider's duties.
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The reference to specific information only can be best explained by the
need to ensure that the definition of inside information is not so wide as to
include legitimate research undertaken by investment analysts. In the
Committee stage, in an attempt to offer practical guidance on the meaning of
the distinction, the Minister of Trade suggested that what the government had
in mind was the difference between "day to day knowledge" and "knowledge of
important factors which, when revealed to the market, [would] shift the price
H 22of the shares.
To satisfy the requirement of information "not generally known" it would
seem that more than mere publication of the inside information is needed. 23 A
gauge of materiality, meanwhile, may be had from the U.S, where information is
material if it is the sort of information where there is a "substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an
investment decision about the company's stock. 24 Thus the information need
not actually cause the share price to move; it must however make such a move
substantially likely. Rider makes the point that whether information comes
within the scope of s.1O is a question of fact for the jury or the magistrates
to decide.25 In this respect it is important to note that a common sense view
will be taken. Indeed, during passage of the Act the Minister remarked that
the type of knowledge he was looking for was TM knowledge of dramatic events,
22. Parliamentary Debates. Standin g Committee A. 11th sitting, col.561 (6
December 1979).
23. But see, Branson, "Insider Trading" (1982) jk 343, at p.413. where
he notes that with the repeated use of the phrase "unpublished price-sensitive"
information the British statutes emphasis seems to be on publication ye! non.
He also argues that the generally known test can be fulfilled through word of
mouth instead of any need for publication (, p.4 14).
24. TSC Industries. Inc. v. Northwa y. Inç,, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
25. , Rider su pra note 9 at p.??
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major happenings and things that [would] transform the company's prospects."26
Despite s.lO and its tortuous legal complications there remains a good
deal of "inside information" which according to the economist is not subject to
legal proscription simply because it does not fulfil the s.lO test.27 Carlton
and Fischel, for example, argue that "[knowledge that one of the firm's top
management is dispirited because of family problems or because preliminary
reports on a new technological process show that costs are running much higher
than expected are examples of valuable information that is almost certaintly
not material in the legal sense."28
Dealing in the Securities of Any Other Company
The prohibition outlined in s.l(2) is aimed at an individual who is
knowingly connected with a company (the first company) or its related company
and has information which relates to transactions (actual or contemplated)
between the first company (or a related company) and any other company or
involves one of them and the securities of the other. The prohibition
precludes such an individual from dealing on a recognised exchange in the
shares of the other company if the information is unpublished and price-
sensitive which the individual holds by virtue of being connected with his own
company (ie., the first company or a related company). Thus, A, a director of
26. H.C. Deb. (Standing Committee A Minister of Trade), col. 394 (6 Dec.
1979).
27. Branson, su pra note 23, at p. 415, argues that market information
will very rarely be covered by s.lO. He claims that market information is
rarely of concern to a company because some companies are unconcerned with the
market for their shares as distinct from the affairs of the company itself. He
notes that "[m]any corporate officials believe that concern with share prices
causes a company to play to the crowd sacraficing long term results for short
term profitability." (footnote 37 at p.415).
28. Carlton and Fischel, "The Regulation of Insider Trading", (1985) 35
Stanford Law Review 857 at p.886.
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XYZ and Co. Plc being aware of the placing of a major order for machinery from
QPR and Co. Plc, which will entail a significant expansion in the latters
current output, will be precluded from buying shares in QPR and Co. Plc. This
is so despite the subsequent shelving of the deal.
Secondar y Insider Dealing
The provisions dealing with secondary insider trading are outlined in s.l
29	 .	 .
ss.3 and 4.	 They aim to prevent any person taking advantage of a tip (insider
knowledge) provided by someone who holds inside information. The person who
relays the information is called the tipper while the recipient of the
information is called the tippee.
Consider the following example of a managing director of X Company who,
knowing of impending good news about his company, tells his next door neighbour
29. S.l ss.3 reads:
(a) an individual has information which he knowingly obtained (directly or
indirectly) from another individual who -
(i) is connected with a particular company, or was at any time in the 6
months preceding the obtaining of the information so connected, and
(ii) the former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe held
the information by virtue of being so connected, and
(b) the former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that,
because of the latter's connection and position, it would be reasonable
to expect him not to disclose the information except for the proper
performance of the functions attached to that position.
Subject to the defences available in Section 3 the former indidividual
according to ss.4:
(a) shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in the securities
of that company and he knows that the information is unpublished price
sensitive information in relation to those securities, and
(b) shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of
any other company if he knows that the information is unpublished price
sensitive information in relation to those securities and it relates to
any transaction (actual or contemplated) involving the first company and
any other company, or involving one of them and the securities of the
other, or to the fact that any such transaction is no longer
contemplated.
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of this news. As a result the neighbour buys shares in X Company. Provided
certain facts apply (outlined below) it can be said that two offences have been
committed under the 1985 Act. First, the managing director is in breach of s.l
(8) for tipping, or, communicating inside information (Or under s.1(7) for
counselling or procuring 30 someone to deal in shares) "to another person if he
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that that or some other person will
make use of the information for the purpose of dealing, or of counselling or
procuring any other person to deal, on a recognised Stock Exchange in those
securities." 3 ' Second, the neighbour is guilty as a tippee if he obtains the
information, directly or indirectly, from the other person and deals on the
basis of it. Under the legislation it is also necessary for the tippee to know
that the information is inside information. This "subjective knowledge"
requirement is an onerous burden for the prosecution to discharge. The tippee
must also know or have reasonable cause to believe that the tipper was himself
precluded by subsection (1) or (2) from trading in those securities. 32
 Here the
test is objective.
Two further constraints are placed upon tippees:- First, they are
prohibited from any attempt to cause or procure any person to deal 33 and
secondly, they are prohibited from sub-tipping ie., relaying inside information
to another person (the sub-tippee) where they know or ought reasonably to be
aware that the sub-tippee will deal or cause or procure someone else to deal on
34the basis of it.
30. Thus if the insider tells the other person to deal without
disclosing the information he is liable under the legislation.
31. See, s.1(8) CSA.
32. s.1(3),(4) CSA, above.
33. , s.1(7) CSA.
34. s.1(8) CSA.
100
R v. Fisher at First Instance
A recent case which dealt with secondary insider dealing placed the whole
35	 .	 36
scheme of the CSA in great jepoardy.
	
In , v. Fisher	 Judge Butler
ruled that the word "obtained" in s. 1(3) of the CSA 1985 had to be given a
strict construction. By that he meant that an individual could only commit an
offence under the sub-section if inter alia the individual had actively sought
the information proscribed; receipt of unsolicited information was not
sufficient. Thus his ruling meant that the unsolicited receipt of inside
information could be used to make market trades.37
The facts of the case were straighforward. In 1985 the defendant (D)
approached an ailing caravan manufacturing company called Thompson T-Line Plc.,
with the intention of making an offer to acquire the bulk of the company's
shares. In November 1985 Mr Thompson, the managing director and acting head of
the controlling Thompson family shareholding, suggested that the D should
consult the firm's financial advisers, Kleinwort Benson. This he did. There
the D spoke to a Miss Hedley-Miller, then head of the corporate finance
division. Mr Thompson did not in fact consider the D to be a serious buyer and
early in December 1985, unknown to either the D or Miss Hedley Miller, he
reached a preliminary agreement regarding the sale of the Thompson family
interest with a company known as Diamond Ltd. Immediately after the agreement
he contacted Miss Hedley-Miller and informed her how events stood. Both agreed
35. Since the risk of detecion under the CSA is one of the key incentives
for enforcing self-styled Chinese Walls any erosion of the prohibitions in the
legislation (especially s.1(3)(4): because the conglomerate is more likely to
be operating in the tippee context) lessens the incentives to enforce the
mechanism.
36. (1988) 4 BCC 360.
37. For a more detailed comment on Judge Butler's reasoning, 	 , McVea,
"Was the Fisher Case wrongly decided?", (1988) June Financial Times. Financial
Regulation Renort p.9.
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that in the circumstances proper practice required that the D be told of the
development. Miss Hedley-Miller then telephoned the D and told him that Mr
Thompson had accepted a new offer. She did not, however, tell him the price or
the amount of shares involved, but did say that an announcement would soon be
made. Furthermore, according to Miss Hedley-Miller's recollection, she told
the D that the information she was imparting was sensitive and highly
confidential and that as a result of the conversation he would be an "insider."
The D then telephoned his brokers and bought 6000 shares in Thompson T-Line
Plc, which, after Diamond's announcement of the takeover, he sold at profit of
L3,000.
The D was subsequently charged with dealing as a prohibited person in the
securities of a company contrary to: s. 1(3) and s.l(4)(a) and s.8(l) of the
CSA 1985 as amended. He pleaded not guilty and was ultimately acquitted.
The prohibitions relating to secondary insider dealing (which were at
issue in the Fisher case) apply where it can be shown that an individual has
information which he has knowingly obtained, whether directly or indirectly,
from another individual who is connected with a particular company (here Miss
Hedley .-Miller) and he deals, having the requisite state of mind.38
It is patently clear that Judge Butler's decision went a long way in
restricting the crime of secondary insider dealing. So much so that an
individual who came into possession of inside information by way of a "tip off"
which had not been actively sought or requested was immune from the U.K.'s
secondary insider dealing provisions notwithstanding the fact that he made a
large profit from the trade, and that the whole rationale of the legislation
38.	 , earlier at note 29 and accompanying text.
102
(ie. to protect the fairness and integrity of the market) was seriously
undermined. The decision also represented a serious blow to the morale of the
investigative authorities. As a result the Attorney-General referred the
39decision to the Court of Appeal.
Fisher in the Court of ApDeal
The Attorney General's reference to the Court of Appeal was sought in
order to lay down clear guidelines for Crown Court rulings in future cases
following Judge Butler's decision at first instance. The Attorney General
referred the following points to the Court of Appeal for consideration:
(a) Whether or not the word "obtained" in section 1(3) of the CSA 1985
has the restricted meaning of "acquired by purpose and effort" or
whether it has a wider meaning.
(b) Whether or not any individual who has, from another, information
within the scope of the Act and is otherwise within the scope of
the prohibitions contained in sections 1(4), 1(6) and 2 of the
Act, may be an individual who has "obtained" within the terms of
sections 1(3), 1(6) and 2 of the Act.
The Court of Appeal held that Judge Butler had been wrong in his interpretation.
The word obtained had to be given its broader meaning ie. one could obtain not
only as a result of purpose or effort but also through passive receipt or
acceptance. The effect of the Appeal Court's ruling was to make guilty anyone
who knowingly traded in shares on the basis of unpublished price sensitive
information regardless of how the information was obtained unless, that is, the
trader fell within certain specified defences laid down in the legislation.
In giving judgement for the court Lord Lane LCJ's thought the first task
was to determine the ordinary meaning of the the word 'obtain'. Two meanings
where discernable. One in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defined the
39. Attorney-General's Reference (No.1 of 1988) [1988] 2 W.L.R. 195.
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word as " to procure or gain, as a result of purpose and effort; hence, generally,
to acquire, get." The other, in Webster's International Dictionary, defined
obtain as: "to get hold of by effort; to gain possession of, to procur, to
acquire in any way." The learned Judge therefore concluded that the word was
"capable of supporting the contention of either party".4°
The learned Judge then surveyed the arguments of both sides:
The Attorney General contended that it was necessary to look to the
intention of the draftsmen and to the general scheme of the Act. In doing so
he argued that in the case of each type of insider, the offence was not one of
using information but rather dealing in securities whilst being in possession
of relevant information. The Attorney General then went on to consider the Act
as a whole noting that the wrongdoing aimed at was the exploitation of an
unfairly priviliged advantage gained from a particular source. He could not
see then why an unsoliciting tippee should be any less culpable than the person
who had deliberately sought out the information. The vice lay in the way the
information was used, not in the method of its receipt.
The issue of the history of the Act was then raised, concentrating
primarily on a Government White Paper on the Conduct of Company Directors
(Cmnd. 7037) of 1977). The purpose here was to discover the mischief which
Parliament wanted to remedy. The Attorney General drew attention to two
particular expressions: "the information ... would generally be in his
possession" and "someone in such a position has provided him ... with the
40. Jj, at p . 202.
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information".4 ' These, he said, indicated that Parliament intended that the
broad approach be adopted when interpreting the word "obtained" in the
legislation.
Defence counsel's submissions were then heard. First, that adopting a
broad construction provided inadequate protection for those who involuntarily
received inside information. The Court of Appeal disagreed, saying, "[there
is no crime in receiving the information. He [the receiverj can protect
himself from prosecution by the simple expedient of not dealing in the relevant
securities."42 Secondly, it was argued that in previous Appeal Court rulings
the word "obtain" had been interpretated according to the narrow construction
and therefore this was the interpretation intended in the Act. Two cases,
43	 44Fisher v. Raven	 and R v. Ha yat	 where relied upon. Lord Lane LCJ
distinguished both. Commenting on the former, he said, the judgement was
"careful to confine the definition to the purposes of the case under
consideration."45 Upon considering the latter, he was of the opinion that the
current Situation was quite different in that the crucial element was dealing
while obtaining on its own was of no importance. Finally, it was submitted
that in the case of a penal enactment any ambiguity should be resolved in
favour of the defence. However, this too the Court rejected, relying on the
words of Lord Reid in
	
v. Ottewell,46 where he said: "It is not
enough that the provision is ambigious in the sense that it is capable of
having two meanings."47
41. at p. 204
42. at p. 205.
43. [1964] A.C. 210, (H.L.'s).
44. 1976 Vol. 63 Cr.App. R. 181.
45. SuDrp, note 39, at p.205.
46. [1968], 52 CAR 679.
47. at p.686.
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Speaking on behalf of the Court, Lord Lane LCJ concluded that while it
had not been an easy decision, he was content that it was Parliament's
intention to "penalise the recipient of inside information who deals in the
relevant securities, whether he procures the information from the primary
insider by purpose and effort or comes by it without any positive action on his
part."48 This was evident from the concern which the White Paper showed about
about damage to public confidence which insider dealing was likely to cause and
"the clear intention to prevent so far as possible what amounts to cheating
when those with inside knowledge use that knowledge to make a profit in their
H49dealings with others.	 Linked to this was the fact that it made no difference
to the person cheated whether the information upon which the "tippee" based his
cheating was either sought out by him or came to him by way of unsolicited
gift. The learned judge continued: (at p. 204)
Against the background of public and government concrn it would
indeed have been suprising if Parliament had intended that persons
such as, for example, the respondent in the instant case should be
free to make a profit from their insider information simply because
of the way they came by the information. It would do nothing to
increase the confidence of the public in the probity of the business
world if behaviour such as that of the respondent were to be free
from sanction ... If one construes the key word "obtained" in the
light of the purpose behind the Act the conclusion must, in our
judgement, be that it means no more than "received".
Similarly, the wider approach was more preferable because it avoided the need
to establish criteria for what did and what did not constitute sufficient
purpose or effort to satisfy the narrow meaning of the word "obtain". To do
so, thought the judge, "would have done nothing to enhance the reputation of
the business world for honesty or of the criminal law for clarity."50
The Court of Appeal's ruling represented a much needed victory for the
48. SuDra, note 39, at p.2O6.
49. j.jçL, at p.204.
50. SuDra, note 39, at p.206.
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regulatory authorities in the area of insider dealing enforcement. But the
lower court's attempt to provide potential insiders with a technical loophole
at a time when the obvious intention of the Act and the general thrust of
securities regulation is to clamp down on insider abuse would appear to have
been a rather unfortunate and anomalous development. By contrast, the Court of
Appeal adopted a broad interpretation, discovering the mischief which it was
Parliament's intention to remedy via legislation, and ensuring that such an
intention was given effect in the interpretation of the statute.5'
Takeovers
The law in relation to takeovers is probably most important in the
context of conglomerates benefiting from inside information. It would seem
likely that s.J(2) also covers takeovers. 52 But s.l(5) deals explicitly with
the conduct. The section prohibits an individual who has contemplated or who
is contemplating making a takeover offer53 for a company in one capacity from
dealing in the shares of the offeree in another capacity if he knows that the
information relating to the fact that the offer is comtemplated or is no longer
contemplated is unpublished price-sensitive information. Naturally the insider
who falls within the above is further not allowed: (1) to counsel or procure
another to deal; 54 (2) tip someone else who would be likely to deal or who
would counsel or procure someone else to deal. 55 Similarly a tippee who
receives information (which he knows to be inside information) from an insider
51. The case then went to the House of Lords were Lord Lowry affirmed
the Court of Appeal's decision. 	 , McVea, "House of Lords Clarifies Law on
Insider Dealing" (1989) May Financial Times. Financial Regulation Report at p.
16.
52. , Prentice, supra note 9, at para. 313.
53. Takeover is defined in s.14. The contemplation of a takeover may be
with or without another person.
54. , s.1(7).
55. , s.1(8).
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in this context must not himself deal, nor counsel or procure someone to deal
nor tip someone else who would deal (or counsel or procure someone else to
deal) in those securities.
Failing to Sell on the Basis of Inside Information
Some economists have highlighted what they see as a significant flaw in
the statutory regulation of insider dealing. Manne, for example, argues that
not only is the practice hard to detect but also insiders who exploit inside
information do not necessarily 	 additional stock on the basis of their
information; rather they buy a portfolio of stocks and basing decisions on
legally proscribed inside knowledge they refrain from selling. 56
 This has the
same effect as "buying", but a deliberate failure to sell, nothwithstanding the
fact that the decision was prompted, indeed determined, by unpublished price-
sensitive information, is not a violation of the CSA 1985. Before the
legislation takes effect a positive act of buying or selling is required.
Manne has even gone as far as to suggest that "not selling" could be the most
common means of using inside information in securities transactions.57
Defences
Apart from factual defences the defendant may rely upon a number of
specified statutory exemptions from the prohibitions laid down in s.1&2. Four
of the main exemptions are listed here. 58 The most important is trading other
56. , Henry Manne, "Insider Trading and Property Rights in New
Information", (Winter 1985) 4 Cato Journal 933, at p. 936. Equally they know
when not to buy.57.Ii
58. For other defences,	 , s.3 (2) (dealing in order to facilitate the
completion or carrying out of a transaction) and s.6. (price stabilisation).
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than with a view to making a profit or avoiding a loss. The prohibitions in
the CSA are rendered ineffective where the defendant can show that, notwith-
standing the fact that he fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in s.1&2, the
dominant purpose of his trade was not with a view to making a profit or avoid-
ing a loss for either himself or another person by using that information.59
Some commentators has expressed concern over the nature of this defence fearing
that if it is construed broadly it could endanger the whole efficacy of the
Act.6° The second covers dealings made by individuals in the bona ficle
performance of their functions as liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy.61
The third exemption or defence is aimed at those who perform specialist roles
within the financial sector, namely jobbers and market makers 62 , while under
the fourth defence trustees and personal representatives are also exempted in
59. See, s.3(a) CSA 1985.
60. , Sugarman & Ashe, "The Companies Act 1980" (1981) 2 Co Law 13 at
p.17. Likewise, Prentice, supra note 9 at para. 320. writes that "care will
have to be taken [to ensure] that the all-to-easy assertion of an innocent
motive does not result in the defence becoming a convenient escape for the
unscrupulous." See also, Gower, Modern Como g n y Law (1979, supp. 1981) supp.
p.638, who writes that "[t]his will undoubtedly be the defence invoked by
directors and other insiders detected in insider dealing. It will legitimately
protect them if they can show that circumstances compelled them to realise
their holdings and that they would have done so at the time whether or not they
had the price-sensitive information. It would also, less legitimately, protect
them if they engage in idle gossip and thus leak price-sensitive information."
61. , s.3(b) CSA 1985. If the deals made by such persons are carried
out in "good faith" then, notwithstanding the fact that they constitute an
offence under s.1&2 of the Act, the transaction is exempt.
62. With the termination of the single capacity system of trading and
the adoption of a new dual capacity regime whereby a financial intermediary may
trade as both broker and jobber simultaneously this exemption has become
extended by s.174 of the Financial Services Act 1986 to include market makers.
S.174 (1) permits a market maker to do "any particular thing in relation to any
particular security" which would otherwise be in breach of s.1&2 of the CSA
1985 "if the information was - (i) obtained by him in the course of a business
of a market maker in those securities in which he was engaged or employed, and
(ii) was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him to obtain
in the ordinary course of tha business, and that he does that thing in good
faith in the course of that business." Market maker is defined as meaning any
person on a recognised exchange (whether an individual, partner or company) who
holds himself out to make a continuous succession of prices and is recognised
as doing so by that exchange.
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certain limited circumstances.63
The point to be made here is that if these defences are given a wide
interpretation by the Courts (and it is too soon to tell this given the fact
that too few cases have been brought) then the risk of prosecution diminishes
even further. All other things being equal, this increases the incentive to
breach Chinese Walls and trade illegally on the basis of inside information.
Penalties
Contravention of s.1,2,4 or 5 of the CSA 1985 makes an individual liable
to criminal penalty. 64 On summary conviction the statutory maximum penalty is
six months imprisonment with a fine of up to Ll000- while on indictment the
maximum penalty is seven year's imprisonment but with an unlimited fine.65
The rate of prosecution has, however, been very low. 66 Despite the fact that
the penalty on indictment is sever, the courts have traditionally imposed little
more than nominal sanctions on miscreants. 67 This raises a serious question
mark over the efficacy of the whole of the U.K. insider dealing enforcement
regime and seriously effects the cost-benefit economic calculous faced by
63. , s.7 CSA 1985. This exemption covers the Situation where a
fiduciary possesses unpublished price-sensitive information and where he trades
in securities relating to that information if his trades were based on the
advice of someone who appeared to be (a) an appropriate person for whom to seek
such advice and (b) who did not seem to him to be prohibited by s.1, 2,4 or 5
from dealing.
64. , s.8(1) CSA 1985 as ammended by s.48 of the Criminal Justice Act
1988.
65. Under s.8(2) proceedings in England and Wales can only be initiated
by the Secetrary of State for Trade or the DPP; in Scotland this duty rests on
the Lord Advocate.
66. This contrasts heavily with the U.S. where insider dealing is one of
the most frequent violations of the securities laws.
	 , Bainbridge, "The
Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma" (1986) 38 University
of Florida Law Review 35, at p. 36.
67. See, Hannigan, supra note 9 at pp. 90-91.
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financial firms and individuals working within them when deciding to breach a
Chinese Wall.
Manne notes that enforcement is never perfect, thus in an area where only
limited resources are available to police what is probably a common practice,
enforcement will at best be partial.68 In order to maximise existing resources
the enforcement regime must impose heavy sanctions so as to compensate for the
relatively low risk of detection and prosecution. Any other regime is not
optimal given existing resources. 69
 Such logic does not seem to have been
present in the court's decision in , v. Collier70
 where the defendant, a top
merchant banker with the City firm Morgan Grenfell, was given a derisory fine
of h25,000 and a one year jail sentence suspended for two years.
C. The Financial Services Act 1986 - Enhanced Enforcement Powers
The Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA) deals with insider trading in two
main ways: First it contains provisions which amend the substantive law of the
CSA 1985 (ss.173-176). Secondly, it confers on the DTI special investigative
powers aimed at detecting those have broken insider trading laws (ss.177-
i78).' It is only the latter which is given treatment below.
Under s.177(1) of the new Act the Secretary of State is empowered to
68. , Manne, "insider Trading and the Law Professors", (1970) 23
Vand. L. Rev. 547, at p.553.
69. But see, Brandon, supra note 23, at p.538.
70. (1987) unreported but see Financial Times, 2 July 1987.
71. For a comprehensive account of the DTI's newly acquired powers set
within the context of recent case law developments, 	 , Trimidas, "The
Financial Services Act and the Detection of Insider Trading, (1987) 8 Co. Law
162. See generally, Rider et p1, Guide to the Fin pncipl Services Act 1986 by
(CCI-1) 1987, pp. 701-730.
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appoint inspectors to investigate suspected insider dealing offences. These
inspectors have by virtue of s.177 (4) the power to require any person who may
be able to give any information concerning whether a contravention has actually
occurred to: (1) produce the relevant documents, 72 (2) appear before them, and,
if necessary, (3) give evidence on oath as well as generally render all
assistance in connection with the suspected offence. Moreover, s.199 enables
inspectors to enter premises and search for evidence where there are reasonable
grounds hat inter atia an offence has been committed under the CSA 1985.
The penalties for failure to comply with the request of an investigator
are specified in s.178(l).	 A refusal to answer questions for example could
amount to contempt of court unless it was decided that the refusal was made
with reasonable excuse. If it is adjudged that no reasonable excuse exists
then the Secretary of State may revoke that person's authorisation as an
investment dealer - such a power could, more than anything, prove to be the
greatest incentive to cooperate. The point of course is that with the
increased powers of the authorities there is a greater chance that the
requisite evidence needed for a sucessful prosecution will be more readily
available, adding a futher element of risk to the possibility of evading
Conviction for insider dealing.
That the hands of the authorities are not tied is illustrated well by the
House of Lords decision in Re an inquir y under the Compan y Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act l985.	 The dispute arose out of a DTI investigation into a
suspected "mole, working at either the Office of Fair Trading or the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, who passed on price sensitive information to
72. For a definition of documents,	 , S. 177 (10).
73. [19881 1 All ER 203, HL.
112
others who then dealt on the basis of it on the Stock Exchange. It was
believed that there was a ring of people involved. On the basis of two
articles written by Jeremy Warner, a journalist with the Independent newspaper,
the DTI were convinced that he knew members of the ring and could as a result
provide helpful evidence to assist their investigations. Warner refused to
comply with the DTI's request for information under s.178(1), alleging that
to do so might result in the identification of his sources. The House of Lords
held that Warner did not have a reasonable excuse within the meaning of the
section since his evidence was required for the prevention of crime in a
general sense. It was not neccessary for the inspectors to show that the
evidence was required to stop some identifiable future crime.
D. Civil Liability For Insider Dealing: Is there a Remedy?
The purpose of this section is to examine the civil remedies available to
persons who have been adversely affected by insider traders. These persons may
be either (1) companies in whose shares insider dealing has taken place, (2)
the shareholders of those companies, or (3) outsiders who trade with insiders.
The criminal sanctions applicable to insider dealing were considered
above; however, as one commentator notes, [t]he issue of whether provision
should be made for civil remedies is one of the most controversial aspects of
insider dealing regulation. Controversy surrounds both the principles upon
which liability may be based and the formulation of the remedies themselves."74
What then are the civil remedies?
74. J. Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealin g in Britain and France
(European Institute Florence: 1988) at section 4.1. For a review of the contro-
versy surrounding the basis of civil liability, 	 , Chapter Three, note 66 and
accompanying text.
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The analysis herein falls into two broad sections. First of all, the
position at common law is examined. Then secondly, treatment is afforded to
the recent advent of statute law in the area as laid down in the Financial
Services Act 1986 (FSA) by virtue of s.61 and s.62.
Before the enactment of the FSA the only means from which civil redress
for insider dealing could be had was through reliance on general commmon law
principles. These principles remain important because of the narrowness of
s.61 and s.62 of the FSA which, in theory, provide a statutory civil law remedy
in the event of an infringement of the SIB rulebook. Since the SIB rulebook
applies only to a limited range of circumstances - confined to the regulation
of financial intemediaries in the financial sector - the common law must still
be looked at in order to gain the broader perspective of the law as it
currently stands. In this respect the common law position in regard to face-
to-face transactions must necessarily be considered first before going on to
consider the position in relation to impersonal stock market deals.
Civil Liability at Common Law
The General Princi ple of Percival v. Wright
The is no general principle at common law requiring an insider to
disgorge any improper gain he has made as a result of his "insider" trades. In
Percival v. Wright75 , Swiften-Eady J held that directors owed their fiduciary
duties to the company and not the company's shareholders. 76 As a result
75. [1902] 2 Ch 421.
76. But see, Prentice, "Insider Trading" (1975) 	 83, at p.83, who
lists a number of contraining facts about the case.
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shareholders had no direct cause of action against a director who had used
inside information at the shareholders' expense; and, a fortori, a non-
shareholder (ie. an outsider), had no cause of action. In other words, if an
existing shareholder who bought or sold shares was owed no special duty then
neither was an outsider who, having no pre-existing relationship to the
company, bought shares from an insider.
The SDecial Circumstances Doctrine
Following the ruling in Percival v. Wright there developed what has
become popularly known as the "special circumstances doctrine". The relevant
cases here are Allen v. Hyatt,77
 Gethin g v. Kilner,78 and Coleman v. Myers.79
In Allen v. H yatt it was held that where a director holds himself out to be the
agent of the shareholders then he owes the same fiduciary duties as would an
ordinary agent to his principal. In that case merger negotiations were taking
place. The directors of one company, Lakeside Canning Co. Ltd., induced certain
shareholders in the company to give them the option to sell their shares. The
offer was made on the purported basis that it would strengthen the position of
all the shareholders in the merger negotiations. When the negotiations were
concluded the directors exercised their right to buy the shares and in doing so
made a profit. The case was distinguished from Percival v. Wri ght because the
directors had held themslves out as agents of some of the shareholders and thus
were capable of being considered as fiduciaries to those shareholders.
Likewise, in Gethin g v. Kilner, certain dicta gave support to the view
that in some circumstances directors owed fiduciary duties to shareholders.
77. Allen v. Hyatt [1922] 30 TLR 444.
78. [1972] 1 WLR 337.
79. [1977] 2 NZLR 225.
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This involved the duty to refrain from making negligent or deceitful misstate-
ments. In that case, the plaintiffs were shareholders in R. Co.,. Another
group called TC Ltd sought to acquire the plaintiff company's assets. An
agreement was eventually reached. Subsequently, R.Co., called in a firm of
stockbrokers whose job it was to advise R.Co., on the merits of the offer. The
stockbrokers' report concluded that the offer was unsatisfactory. R.Co.,'s
directors disagreed and recommended their shareholders to sell. The plaintiff's
sought to prevent the directors of R. Co., from recommending the offer. It
was held, that the directors of R. Co., owed a duty to their shareholders
which included the duty to be honest and not to mislead. The special nature of
the facts of the case mean, quite obviously, that it has a very narrow reading
and for this reason might amount to nothing more than an amalgam of common law
duties not to be dishonest.8°
Undoubtedly the most significant case to advocate a special circumstances
doctrine has been Coleman v. Myers81 . There the New Zealand Court of Appeal,
departing from the principle in Perceival v. Wright, held that in special
circumstances a director would owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. The
circumstances in that case which prompted the judge to establish a duty focused
on (1) the nature of the face-to-face transaction, (2) the high degree of
inside information which the insiders possessed, and (3) the actual conduct of
82the takeover. In the words of the Woodhouse J (as he was then):
the standard of conduct required from a director in relation to
dealings with a shareholder will differ depending upon all the
surrounding circumstances and the nature of the responsibility which
in a real and practical sense the director has assumed towards the
shareholder. In the one case there may be a need to provide an
explicit warning and a great deal of information concerning the
proposed transaction. In another there will be no need to speak at
all. There will be intermediate situations.
80. , Pennington, Com pany Law, at p.684, (5th Ed. Butterworths 1985)
81. [1977] 2 NZLR 225.
82. [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225 at p. 324.
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It is uncertain to what extent , if any, a UK court would follow this decision.
Indeed, in a recent U.K. decision, Dillon U said: "The directors ... owe
fiduciary duties to the company though not ... to the indivdival shareholders.83
Possible Actions Derived From Existin g Case Law
(a) Civil Action B y the Comoany:
(i) against its directors
Since a director owes fiduciary duties to his company, a number of
corollaries necessarily follow. 84 First, he must not put himself into a
position where his own interest is in conflict with the interests of his
principal and the duties owed to that principal. 85 Secondly, he is precluded,
by virtue of his position as fiduciary, from making a secret profit from the
company to whom he owes fiduciary duties. 86 According to Re gal Hastin gs v.
Gulliver any profit made by a director as a result of the misuse of
confidential information is the property of the company. 87 The company can,
therefore, bring a civil action against the director to recover these profits.
83. See, Multi-national Gas and Petrochemical Co v. Multinational Gas and
Petrochemical Services Limited [1983] 2 All ER 563 at 585 CA.
84. It is also important to note that a director occupies an agency role
rather than that of a trustee in relation to the affairs of the company. As
Rider points out, this is significant from two points of view: (1) the
strictness of the duties owed and (2) the remedies available for breach of
duty. He also argues that a director might be liable as a constructive trustee
of corporate property which he misdirects. $., Rider Insider Tradin g (Jordans,
1983) at p.69 et sea,
85. See generally , Chapter Six and the sources cited therein.
86. Keetch v. Sandford (1972) Sel Cas Ch 61.
87. [1942] All ER 378. See also, Boardman v. Phios - [1967] A.C. 46
where it was held that "any benefit derived from the use of confidential inform-
ation obtained by virtue of a fiduciary position should be accounted for to the
persons to whom the duty is owed even if they themselves could not have made
use of the information."
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In Regal Hastin gs the directors acquired a profit by virtue of their position
as directors in Regal Hastings. They bought a company which they knew Regal
Hastings could not afford to buy. Regal Hasting was thus allowed to sue.
But the decision in Regal Hastin gs - permitting the company to sue - is
not without its difficulties. Not only has there been a reluctance on the part
of directors to enforce the remedy on behalf of the company by suing fellow
directors88 but the remedy does very little to help the real victim: it is the
shareholder (in a face-to-face transaction) and an "outsider" (in a stock maket
deal) who is "damaged" by insider dealing; not the company. 89
 Indeed, as the
Justice Report concluded:90
[T]he company will not normally have suffered any loss, and there
seems no reason in equity why it should benefit from the punishment
of the insider's misconduct ... [I]f the insider is a substantial
shareholder, the damages paid by him will, in part, indirectly return
to him and he will still be left with a net profit on the transaction,
(... even if the rule in	 v. Harbottle were allowed, the
practical difficulties of ensuring that proceedings are taken by a
shareholder on behalf of the company would be very considerable.
Consequently we think that proceedings by the company are not
appropriate as the primary remedy against insider trading, and we see
no reason to extend the rights of action which the company appears to
have (see paragraph 6 above), though equally we see no reason to
restrict them.)
It is probably not necessary to show that the company has suffered loss91
92As Prentice writes:
the fact that a company suffers no loss would not constitute a bar to
the company recovering from a director any profits made from insider
88. It would probably be necessary for control of the company to change
hands before such an action is contemplated. This infact was the case in Regal
Hastings where an action was brought against the ex-directors to recover the
profits they had gained form the misuse of the company's information.
89. However an insider of the offeror company knowing the name of the
target company who buys shares in the target will effectively increase the bid
price which the offeror company must make. Admittedly this is only so if the
purchases by the insider are substantial.
90. Justice, Report on Insider Tradin g (1972) para. 32.
91. , infra at note 140 and accompanying text.
92. Su pra, note 76 at p.86.
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trading as other pegs on which liability could be hung, such as
access to confidential information or abuse of position, are clearly
present.
Rider also argues that a company can recover from a director who misuses inside
information for a purpose other than that for which it was entrusted. He
93
says:
Where a person in a fiduciary relationship with a company is
entrusted with information in confidence on behalf of the company,
then it is certain he would be in breach of his fiduciary duties if
he used that information for other than the corporate purpose for
which it was given to him. To engage in insider trading for himself
or another ... would not be a legitimate corporate purpose and would
render him accountable to the company for the profit that he makes.
This would obviously cover a good many situations of [traditional]
insider trading.
(ii). against a third party ("tippee") as constructive trustee
A third party - or tippee - may become liable as constructive trustee if
he knowingly assists in a dishonest and fraudulent design or breach of trust
undertaken by the director of a company, notwithstanding the fact that he did
not acquire possession of the trust property. 94	The tippee must, however,
know not only of the existence of the fiduciary relationship and of the
fraudulent and dishonest design by the fiduciary (director), but also of his
own assistance in that fraudulent design. 95
	Furthermore, a third party may
also be liable if he receives corporate property with actual or constructive
knowledge of a breach of trust.96
 However, here the equitable remedy of
tracing extends only to those who are not bona fide purchasers for value. It
93. See, su pra note 9, at p.79.
94. , Karak Rubber Co. v. Burden [No.2], [1972] 1 AU E.R. 1210 at pp.
1234-1235; Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Craddock [No.31 [1968] 2 All
E.R. 1073 at pp. 1123-1124; Snell, Princi p les of Equity (27th ed., 1973), 185-
188.
95. , Belmont Finance Cor ps v. Williams Furniture Ltd [No.2] 1980 1
All 393 at 405.
96. For the difficulties with this approach, see, Hannigan, supra note 9
at p. 119 et seq.
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is not clear whether the company is required to show loss. 97
 Indeed the law is
very uncertain in this whole area and such actions in relation to the imposition
of liability for insider dealing are very unlikely to be brought or to succeed.
(b) Possibilit y of a Derivative Action B y The Shareholder
Another possibility of gaining civil redress is that a shareholder could
take a derivative action on behalf of the company. The problem here is that
the rule in EQ v. Harbottle virtually debars individual shareholders from
taking such a course of action. 98	However by virtue of s.459-461 of the
Companies Act 1985 a shareholder is allowed "to bring an action for relief on
the basis that a minority (including himself) has been unfairly prejudiced by
those in control of the company." This should provide some relief from the
strictness of the rule in 	 v. Harbpttle. But even here an individual
shareholder who brings an action would be unable to secure a direct remedy
because any damages that might possibly be recovered would belong to the
company.
It would seem therefore that although various potential commom law
remedies do exist, an individual shareholder has no effective remedy against an
insider. Even if the UK Courts did follow Coleman v. M yers it would
provide relief only in very limited circumstances. Furthermore, an "outsider"
who purchased shares from an insider would have no means of redress.
97. , infra at note 91 and accompanying text.
98. (1843) 2 Ha 461. The rule states that shareholders may not pursue an
action against a director if the directors actions are such that they can be
(though they need not have been) ratified in general meeeting. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule and the possibility always exists that the
courts could make another exception. A further motivation for shareholders to
take a derivative action has arisen due to the decision in Wallenstien v. Moir
(No 2) [1975] QB 373.
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99Breach of Confidence
If one arm of a conglomerate offering financial advice to a client
acquires inside information about that client and subsequently deals on it or
relays it to others who deal on it, the conglomerate is potentially liable for
an action brought by the client for breach of confidence. Though not confined
to contractual relationships,' 0° such an action is nonetheless dependant on
two main factors.
First: what constitutes confidential information? The Saitman case'°°
addressed the question of the nature of confidential information. The acid
test, said Lord Greene, was whether the information had:'°2
the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be
something which is public property and public knowledge.
In general unpublished price-sensitive information fulfils this requirement.'°3
Secondly: when does an obligation of confidence arise? According to
104Megarry J. in Coco v. A N Clark (En g) Ltd	 an obligation of confidence
arises where: "... the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing
in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon
reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then
99. See generally , the Law Commission Re port No.! 10. Breach of Confidence
(1981), Cmnd. 8388, and Hanningan, su pra note 9 at p.125 et sea.
100. Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v. Campbell En g ineering Ltd [19631 3 All
ER 413.
101. Saltman Engineerin g Co Ltd v. Campbell En gineering Ltd [1963] 3 All
ER 413.
102. jjj, at p.415.
103. But see, the reservations expressed by Hannigan, supra note 9 at
p.26-27.
104. Coco v. A N Clark (En g) Ltd [1967] RPC 41, at 47.
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this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence.
In particular, where information of a commercial or industrial value is given
on a business-like basis and with some avowed common objective in mind ...
would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a
contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence."
In view of this, it would appear that the corporate finance arm of a
conglomerate which acts as an underwriter to a client and in the course of that
relationship acquires confidential information such as earnings figures, future
corporate plans, new innovations or inventions, would fulfil this test and
would as a result owe an obligation of confidence to the client.' 05 Indeed in
Scherin g Chemicals Ltd v. Falkman Ltd 106 Shaw U said: 107 "... the
communication in a commercial context of information which at the time is
regarded by the giver and recognised by the recipient as confidential, and the
nature of which has a material connection with the material interests of the
party confiding that information, imposes on the recipient a fiduciary
obligation to maintain that confidence thereafter unless the giver consents to
relax it." Furthermore employees owe a duty of fidelity and good faith to their
employer. 108 Knowing misuse of confidential information would be a breach of
this duty. It would be implicit that City employees know that they are not to
use confidential information for the purposes of insider dealing. Thus the
confidence is breached where there is an unauthorised use of such information
by the confidant. Insider dealing would without doubt constitute an
105. But see, Law Commission Report su pra note 99 at para.4.4 where the
argument is put that Megarry J.'s test was obiter.
106. [1981] 2 All ER 321.
107. 1J2jç at 337.
108. Hival Ltd v. Park Royal [1946] 1 All ER 350. See also,
Hannigan, supra note 9 at p. 130 and the examples cited therein.
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unauthorised use.' 09
 Fiduciaries would also owe similar obligations.' 10
What remedies are available when a confidence is breached? The remedies
relevant to insider dealing are damages and an account of profits. 111 The
important point to be made from all this is that an action for breach of
confidence is a further incentive for the firm (and the individual) not to
systematically breach its Chinese Walls. To do so, and in the process use
confidential information to trade in shares, not only leaves open a firm (or
rather those members responsible for the deals) for criminal liablitiy under
the CSA 1985 and civil liability under the FSA 1986 (discussed below) but also
the client could recover for breach of obligation of confidential information
conveyed to the conglomerate in the normal course of business.
Miscellaneous Remedies
(a) Breach of Statutory Duty
It is possible, but very unlikely, that damages could be recoverable for
a loss caused by the commission of a statutory offence. For example, in
South of En gland Natural Gas Co.1 12 it was held that damages were recoverable
109. , Hannigan, su pra note 9 at p.134. According to Hanningan there
is no longer any need to prove that the confidential information was used to
the detriment of the confider.
110. See generally, discussed infra at jQ v. Coole y [1972] 2 All ER 162,
Chapter Six at note 29 and accompanying text.
111. , Hannigan, su pra note 9 at p. 136 for an assessemnt of the
extent of damages.
112. [1911] 1 Ch.
	
573.
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as a result of omissions in a prospectus which were relied upon by an investor.''3
(b) Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973
Section 35 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 empowers the courts
to require any person who has committed an offence to compensate anyone who has
suffered adversely as a result of his crime. It is possible (though unlikely' 14)
that this discretionary power could be used to provide civil compensation in
cases of insider dealing.
(c) Extra-legal control by the Takeover Panel.
A number of the Takeover Panel rules prohibit trading on the basis of
inside information.' 15 Firms regulated by the Panel who have been found to have
traded on the basis of inside information are required to disgorge any profit
they make. But the remedies are extra-legal and of little assistance to an
aggrieved investor. Even when ill-gained profits are disgorged they are
distributed to charities rather than aggrieved investors.
113. But see, Mayson and French, A Practical A pproach to Com pany Law
(2nd. Ed. Financial Training Publications Ltd: 1982), at p.254, where they
write that: s!the fact that Parliament has imposed stiff penalties for insider
dealing will probably stop the Courts permitting actions for damages for breach
of statutory duty brought by an uninformed buyer or seller [against an insider
dealer with whom he dealt].
114. Mainly because of the difficulty of unscrambling random deals and
assessing the Correct amount of damages to be awarded. In any case it has been
held that the remedy should only be given in the clearest cases of loss.
115. , Chapter Seven at note 77 and accompanying text.
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Civil Law Remedies under the Financial Services Act: Sections 61 & 62116
In the Gower Report recommendations with respect to a civil law remedy
for securities fraud which extended to insider dealing were eventually
transalated into law in the FSA but only in a conditional rather than an
explicit fashion, conditional in the sense that it was dependant on the SIB
making a rule prohibiting insider dealing.
Under section 62 a private investor' 17 who has suffered loss as the
result of an insider's trades may take an action if the insider has breached
one of the rules of the SIB, an SRO or an RPB.118
Clearly before s.62 can establishes a civil remedy for anyone who has
suffered loss from an insider's trades there must be a rule outlawing insider
116. See generall y , Alan Berg, "Sec 62: the Full Extent of Exposure"
(Aug) 1988, IFLR 26; also Berg, "Sec 62 and the SIB's Legal Novelty" (Jan)
1989, IFLR 18.
117. Previously the section catered for any investor. The newly
refashioned text of the section, narrowing its scope, is to be incorporated
into the forthcoming Companies Bill.
118. It is important to note that s.62 does not Q.flhl provide a civil
remedy for insider dealing but gives civil redress for any breach of the SIB
rulebook. Given the reluctance of the Parliament to provide a statutory civil
remedy to those adversely affected by insider dealing did Parliament forsee the
introduction of such a remedy when it passed section 62? No mention is made in
the debates - an indication perhaps that the remedy was in fact unintentional.
The relevant parts of section 62 read:
(1) Without prejudice to section 56 above, a contravention of, (2) Subsection
(1) applies also to a contravention by a member of a
recognised self-regulatory organisation or recognised professional body
of any rules of the organisation or body relating to a matter in respect
of which rules or regulations have been or could be made under the
Chapter in relation to an authorised person who is not a member of such
an organisation or body.
(3) A person shall not be guilty of an offence by reason of any contravention
to which this section applies and no such contravention shall invalidate
any transaction.
Subsection 1 allows an individual to pursue his action even though the SIB is
simultaneously seeking an injunction or restitution order under s.61 of the
FSA.
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dealing. Rule 3.10 of the SIB rulebook has been adopted for this purpose.''9
According to the rule, a firm is prohibited from using inside information when
dealing on its own account in those situations where the CSA prohibits
individuals from insider dealing. But an exemption is allowed if the
individual so prohibited by the CSA is "screened off" behind an effective
Chinese Wall so as to prevent that individual(s) from being aware of the
circumstances giving rise to the prohibition. Furthermore, a firm is
prohibited from effecting a transaction with any person - either a customer or
a counterparty - if it has reason to believe it is acting on the basis of
inside information.
The Issue of Proving Loss
An individual has a right of action under section 62 when he is able to
show that he has suffered loss as a result of a breach of the rule. In
relation to insider dealing this is not an easy task. The plaintiff must
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that: (1) there was a contravention of
Rule 3-10 (or its SRO equivalent), (2) privity existed between himself and the
defendant firm so that the firm's breach of duty caused him to suffer loss.
119. For a more detailed review of the rule,	 , infra Chapter Seven at
note 62 and accompanying text. It is sufficient for the present to note that
the rule states that a firm shall not effect a transaction as principle for its
own account if:
an officer or em ployee of p firm is prohibited by the Companies
Securities (Insider Dealin g) Act 1985 from effectin g p transaction...
The SIB permits two exceptions to this prohibition, first if:
the only reason why that officer or emmolovee was so prohibited was becpu
of his knowled ge of the firms intentions
and secondly, if an effective Chinese Wall is maintained by the firm so that
none of the officers or em ployees of the firm involved in effectin g or
arranging for the effectin g of the transaction on behalf of the firm knew or
ought to have known of the circumstances giving rise to that prohibition.
The rule also prohibits a firm from effecting a transaction with or for any
person:
if it has reason to believe that the effectin g of that transaction b y that
person is prohibited b y the Com pany Securities (Insider Dealin g) Act,
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Uncovering a breach of Rule 3-10 depends on the powers and resources
devoted to detecting insider dealing. While these have been woefully
inadequate in the past - very few convictions have resulted from the
legislation - these powers have nonetheless substantially increased in recent
years.' 2°	 Too what extent and, more importantly, to what effect remains to be
seen.
What is certain is that it is extremely unlikely that a private plaintiff
will uncover insider dealing transactions where the criminal authorities have
failed. However, where the plaintiff is a counterparty on the wrong side of an
insider deal the counterparty would probably have greater resources, increased
access to the relevant information and more impetus to bring an action. But it
must be remembered that only private investors may bring an action under s.62.
Of course there is always the likelihood, common in the U.S., 121 that where the
authorites have thought a case sufficiently strong to have the defendant
charged with a criminal offence and the courts have found him guilty, then the
private plaintiff may use the findings of the criminal trial to prove his own
case.
Even if the plaintiff overcomes the difficult hurdle of proving a rule
has been breached he must further show that the contravention caused him loss.
Loss is not defined in the FSA, but it probably refers to a pecuniary loss.
Thus the plaintiff would be obliged to show that he either bought/sold shares
at an inflated/deflated price from what it would have been but for the
120. , surp note 71 and sources cited therein.
121. , Cottrell, "Insider Dealing in the United States: I" (1986)
Janurary 31 LLI 88 at p.90.
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122 That is, he must show that the loss incurred was due todefendant's actions.
the insiders actions. He will have to prove that it was the defendant with
whom he dealt with and that this caused him loss. Establishing this privity
between the insider and outsider is, in strict legal terms, impossible.'23
Will the computerisation of the UK Stock Exchange resolve this dilemma?
Certainly it will make it much more easy for the authorities to find out who is
trading and when, but to what extent it will show privity is yet to be seen.
Does Section 61 Provide a Better Alternative to Section 62?
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that an investor attempting
to recover damages from an insider will face enormous difficulties in proving
not only that an insider deal occured, but also that he has suffered a loss as
a result of it. An alternative, or additional, remedy which may be pursued by
an aggrieved investor is that provided by s.61 of the FSA. Section 61 empowers
the SIB to apply to the court for a restitution order (or as it is sometimes
referred to a "disgorgement order") requiring any firm that infringes the
criminal law or the rules of the SIB or an SRO to disgorge their profits and
compensate any loss suffered by the victims of the breach on behalf of
investors. This disgorgement order could be used by the SIB in insider deal-
122. Of course in nearly every instance the plaintiff will already have
decided to buy or sell the securities in question, unaware of the insider's
price-sensitive knowledge. In reality, therefore, it is arguable whether the
defendant has caused the plaintiff any loss at all - thus the "no credible
plaintifr theory.
123. In the US the courts have done away with the need to show privity
and require plaintiff's merely to show that the insiders were trading in the
same time period as they themselves. In the US the plaintiff's action for
damages is limited to the profit which the insider has made or the loss he has
avoided and no more. See, Fischman v. Ra ytheon Mfg. Co. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul phur Co, 401 F.2d 423 (2nd Cir. 1968); Elkind v.
Liggett and Myers Inc 635 F.2d 156, 168-173 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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ing cases where Rule 3-10 has been breached. This is so because s.61 (l)(a)
provides that an order may be made where any Conduct of Business rule has been
contravened.
The court may make a disgorgment order when it is satisfied that as a
result of the contravention either the defendant has accrued a profit or one or
more investors have "suffered loss or have been otherwise adversely
l24	 .
affected.	 In an action to recover damages for insider dealing these
conditions would probably be more easily satisfied than the s.62 remedy simply
because the SIB does not need to prove the difficult problem of "loss" but
merely that an investor has been adversely affected by the contravention in
question. However it is not at all clear what "adversely affected" means.
Thus a court may apply a liberal interpretation to this concept in order to
overcome the strictness of the test in s.62. It is interesting to note that
Parliament struck these words out of s.62 because they took away from the
purity of the section. This leaves the question: why were they not removed
from s. 61 as well? This aside, the courts may still make an order if an
insider has profited as a result of his dealing. Thus under s.61, if insider
dealing itself can be shown and also that a profit accrued to an insider, it is
substantially easier to recover damages against that insider than under s.62.
If an order is made the sum to be disgorged is based on either the amount
of the profit which has accrued to the insider, or the amount of loss or
adverse affect to investors, or indeed, a combination of both these factors.125
The money is then to be paid into court, or to a receiver, and distributed:126
among such persons as the court may direct, being a person or persons
appearing to the court to have entered into transactions with [the
124. , FSA s.61 (I), emphasis added.
125. , FSA s.61 (3).
126. , FSA s.61 (6).
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insider].
Thus privity in the transaction must still be shown if a particular investor is
to benefit from the disgorgement order. As mentioned earlier this should be
made easier since the computerisation of the Stock Exchange in October 1986.
Section 61 of the FSA is obviously crucial to the future development of civil
liability for insider dealing.
It is clear that at common law there is no effective remedy for an
individual who suffers loss due to insider dealing. Such a remedy is however
offered by s.62 of the FSA 1986, the operation of which has presently been
suspended and is due for amendment in the new Companies Bill. When it does
become fully operational s.62 will, inter alia, theoretically, provide
individual private investors' 27
 with a right of action as a result of the
prohibition of insider dealing in the SIB's Conduct of Business Rules. However
an attempt to bring an action will be plaged by difficulties, not the least
being the need to prove loss, and the absence of a contingency fee system in
the UK.
In practice it is more likely that investors will be offered a greater
possibility of restitution for the illegal use of inside information by virtue
of s.61 of the FSA. This section has the advantage of the SIB bringing the
action, therefore the investor does not have to lay out significant amounts of
money in legal fees. Further, the factors to be proven are less stringent,
with the immediate advantage that this section is now legally operative whereas
s.62 has been further delayed.
127. The new newly amended section will not provide professional or
business investors with a right to sue. , suora note 117 and accompanying
text
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II. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE U.S.
In the U.S. insider trading law has evolved at a much faster pace than
any other country. Reliance has been placed mainly on case law to map the
contours of the current prohibition. 128	Recently, however, statutory measures
have become increasingly relevant. These are also considered below.
Tradin g B y Corporate Insiders
Insider trading is not defined in either the Securities Act 1933 or the
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA). 129 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.), which was formed in 1933, and remains the governing regulatory
watchdog body for the U.S. securities markets, has constructed its enforcement
programme of insider abuse on a number of rather pragmatic bases. First, on
the general anti-fraud provisions contained in the aforementioned statutes and
developed by case law; and second, on what has recently emerged as the SEC's
128. The literature on this subject is voluminous and steadily growing.
The main texts are cited in the footnotes accompanying this section. It seems
certain that in near future the U.S will have in place comprehensive statutory
proposals prohibiting insider trading. However at the time of writing, these
had not been finally settled. For a brief review of one SEC proposal	 ,	 H.
McVea, "U.S.A. - Compromise Proposal for Regulation of Insider Trading", (1988)
9 LB., p.239. However,	 , SEC Commissioner Grundfest, "Is the Sky Really
Falling? The State of Insider Trading Law After the Winans Decision", speech
before the Federal Bar Association, Washington, 26 January, 1988, where he
states that: "The more prudent course of action may ... be to allow the courts
to continue to develop the law of insider trading on a case-by case basis, and
put efforts aimed at a statutory definition on the legislative back burner."
(at p.2).
129. Section 16 of the SEA 1934 was the first legislative attempt in the
U.S. to regulate insider trading. The section, however, has a narrow scope
applying only to directors, officers, and large shareholders. Section 16
requires these individuals to report all trading activity in the shares (or
options) of	 j1 company, prohibits short selling, and requires disgorgement
of any profits that result from holding a position less than six months. For a
more detailed review of s.16,	 , William H. Painter, "Insider Trading and
the Banker Director", (1967) 150 (Winter) Banker's Ma gazine, p . 30 et sea.
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new and most potent weapon - the misappropriation theory.' 3°	 The most
131	 .	 . .	 .	 132important	 anti-fraud provisions are section 10 of the SEA 1934 	 and Rule
133lOb-5 derived there-from.
The growing body of U.S. case law which this regulation has spawned,
makes it possible to devise a framework outlining the countries current
proscription of the abuse. In the U.S insider trading may be defined as
trading in an issuer's securites (or communicating or "tipping") while in
possession of material nonpublic information 134 relating to the issuer's
securities or the market for those securities. This may involve either the
130. $, below at note 159 and accompanying text for a detailed review
of the misappropriation theory.
131. Generally all insider dealing convictions involve violations of the
mail and wire fraud statutes (see below at note 166 and accompanying text) as
well as tax fraud, perjury and obstruction of justice.
	
for example,
Carberry & and Romatowski, "Criminal Theories for Prosecution of Insider
Trading," in Insider Tradin g 83-125 (1986) quoted in Ralph S. Janvey,
"Criminal Prosecution of Insider Trading", (1987) 15 Securities Re gulation Law
Journal p.136 at p.138.
132. Section 10 reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
133. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
134. Information is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment
decision. TSC Industries. Inc. v. Northwpy . Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Although Northway involved proxy violations, this test has been applied in
insider trading cases as well. See also, United States v. Car penter, 791 F.2d
at 1032 n.9.
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misappropriation of confidential information or the breach of a fiduciary duty
of confidentiality.
Insider Trading at Common Law
At common law, an action for insider trading was originally based in the
tort of misrepresentation or fraud. The main problem with this was that often
the insider merely failed to disclose that he had material nonpublic inform-
ation; in other words there was no positive misrepresentation. Furthermore,
there needed to be proved that a duty to disclose was owed. The courts, in
turn, developed three different rules specifying when, if ever, an insider
would owe a duty of disclosure in face-to-face transactions.
According to the "majority rule TM a director owes fiduciary duties to his
corporation and not to the shareholders with whom he trades in face-to-face
transactions; p fortori no duty is owed to outsiders with whom he trades on the
impersonal stock markets.'35
In Stron g v. RaDide' 36 the "special facts" doctrine emerged. This says
that a director has, depending on the circumstances, a positive duty to
disclose any material information he holds when engaging in face-to-face
137transactions.
135. , Goodwin v. A gazziz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
the similarity with Percival v. Wrighl, [1902] 2 Ch.421, discussed su pra note
75 and accompanying text.
136. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
137. According to Lazenby v. Goodwin, 253 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. App. 1979),
special circumstances likely to invoke the exception include: "the fact that
the corporation is closely held ... the familial relationship of the parties
initiates the sale ... and the relative ages and experiences in financial
affairs of the directors and shareholders." (at p.492). Note, the similarity
with Colmen v. Myers, [1977] 2 NZLR 225.
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Under the "strict" rule, however, directors owe a duty of disclosure
to individual shareholders in face-to-face transactions; that is, no special
circumstances are required. Perhaps the most widely quoted statement of the
rule is contained in Taylor v. Wright' 38 where it was laid down that: "the
detailed information a director has of corporate affairs is in a very real
sense property of the corporation, and ... no director should be permitted to
use such information for his own benefit at the expense of his stockholders."39
The "majority rule" is probably no longer the most widely followed of the
three legal principles by the U.S. State Courts today. 14° Thus, it would seem
fair to say that in the U.S., common law dictates that a director will, in most
circumstances, owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure to shareholders with whom he
trades in face-to-face transactions (this is in distinct contrast to the
position at U.K. common law under Percival v. Wri ght). However, his common law
responsiblities do not extend to a duty of disclosure when he trades in the
impersonal stock exchange markets.
The limitations of individual recovery at common law led some courts to
develop a rule allowing the corporation to recover the insider's profits by way
of a derivative action which encompassed the situation where the insider traded
on impersonal stock markets. For example, in Broth y v. Cities Serv.
the court held that when "an employee in the course of his employment acquires
secret information relating to his employer's business, he occupies a position
138. 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 159 P.2d 980, (1945).
139. IkJ^L, at p.984-S.
140. , Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York:
Free Press 1966) at p. 57-58, where he says that the special facts doctrine is
"without question the prevailing approach in the states today".
l4Oa. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
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of trust and confidence toward it, analagous in most respects to that of
fiduciary ... [consequently the information was not to be usedi in competition
with or to the injury of ...[the corporation].' 4 ' In a further passage, the
court noted that it was not necessary for the corporation to suffer injury.'42
In the later case of Diamond v. Oreamuno,' 43 Brophy was heavily relied
upon. Applying strict agency principles, the court concluded that an insider
who traded on the basis of material nonpublic information was liable to his
corporation for the profits. The decision in Diam, however, was not
followed in Schien v. Chasen' 44 or in Freeman v. Decio t45 where the courts
ruled that a corporation could not recover unless it first proved that it had
in fact been injured by the insider's illicit trading.' 46 Either way, in the
U.S., at common law, an insider does not owe an outsider any duty of disclosure
when the insider trades on impersonal stock markets.
141. at p.7.
142. at p.8.
143. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
144. 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
145. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978). Indeed the Court posited the view
that a corporation was unable to show loss - how could inside information the
corporation was not capable of using in any case be considered a corporate
asset, asked the court.
146. For a comprehensive review of this whole issue 	 , Gerard E.
Wimberly, Jr., "Corporate Recovery of Insider Trading Profits at Common Laws,
(1985) 8 CorD L Rev p.179-250. Wimberly's main thesis is that the Brophy-
Diamond decisions are justifiable "on the grounds of fundamental principles of
fiduciary law and the status of confidential information as an asset to the
corporation, to which its exclusive use is reserved." (at p.201). For other
types of liability premised on common law principles	 , Jeffery D. Bauman
and Robert H. Rosenblum, "The Resurgence of Common Law Restrictions on Insider
Trading", Vol. 32 No.5 The Practical Lawyer. Other types of liability
mentioned therein include: conspiracy, aiding and abetting and conversion. The
general conclusion, however, is that these are at best uncertain and vary from
State to state. For this reason, it is not proposed to deal with them further.
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Insider Trading at Federal Law
In 1942 the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5. Initially the rule was not viewed
with great significance by either the SEC or commentators.' 47 However, before
long the Courts began to use it in an attempt to curb insider trading. In
Kardon v. National G ypsum, 148 the court held that corporate officers who traded
face-to-face with shareholders on the basis of material nonpublic information
were in violation of rule lOb-5. In 1961, in the Commission's administrative
149proceedings against Cadv Roberts
	
, the SEC outlined for the first time the
basis of the insider trading prohibition. There it was said:
the obligation [entails] two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent,
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such i1?rmation
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Initially then, while the insider trading prohibition was directed only
at persons connected with the company whose securities were in question, the
Cad y. Roberts decision broadened the scope of the law considerably to extend
to, in this example, a trust officer who traded on the basis of inside
147. , Manne, "In defence of Insider Trading" (1966a) 44 (6) Harvard
Business Review ppl20-121.
148. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
149. In Re Cadv. Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) the facts were as
follows: X, a member of the board of directors of the Curtiss Wright
Corporation, was also a registered representative of the brokerage firm of
Cady, Roberts. X informed one of the partners of the brokerage firm that
Curtiss Wright's dividend was about to be cut. As a result, the partner sold
some Curtiss Wright shares. It was held that material facts had first to be
disclosed publicly before trading in the shares on impersonal stock markets
could take place. Consequently, the partner, as tippee, was just as unable to
make use of the material nonpublic information as was X himself. Furthermore,
concluded the SEC, in the event of a conflict between duties imposed by Federal
Law and fiduciary duties imposed by State law, Federal law was to remain
primary.
150. at 912.
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151information he had obtained from an insider. 	 Thus the SEC held that Rule
lOb-S was not confined to traditional insiders but was equally applicable to
"those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs, and [who] thereby suffer corresponding duties in trading
[on] its securities".'52
On the basis of the second limb of this key dicta, the wider principle
could also be extracted: that insider trading in impersonal stock markets was
153in breach of Rule lOb-5.
The Commission's ruling was soon given judicial backing in S	 v. Texas
151. Originally trust law required all special skills and knowledge of
the trust officer to be placed at the disposal of the beneficiary. Indeed the
courts considered the gathering of information from insiders as evidence of the
trustees "care and prudence." However this could no longer be true after the
1961 ruling.
152. Re Cady. Roberts & Co., su pra note 149, at 912.
153. See, Langevoort, "Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A
Post-Chiarella Restatement", (1982) 70 Calif L Rev 1 at p.8, who observes that
Cad y. Roberts contained: "little discussion of how it is that, absent any real
inducement of shareholder trading, such unfair conduct becomes fraud. Instead,
the decision implicitly relies on the insider's duty to act affirmatively to
prevent the other party's disadvantageous trade, apparently based on the duty
of loyalty. In theory, had disclosure been made to the public, marketplace
buyers or sellers would not have traded (at least not at that price). By so
stating the duty to disclose and resulting marketplace harm, the unfair conduct
could be treated as a fraud, which would satisfy the statutory prerequisite for
rule lOb-5 liability. However, this analysis involves some fiction, since had
the insider simply abstained (as was his or her principal obligation), most
marketplace buyers or sellers would have traded just the same, so that
deception and resulting harm are difficult to find. Nevertheless, it provided
the only open remedy for open market insider trading." (footnote omitted).
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154Gulf Sulphur Co.
	
There it was laid down that those persons who had access to
inside information were required to observe the 'abstain or disclose' principle
ie. they had either to disclose the inside information held or abstain from
trading. The Court said:
An yone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public or if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securitis5 oncerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.
In 1971, the Texas Gulf Sul phur decision was developed in the
administrative case of Re Investors Management.' 56	There, a brokerage house,
acting as underwriter, legitimately acquired inside information from one of its
client's. On learning of the information, the brokerage house sold a large
stock position which it had built up in the clients shares. The brokerage firm
argued that it was a non-insider with no special relationship to any insider,
and did not, as a result, owe any duty of disclosure. The Commission rejected
this contention. Instead it adopted an expansive interpretation which required
anyone who obtained possession of material, non-public information from a
corporation to disclose this information to the market. This was so because
possession of such information placed it in a position "superior to other
persons [and] thereby acquir[ing] a relationship ... [which made it] subject to
154. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir 1968). Here, company officials, being aware of
an important mineral strike by their company, TGS, bought shares in the
corporation. The shares where purchased through the New York Stock Exchange
before the news reached the company's full board of directors. The Court held
that the company officials where in breach of Rule lOb-5 because "the Rule is
based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access
to material information" (at p. 848). The court established the principle of
fraud on the market place thereby neatly side-steping any need to define who
exactly had been defauded. A fund was established into which the defendants
were required to disgorge their illegal profits.
155. at p.848. (emphasis added).
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the restraints and the purview of the anti-fraud provisions".'56
The substantive law of insider trading was reviewed by the Supreme Court
for the first time in Chiarella v. LL&157 where the defendant, Vincent
Chiarella, a print worker in Pandick Press, a financial printing firm, decoded
the names of several target companies in which takeovers where imminent. Aware
that his conduct was forbidden by his employer, he bought shares in the
companies prior to the announcement of the bid. When the announcement forced
the price of the shares up he subsequently sold. The Supreme Court held,
overturning the lower court, 158 that Chairella did not owe an affirmative duty
to disclose his information or abstain from trading. No duty was owed, said
the court, where the defendant merely possessed material non-public information
relating to the securities in which he traded. Instead the duty to disclose or
abstain was dependant upon whether the trader owed the issuer of the securities
a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence. No such relationship
was present.
The Misa ppropriation Theory
The Supreme Court's ruling in Chiarella represented a major set-back for
the SEC's insider trading enforcement programme. Although the law adequately
covered corporate officers who traded in the securities of their own companies
- such officers owed fiduciary duties to the company if it was the issuer of
156. SEC 633 (1971), at p.644.
157. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
158. In the lower court, Chairella had been convicted of a criminal
violation of s.lU(b) and Rule lOb-5. This was affirmed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals who held that since he had access to inside information he was
a market insider and was thus bound by the disclose or abstain rule. The court
was of the opinion that its ruling was "but a logical application of the
congressional policies underlying the rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur." 588 F.2d
1358 (2d Cir 1978) at p.1369.
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securities in which they traded - the prohibition did not extend to persons who
breached fiduciary duties to anyone other than the issuer of the securities
traded in.' 59
 As a result of this weakness the SEC developed the misappropr-
iation theory. According to this doctrine, it is theft of confidential
information if an individual uses non-public inform-ation for his own personal
benefit in breach of any duty. 16° Therefore, a lawyer, accountant or
journalist aware of inside information relating to a company in whose shares he
trades is liable under Rule lOb-5 notwithstanding the absence of a fiduciary
duty to the issuer of the securities provided there is at least a duty owed to
another person - here the law firm, the accountancy firm or the newspaper.
The lower courts have been prepared to endorse the misappropriation theory
in a number of their rulings. For example, in LLJ, v. Newman, a decision in
which the misappropriation theory was adopted by the Second Circuit for the
first time, the court held that Newman had stolen information from his empoyer
and had thereby breached his fiduciary duties to his employer and his employers
161	 .	 . 162
clients.	 Equally, in	 v. Materia	 the Second Circuit thought that one
who misappropriates non-public information in breach of a fiduciary duty and
159. In other words, the law did not cover a breach of duty owed to the
courts, self regulatory bodies, financial intermediaries or newspapers etc.
160. The idea of a misappropriation theory was first mooted in the
Second Circuits Chiarella judgement, but was rejected in the Supreme Court's
majority opinion because it had not been fully argued before the jury in the
lower court. Nonetheless the doctrine did find favour in the Supreme Court's
concurring and dissenting judgements. Chief Justice Burger, for example,
believed that "[a]n investor who purchases securities on the basis of mis-
appropriated nonpublic information possesses ... an 'undue' trading advantage;
his conduct saves no useful function except his own enrichment at the expense
of others." (445 U.S. at p.241). In his opinion Rule lOb-S prohibited trading
on misappropriated nonpublic information and the majority had been wrong in not
expressly arriving at that conclusion (at p.243).
161. LL	 v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
162. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) at 203, cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1053 (1985). Here the facts resembled closely those in the Chiarella
case. An employee of a financial printers specialising in documents dealing
with forthcoming tender offers discovered 4 target companies and purchased
shares in them. These he sold once the offers were made public.
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trades on that information to his own advantage" was in violation of the
law. 163 It was held that Materia had breached his fiduciary duty to his
employers and his employer's clients, and had therefore, violated Rule lOb-5.
The most recent challenge to the validity and scope of the misappropriation
theory came in the Supreme Court decision of Caroenter v. 	 more commonly
164known as the Winans case. 	 The decision has been heralded by the SEC as
judicial acceptance of their controversial doctrine. On closer inspection,
however, it would appear that this interpretation is much too wide.'65
It is crucial to make a clear distinction between the misappropriation
involved in Winans and that which was at the centre of both the Newman and
Materia cases. While in Newman and Materia the information misappropriated was
the employers' clients' confidential information, in Winans the confidential
information was not. Rather, the information merely related to a newspaper
column which was soon to be published recommending the shares of a particular
company. In other words, in Winans no confidential information was specific-
ally entrusted to his employer whereas in Newman and Materia there was. The
facts of the case make this clear. Winans was a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal's wIIeard on the Street Column". The column, which assessed the favour-
ableness of certain investments in shares, had the potential for affecting the
price of the securities it examined. Winans was aware that Journal policy was
to keep the contents of the column secret prior to publication and that the
contents of the column were regarded as the Journal's confidential information.
In disregard of this fact Winan's engaged in a scheme with certain Wall Street
financiers to provide them with the contents of the column prior to its
163. at p.203.
164. David Carpenter. et at., v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
165. See, below at note 167 and accompanying text.
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publication. The plan was for the financiers to place deals based on the
probable impact of the column on the market and then share the profits.
At first instance the District Court found (and the Court of Appeals
agreed) that Winan's had knowingly breached a duty of confidentiality by
misappropriating prepublication information regarding the timing and contents
of the Heard columns. With respect to the charges under s.JO(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act the court held that the deliberate breach of Winan's
duty of confidentiality and concealment of the scheme was a fraud and a deceit
on the Journal, and although the victim of the fraud - the Journal - was not a
buyer or seller of the shares traded in or otherwise a market participant, the
fraud was nevertheless considered to be "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of securities within the meaning of the statute (ie. s.1O(b) and Rule lOb-
5).
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the Lower Court's ruling. The
Justices were asked to review two questions. The first related to conviction
under s.lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and the second concerned
166
conviction under the mail and wire fraud statutes. 	 On the first question,
the Court was evenly divided 4-4 and for that reason affirmed the judgement of
the Lower Courts which had accepted the misappropriation doctrine. Therefore
the Supreme Court's analysis of the case only revolved around the second
question presented to it; ie. conviction under the mail and wire fraud
166. 18 U.S.C. S.S. 1341 and 1343. These share the same language in
relevant part to s. 10(b) of the SEA 1934 and Rule lOb-5.
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statutes. 167
 As a result the misappropriation theory still rests on a rather
168precarious foothold.
Tender Offers: Rule l4e-3
The SEC's Rule 14e-3, which derives validity from s.14(e) of the SEA
1934, forms the basis of insider trading liability in tender offer cases and as
such would probably, had it been in operation, covered the activities of both
Newman and Chiarella. The rule, which was promulgated on 4 September 1980, in
relevant part reads:
[i]f any person has taken substantial steps ... to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall
constitute a fraudlent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice
within the meaning of section 14(e) of the [Exchange] Act for any
other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such tender offer which information he knows or ought reasonably
to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from: (1) [t]he
offering person; (2) (tlhe issuer of the securities sought or to be
sought by such tender offer; or (3) [a]ny officer, director, partner
or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering
person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased
or sold any of such securities ... unless within a reasonable time
period prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source
are publically disclosed by press release or otherwise.
Once "substantial steps" have taken place to commence a tender offer the Rule
167. Althought this had strictly nothing to do with the misappropriation
theory it did have a direct bearing on the conviction of insider traders. 	 ,
Grundfest, supra note 1 at p.7: "(T]he scope of the Court's mail and wire fraud
ruling is so broad that it effectively fills any void that may have been created
by the securities Jaw decision on the criminal side. In the wake of Winan it
seems clear that insider trading violations are ... also violations of the mail
and wire fraud statutes." See also, Janvey, sur note 131, at p. 140 and
sources cited therein.
168. At least two Commentators would seem to endorse this view.	 for
example, Harvey Pitt who suggests that the split decision "leaves the Commission's
own enforcement tools in a state of limbo."; and Professor James Cox who claims
that the Winans decision "casts a menancing shadow on the continued effective
enforcement of insider trading rules." (as cited in Grundfest,
	 note 128).
however, the Commissioners rebuttal: "Contrary to the suggestion of
[some] observers, Winans does not mean that the sky is falling on the
Commission's insider trading program." (at p.2). I-Ic bases his argument on the
fact that "Winans is not a garden-variety misappropriation case. It is an
exotic case that tests the outer limits of the securities law." (at p.1).
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prohibits M person who possesses material, nonpublic information concerning
the tender offer from: (1) trading themselves or (2) causing others to trade,
in the securities of the target company if the person "knows or ought reasonably
to know" that the information has been acquired either directly or indirectly
from any of the three groups specified in the Rule. If any person does fall
within the remit of the rule, public disclosure of the information is essential
before that person can trade. It is also important to note that the prohibition
in Rule l4e-3 does not require the defendant to owe or breach a fiduciary or
other duty to the issuer of the securities traded in or to any other person.
In other words, although under the misappropriation theory no breach of duty to
the issuer of the securities traded in is required, there only needing to be a
breach of duty to another person, under Rule 14e-3 it is not necessary for any
fiduciary duty to be owed or breached.
Trading
 by Secondary Insiders or Tippees
Texas Gulf Sul phur, as well as affirming the general disclose or abstain
principle, made it clear that the persons communicating inside information
(tippers) to others (tippees) would be in breach of the Jaw; and the tippees
themselves would also be subject to the disclose or abstain rule (ie. prevented
from tipping).' 69 The case of Sha p iro v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce. Fenner & Smith
Inc' 70 in part addressed this issue. It was clearly held that "tippees" -
here institutional investors - were subject to the abstain or disclose rule.
The reasoning offered by the court centred on the fact that such persons had a
169. v. Texas Gulf Sul phur Co., 401 F.2d at 852.
170. 495 F2d 228 (2d Cir 1974). Here, Douglas Aircraft Authority was an
underwriting client of the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch. In the course of the
relationship the underwriting department received adverse non-public
information about the Aircraft Authority. This information was "leaked" to
some of the firms favoured institutional clients by empoyees in a number of
departments.
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special access to inside information which arose from communications they had
received from primary insiders.' 7 ' Consequently they ought to have imposed upon
them the same duties as traditional insiders.
In Dirks v.	 the Supreme Court curtailed the liability of both
tippers and tippees considerably. Dirks, an investment analyst, uncovered a
massive financial fraud. This news he relayed to some of his clients who sold
the issuer's shares before the fraud was publicly disclosed. A new general
rule was applied: that a tippee owed outsiders a fiduciary duty when an insider
tipped or communicated to him material non-public information where the tippee
knew or ought to have known that the information was of the prohibited type and
was communicated in breach of a duty owed by the tipper.' 73 However a rider was
also added: the question of the tipper's liablity was dependant upon the
purpose of the disclosure. The test was whether the prosecution could show
that the tipper received some form of direct or indirect personal benefit from
the outlawed conduct.' 74 Thus the tippee's liabiltiy was limited to those
situations where he knew or ought reasonably to have known of the insider's
breach of duty; and the tipper's liability was contingent upon the purpose of
his action.
Much has been made by the SEC of a footnote in the Dirks case. 175 The
note imposes 'temporary insider' status in the situation:'76
where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders ... [they do not
171. at p. 237. Note also that Cad y Roberts was also a tippee case.
172. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
173. , at p.660.
174. The test is objective.	 Janvey, su pra note 131. See also, the
new SEC proposal discussed in McVea, suora note 128, where the requirement of a
showing of direct or indirect benefit is abolished all together.
175. Jkj, at p. 655 note 14.
176. Ibid.
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actively solicit or acquire inside information] but rather they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct
of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. When such a person breaches his
fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper
than a tippee. For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation
must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information
confidential, and the relationship must at least imply such a duty.
?enal ties
Criminal and Civil Penalties at Statute Law
Basically the authorities rely on two types of legal action to penalise
insider traders. First, the SEC may take an injunctive action which requires
the disgorgement of illicit profits. 177 Secondly, the SEC can refer a case to
the U.S Department of Justice who may prosecute through the U.S Attorney's
Office.' 78 The various statutory civil and criminal penalities are outlined
below:
(A) The Insider Trading Sanctions Act 1984
While the SEA 1934 provided penalties for securities violations in
general, it did not provide specific penalties for insider trading. However
the SEA, as amended by both the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 1984 (ITSA) and
the recent Criminal Fine Improvements Act 1987 (CFIA), provide a tough package
of measures which include: suspension or disbarrement from the securities
industry; disgorgement of profits;' 79 penalties of anything up to three times
177. , below at note 179 and accompanying text.
178. , Janvey, su pra note 131, at p.138-140.
179. From the 27 insider trading cases in 1986 $30.2m was obtained
through disgorgement. $ll.6m came from the case against Dennis Levine. 	 v.
Dennis Levine. et al., 86 Civ. 3726 (RO) (S.D.N.Y.), filed May 12, 1986.
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the illicit gains made on the insider trades; criminal fines of up to $250,000;
180
and prison sentences.
The SEC action against Levine was the first of a series of major
Commission "swoops on Wall Street insider traders. Levine, an investment
banker at a prestigious Wall Street firm, was alleged to have been involved in
insider trading over a period of six years, during which time he made huge
profits while trading on the basis of material nonpublic information in the
securities of companies. It was believed that much of the information was
acquired by way of his employment as an investment banker. On June 5th 1986,
Levine finally agreed to settle the dispute, disgorging $11.6m in profits and
accepting permanent disbarrement from the securities industry.
On November 14th, 1986, in	 v. Ivan F. Boesky. et al.,' 8 ' the
Commission began its largest and most notorious case to date. Boesky, a risk
arbitrageur, was charged with dealing on the basis of nonpublic information
that was provided by Levine. 182 In the settlement that was reached, Boesky
agreed to relinguish $50m in illicit profits; pay a civil penalty of a further
$50m; accept permanent disbarrement from the securities industry and to plead
180. Since the U.S. securities markets have a system of self regulatory
bodies (SRO's), penalties may be imposed through them more expediently and with
better effect and without resort to the protracted complexities of expensive
court battles. SRO's have powers to hold disciplinary hearings and to penalise
any members found to have breached securities laws or self regulatory codes.
For example, they may issue warning letters making clear that any future
violation could lead to more serious action by the SRO; impose fines ranging
from $25,000 for each violation by a member and up to $100,000 for member
organisations; suspension of trading for a specified period; expulsion from
trading and from SRO membership. The SRO's are actively involved in monitoring
trading activity in their markets on a day-to-day basis. Violation are then
referred to the SEC who pursues the investigation further and decides whether
to take Court action.
181. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y), filed Nov. 14, 1986.
182. For a concise review of the 'Levine-Boesky Saga', 	 , Janvey,
su pra note 131 at p. 148ff.
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guilty to a federal charge of insider trading violation. He was subsequently
sentenced to two years imprisonment. Boesky's cooperation with the regulatory
authorites has resulted in a number of other SEC investigations.183
184(B) Civil Penalties at Common Law
Prior to 1984, the emphasis was on civil remedies in the form of
restitution ie. isoring the status quo by removing the profit made or loss
avoided from the insider trader and compensating the 'victim' for any loss
suffered. Thus at an early stage the Courts recognised a right for a
contemporaneous trader to bring a private right of action under Rule lOb-5.
Nonetheless the plaintiff must first overcome a number of hurdles. The
information withheld must be sufficiently material to have "a substantial
effect on the price of a security if disclosed." 185
 To what extent the
plaintiff must also establish reliance on the non-disclosure is uncertain. The
same is true of the question of Causation. In stock exchange transaction it
could be argued that there is never a causal connection arising from the
purported loss sustained and the non-disclosure of the inside information.
Once again the issue of privity fits uncomfortably into the traditional common
law analysis of recovery for insider trading. 186
 Indeed in the U.S. it has been
modified to the extent that "not even a 'sembalance' of privity is any longer
183. See, SEC v. Kidder. Peabod y & Co.. Inc., 87 Civ. 3869 (RO) (S.N.Y.D.
1987), in which a leading brokerage firm consented to pay $25m in disgorgement
and civil penalties. See also, the recent SEC action against leading Wall
Street firm Drexel Burnham Lambert - McVea, "SEC Begins Civil Action Against
Drexel", (1988) October Financial Times. Financial Re gulation Report, p. 10.
184. See also, supra note 140 and accompanying text.
185. See, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul phur 401 F 2d at p. 848.
186. See, Rider and Ffrench The Re gulation of Insider Tradin g Macmillan
19 (1979) at p.92: "If the doctrine of privily were strictly applied and only
the one who can match up his actual dealing s with that of an insider would
recover."
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,,187
required for liability under Rule 10(b)-5.
Some cases illustrate the current position. For example, the Shapiro
case' 88 addressed the issue of to whom the duty to disclose or abstain was
owed. This was important because it directly determined who had the standing
to sue in a private action under Rule lOb-S. The court decided that according
to the logic of both Cad y. Roberts and Texas Gulf Sul phur, disclosure was owed
to the whole market place. As a result, all investors who had purchased
Douglas Aircraft stock between the date when the defendant first traded and the
date when the disclosure was finally made were eligible to bring a private
action under the rule, provided, they were able to establish injury and show
the necessary causal link with the defendant's actions. However, according to
189 .	 . .Moss v. Mor gan Stanley. Inc.,	 in traditional insider trading cases brought
under Rule lOb-5, no recovery can be made where the plaintiff neither dealt
with the defendants nor was influenced in his trading decision by the
190defendants trading.	 Recovery by contemporaneous traders has also been
precluded in misappropriation cases.'9'
Another interesting question which needs to be addressed is what
constitutes the requisite guilty mind, or scienter, before an action can be
brought under Rule 10(b)-S. According to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'92
it is necessary to prove scienter before a private cause of action for damages
187. Ibid..
188. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). 	 , suprp note 170 and accompaning
text.
189. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
190. See also, Elkind v. Li ggett & Myers. Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1980) (a tipper case where the amount of damages was limited to the tippee's
profit).
191. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977). (must show harm resulted from defendant's conduct).
192. 425 U.S. 185. See also, Rider, su pra note 186 at p. 85.
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under s.1O(b) and Rule lOb-5 can succeed. Furthermore in a more recent case it
was said: "In our view, the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the
conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of s.1O(b) and Rule lOb-
5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief
193
sought.
(C) The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 1988
New legislation aimed at improving the procedures and remedies for the
prevention of insider trading has recently been passed by the U.S. Congress.194
The legislative initiative - the "Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988" - is the first substantive statutory response to the
most recent wave of insider abuse, highlighted largely by the Boesky affair.
The emphasis on deterrence, by providing even stiffer penalties for those
involved in insider trading, is clearly evident.
* Civil Liability for Controlling Persons
Section 3 of the Act covers the liability and civil penalties for
financial institutions (called Controlling Persons) involved in illegal insider
trading. The SEA 1934, s.21 of which deals with the liability of controlling
persons, is now supplemented by a new Sec. 21A. Basically this provides that
firms and other controlling persons who "knowingly or recklessly" fail to
supervise properly their employees and prevent insider dealing violations can
be made liable for a treble penalty for violations committed by their employees
193. Aaron v. SEC 446 U.S. 692.
194. The initiative was heralded by Congress as necessary because
despite the SEC having enforced its "rules and regulations, vigorously,
effectively, and fairly, ... nonetheless, additional methods are necessary and
appropriate to deter and prosecute [violaters]". 	 s. 1 of the Act.
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or other controlled persons195
Perhaps the most novel provision in s.21A is ss. (e) which provides the
SEC with the authority to award bounties to informants. In the past the
Commission has used informants to good effect. In forty five enforcement
actions brought in 1985 and 1986, informants were instrumental in providing
information in fifteen cases. It was thought therefore that the increased use
of such a system might lead to improvements in enforcement. Consequently in an
SEC Commissioners document published in Febuary 1986 the scheme was viewed
positively, but owing to competing priorities legislation was never framed to
give it Congressional backing. The new legislative measure rectifies this
failing. Subsection (e) in part reads:
(e) ... there shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under
this section and recovered by the Commission ... such sums, not to
exceed 10% of such amounts, as the Commission deems appropriate, to
the person or persons who provide information leading to the
imposition to such a penalty.
Clearly this could increase significantly the number of future indictments
brought by the SEC.
* Amendments Concerning Supervision
With respect to brokers and dealers s.15 of the SEA 1934 is amended by
adding the following new subsection:
(f) Every registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and
195.	 , s.3(a). Other activites are also specified. The legislation:
* Empowers the SEC with the authority to impose civil penalties on
Controlling Persons,
* Specifies the amount of the penalty to be imposed on the person who
committed the violation,
* Outlines the amount of penalty for the Controlling Person,
* Specifies limitations on the liability of Controlling Persons,
* Specifies procedures for the collection of payment of penalties to the
treasury.
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enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking
into consideration the nature of such broker's or dealer's business,
to prevent the misuse in violation of this title, or the rules or
regulations thereunder, of material, nonpublic information by such
broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer.
The Commission, as it deems necessary ... shall adopt ... regulations
to require specific policies or procedures reasonably designed to
prevent misuse in violation of this title ... of material nonpublic
information.
Under newly implemented s.204 A of the Investment Advisors Act, 1940, the above
procedural policies are also applicable to prevent the misuse of nonpublic
information by investment advisers. In effect these procedures require, inter
1, the establishment of Chinese Wall informational barriers to ensure that
inside information acquired by one arm of the firm is not transmitted and used
by another arm of the financial entity. The provisions represent the first
time that the Chinese Wall concept has been explicitly enshrined in statutory
language in the U.S.
* Increases in Criminal Penalties
Under s.4 of the new legislation, (newly amended s.32(a) of the SEA 1934)
persons found guilty of insider trading "... shall upon Conviction be fined not
more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both." 	 The
SEC hopes that by doubling both the statutory fines and prison sentences this
will do more to re-adjust the regulatory imbalance which currently favours
insider trading. The aim is to deter both current and potential offenders.
* Liability to Contemporaneous Traders for Insider Trading
Section 5 of the new initiative ammends s.20 of the SEA 1934. Newly
inserted s.20A (a) gives a private right of action to any person who trades
contemporaneously with an insider in securities of the same class. However
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under s. 20A (b) limitations on potential liability are outlined. These are:
(i) The total amount of damages imposed against a person are reduced by any
amounts that the defendant is obliged to disgorge under a Commission
disgorgement order relating to the same transaction(s).
(ii) There is a statute of limitations bar in that no action may be taken under
the section more than five years after the date of the last transaction which
is the subject of the violation.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the powers contained in the section do not
restrict any other express or implied rights of action.'96
* Investigative Assistance to Foreign Securities Authorities'97
Section 6 (b) of the new legislation amends s.21(a) of the SEA 1934 by
empowering the SEC with authority to provide assistance to "foreign securities
authorities". This term is defined in the legislation as "any foreign
government, or governmental body or regulatory organisation empowered by a
foreign government to administer or enforce its laws as they relate to
securities matters." According to the amendments instituted by s. 6 of the new
legislation:
the Commission may provide assistance ... if the requesting
authority states that ... [it] is conducting an investigation which
it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is
violating, or is about to violate any laws or rules that the
196. Section 5 thus reverses the rule of Moss v. Mor gan Stanley . Inc.,
719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1025 (1984), which required
the plaintiff to show that the insider trader breached a duty which was owed to
him.
197. For a fuller review of this see, McVea, "SEC gives major boost to
securities fraud cooperation", (December, 1988) Financial Times. Financial
ReRulation Report, at p. 10.
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requesting authority administers or enforces. The Commission may, in
its discretion, conduct such investigation as the Commission deems
necessary to collect information and evidence pertinent to the
request for assistance ... In deciding whether to provide such
assistance, the Commission shall consider whether (A) the requesting
authority has agreed to provide reciprocal assistance in securities
matters to the Commission; and (B) compliance with the request would
prejudice the public interest of the United States.
In the field of securities regulation the new Act is perhaps the most
important legislative initiative to emerge from the U.S. in recent times. By
approving the Act, Congress has given explicit recognition to many practices
hitherto conducted on a largely pragmatic and informal basis by the Commission.
For example, the adoption of a paid informant system is without doubt a novel
development and one which if successful could find favour with the regulatory
authorities in the U.K. However, the use of detterent remedies such as the
increased use of civil law measures and increases in statutory fines and prison
sentences is yet further admission by the SEC that expending resources on
detection is much too costly given the end return.
Summary
Chapter Four proceeds on the premise that insider dealing is an "economic
bad" and ought therefore to be regulated. The chapter looks at the formal
regulatory approach as adopted in the U.K. and the U.S. These formal laws are
complex and in the U.K at least rarely resorted to. However the fact is that
these prohibitive rules if breached invoke restitutive and a punitive sanctions,
thus imposing costs on miscreants. In this way they alter the incentives to
break down Chinese Walls and engage in insider dealing. Consequently the rules
themselves and the penalties imposed and indeed the likelihood of the penalties
being imposed needs to be considered.
154
In the U.K. insider dealing was orginally left to common law remedies.
As is shown, these remedies are largely inadequate. Consequently more detailed
statutory prohibitions have been adopted in the form of the Companies Act 1985,
the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and the Financial Services
1986. The increased investigative powers contained in the latter piece of
legislation is likely to give the regulatory authorites a greater degree of
success in detecting insider abuse, however the subjective elements of the
substantive offence as enshrined in the CSA 1985 remain an onerous burden for
the prosecution to discharge. Thus although the equation is changing in favour
of the regulators, the skilled operator with nominee accounts and bank secrecy
laws in off-shores centres is still often beyond the reach of the authorites.
What effect the provision of a civil remedy under s.61 and 62 of the FSA 1986
for breach of the SIB (or an SRO) rulebook will have is, as yet, too early to
tell, but most probably it will not have any significant deterrent effect.
U.S law on insider dealing is considerably more pervasive and pragmatic
than that which exists in the U.K. Case law has issued an expansive web of
liability, with recent statutory provisions marking out the boundries of this
liability. It seems only a matter of time before the substantive law of
insider dealing in the U.S., currently contained in case law, finds itself
codified on the statute book. The pervasiveness of the SEC's misappropriation
theory, notwithstanding certain reservations about Winans, plus the widespread
bargaining powers of the SEC and the potential penalties it may impose, provide
a formidable array of incentives to trade within the law. The strength of
these penalties could deter potential offenders from breaching Chinese Walls.
It must also be remembered that in both jurisdictions self-regulatory codes of
conduct prohibiting insider dealing aslo provide strong incentives to trade
fairly. For example, in Britain, the Stock Exchange Model Rules.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHINESE WALL - AN INTRODUCTION1
Regulating Insider Dealing and other Conflicts in Financial Conglomerates
While "blanket" insider dealing legislation (such as the CSA 1985) has an
important role to play in deterring and penalising insider abuse in the general
or traditional context, conglomerates pose special problems which arguably
require special regulatory 50i05.ta	 Not only is there an increased flow
flow of price-sensitive information in the conglomerate context but also there
is a greater potential for this information to be misued and for the abuse to
go undetected. Other conflicts both of duty and interest are also capable of
misuse.2 A number of regulatory options are available to both regulators
and policy makers. Broadly speaking they fall into two categories: either
conflicts in conglomerates can be orevented or they can be controlled.2a The
Chinese Wall is one means of control. It has been isolated by the regulatory
authorites on both sides of the Atlantic as a key mechanism in resolving both
conflicts of interest and duty.3
I. The general term Chinese Wall is sometimes used as if there was no
distinction between a "Chinese Wall" and a " 'reinforced' Chinese Wall". The
term Chinese Wall (sometimes called 'naked' Chinese Wall to distinguish it from
the reinforced type) is used herein to denote a Wall which is sufficiently
effective to allow a financial conglomerate to operate in whatever capacity it
wants. Thus it is different from a 'reinforced' Chinese wall which places
restrictions on what deals the conglomerate can perform. This is a crucial
distinction because it will inevitably affect the liability of the conglomerate
and is an important distinction when making policy choices. A 'reinforced'
Wall incorporates a 'naked' Chines Wall but goes even further.
Ia. That this is the case is evident from the SIB's own Rule 3-10
prohibiting insider dealing in the conglomerate context. Also the SIB's "build
a Chinese Wall or disclose": Rule 5.07 discussed infra Chapter Seven.
2. , infra Chapter Two at note 32 and accompanying text.
2a. For a discussion of the other means of prevention and control see
generall y, infra Chapter Eight.
3. For recent U.K. and U.S. developments see generally, infra Chapter
Seven.
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The Chinese Walt Description and Analysis
As a result of both the perceived and actual conflicts which arise in
financial conglomerates there is a real need to balance these competing interests
and obligations. On the one hand there is the financial conglomerate's obligation
to its corporate clients (eg. those seeking to have their new share issues
4
underwritten). To these clients the conglomerate owes a duty of confidence.
On the other hand, there is a duty owed to its investment advisory customers
(clients whose investment portfolios the conglomerate handles). To these
clients the conglomerate has a legal duty to use all legitimate information in
making investment decisions.5 On top of all this, the conglomerate also owes
a duty to the investing public not to use inside information in conducting
investment deals on its own account.6 Consequently, it has been the custom of
most multi-service financial firms to erect Chinese Walls (of whatever type) in
an attempt to avoid potential civil liability at both common law and statute
law. In this way the Wall mechanism had been, long before the arrival of Big
Bang, a cornerstone of self-regulation in the UK.7
The adoption of a Chinese Wall policy, says one compliance officer,
"involves a range of practices, designed to foster a culture sensitive to the
4. Discussed infra at Chapter Four note 99 and accompanying text.
5. This is no more than an amalgam of the duties imposed on a fiduciary
to act with due skill care and diligence. See generally , infra Chapter Six.
also, Financial Services in the United Kin gdom: A New Framework for Investor
Protection Cmnd. 9432, at para.7.5. For the position in the U.S.
	 ,	 v.
Hanley , discussed infra Chapter Two at note 58.
6. See generally , infra Chapter Four.
7. , for example: 1970 Takeover Statement discussed infra at Chapter
Seven at note 30 and accompanying text. Despite not having finaincial
conglomerates in the British sense, the same is true of multi-service firms in
the U.S. For example	 , Merrill Lynch, discussed below at note ? and
accompanying text; and see also, E. D. Herlihy, "Insider Trading and 'Chinese
Walls': Is There a Need For Reform", (1987) 16 April, a paper circulated by
U.S. Law Firm - Wachtill, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
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management of conflicts of interests. They vary in formality but inevitably are
becoming more formalised in the high-regulated environment into which we are
moving."8	The term "Chinese Wall" thus refers to a self-enforced informational
barrier consisting of systematic, as opposed to ad hoc, procedural and
structural arrangements designed to segregate the flow of unpublished price-
sensitive information between different divisions within a multi-capacity
financial intermediary with conflicting interests and obligations.9
The Wall therefore Consists of essentially three components: First,
it is a combination of policies and procedures. Second, these procedures are
designed to halt unpublished price-sensitive information 10; and lastly, the
policies and procedures operate between departments within the one firm.
Thus the Wall can be distinguished from the situation where "non-
conglomerate outsiders" are tipped off and they trade on the basis of the inside
information provided. In other words, the Wall cannot be expected to work
where, outside the normal course of business, one friend in one conglomerate
swaps with another friend in a totally different conglomerate inside information
they have learned at their respective work places. If this were the case the
Wall would be breached in nearly every wine bar in London. The Wall works
intra-department within the one conglomerate. The Chinese Wall is essentially
8. , Mayo, "The Role of Compliance" (1987) June The Treasurer 41, at
p.43.
9. It may also be described as the collection of operational and
structural constraints which financial intermediaries erect and enforce to
prevent unpublished price-sensitive information acquired or created in one
department of a dual capacity firm from being transmitted and used by another
department within the one corporate entity.
10. This term has already been considered in Chapter Four note 21 and
acconpanying text. Essentially the issue here is really how to ensure that the
screening procedures which constitute the "Wall" do not block out legitimate
information. See also note 19 and accompanying text.
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a corporate device.' 1 It deals only with abuse in the ordinary course of
business. The Wall ought not to be criticised for failing to prevent abuses it
is not actually designed to prevent.'2
In surveying the procedures which constitute the Wall it is necessary to
distinguish between those procedures which are information blockin g, ie.
procedures which restrict the flow of information to the decision maker, and
those which are conduct blocking, ie. arrangements which prevent a person who
is privy to the information from making investment decisions.' 3 While it is
true that procedures may be of either type, more often than not they go hand-
in-hand and are seen as being very much complementary to one another and indeed
critical to the effective operation of the Wall mechanism.
Procedural and Structural Measures Used in Constructing a Chinese Wall
The logic upon which the Wall mechanism rests is essentially that proper
controls over access to inside information will stop its misuse. 14 There is,
however, no "standard" Wall. To what extent controls are "adequate" is uncertain.
Regulatory authorities worldwide have adopted a very pragmatic approach to the
question of what constitutes adequate Chinese Wall controls.' 5 Recently in
the U.S there have been calls to outline criteria for minimum Chinese Wall
11. , the definition of the Chinese Wall offered by the SIB infra
Chapter Seven note 52a and accompanying text. See also, SEC wider definition
jafi:a Chapter Seven at note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See also, Edward DJ-Ierlihy, "'Chinese Walls' and Insider Trading: How
Well Does Self-Policing Work?" (1987) 9 National Law J. (Part 1) 39, at p.39.
p.2.
13. , Rodger D. Blanc, "Chinese Walls, Tippers, Tippees and Denis
Levine", (1986) 195 New York Law Journal 23, at p.23.
14. See, L. Yarn, "The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese
Wall: A New Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code", (1984) 63
Nebraska Law Review 197, at p. 212.
15. In Britain, for example, neither the SIB nor the Takeover Panel have
published a rigorous set of criteria of what constitutes a Chinese Wall.
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procedures. In the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Final
Report of the Regulatory Review Task Force, March 1988, it was to the task
force's distress that:
neither the Commission nor any SRO had issued regulations establishing
minimum requirements for Chinese Wall procedures. Instead regulators
have allowed procedures to evolve on a firm-by-firm basis ... Recent
Commission enforcement cases underscore the need for the NASD and
other SRO's ... to ensure that integrated firms have adequate Chinese
Wall procedures and adhere to them.
When the controls are considered to be adequate the Chinese Wall purports
16to resolve the disparate duties which the conglomerate owes	 by compartment-
alising the conglomerates decision making powers so that information acquired
in one capacity is considered not to be used in another one. Thus by operating
a Chinese Wall the conglomerate, while still remaining one distinct corporate
entity at law, may nonetheless be considered to operate with two or more
separate minds. Whether the duties owed by these separate minds (Or corporate
divisions) really are infact resolved by the use of the Wall device is a moot
17.point.
The dilemma all Chinese Wall builders face is ensuring that the Wall is
not SO low as to allow unpublished price-sensitive information in and ensuring
that the Wall is not so high that it blocks out legitimate information which
the different arms of the conglomerate really ought to be using when making
investment decisions. To do otherwise would be to expose conglomerates to the
risk that legitimate information acquired by one arm of the conglomerate would
be "blocked" by the Wall, thus facilitating a civil law action, for example,
for breach of a conglomerate's fiduciary duty to its clients to use all inform-
ation legitimately and reasonably available in the making of an investment
16. See,	 pra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. See generally, Chapter Nine.
160
decision.' 8 Consequently, the "screening" procedures which in effect constitute
the Wall must be sufficiently flexible to deduce whether information is or is
not legitimately to be transfered.19
Though it is true to say that Chinese Walls vary from firm-to-firm, at the
very foundation of every Wall is the distribution of a policy statement
affirming the company's prohibition of insider dealing and explaining in detail
the procedures by which it is intended to prevent abuses of unpublished price-
sensitive information. 20
 Thus there are a number of policies and procedures
which could form the basis of a Chinese Wall. These are now reviewed below.
1, Organ isational Cpmartmentalisation
At the heart of the Wall policy is some form of organisational separation
or compartmentalisation of the different divisions within the one firm, with
different financial functions being assigned to groups of employees working as
though one self-contained unit. This separation is only given efficacy when
access to files concerning other customers or the "positions" held by the firm,
for example the market making arm, are closely monitored or, indeed, prohibited
18. supra note 5 and the sources cited therein.
19. Choosing clearly between what information may legitimately pass is
crucial not only because of the potential for civil liability but also because
of the need for confidence in the markets. For example, if it were thought
that financial conglomerates were not making use of all the information they
were legally entitled to use in the making of an investment decision /recommend-
ation for a customer this might well run counter to customer expectations and
go some way to undermining investor confidence in market participants and the
markets themselves. The argument here is not about insider dealing but rather
about the right of investors to have legitimate information make the basis of
investment recommendation. See, Gower Report Part II, at para.4.13.
20. Lipton and Mazur write: "The Chinese Wall is easier to describe in
conceptual terms than it is to implement in day-to-day practice. (M. Lipton
and R. Mazur "The Chinese Wall Solution to The Conflict Problems of Securities
Firms", (1975) 50 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 459, at p.467.
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altogether. Increasingly, complex high security systems are being introduced
whereby access to files and other sections of the firm can only be had if the
employee has express authorisation or the proper key code. This not only
curtails the scope for a flagrant breach of the Chinese Wall but also reduces
the possibility that an accidental breach could occur. Equally it is necessary
to regulate the sharing of common services such as research libraries,
photocopying areas and cafeterias. 2 ' As a result a duplication of such services
may be required. To the extent that duplication occurs, the underlying
rationale of the use of the Wall technique - to capture synergies or economies
of scope - is increasingly eroded.22
2, Ph ysical Compprtmentplisation
Organisational compartmentalisation is often supplemented by actual
physical segregation by housing various staff groups in separate buildings.
Segregation of this type is really only feasible in the larger conglomerate
21. One compliance officer has revealed that "Preparing our own
Compliance manual was not without its problems. In particular we had to review
our security arrangements, looking very carefully for possible weaknesses. It
is not possible or sensible for each part of a group to be wholly self-
contained and therefore we had to pay particular regard to common services. We
found it necessary, for example, to restrict access to our word processing
department to bar the possibility of someone not waiting for urgent work to be
delivered but seeking to collect it in person from the word processing area and
while doing so seeing confidential papers which he ought not to see. We
identified risks in the use of our main library by both asset management and
corporate finance personnel and, having sought to block such risks, ended up by
providing a separate library for asset managers, round which we had an
especially "thick wall" and who ideally should be housed in a separate building
as used to be the case and will, I have no doubt, be the case again before very
long."	 , Mayo, su pra note 8, at p.47.
22. For a more detailed discussion on this 	 , infra Chapter Eight at
note 15 and accompanying text.
162
groups.23 Again care needs to be taken in the transfer of personnel from one
department to another. The flexible inter-flow of personnel between any two
departments separated by the Chinese Wall would greatly weaken the efficacy of
the mechanism. Thus compliance personnel (ie. those responsible for the
drawing-up and internal policing of the procedures that go to make up the
Chinese Wall) must ensure that the transfer of personnel is done only under
controlled circumstances. Failure to do so would seriously undermine the
effectiveness of the mechanism.24 For example, in the finalisation of certain
deals it might be necessary for one department to draw upon the specialised
skills of another department or of one particular individual located therein.
The question then becomes to what extent the Chinese Wall policy should allow
these so-called "selected" breaches to take place. In most, if not all,
countries where insider dealing is regulated by law, a "flexible" Chinese Wall
which permits selected breaches to occur would not be sufficient to fend off
liability. However, it might be possible for legitimate enquires to be made
intra-conglomerate provided the compliance department are informed and that
they actually monitor the request to ensure that no improper transfer of
information is undertaken. Equally the Wall policy should be sufficiently
flexible to allow, for example, an employee in a broker- dealer division to
respond to unsolicited requests to purchase shares in Company X after he has
become an insider to information relating to the future price of shares in the
23. "In some instances ... [physical segregation] is accomplished by
housing the staff of the isolated department in offices which are removed from
the quarters of the rest of the firm; in others by creating a separate
subsidiary or affiliate through which their department thereafter functions
Physical and corporate separation, though, are very costly and impractical
solutions for those securities firms, investment companies and similar other
business entities faced with inside information conflict problems; furthermore,
such a requirement would approximate in result a mandate for separation through
divesture ...", 	 , Lipton and Mazur suora note 20 at p. 496).
24. The recruitment of personnel from other firms could also cause
problems, however here there would be no breach of the conglomerate's own
internal procedures, thus it would not strictly be a Chinese Wall problem.
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company. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that broker A is apprised of
unpublished price-sensitive information about Company X he should not be
precluded from responding to an independent request made by a client or an
occasional customer to purchase shares in Company X.
3. on going Educational Programmes
Another integral facet of the Wall is to ensure that the policy statements
issued to staff are clearly explained and regularly updated through ongoing
educational programmes which emphasise the potential liability of the company
and employees alike if essential procedures are not adhered to.
4. A List Recordin g the Reasons for Bu ying
 Certain Shares
Here, for example, discretionary fund managers would be required to
produce on an up-to-the minute basis the reasons which prompted them to buy or
sell a particular security. In the situation where a similar recommendation
had been placed on the firm's buy or sell lists the fund manager would be
required to explain the basis upon which he determined his decision.25
5. Procedures Which Establish Whether Information Can or Cannot be
Legitimately Used by Other Departments Within the One Firm
It would seem that given the need to use all legitimate information
belonging to a conglomerate it is essential that the conglomerate establish
25. Yellon, "Trusts Investments: Problems Regarding the Exchange of
Information ...", (June 1973) Chica go Bar Record 405, at p. 413.
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some form of clearing procedures by which senior personnel or compliance
officers with no particular interest in any one department fulfil the role of
overseer with regard to the various information flow. The officer is vested
with the formidable task of determining which types of information are
unpublished and price-sensitive and which are not.
6. A Policy of Encourag in g Clients to Disclose their "News" as soon as is
Feasible
That firms should encourage clients to disclose inside information to the
public as soon as is feasible is at the very cornerstone of combating insider
25a	 .trading.	 While there are many problems with this approach, such a policy
could be explicitly expressed in the conglomerate's formal Chinese Wall
statement, distributed to employees through out the firm.
7. Contin gency Plans for the Accidential Disclosure of Inside Information
from one Department to Another
It would be wholly impracticable to expect that a Chinese Wall will
always be completely watertight. While a number of breaches would undoubtedly
have to be attributed to deliberate action it is nonetheless conceivable that
some breaches will be inadvertent and accidental. In such situations it is
essential that appropriate procedures are available so as to ensure a speedy
and convenient remedy to resolve the problem. Most obviously the "leakage" of
information should be reported to the compliance department as soon as
possible. It then becomes the responsibility of the compliance personnel to
carry out an investigation of the incident considering the legal repercussions
25a. Note also that the Stock Exchange disclosure requirements also apply.
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and making suggestions as to any readjustments which are necessary for the Wall
to undergo.
A Practical Viewpoint
Bearing in mind that there are no miminum procedures on either side of
the Atlantic for what constitutes a Chinese Wall it might be useful to review
how other interested groups have sought to translate general Chinese Wall
principles into practical guidlines. Herein it is attempted to do this by
first looking at a market participant's interpretation and then comparing this
with a regulatory perspective.26
(1) A Market Participant's Pers pective: Re Merill Lynch. Pirece. Fenner &
Smith Inc.. 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968)27
Though a ruling given by the SEC, the offer of settlement (which entailed
the setting up of a Chinese Wall), was essentially put forward by Merrill Lynch
itself. For the Statement of Policy see Appendix No. II
26. It would be appropriate to consider a Judicial view with regard to
the legal translation of the term "Chinese Wall" into practical guidelines.
However, no substantive comment has been made on Chinese Wall procedures either
here or across the Atlantic. But, see some of the comments made in Washington
Steel v. T W Corp. discussed infra at Chapter Six note 83 and accompanying
text.
27. For a discussion on the facts of the case see, infra Chapter Four at
note 170.
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(21 A Regulatory Perspective
(a). The SEC (see qualifying comments on Merrill Lynch below)
Despite the fact that the SEC accepted the Merrill Lynch Chinese Wall
proposal it did issue a disclaimer:28
As a matter of Commission policy, we do not, and indeed cannot,
determine in advance that the Statement of Policy will prove adequate
in all circumstances that may arise. Stringent measures will be
required in order to avoid future violation.
(b). The Sydney Stock Exchange - See Appendix III.
Some Reservations
The crucial question surrounding the Wall is to what extent it can be
"straddled" by top management. 29 Since much of the management of conglomerates
requires cross-cutting organisational lines in order to establish exactly what
is happening and what the firm's policy should be, many of the top personnel
will of necessity come into contact with price-sensitive information. To what
extent this is a problem is uncertain. One option would be to regard the
Chinese Wall as operative only at a decision-making level. As Lipton and Mazur
30
observe:
In many securities firms both large and small - there is a considerable
overlap between departments particularly at the partner or senior
28. Re Merrill Lynch. Pirece. Fenner & Smith. Inc., Federal Securities
Law Reports 83,347 at 83, 350.
29. See, Peter Rogers, "Directors can jump over Chinese Walls", Financial
limes 14 October 1986 at p.20.
30. Supra note 20 at p. 467.
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officer level. As a practical matter the Chinese Wall must be
applied on the decision-making level. If the personnel making the
final decision with respect to the transaction in question have been
isolated from the inside information, then the Chinese Wall solution
is effective. The mere fact that a decision - making department or
employee reports to a senior executive who knows the inside
information does not vitiate the Chinese wall solution." [emphasis in
the original]
This, it would seem, makes good sense. Any other interpretation would
frustrate the effective use of the Wall mechanism to the point that a firm
could not rebut the imputation that the information was known throughout the
conglomerate and would make it impossible to engage in strategic planning in
multi-functional firms.
Summary
Chapter Five looks at the Chinese Wall regulatory technique as an
essential backup to formal statutory anti-insider dealing controls. While the
legislation operates in the general context, Chinese Walls are specific to
financial conglomerates. These conglomerates pose special problems with regard
to insider dealing. The Wall consists of a set of policies and procedures
aimed to stem the flow of price sensitive information within the conglomerate,
thus limiting the opportunity to deal on the basis of such information. It is
essentially a corporate device which aims to prevent insider dealing within the
ordinary course of the conglomerates business. It may, as is shown in Chapter
Eight, also serve as a legal defence to criminal and civil liablity for insider
dealing. The 'size' of the Wall will vary from firm to firm. The courts have
not yet proffered an intrepretation of the Chinese Wall's procedural elements
and the regulatory authorites have done little better. There still remains the
difficult problem of high ranking corporate personnel who over-look the Wall
but who continue to make 'high-level' boardroom decisions.
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CHAPTER SIX: A COMMON LAW ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE WALL
Introduction
The exact legal status of the Chinese Wall in multi-functional financial
firms either here or across the Atlantic has never been clearly established.
Although the idea of one entity at law operating in two separate capacities has
been sanctioned in English law, how far this doctrine extends to separate
departments in financial conglomerates is uncertain. 	 At present, support for
the legality of the use and effficacy of the Chinese Wall in financial
conglomerates is derived from a number of sources. 	 In the U.K, Chinese Walls
have been sanctioned by the legislature 2 and given recognition by the regulatory
authorities. For example the SIB and SRO's and, indeed, the Takeover Panel
have all adopted Chinese Wall rules. 3	The SIB rulebook, derived from the
Financial Services Act 1986, is without doubt the clearest and strongest
expression of approval yet to have been made.
It is necessary, however, in considering to what extent the SIB's Conduct
of Business rules are declaratory of the law in this area, to deal first with
the position of the Chinese Wall at general law. As the SIB, in draft Rule
2.05 entitled: Agency, Fiduciary and other Duties and these Rules, states:
Unless otherwise expressly provided, these Rules shall not be
construed as excluding or restricting any provision of the law of
agency or other duties owed by a firm to those for or with whom it
1. , Rusken v. Ellis. Monda y and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831, discussed
infra at note 15 and accompanying text.
2. See, s.48(6) FSA, discussed infra at Chapter Seven
3. See generall y , infra Chapter Seven. A similar acknowledgement has
been forthcoming in the U.S. The U.S. position is also discussed in Chapter
Seven.
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4deals.
This chapter, attempts a common law analysis of the Chinese wall
mechanism which, owing to the lack of direct U.K. authorities on point, draws
on English, U.S. and Commonwealth case law. The difficulties which this
introduces into developing a consistent body of legal argument cannot be too
strongly emphasised. The next chapter - Chapter Seven - considers official
recognition of the mechanism as expressed in the adoption of the recent
statutory and self-regulatory codes both here in the U.K. and in the U.S.
Chapter Eight attempts a policy analysis concentrating on some of the as yet
unresolved legal and economic issues. Chapter Nine offers a synthesis of
these ideas and of the legal validity of the isolation technique. The current
academic controversies are addressed while at the same time charting a basis
for reliance upon the Chinese Wall mechanism by financial conglomerates.
The legal concern over the Chinese Wall revolves around two directly
related problems. The first is that the Chinese Wall is inherently defective
and could, as a result, facilitate insider dealing in financial conglomerates.5
The second is that the mechanism will work and will therefore facilitate an
action for failure to use all material and legally available information in the
4. Securities and Investments Board Conduct of Business Rules a new
approach, November 1988 p11. Rule 2.04 lays down the same principle with regard
to the law of contract. See also, Wood "Financial Conglomerates and Conflicts
of Interest" in Conflicts of Interest in a Changing financial World (Ed. R. M.
Goode, The Institute of Bankers, London, 1986) at p.68 who points out that:
"Conduct of Business rules made under the financial services legislation will
set out particular obligations on financial conglomerates. But it will not be
enough merely to observe the letter of the Code. The general law is not
excluded. There is therefore a double layer of law: the codes themselves and,
behind them, the brooding presence of law relating to fiduciaries."
5. Thus exposing the conglomerate to liability under The CSA 1985, the
FSA 1986 and civil liability at common law.
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making of an investment decision on a customer's behalf. 6 Thus the questions to
be addressed at common law are: (1) whether a Chinese Wall is effective and can
be relied upon as a mechanism which rebutts the presumption that knowledge held
by one department in a financial conglomerate is also held by another in the
same conglomerate? (ie. is the Wall effective?)7 If not, the use of such an
isolation technique could leave a firm open to a charge of insider dealing and
or breach of confidence; 8 and (2) whether the Wall, if it 	 rebut the
presumption that knowledge held by one one department in the conglomerate is
al o held by other departments, will actually facilitate an action at civil law
against the conglomerate for breach of fiduciary duty for operating in a
conflict of interest Situation without adhereing to a fiduciaries Strict
.9disclosure duties.
	 As already mentioned, owing to the absence of common law
authority dealing with the Chinese Wall on these points it is necessary to
resort to general legal principles in an attempt to gain an understanding of
the position of the Wall mechanism at common law.9a
6. The author does not argue that in a conflict situation all material
price sensitive information held by the fiduciary should be used in the making
of an investment decision for his client. The fiduciary is not under an
obligation to break the law.	 , source cited in Rider, "Conflicts of Interest
and the Chinese Wall", at p. 97. in The Re gulation of Insider Dealin g (Ed.
Rider, Oyez 1979). For the U.S. position see, p.8 of the SEC amicus curie
brief in Slade v. Shearson Hammill 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) where it says:
"the customers of a broker, who are normally entitled to the benefit of
information the broker has, are not entitled to inside information that he
possesses". The fiduciary is, however under an obligation to use all
legitimate information.
7. For the proposition that knowledge held by one department is
knowledge held by another, see, Harrods. Ltd v. Lemon [1931] 2 K.B. 157 at
p.162. To the extent that this presumption is in operation the Chinese Wall is
erected to rebut it.
8. , infra Chapter Four at note 99 and accompanying text.
9. , below at note 10 and accompanying text.
9a. The foregoing analysis proceeds on the assumption that there is no
deceit nor negligence on the part of the firm or anyone belonging to the firm.
The main head of liability therefore is breach of fiduciary duty.
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The Law Relatiug To Fiduciaries
The discussion is couched in the following way. First, fiduciary law
relating to a fiduciary acting for two sides per se is discussed. Second,
consideration is given to a fiduciary in a conflict of interest situation who
self-deals, ie. who breaches the no-profit fiduciary principle. Lastly, the
extent to which separation by use of the Chinese Wall neutralises fiduciary
duties is then reviewed.
I, The Fiduciary Acting For Both Sides Per Se
While must fiduciary law is uncertain, two fiduciary principles are,
however, of universal application:' 0 first, fiduciary theory debars a person in
a special relationship of trust and care from putting himself in a position
with his principal where his interests and those of the principal might come in
conflict, unless, that is, the fact of the conflict is disclosed and the
10. Though not of universal intrepretaion. The law relating to
fiduciary duties in the U.K.. is currently in a state of flux, and is some way
behind many of its Commonwealth counterparts. As a result, it is neither clear
nor certain if and in what circumstances the courts are obliged to impose
fiduciary duties. The classic statement of the standard of fiduciary care
required by the courts was established in Meinhard v. Salmon (249 NY 458 [1928]
at p. 464 where Cardozo CJ stated: "Many forms of conduct permissible in a
work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound
by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the puncilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behaviour. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of the courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
individual loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions."
Ironically if this standard where to be imposed on financial conglomerates
operating Chinese Walls it would probably mean that they could not function
without fear of civil liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
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fiduciary receives his principals full and informed consent;1 1 second, (which
is also part of the first) a fiduciary is unable to deriving any benefit from
his privileged position without the informed consent of his beneficiary.'2
Lord Upjohn, in the celebrated case of Boardman v. Phipps 13 summarised the
state of U.K. fiduciary law in respect of both these rules when he said:'4
Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of
circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms
and applied with the most particular attention to the exact
circumstances of each case. The relevant rule for the decision of
this case is the fundamental rule of equity that p person in a
fiduciary capacity must not make p profit out of the trust which is
part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a
position where his duty and his interest may conflict. I believe
the rule is best stated in	 v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44, 51, by Lord
Herschell, who plainly recognised its limitations:
It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a
fiduciary position, such as the respondent's, is not, unless
otherwise expressley provided, entitled to make a profit; he is
not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and
his duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as
has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it
rather as based on consideration that, human nature being what it
is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of a person holding a
fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty,
and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has,
therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule.
But I am satisfied that it might be departed from in many cases
without any breach of morality, without any wrong being inflicted,
without any consciousness of wrong-doing. Indeed it is obvious
that it might sometimes be to the advantage of the beneficiaries
that their trustees should act for them professionally rather than
a stranger. (emphasis added)
Thus at common law there is no outright rule excluding an agent from acting as
11. See, Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blakie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461, at
p.471 (H.L.) per Lord Cranworth L.C.; Re gal Hastings Ltd. v. Gulliver [1943] 1
All E.R. 378 at p.38l (H.L.) p Lord Sankey; and An glo-African Merchants v.
Bayley [1970]! Q.B. p.311. This latter case is briefly disscussed below at
note 66 and accompanying text.
12. This is the prohibition against undisclosed self-dealing, ie. an
agent cannot secretly sell his own property to his principal or secretly buy
his principal's property for himself. For the main cases 	 , infra at note 24
and accompanying text. The rule therefore prohibitions a fiduciary from making
a secret profits or any other surreptitious financial advantage obtained by the
use of his position.
13. Boardman v. Phi pps [1967] 2 AC 46.
14. at	 p.123.
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principal, ie. there are certain instances when a fiduciary will be permitted
to place himself in a conflict of interest situation. For example in the
15English Court of Appeal decision in Rusken v. Ellis. Monda y and Clarke	 the
issue was raised as to when a firm of solicitors could act for both sides.
Fundamental to the decision in the case was whether the law should automatically
and regardless of the surrounding circumstances, impute the knowledge of one
partner of a company to another partner in the same company.' 6 In the Rusken
case, M and C were partners in a law firm who conducted all their business
separately, never enquiring about each other's clients. R consulted one of the
partners, M, regarding an action against a Company, X, but later changed
solicitors before the matter went to arbitration. Meanwhile, C, having
returned from holiday and knowing nothing of R's consultations with M, was
appointed under the name of the law firm to act as solicitor for Company X in
arbitration. R applied for an injunction to prevent the law firm from acting
for the company.
It was held that there was no general rule that prohibited the law firm
from acting in the way it had. Indeed the court found that the onus of proving
that a mischief had been done rested on the plaintiff and as there was no
danger in the present case the injunction was denied. Thus the information
relating to the existence of the conflict was held not to have been imputed
from one partner in the firm to the other.
This issue of the imputation of knowledge is crucial. Authorities vary
Indeed the outcome of the Rusken case may be compared with the decision in
15. [1912J I Ch 831.
16. By analogy the same argument could be applied to separate departments
within the one financial conglomerate.
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Regina Fur Co. Ltd. v. Bossom.' 7 Here A and B were both directors of a
company. The company traded in furs. B insured the furs. The furs were
stolen. The insurers refused to pay the claim. They contended inter Jia that
the plaintiff's had failed to disclose a material fact. Only A knew that fact.
One question the judge therefore had to decide was whether A was "sufficiently
concerned with the insurance transaction for his knowledge to be imputed to the
company". The judge held that he was.' 8 After setting out the difficulty he
faced, Pearson J. went on to lay down the following test:
Did the P company have ... [the requisite] knowledge? The company
itself had no mind, and its knowledge or ignorance must be found in
the minds of its agents ... [A] knew of [it; B] ... did not ... Is
the knowledge of ... [A] to be imputed to the company for the present
purposes? There seems to be no decided case which is at all close to
this case ... One simply cannot say, "the knowledge of the agent is
the knowledge of the principal."
The general effect of the authorities is, in my opinion, that
in deciding whether in a particular case the knowledge of the agent
is to be imputed to the company, or other principal, one should
consider, mainly at any rate, (1) the position of the agent in
relation to the principal and whether the agent had a wide or narrow
sphere of operations, and (2) the position of the agent in relation
to the relevant transaction and whether he represented the principal
in respect of the transaction.
In some cases the courts have interpreted the general duty of a fiduciary
not to put himself in a fiduciary position very strictly. In the context of
business/ financial entities there have been a number of judicial decisions
directly of interest. 	 In Harrods. Ltd. v. Lemon 19 the plaintiffs were a
department store with a real estate section. The plaintiffs had a separate
building department which was located in a totally different building. The
defendant sought the services of the real estate arm to find a purchaser for
her house. When a purchaser was found an agreement was signed "subject to
contract and survey" which the plaintiffs building department carried out. The
17. [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 466.
18. Ibid., at p.466.
19. [1931] 2 K.B. 157.
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survey discovered some defects in the house and as a consequence the dedendant
received a lower sum than expected for the property. Neither the building nor
the estate departments were initially aware of each others involvement.
However, when the defendant found out about the conflict of interest she
refused to pay the estate department's commission, even though the sale had
been completed. Commenting on the plaintiffs conflicting position Avory J.
20
said:
I cannot accept the contention put forward by the Plaintiffs and
their solicitors that the estate department and the building
department are to be regarded as two separate entities. Harrods,
Ltd., the Plaintiffs, are one person in law, however many businesses
they may carry on. In acting as they did through their building
department for the purchaser they where committing a breach of their
duty as agents for the vendor.
In the Canadian case Comeau and Comeau v. Canada Permanent Trust Co. and
Arsenault2 ' which also dealt with a real estate transaction, the defendant
had both a real estate division and a mortgage department. The mortgage
department was housed in a separate but nonetheless nearby building. The
plaintiff, using the defendant's real estate branch sold property to T. T
applied, sucessfully, to the defendants's mortgage division for a first
mortgage to buy the property. The defendant's mortgage department was given a
copy of the original sale agreement but did not tell F's agent that T had
applied for a loan. In a mix up that subsequently ensued, the agent asked the
defendant's to accept a second mortgage on the property, giving the impression
that T was supplying $20,000 of his own money. The defendants accepted. But,
unbeknown to them, this was not the true state of affairs. T failed to meet
the mortgage repayments and the defandant's were forced to sell the property at
a loss under their powers of sale specified in the first mortgage. The
20. Ibid., at p.162. The judgement was affirmed on appeal but no mention
was made on the validity of a Chinese Wall defence.
21. (1979), 27 N.B.R. (2d) 126 (Q.B.).
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plaintiff's then sued the defendant's for breach of fiduciary obligation
because they had simultaneously acted for both parties. There was no specific
reference made to the Chinese Wall defence and it was held by Stevenson J. that
despite the fact that the real estate and mortgage departments operated
independently of each other he did not consider this to help the defendant's
argument in any way. In fact, he criticised the defendant's because "the left
22hand did not know what the right hand was doing. 	 Thus in doing so he
endorsed the view that both departments where to be considered as part of the
one corporate entity owing indivisible fiduciary duties to the plaintiff's.
In another more recent Canadian case the issue of conflict of interest in
the banking context was addressed. In Standard Investments Ltd. v. Canadian
Im perial Bank of Commerce 23 the defendant Bank allied itself with two opposing
groups involved in a takeover, thus placing itself in a classic conflict of
interest situation. The facts were as follows: The plaintiff's wanted to make
a takeover bid for Crown Trust. In pursuit of this, the plaintiffs transferred
their accounts to the Defendant bank and approached the Bank's President,
Wadsworth, for advice and financial support. Not long before this, however,
the defendant Bank's then Chairman, Harrison, in conjunction with MacDougall,
another Bank director, persuaded the Bank's officers to increase its
shareholding in Crown Trust to about 10% in order to ward of the plaintiff's
hostile takeover for the company. As events turned out, Harrison was unaware
of Wadsworth's meeting with the plaintiff's. By the same token, Wadsworth was
unaware of Harrison's decision to buy up shares in Crown Trust and decided, in
the proper exercise of his authority, to proceed with his advice to the
plaintiff's. When Wadsworth did discover the bank's involvement in Crown Trust
22. at p.133.
23. (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410, 52 O.R. (2d) 473 (C.A.).
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he warned the plaintiff's that their takeover bid was doomed to failure but did
not say why. For another 5 years the plaintiff's persisted in their efforts to
acquire Crown Trust, but when Black, a customer of the Bank, acquired 44% of
Crown Trust with the Bank's support and subsequently sold his holding to
Canwest at the same time as the Bank sold its 10% stake, the value of the
plaintiff's holding fell by more than half. The plaintiff's sought damages
from the Bank for breach of fiduciary duty claiming that the Bank: (1) was
under a duty to inform them at the earliest date possible that their takeover
plan would fail and (2) should not have favoured Black nor sold its own holding
to the ultimate purchaser.
In the Court of Appeal, it was held that by acting simultaneously through
Wadsworth to encourage the takeover, while at the same time having decided to
prevent the scheme, the bank owed the plaintiff's fiduciary ties which it had
failed to discharge. The bank was thus caught in a conflict of interest. The
proper course of action, said the learned judge, would have been either to have
disclosed the nature of the conflict to the plaintiff's and received their
consent or have refused to advise them.
2. A Fiduciary Who Self-Deals
The rule prohibiting a fiduciary from self-dealing originated in Keech v.
Sandford. 24
 Although the rule becomes blurred with other fiduciary principles25
the duty here is very strict. A leading case, Re gal (Hastin gs) Ltd v.
24. (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61.
25. See, Hannigan, Insider Dealing (London 1988) at p.102 footnote 49,
where she writes: "The no-profit rule was originally regarded as an aspect of
the no-conflict rule, although it is now usually regarded as a separate rule in
its own right."
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Gulliver,26 illustrates this. There the plaintiff company formed a subsiduiary
called company A. The aim was for Company A to acquire the lease on two
cinemas. However the owner of the cinemas would not lease the cinemas until
Company A's share capital was fully paid up. Certain directors of the
plaintiff company put their own money into the venture and bought up the
remaining shares in company A. The aim was to sell the cinemas but before they
could the plaintiff company and company A were taken over by another company.
Those directors in the plaintiff company who had bought shares in Comapmy A
made a substantial profit. The plaintiff company sued them for the profits
they had made. The court held that aithought the directors had at all times
acted bon g fide they were nontheless accountable to the plaintiff company, as
fiduciaries, for the profits made.
Arguing by analogy, a director is accountable to his company where, by
virtue of his position, he acquires confidential information about the company,
for example, an impending takeover, and makes a profit (or avoids a loss) by
either buying or selling the company's shares. This is so notwithstanding the
fact that the company itself is unable to make a profit from the information.27
Boardman v. Phi p ID$28 is another case in point which clearly shows
the vigor with which the courts have applied the "no-profit" rule in respect of
preventing fiduciaries from self-dealing. Here Boardman was a solicitor for
trustees, and in this way acted as a fiduciary. The trustees were minority
shareholders in a private company, X, which was capable of being more profitable
than it actually was. While acting as a fiduciary agent for the trustees
Boardman obtained confidential information. On the basis of this information
26. [1942] 1 All ER 378.
27. , infra Chapter Four at note 91 and accompanying text.
28. [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
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he invested his own money in the shares of a company. At all times he acted in
good faith. The venture was sucessful both from Boardman's point of view and
from the point of view of the trust. The House of Lords nevertheless held that
Boardman must account to the trustees for the profit from the shares. The
opportunity for Boardman to make a profit arose from two factors: (1) his
fiduciary position; and (2) the use of confidential information acquired by
virtue of that position. The solicitor was however entitled to renumeration
for his work and skill.
29Finally, the decision in IDC v. Coole y	yet again illustrates the
rigidity of the fiduciary principle against self-dealing by an agent. As well
as being a managing director of a design company, the defendant was also a
sucessful architect. He sought to secure a contract for the company with the
Gas Board. He was unsucessful. Following this, the Gas Board approached him
and asked him to undertake the contract in his private capacity. Without
telling the company, and making out that he was in poor health, the defendant
was released from the company and took up the contract with the Gas Board. It
was held that the defendant was liable to account for the profit on the
contract because following the offer from the Gas Board he: (at page 173-4)
embarked on a deliberate policy and course of conduct which put his
personal interest as a potential contracting party with the [gas
board] in direct conflict with his pre-existing and continuing duty
with as managing director of the [company].
3. The Fiduciar y Who Erects a Chinese Wall
To recap then, there are two strict duties imposed on fiduciaries: (1) a
duty to avoid conflict situations; and (2) a duty to not make a profit from a
29. [1972] 2 All ER 162.
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fiduciary position. With this in mind where does a conglomerate, which
operates in a number of conflict situations and which is simultaneously
involved in breaching the no-profit rule by virtue of the conduct of its
various arms, stand in relation to fiduciary law. As we have seen from Lord
Upjohn's statement in Boardman v. Phi pps3° (relying on Lord Herschell's dicta
51in th	 v. Ford ) the common law will tolerate some situations where a
fiduciary places himself in a conflict situation and where he, as a result,
self-deals. What then are these exceptions? The first is full and frank
disclosure of the nature of the conflict of interest; and the second is
reliance on a market practice or custom, perhaps such as the use of a Chinese
Wall.
A, Full and Frank Disclosure of the Conflict of Interest
Do Conglomerates owe Fiduciary Duties?
One of the first questions to be addressed is is whether conglomerates
owe fiduciary duties. There is little U.K. authority on this point, thus
analysis must again revert to broad principles. Some of the factors which are
crucial to the determination of fiduciary duties include the degree of
sophistication of the parties, 52
 the degree of discretion vested in the firm
30. [1967] 2 AC 46, see, su pra note 13 and accompanying text.
31. [1896] AC 44, at p.51.
52. See, Chapter Seven note 50 and accompanying text for a list of
market participants in the U.K.
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and the likelihood of conflict. 53 Arguing by analogy with the situation of
broker dealers in the U.S., it may be noted that: "a broker dealer is not
automatically regarded as standing in a fiduciary relationship to the
customer". 54 However as Wood observes: "A firm acting in an agency or
advisory capacity will generally be a fiduciary and subject to the duty of
economic loyalty."55
Once it has been established that a fiduciary duty of care exists the
question then arises as to the way in which that duty is discharged. Probably
the clearest and most accurate statement of law in this area is laid down by
Sir George Jessel M.R. in Dunne v. English 56, where he said (at p.533): "It is
not enough for an agent to tell the principal that he is going to have an
interest in the purchase, or have a part in the purchase. He must tell him all
the material facts. He must make full disclosure". Thus in the case of a
conglomerate, not only must the broker dealer disclose to his client that he is
dealing as principal rather then as agent, but he must also make full and frank
53. In Industrial Develo pment Consultants v. Coole y [1972J 2 All ER 162,
Roskill J said: "The phrase 'possibly may conflict' requires consideration. In
my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real
possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation arising
which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real
sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in conflict."
54. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Reu1ation (Little, Brown &
Company: 1983) pp. 958-968.
55. , Wood su pra note 4 at p.63; see also Austen, "The Corporate
Fiduciary: Standard Investments v. Canadian Im perial Bank of Commerce", (1986-
87) 12 CBLJ 96 at p.100: "There is, in principle, no reason why a corporation
cannot occupy a fiduciary position, though there will be some fine-tuning to be
done to identify the persons who may give fiduciary undertakings on the company's
behalf and the problem will inevitably arise when more than one corporate
executive acquires information or deals on a fiduciary basis."; Woods v.
Martins Bank Ltd. [1959] 1 Q.B. 55: "In my judgement, a fiduciary relationship
existed between the plaintiff and the defendants [Martins Bank LtdJ; and generally,
Standard Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Im perial Bank of Commerce (1985) 22
D.L.R. (4th) 410, discussed su prp at note 23 and accompanying text.
56. (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 524.
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disclosure of all material interests. 57 This leads to a number of problems not
the least being the definition of what constitutes a material interest? A
material interest has been described as an interest sufficient to alter a
client's decision about whether to enter into a particular transaction.58
Therefore the onus would be on a firm to inform the customer that it was, for
example, self-dealing by making a market in shares that it might possibly
recommmend to the customer.
As well as this there is the question of in what circumstances general
disclosure might in some instances suffice. As Wood observes, "Specific
disclosure will often be impracticable. How can a financial conglomerate
disclose in specific detail its multiple interests which might be material?"59
It would seem therefore that no hard and fast rules can be applied. Each
situation must be looked at on its own merits, considering to what degree
specific disclosure might have been reasonable and practicable in view of the
intensity of the conflict Situation. Thus it may well be the case that in some
circumstances general disclosure will suffice.
While it might appear that fiduciary ties are particularly onerous, the
fiduciary always has the option to make full disclosure to the principal and
obtain his consent. However, the interesting point about the Chinese Wall is
that more often than not the Wall device operates as the alternative to
57. See also, New Zealand Netherlands Societ y Orange' Inc. v. Laurentius
Cornelius Ku ys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, at pages 1131, 1132 (P.C.): "there must be
full and frank disclosure of all material facts".
58. at p.1132; see also, infra Chapter Seven note ? and
accompanying text for the SIB definition.
59. See, supr note 4 at p. 70.
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disclosure.59a Indeed, in some of the SIB's new rulebook the incentive is almost
overwhemingly to erect a Chinese Wall and not disclose. 60 It is because of this
that the Chinese Wall mechanism can be said to run counter to a conglomerate's
fiduciary duties to its customers. Can then the Chinese Wall be considered as
falling within the second exception to strict fiduciary duties, that of market
usage or custom?
B. Market Usage or Custom: The Chinese Wall
It is readily clear from existing authorities that the rule prohibiting a
fiduciary from putting himself in a conflict situation or deriving a profit
from his fiduciary position is subject to custom or market practice. In Jones
v. Canavan61 , Jacobs J.A. and Manning J.A. stated that where an agent found
himself in a conflict of interest his fiduciary duties would be modified by a
Custom, provided, that is, the custom fulfilled the requirements of notoriety,
certainty and reasonableness. As yet it has proved difficult to fulfil this
test. In North and South Co. v. Berkele y ,62 for example, a firm of Lloyds
insurance brokers placed themselves in a position where their duties and
59a. , for example Rule 5.07 discussed infra Chapter Seven at note ?
and accompanying text. Of course it could be argued that a notorious custom,
such as a Chinese Wall, equals disclosure.
60. See, The Securities and Investments Board application for Designated
Agency Status under the Financial Services Act 1986 and the revised rulebook
dated February 1987, where it was stated that: "Outside the life insurance/unit
trust area, the Boards rules will not preclude a firm operating on a dual
capacity basis (e.g. as broker/ dealer). Nor do the rules preclude a group
from including firms whose interest and duties may conflict, e.g. a corporate
finance arm and investment arm. The rules provide a number of safeguards (many
based on disclosure, which the Board considers is effective in these contexts)
to protect investors from these conflicts. "Chinese Walls" are not actually
required, but the absence of such arrangements within a firm or a group may
well attract such severe disclosure requirements to the firm - because otherwise
knowledge in any part of the firm is imputed to the whole firm - that it is
essential for it to erect and police them."
61. [19721 2 NZWLR 236.
62. [1971] 1 WLR 470. The case which was distinguished in Jones v.
Cnavan [1972] 2 NZWLR 236.
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interests conflicted by acting as agents for both parties. One of the
arguments advanced by counsel for the respondent was that part of the training
of an insurance broker was to act in a dual capacity. The fact that it was
virtually unknown for an insurance broker to use this dual position to act
improperly was proof of "uberrimae fidei". Donaldson J, rejecting this line of
argument said (at p.482):
If a usage is to have effect in law it must be at least notorious,
certain and reasonable. On the evidence before me, [the Lloyds
insurance brokers dual capacity arrangement] may be certain ... For
my part, I entertain doubts whether it is sufficiently notorious
It is sufficient for present purposes to say that I regard the
practice as wholly unreasonable and therefore incapable of being a
legal usage.
He relied upon the general principle laid down in Fuliwood v. Hurle y. 2° There
Lord Hanworth M.R. said (at p. 502):
if and so long as the agent is the agent of one party, he cannot
engage to become the agent of another principal without the leave of
the first principal with whom he has originally established his
agency"
Donaldson J. also relied on the dicta of Scrutton L.J. who on the same page of
the report said:
No agent who has accepted an employment from one principal can in
law accept an engagement inconsistent with his duty to the first
principal from a second principal, unless he makes the fullest
disclosure to each principal of his interest, and obtains the
consent of each principal to the double employment."
In a later passage (at p. 483H) Donaldson J summed up the legal conundrum which
he and others faced:
[H]ow do you train anyone to act properly in such a [dual capacity]
situation? What course of action can possibly be adopted which does
not involve some breach of the duty to one principal or the other?
yield to no one in my admiration for the skill and honesty of the
insurance brokers and other men of business of the City of London,
but neither skill nor honesty can reconcile the irreconcilable.
He was "astonished that Lloyds should have evolved a practice which renders the
maintenance of the utmost good faith so fraught with difficulty ... [T]he
63. [1928] 1 K.B. 498.
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practices of Lloyds must not only be reasonable, but must be seen to be
,,64	 .	
.reasonable.	 No doubt the same could be said with regard to other City
Practices". Where then does this leave the City Practice of erecting Chinese
Walls? Is the mechanism sufficiently established to constitute a custom or
market practice at common law?65 According to Megaw J in the earlier case of
Angjo-African Merchants Ltd v. Ba yIey66 , the general principle regarding a
market custom could be stated thus:67
a custom will not be held by the courts of this country if it
contradicts the vital principle that an agent may not at the same
time serve two masters - two principles - in actual or potential
opposition to one another: unless he has explicit, informed consent
of both principals.
There was more than a hint of Matthew 6 v.24 in this dicta.68 Megaw J also
referred to and approved of the passage in Bowstead on Agency which said:69
he may not act for both parties in a transaction unless he
ensures that he fully discloses all the material facts to both
parties and obtains their informed consent to his so acting ...
custom to the contrar y will not be upheld." (emphasis added)
Consequently, it would seem that the formulation of the principle in Jones is
most probably too wide. However in another passage in Bowstead it says:7°
A custom or usage which converts an agent into a principal or
otherwise gives him an interest at variance with his duty is prima
facie unreasonable, and will therefore be ineffective unless known by
64. [19711 1 WLR 470 at p.484, emphasis added.
65. , R. Nicholson and M. Darling, "Hitting the Chinese Wall", (1986)
60 Law Institute Journal, 1338 at p.1339: "Of course the duty that is implied
between an adviser and his client may be limited either expressly by contract
or by industry practice. The question thus becomes whether Chinese Walls are a
sufficiently well-established part of commercial dealings in the Australian
market to represent industry practice." The authors then go on to illustrate
how this is probably the case. Reference is made to the Rules and regulations
of the Australian Stock Exchange and s.128 of the Securities Industry Code,
both of which specifically recognise Chinese Walls.
66. [1970] 1	 Q.B. 311.
67. at p. 323B and H.
68. There Jesus said: "No man can serve two masters, for either he will
hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold on to one and despise the
other."
69. Bowstead on A gency 13th ed., at p.144.
70. at p. 166.
186
and consented to by the principal.
Thus, there would seem to be an argument for saying that such a practice is
merely prima facie unreasonable at common law and not absolutely; this is
crucial for it leaves the door open for common law acceptance of the Wall
mechanism in those situations where it is reasonable.
A Chinese Wall would in all likelihood fulfill the notoriety test in most
71	 .	 .instances.	 However it is more questionable whether it would always fulfill
the certainty and reasonableness criteria. Concerning certainty, the common
law might be loathe to accept, in an area as sensitive as this, a mechanism
which, from an enforcement point of view, is regarded as suspect. 72 On the
issue of reasonableness, the Wall could easily be toppled. This is especially
so when anything which goes against the basic fiduciary principle outlined
above is prima facie unreasonable. Since the common law will only accept the
Wall mechanism where it is reasonable to do so, it is submitted that the means
of resolving the reasonableness test depends on an accurate assessement of the
degree of conflict and the likeihood of abuse. Essentially these questions are
non-quantifiable and are dependant on reasoned judgement.73
U.S. Case Law Relating to the Chinese Wall
Owing to the absence of any more precise U.K. case law relating to the
position of the Chinese Wall, analysis must of necessity draw on judicial
pronouncements in other jurisdictions. Two U.S. decisions would seem to seem
71. It has been adopted widely in the industry codes and practices.
generally , infra Chapter Seven. Such notoriety could, therefore, be a kind of
disclosure. It could also be argued that a notorious custom gives implied
consent and is therfore within the general consent rule.
72. , Cmnd. 9125 Review of Investor Protection: Report Part II at
para. 4.13.
73. See generall y , Chapter Nine: Summary and Conclusions.
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to support a Strict view of fiduciary duties in relation to the intrepretation
of the Wall mechanism. 74 As noted earlier, the legal controversy surrounding
the Chinese Wall is as much to do with the legal implications of effective
isolation (and a defence based upon that isolation by those charged with the
improper use of material non-public information) as it is to do with concern
about the mechanism's ability to isolate inside information. These issues came
75before the courts in both Black v. Shearson. 1-lammill & Co., 	 and Slade
Shearson. Hammill & Co.76
In Black, a common law action brought under State law, the facts were as
follows: Shearson Hammill's salesmen recommended that clients should buy shares
in X company. A partner in Shearson Hammill became privy to adverse inside
information concerning X company by virtue of the fact he was, simultaneously,
one of its directors. The issue revolved around why he had not, on discovery of
the adverse information, told his salesmen to stop recommending shares in the
company. The partner contended (1) he had a duty to X Company not to tell his
salesmen; (ii) the existence of an effective Chinese Wall prevented him from
communicating the information. It was iij.,: (a) that the partner was in a
conflict of duty which was not to be resolved but was to be avoided in advance
or terminated when it appeared; and, (b) that the isolation of inside
information by a Chinese Wall was in conflict with the firm's obligation to its
74. Two factors militate against transposing the following American
judicial reaction to the U.K. First of all, the Chinese Wall has only been
given tentative legislative and regulatory approval in that jurisdiction; and
secondly the institutional structure of the U.S. financial markets is less
integrated than in the U.K. primarily because of the restraints imposed by the
Glass-Steagall Act 1933. Because the integration of financial services is
less, there is less possibility of abuse and therefore more likelihood that a
Chinese Wall would in fact be acceptable to the courts. See, for example, infra
note 82 and accompanying text.
75. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968).
76. 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974). The special facts of both Black and
make it difficult to conclude decisively what the judiciary have said and
it is generally considered that much still remains unresolved.
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clients. The Court of Appeals said that the firm's "conflict of duties [wasj
the classic problem encountered by one who serves two masters. It should not
be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties, it should be avoided in
'I
advance
The case however should be given a narrow reading because it involved a
particularly unusual set of facts. The Shearson partner who possessd the
"bearish" information not only failed to inform the firm's salesmen, but at the
same time sold shares in X Company for his own account and for priviliged
clients. As a result the Wall operated with regard to those clients to whom
the firm's salesmen gave advice, but not with respect to the partner's own
business dealings. No exception was made for a bona fide Chinese Wall and thus
it is little wonder that the court was led to impose liability. It would be
wrong, therefore, to interpret the decision as wholehearted judicial
disapproval of the Wall mechanism.
The Slade decision, which involved Federal Law, once again raised the
whole issue of the departmental isolation of information. 78 Here it was held
that a broker could not recommend securities in a company when at the same time
the underwriting "arm" was in possession of adverse information which was not
made available to the broking "arm". Again the facts were straightforward:
salesmen belonging to the firm of Shearson Hammill promoted shares in Y Company.
Slade purchased some of these shares. Y Company was, however, an investment
banking client of Shearson Hammill's. As a result Slade claimed (I) that
Shearson Hammill held adverse inside information about Y Company at the same
77. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968) at p.
78. For a helpful review of the cases litigation history, , Huck "The
Fatal Lure of the 'Impermeable Chinese Wall", (1977) 94 Bankin g Law Journal
100 at p. 110 et seq.
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time as its salesmen were promoting shares in it, and (2) that by making a
recommendation while still in possession of adverse information the firm had
breached the common law duty it owed to its customers. This was so despite the
duty of confidence owed to Y Company.
Shearson Hammill, who, in actual fact, had not used any of the inside
information, contended, inter alia, that a Chinese Wall had operated to prevent
its salesmen knowing about the information.
The court realised that the effect of introducing a rule proscribing the
use of inside information would inevitably, in the context of the multi-service
firm, place a firm which acquires inside information from one of its corporate
clients, Company X, at a disadvantage vis-a-vis another firm with no such
information. The latter firm would not be debarred from recommending the stock
of Company X whereas the former would. Speaking on the question of a fiduciary's
conflicting duties the Court said:79
It must be remembered ... that Shearson voluntarily entered into a
fiduciary relationship with Tidal Marine, as a consequence of which
it received information. Shearson also voluntarily entered into
fiduciary relationships with its customers. It cannot recognise its
duty to the former while ignoring its obligation to the latter.
Having assumed fiduciary responsibilities, Shearson is required to
incur whatever commercial disadvantage fulfilment of those
obligations entails.
In the ensuing appellate proceedings the SEC along with two leading
financial firms submitted amicus curaie briefs. The question presented was:
Is an investment banker/securities broker who receives adverse,
material, nonpublic information about an investment banking client
precluded from soliciting customers for that client's securities on
the basis of public information which (because of its possejon of
the inside information) it knows to be false or misleading?
79. [1973-74 Transfer Binderl (CCH) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,329 at 95, 132.
80. Slade v. Shearson. Hammill & Co.. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,439, at 95,530 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
190
In other words could it make a recommendation which, in the light of the
corporate group's knowledge as a whole, was patently false?
No direct judicial pronouncement was ever made in answer to this question.
But in its submission the SEC concluded that the Wall was an acceptable
regulatory mechanism for stemming the flow of inside information between
investment bankin g and broker-dealer type financial services. Nonetheless, it
recommended that in such a situation the Wall needed to be "reinforced", eg.
80athrough the use of a species of no-recommendation/restricted-list policy.
It is usual for a no-recommendation policy to operate when inside
information is received, only then is the security placed on the restricted-
list. The point, however, can be made that the very inclusion of a company's
shares on a restricted list is itself price-sensitive information which may
constitute a breach of confidence in respect of the company. An indication
that something is about to happen with regard to the company would mean that
informed traders could easily draw correct conclusions as to whether the
financial intermediary knew of adverse or favourable information. In an
attempt to by-pass this problem and to circumscribe the use of the Wall
mechanism the SEC decided to lay down more stringent requirements. The firm
should, said the Commission, restrict a security and withdraw any outstanding
recommendations on it when the firm enters into an investment banking or other
type of confidential relationship. This is a severe obligation because to
fulfill it the security must be placed on the restricted-list before inside
information is actually received.
80a. See, discussion infra Chapter Eight at note 	 and accompanying
text.
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The reluctance of the U.S. courts to embrace the Wall mechanism has waned
considerably. 8 '	 Three further U.S. cases illustrate this. In American
American Mendicorp . Inc.. v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 82 which
involved a loan made by the defendant Bank to finance tender offers, the District
court held that the bank could finance the tender offer notwithstanding the
fact that a bank customer was the target of the offer. The court's findings
where based on the belief that the bank had not used confidential information
belonging to the customer.
83In Washin g ton Steel Corp. v. TW Corp..	 another tender offer case, the
matter reached the Court of Appeals. Again the issue at stake was to what
extent the law allowed a commercial bank to provide funds to one client in
order to facilitate the takeover of another of the bank's clients. Here,
Chemical Bank had two clients: Talley Industries and Washington Steel. Chemical
Bank agreed to act as "lead bank" for a loan to finance a tender offer that
Talley was about to make. The target of the proposed offer was Washington
Steel, a company to whom Chemical Bank (and two other banks) had recently
issued a loan. During the course of the arrangements for the loan, information,
some of which was non-public in nature, was conveyed. Chemical also acted as
the registrar of the company's stock. Washington claimed, inter alia, that
Chemical had, in deciding to finance the tender offer, broken its fiduciary
duty to the company because the decision had been based on the misuse of
confidential information provided by Washington.
The District Court found in favour of Washington and issued a preliminary
81. See generally, infra Chapter Seven.
82. No.77 C 3865 (N.D. III. 1977).
83. 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
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injunction preventing Chemical from participating in the loan to Talley. The
court stated that Chemical "was acting as agent for ... Washington ... and
was charged with the responsibility of advancing the best welfare and corporate
interests of Washington ... [Chemical thusj ... had a duty not to act adversely
to the interests of ... Washington". 84 It was upon this er se fiduciary duty
that the Appeal Court first seized. The court rejected Washington's contention
that Chemical Bank had breached its fiduciary ties on the basis of important
policy grounds and went on to approve the decision in American Medicorp. Thus
to some degree at least (none was explicitly stated) the Appeal Court sanctioned
the Chinese Wall method of isolation. In a pragmatic judgement in which the
court recognised the importance of not upsetting the status quo, as well as the
likelihood of congressional action, it said:
establishing a per se common law duty of banks to their borrowers
seems archetically within the domain of legislative judgement. A
legislature is best suited to consider the delicate financial issues
at stake and strike the appropriate balance between sound economics on
the one hand, and expectations of loyalty on the other ... [Amy state
common law that we8 ight imply would likely give way to the preemptive
force of federal law.
The court continued, "Congress is aware of this issue and has begun the
difficult process of effecting a legislative solution ... any common law duty
we might imply would, in all probability, have to yield to whatever national
policies might emerge form these deliberations."86
On the question of the effectiveness of the Chinese Wall a number of
factors needed to be considered. Washington's main argument was that there
should be a presumption that Chemical made use of the confidential information
conveyed by the former in coming to a decision about making the loan to Talley.
84. 465 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D.Pa. 1979) at p. 1104.
85. 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979) at p.601.
86. Ibid.
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The court however rejected this view, coming to the conclusion that:
there was ... no showing that those Chemical officers who were
involved in the loan with Talley made any use of the information
provided to Washington. We refuse to presume such a use on the basis
of an unsupported assumption that, in view of Talley's ostensibly weak
financial condition, Chemical would not have decided to make the l%a1n
to Talley had it not known of Washington's assertedly bright future.
The court drew attention to the fact that Chemical Bank staff were "instructed
not to talk to anyone who worked on the Washington account, nor [were theyl
88to look at any files kept on the target company. 	 That the Wall had been
further strengthened could be found in statements submitted by senior Chemical
Bank official who maintanined that they had personally secured all Washington
files and made sure they were not available to persons working on the Talley
89loan.
In the 1981 New York State Supreme Court decision in Connell v. Chase
Manhattan Bank. N.A., 90 further support for judicial acceptance of the Chinese
Wall was found. Chase Manhattan Bank, "Chase", which acted as a pensions fund
adviser, was simultaneously a lender to Villager Industries. Chase recommended
that the trustees of the pensions fund purchase Villager shares as part of
their portfolio. Upon purchasing the stock, it fell in value and was later
sold at a loss. The trustees alleged Chase had committed a breach of its
obligations in that when the advice to purchase Villager stock was made the
bank had knowledge about Villager's financial difficulties. The trustees
claimed that Chase ought to have disclosed the nature of its lending relation-
ship with Villager. There was no evidence adduced to show that the actual
department which advised the pensions fund actually possessed the information,
87. Id., at p. 602.
88. at p. 603.
89. Ibid.
90. NYU (Jan 15, 1981) p.7, col.1.
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nor did the trustees claim that Chase Manhattan was under a duty to disclose
the inside information.
The Court held that no conflict of interest was created by Chase's
lending relationship and its advice to the pension's fund. Consequently, the
court was of the opinion that Chase was not under a duty to its pension
advisory unit of the range of its lending relationships. On the question of
whether knowledge of the adverse inside information it said:9'
[T]he legal inference of imputed knowledge is designed to represent
the probable truth in situations in which an organisation is so
designed that knowledge of one part will, or should be brought to the
attention of another part. It has no application to a case in which
a deliberate block to an otherwise appropriate flow of information
has been created.
While the American Mendicor, Washin gton Steel and Connell decisions do
sanction the use of the Chinese Wall, reliance on the use of the technique must
nonetheless be confined to the narrow facts of each of the cases - dealing with
bank finance for a loan for a proposed tender offer of another bank customer in
the first two; and, with advising pension funds in the latter. Whether a
similar finding would be reached in a fully integrated finanical environment,
the like of which exists in the U.K., is more questionable. However, the
Connell decision does seem particularly relevant.
Other Relevant Case Law
Of course in Britain, in the context of fully blown financial
conglomerates, it is necessary to consider to what extent a 'naked' Chinese
Wall is legally valid as opposed to the Slade 'reinforced' Wall. In other
91.	 Ibid.
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words in what circumstances would a conglomerate which erects a 'naked' Chinese
Wall between its departments incur civil liability for acting or failing to act
when the crucial facts pertaining to an investment decision are known by
another department within the same company? Essentially the issue is whether
traditional fiduciary principles should be modified to deal with the post Big
Bang situation where a financial conglomerate purposely becomes involved in
types of financial sector activity that will inevitably lead to conflicts of
duty and interest.92
Since, as we have seen, there is no U.K. authority on point it might be
helpful to look more closely at the recent Canadian case Standard Investments
Ltd. v. Canadian Im perial Bank of Commerce93 , where the matter of the Chinese
Wall was addressed, albeit implicitly. There it will be recalled that the
defendant Bank allied itself with two opposing groups involved in a takeover,
thus placing itself in a classic conflict of interest situation.
Though the issue of the use of the Chinese Wall to prevent the flow of
confidential information between the Bank officers was not raised as a defence
by the bank, what if it had? Whether the isolation technique was impliedly
rejected by the court remains a moot academic point.94 A number of passages in
Goodman J.A.'s judgement deserve closer scrutiny. The case also highlights
some of the important issues discussed above. One of the crucial questions
92. See, Zeigle, "Bankers Fiduciary Obligations and Chinese Walls: A
Further Comment on Standard Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Im perial Bank of
Commerce", (1986) 12 CBLJ 211 at p.213.
93. (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410, 52 O.R. (2d) 473.
94. Professor Zeigle is of the opinion that "any implicit rejection of
[the Chinese Wall] by the court was at best obiter and grounded on the
particular facts before the court. In my view, there is no binding precedent
precluding an appellate Canadian court from accepting the defence where the
facts warrant it", see, supra note 92 at p.2 12. But compare generally with,
Austen, "The Corporate Fiduciary: Standard Investments Ltd. v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce", (1986-87) 12 CBLJ 96.
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which needed to be answered in Standard Investments was to what extent a
corporation could owe fiduciary duties. Goodman J.A. recognised that the fact
that the defendant was a corporation raised some difficult problems. These he
sought to resolve by reference to existing case law, extracting, as a
consequence, the doctrine of identification; that is the idea that acts and
intentions of corporate officers are attributed to the actual company itself
when a mens rea offence is applicable to that company.
He first relied on the dictum of Denning L.J., as he was then, in the
H.L. case of Bolton (En gineerin g) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham and Sons Ltd.,
[1957] 1 Q.B. 159 at p.172, where he said:
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a
brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has
hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from
the centre. Some of the people in the company are merely servants
and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot
be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company,
and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.
Goodman J.A. also considered Lord Reid's dicta in the House of Lords case of
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153, where Denning L.J.'s
passage in Bolton was interpreted. There Lord Reid said:
There have been attempts to apply Lord Denning's words to all
servants of a company whose work is brain work, who exercise some
managerial discretion under the direction of superior officers of the
company. I do not think that Lord Denning intended to refer to them.
He only referred to those who "represent the directing mind and will
of the company, and control what it does".
Goodman J.A. then went on to deal more formally with the identification
doctrine as outlined by Estey J. in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd. et al v. The Queen (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th)
314, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 45 C.R. (3d) 289. At p.335 D.L.R. he said:
Criminal responsibility in our courts thus far has been achieved in
the mens rea offences by the attribution of the corporation of the
acts of its employees and agents on the more limited basis of the
doctrine of the directing mind or identification.
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In a later passage at p. 351 D.L.R. Estly J. said:
Where the criminal act is totally in fraud of the corporate
employer and where the act is intended to and does result in benefit
exclusively to the employee-manager, the employee-directing mind
will, from the outset of the design and execution of the criminal
plan, ceases to be a directing mind of the corporation and
consequently his acts could not be attributed to the the corporation
under the identification doctrine. This might be true as well under
the American approach of res pondaet suDerior. Whether this is so or
not, in my view, the identification doctrine only operates where the
Crown demonstrates that the action taken by the directing mind (a)
was within the field of operation assigned to him; (b) was totally in
fraud of the corporation, and (c) was by design or result partly for
the benefit of the company. (emphasis in the original)
Goodman J.A. was of the opinion that the identification doctrine as related to
the criminal process was "equally applicable" to a civil case. 95 He then went
on to consider exactly who constituted the directing mind and will of the bank
and to find out whether, in the course of the bank's attempt to fulfil its
obligations, there had been a failure to discharge the fiduciary duties that
where ultimately found to have been owed to the plaintiff's. In a crucial
passage the learned Judge said:96
It is my opinion that as a matter of law a corporation may have more
then one directing mind operating within the one field of operations
but I am of the further view that where such a state of affairs
exists, a corporation cannot be found in law to have a split
personality so that it can rely on the lack of knowledge on the part
of one of its directing minds of the acts, intention and knowledge of
the other directing mind operating in the same sphere to protect it
from liability for the actions of the first directing mind or the
combined activities of both directing minds. At least, in civil
cases, where the element of mens rea is not applicable, when there
are two or more directing minds operating within the the same fields
assigned to both of them, the knowledge, intention and acts of each
become together the total knowledge, intention and acts of the
corporation which they represent.
Goodman J.A. then went on to consider the fiduciary aspect. He saw no
95. In fact the doctrine was first posited in the civil case of
Lennard's Carryin g Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1915] A.C. 705
(H.L.).
96. , supra note 93, at p.430 D.L.R.
198
• .	 97difficulty in holding a bank to be a fiduciary,
	
concluding that the Defendant
bank did in fact occupy that position with respect to the plaintiff's and had
failed to discharge its fiduciary duties. This was so because the plaintiff's
"were relying on the advice, assistance and guidance of the defendant, [and]
that the defendant through Wadsworth was aware of ... that reliance". 98 Goodman
J.A. thought that the crucial question was whether it would have made any
differece to the plaintiff's had they known that "the bank was purchasing Crown
Trust stock with a view to eventually acquiring a 10% interest for the purpose
of thwarting any attempt by [the plaintiff's] to acquire control of Crown
Trust."99 The learned Judge thought that such knowledge would have "dissuaded
them from making the attempt." In the final analysis Goodman J.A. was of the
• .
	 100
opinion that:
The breach of duty on the part of the defendants consisted in its
failure to declare its conflict of interest at any time, its
subsequent giving of assistance and advice, and its later sale of its
shares (the acquisition of which and the purpose of such acquisition
it had never revealed to the plaintiffs) for its own benefit and to
the detriment of the plaintiffs ... [T]he defendant had a duty to
disclose any conflict of interest and to deal fairly with the
plaintiffs. This it did not do. it practised secrecy and non-
disclosure while pursuing its own interests in retaining some of the
plaintiffs and obtaining others of the plaintiffs as customers of the
bank and in the sale of Crown Trust shares for its own benefit and
for the benefit of another customer.
Thus it was held that a bank could not place itself in a conflict of interest
situation by advising two separate customers or deal on its own account,
without full disclosure. Of course the fact that Chinese Wall separation was
not argued makes it difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions, and the
Strict interpreation of fiduciary duties may be based on the particular facts
of the case.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., at p. 435.
99. at p. 440.
100. Ibid.
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But is it not true that a number of other problems are likely to arise
with Goodman J.A.'s interpretation of the possibility of there being more than
one directing mind and will of a company? At first blush it might appear that
his dicta is in conflict with the decision in Strain v. Armstrong 101 which lays
down the principle that two innocent minds do not add up to one guilty mind.'02
However this is not so. Goodman J.A. restricts his dicta to those situations
where, in a civil case, the element of mens rea is not applicable. Since in
establishing breach of fiduciary obligations it is not necessary to show a
guilty mind, the learned judge had no difficulty in applying the doctrine. As
well as this, Goodman J.A. further confined the scope of his ruling to
situations where the two or more directing minds operated within the same field
assigned to both of them. 103
 As a consequence, there would seem to be scope for
an alternative analysis in those factual situations where the directing minds
and wills did not operate within the same sphere of business. Even so, the
natural corollary of Goodman J.A.'s decision would be to expose a corporate
fiduciary with a number of directing minds to vast potential liability.
Moreover, financial conglomerates, operating banking and securities arms would,
most likely, be forced to divest themselves of conflicting interests for fear
of liabilty in those situations where the the directing minds were deemed to be
operating in the same business sphere, notwithstanding the establishment of a
perfectly effective Chinese Wall.
101. [1951] 1 K.B. 232.
102. That case involved liability for an intentional tort where
intention to deceive or recklessness with respect to the accuracy of the
misrepresentation was an essential ingredient. Thus the principle of Armstrong
v. Strain is restricted only to cases of deceit where the individual has acted
dishonestly and does not apply to negligence cases.
	 , The "Pantanassa"
[1958] 2 Lloyd's Reports 449 at p.457.
103. One Canadian commentator has sought to argue that Goodman J.A.'s
dicta "...is not the language of rigidity and, so far from shutting the door to
the defence of Chinese Walls, it seems to leave it distinctly ajar", see, suora
note 92 at p. 222. His argument is based on a narrow reading of the Standard
Investments case, which it must be said, is most probably correct.
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The tenor of the decision in Standard Investments, even if a case on very
special facts, along with the general emphasis of English case law, would seem
to stand in stark contrast to the regulatory trends currently dominating the
world's major financial centres - the U.K., U.S., and Japan 104 and to a lesser
extent in Canada and Australia and indeed elsewhere. In the U.K., for example,
the thrust of the decision runs counter to the Chinese Wall ideas expressed in
s. 47 and 48 of the Financial Services Act 1986, the SIB rulebook derived
therefrom, the Securities Association (TSA) rulebook and also the exempt
market-maker status and discretionary fund management status contained in the
newly remodelled Takeover Panel Codes. In the following Chapter it is proposed
to trace the recent legislative and regulatory approval of the Chinese Wall
mechanism in both the U.S and the U.K.
Summary
Chapter Six takes a look at the common law position of the Chinese Wall
in the U.K. To this end the chapter is broken into three main sections: (1)
conflicts of interest per Se; (2) using a fiduciary position to secure a
profit; and, (3) the extent to which separation via the Chinese Wall modifies
strict fiduciary duties. Concerning the last section, owing to the absence of
direct authority on point, the analysis draws on authorites from a number of
jurisdictions, mainly the U.S., where the most explicit judicial comment on the
use of the mechanism is yet to be found. As the analysis of the relevant case
law tends to indicate, there exists a tension between on the one hand what
appears to represent the legal situation at common law and on the other the
104. For regulatory approval of the Chinese wall in Japan
	 , McYea,
"Japanese Moves to Control Insider Dealing", (1988) December FT. FFR, 19.
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strong endorsement which the mechanism has found in statute law and the rules
and codes derived therefrom. Nonetheless a few U.S. decisions have, even if
only in very specific situations, endorsed the Chinese Wall as a suitable
regulatory mechanism in resolving both conflicts of interest and obligation.
This would seem to be in accord with recent regulatory developments and
legislative initiatives within that jurisdiction. These are reviewed in the
next section.
Arguing by analogy, the U.K. courts could well follow their American
counterparts and hold the Wall to be valid in certain special circumstances.
What these circumstances are, it is suggested, is somewhat dependant on certain
public policy objectives considered in Chapter Eight. Consequently an analysis
of the exact legal validity of the Wall, in so far as that is possible, is
deferred until the final chapter - Chapter Nine.
202
CHAPTER SEVEN: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY APPROVAL OF
CHINESE WALLS IN THE U.S. AND THE U.K.
1. The U.S... An Intioduction
In the U.S., the use of the Wall mechanism following the SEC's Menu
Lynch decision,' developed largely on a pragmatic basis. The SIade 2 and Black3
cases while raising many interesting issues resolved little of the uncertainty
or confusion. Recently the trend has been to specify more clearly the exact
use of the device. For example as early as 1977 the Comptroller of Currency
issued regulations reQuirin g national banks to establish "written policies and
procedures to ensure the national bank trust departments shall not use material
inside information in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase
or sell any security." 4 Moreover the burgeoning legislative developments
covering insider dealing in the U.S. securities markets has moved the discussion
of the mechanism into the congressional arena. These developments and their
link with the Chinese Wall are now considered.
83,347.
2.
3.
4.
Re Merril Lynch. Pirece. Fenner & Smith. Inc.. Fed. Sec. Law reports,
266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968).
517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.1974).
12 C.F.R. Rule 9.7(d) (1983).
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Recent SEC and Legislative Approval of the Chinese Wall5
The Insider Tradin g Sanctions Bill 1984
It had been intended that an express Chinese Wall provision would be
included in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 1984 (ITSA) to cover the
situation where one employee in a firm was in possession of inside information
about certain stocks and another employee, not apprised of the pertinent
information, put through deals in those stocks. However both Congress and the
SEC were of the opinion that the ITSA and existing legislation implicitly
provided this protection. Thus it was decided that the SEC should use its
rulemaking powers under the ITSA to deal with such situations on an ad hoc
basis. Accordingly, the legislative history of the statute states:
The Committee ... believes that there should be certain limits on the
liability of a multi-service firm, such as a broker dealer or
insurance company, where one employee possesses information but
another employee, not knowing of the information, trades for the
firm's account before the news is public. Under existing law and the
bill, such a firm with an effective "Chinese Wall" would not be
liable for trades effected on one side of the Wall, notwithstanding6
inside information possessed by firm employees on the other side.
However, it is arguable whether this statement accurately reflects the correct
5. The author has decided to discuss SEC approval and U.S. legislative
developments with regard to the mechanism in the same section due to the fact
that in the U.S. the SEC plays an instrumental role in devising policy
initiatives and in drafting much securities legislation. Note, also the Draft
Federal Securities Code which was the American Law Institute's attempt at a
codification of U.S. securites laws. According to Yarn, "The Multi-Service
securities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New Look in the Light of the Federal
Securities Code", (1984) 63 Nebraska Law Review 197 at pp.234, "[the Code]
has stepped quite gingerly in its approach to the Chinese Wall ... Early
drafts of the Code did not mention the problem." The ultimate outcome of the
code had been to afford the courts the opportunity to consider the existence of
the Chinese Wall or other procedures when determining the imputation question.
Thus the position advocated is much the same as that in existence under U.S.
statute law.	 , infra at note 6 and accompanying text.
6. Report of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce to Accompany H.R.
559, H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983).
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legal position with regard to the validity of the Chinese Wall in the
Indeed as one U.S. Senator recognised6b: "By deleting the statutory exemption
it is my intention to provide the Commission flexibility in order that they may
deal equitably with this situation on an administrative basis." It would seem
therefore that the validity of the mechansim rests on a largely paragmatic
footing.
Recent SEC Rule Changes
(i) Rule 14e-3
In 1980 the SEC introduced Rule 14e-3. 7 The adoption of the Rule
represented the SEC's first significant exercise of its rulemaking authority in
connection with the Chinese Wall. Rule 14e-3 has now been incorporated into
the SEC sponsored Insider Trading Bill 19878
It might be worth noting some of the SEC comments on the operation of
Rule 14e-3. Indeed the analysis could equally apply to the attempt to place it
on a statutory footing in the Insider Trading Bill 1987.
It will be remembered from Chapter Four ("U.S. Tender Offers") that the
exemption from an allegation of insider dealing was dependant on two factors:
(1) a lack of knowledge by the individuals concerned in putting through the
6a. For a tentative exposition of the law, 	 , note 27 and accompanying
text.
6b. Senator Alfonse D'Amato, 130 Cong. Rec. S8911, S8913-4 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984):
7. , SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,
410, 60,418; [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) p. 82, 646 (4
September, 1980). The Rule was discussed infra at Chapter Four, "U.S. Tender
Offers".
8. Discussed infra at note 22 and accompanying text.
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deal(s); and (2) that the firm had implemented one or a combination of policies
and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances", taking into consideration
the nature of the person's business. 9 It is important to note that there are a
range of possible measures. According to the SEC these might include a "Chinese
Wall", a "Watch List", or a "Restricted List".'° 	 The key phrase then is:
"prodedures, reasonable under the circumstances". The circumstances will
undoubtedly be highly dependant on the nature of the trades. For example the
SEC states that a broker-dealer firm can not continue to trade for its own
account when the firm is in possession of material non-public information
concerning a tender offer, ie. under the Rule the firm cannot self-deal.
This is significant because a 'naked' Chinese Wall will not, as a result, be
sufficient in every event.
It would seem that the SEC aims to treat every situation on its own
merits and rely on the prudence of investment firms to ensure that the most
appropriate measures are taken to fit any given factual context. This is far from
giving a "safe harbour" Chinese Wall exemption.' 2 It is a policy orientated
approach in which the firm will have to justify the use of a naked Chinese Wall
as opposed to more stringent procedures. No doubt the Wall may be used in
instances where the potential for conflict abuse is slight; a Watch List where
there is an increased potential for abuse; and a Restricted List for really
serious potential abuse.
The SEC has also made it clear that "it may be appropriate [for the firm]
9. The wording in the Insider trading Bill 1987 is not idential but it
is similar. See, below at note 22 and accompanying text.
10. Supra, note 7 at p. 83, 461.
11. at p.83,462 n.42. Note also, that: "Policies and procedures
which may be reasonable for one institution may not be reasonable for another
institution, even in the same industry" (at p. 83,461).
12. See, Yarn supra note 5 at p.234.
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to advise customers of its use of [such procedures] ... because the institution
would not be using all information it had received to the benefit of a
particular customer".' 3	Whether the courts would accept this as sufficient
disclosure is uncertain. It might also impose an added burden on the firm.
(ii)	 Rule 17i-1
In 1980 the SEC also adopted Rule 17j-1 in accordance with powers granted
under the Investment Company Act 1940.14	 The rule is aimed generally at
neutralising conflict of interest situations in the investment company context.
A typical situation might be where an investment adviser is long on the stock
of Company X and is eager to off-load it. As a consequence he might advise a
fund to acquire some of this stock irrespective of the whether there is a
better deal available. By virtue of paragraph (b) of Rule 17j-1 there is scope
for a Chinese Wail provision in such situations. Here investment companies and
each investment adviser of, and principal underwriters for, an investment adviser
must comply with a written Code of ethics. The Code contains provisions
reasonably necessary to prevent persons such as directors, officers and general
partners and such like (called "access persons") from committing anti-fraud
violations. Investment companies are required to use reasonable diligence to
uncover violations of the Code.
Under paragraph (b) of the Rule the SEC envisaged the use, by investment
companies, of the Chinese Wall to avoid liablity by using the mechanism to
rebutt the presumption that "access persons" who were about to acquire or
dispose of a security were: (1) aware of the fact that the investment company
13. Su pra note 4 at p.83, 461.
14. Investment Company Act Rel. No. 40-11421 [1980 Transfer Binderl Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) p.82,679 (October 31, 1980).
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was, or was considering, purchasing or selling the same security; and (2) aware
that the security was being recommended (or was about to be recommended) for
purchase or sale by the investment company.'5
(iii) Specialists
In 1987 the SEC gave approval to proposed rule changes affecting the
provision of certain financial services on the American (AMEX) and New York
(NYSE) Stock Exchanges. 16	The new rules involved sanctioning the use of a
Chinese Wall in isolating certain types of inside information flows. Under the
new regime a number of prohibitions previously imposed on retail financial
service firms affiliated with what are known as "Specialist" business units
were relaxed.17
Because of the important role specialists perform and the potential
threat of conflict of interest abuse when specialist services are provided
within the context of larger "diversified" financial firms, the operations and
affiliations of specialists were in the past closely monitored. Although no
rules on either exchange ever prohibited retail brokerage firms, or larger
conglomerate or "diversified" firms, from owning or controlling specialist
units, there had always existed strong incentives for not doing so. Up until
the introduction, and SEC approval, of the new measures, financial
intermediaries affiliated with specialists were restricted from undertaking a
number of financial services in relation to "speciality" securities. These
restrictions were a regulatory attempt to neutralise the potential for abuse
15. at p.83,735.
16. , SEC Rel. No.34 - 23768.
17. A specialist is a special type of market maker reponsible primarily
for maintaining "an orderly succession of prices in related stocks".
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which inevitably arose when the "mixing" together of associated, but
conflicting, financial services took place. The SEC's approval of the
Exchanges' new rule changes were designed to ease these restrictions provided
an effective Chinese Wall, between the diversified firm and the specialist
unit, was established.
In a document accompanying the SEC's stance it was recognised that the
new measures raised basic questions regarding the regulation of informational
advantages and the viability of the Chinese Wall. The Wall was defined as
"the combination of policies and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances,
to ensure that material, non-public information is not passed between certain
departments within the one entity".18
Despite the Commission's approval of the new arrangements, a degree of
apprehension was, nonetheless, expressed.' 9	The SEC's fears centred on the
development of significant conflicts of interest unless appropriate Chinese
Wall procedures and the monitoring and surveillance of the continuing adequacy
of those procedures could be found. Notwithstanding this, the Commission
considered that the policies and surveillance system that the NYSE intended to
implement addressed these concerns. Indeed, it was swayed by the fact that the
Exchange had devised additional safeguards requiring the specialist who became
privy to "market sensitive" information to communicate this fact promptly to
his firm's compliance officer. Once done, it was the responsibility of the
compliance officer to suggest what procedures the specialist should then follow
after receipt of such information.
18. Letter to the author from Ellen K. Dry, SEC Attorney, 2 April 1987.
19. See, Memorandum accompanying SEC Release No. 34-23768 at p.23 et seci.
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In assessing whether the Wall was an appropriate regulatory mechanism in
dealing with conflicts of interest arising from the lifting of restrictions
between specialist units and other financial entities, the SEC sought a
response from the U.S. business community. This response was mixed. Those who
objected to the SEC's approval, stressed the insufficiency of the mechanism in
alleviating potential conflict of interest abuse. It was feared that the Wall
would not ensure "independence of operations" and that generally the
effectiveness of the surveillance of the mechanism was decidedly suspect.
There was, however, support for the proposal. Of the 12 firms solicited
half were of the view that the Wall was effective in preventing the exchange of
material, non-public information among potentially conflicting departments.
They based this view on the success of similar Chinese Wall procedures created
to separate sensitive activities such as investment banking and research, and
trading and sales activities. Some stated that a retail brokerage house, or a
"diversified" firm, about to undertake speciality work in conjunction with an
affiliated specialist unit, would not put its reputation in jeopardy, or risk
losing its specialist franchise, by permitting the Chinese Wall to be loosely
enforced. As well as this, severe penalties for any infringement of the Wall
are to be imposed by way of an added deterrent.
The First Boston Case
In a recent SEC enforcement action against the First Boston Corporation2°
the issue of the Chinese Wall and Restricted List was raised. The case was
settled out of court; thus the outcome reflects the SEC's attitute to Chinese
20.	 v. The First Boston Corp., 86 Civ. 3524 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1986).
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Walls rather than that of the courts.
Cigna Corp. was a client of the First Boston Corporate Finance
Department. First Boston operated Chinese Wall and Restricted List policies.
On 21 January 1986 Cigna Corp. told First Boston's Managing Director that it
was considering a $1 billion addition to its property casualty loss reserves.
This news was highly price sensitive and was certain to depress the price of
Cigna's securities when publicly announced. As a consequence the Managing
Director had Cigna's securities added to the firm's Restricted List. A few
days later Cigna informed First Boston that it was about to announce the news
publicly. First Boston's Managing Director duly informed the firm's research
analyst. He in turn relayed the news to the Company's head equity trader who
directed another First Boston trader to unload Cigna securities held in the
firm's own inventory of stocks. The trader did this but also bought Cigna put
options which were later sold. Following the announcement Cigna's shares fell.
As a result First Boston made a profit on the transactions amounting to $132,
138.
It was alleged by the SEC that aithought Cigna had been on the First
Boston restricted list for some nine days the head equity trader had failed to
consult the list even though it was in his possession. Moreover First Boston's
compliance team failed to uncover trading in Cigna's securities for the firm's
own account. The facts came to light following a NYSE interal audit trail.
In the settlement that followed First Boston was absolved from unlawful
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conduct2 ' and agreed to forfeit the profits on the insider trades and to pay a
further civil penalty of $264, 274. As well as this the firm was required to
undertake a thorough review of its Chinese Wall and Restircted List procedures
and submit a report to the SEC.
The Insider Trading Bill 1987
A recent SEC initiative, currently before a Congressional Committee,
intends to add a new s.16A to s.16 of the Securities Act 1934.22	 Under the
Bill the SEC gives approval to the "segregation approach" in dealing with
abuses of conflicts of interest whereby knowledge of events in one department
are kept separate from events in another department. By virtue of s.s (b) (2)
of the Commission's proposal, integrated securities houses, who would otherwise
be in breach of s.s (b) (1)23 or s.s (d) (1)24 are afforded a Chinese Wall
defence in the situation where one individual in the firm has material,
nonpublic information about a security which another individual in the firm
deals in for the firm's own account. The firm is exempt from liability when it
can show both:
(1) that the individual(s) making the deal was not aware of, or influenced by
the information; and
(2) that the firm operated reasonable procedures such as a Chinese Wall and! or
21. First Boston's President, Peter T Buchanan has explained the
situation as follows: "The individuals involved with this trading did not
appreciate that this information was confidential or that trading had been
restricted ... [It] was an inadvertent but serious violation of [the firm's]
restricted list procedures". See, "First Boston's Nasty Spill at the 'Chinese
Wall", (1986) 19 May Business Week 87 at p.88.
22. For a short review of the SEC's proposal, 	 , McVea, "U.S.: A
Compromise Proposal for the Regulation of Insider Trading", (1988) 9 	 239.
23. Ibid.
24. See, the passage below at note 25 and accompanying text dealing with
tender offers.
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restricted list, to ensure that material, nonpublic information did not
flow from one department in the firm to another.
The SEC Bill gives a Chinese Wall exemption to firms involved in "tender
offers" or in British parlance - take-overs. This is significant for two
reasons. First, tender offers provide the most lucrative means of trading on
the basis of inside information and secondly, the effect of such trading on
market prices is invariably significant.
Subsection (d) codifies the existing law in this area as laid down by the
Commission's own Rule 14e-3. 25	This rule prohibits the use of inside
information, (except for the Chinese Wall exemption contained in s.16(b)(2)) in
connection with a tender offer provided certain criteria are fulfilled. First,
that "substantial steps" have taken place to commence the offer (the term
"substantial steps" is used because prior to that stage it is generally assumed
that there is nothing for the Company to publicly disclose). Secondly, that
trades have been undertaken at a time when the trader was in possession of
material nonpublic information relating to the tender offer, if he (the trader)
had known or recklessly disregarded the fact that the information had been
acquired directly or indirectly from the offering person, the target, or any of
those persons' agents. Communications of such information with regard to the
aforementioned persons would also be prohibited, except in respect of certain
25. Another initiative known as S.l380 differs significantly from the
SEC on this matter. Under its terms a wide approach is adopted covering
transaction extending beyond tender offers. The communication of material,
nonpublic information in this context would be prohibited other than to members
of that person's group.
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"good faith" communications.26
The New Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
The new legislation, sponsored largely by the SEC, contains amendments
concerning supervision in certain sectors of the U.S. financial markets. With
respect to Brokers and Dealers s.15 of the SEA 1934 is amended by adding the
following new subsection:
(f) Every registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking
into consideration the nature of such broker's or dealer's business,
to prevent the misuse in violation of this title, or the rules or
regulations thereunder, of material, nonpublic information by such
broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer.
The Commission, as it deems necessary ... shall ado pt ... regulations
to require specific policies or procedures reasonabl y designed to
prevent misuse in violation of this title ... of material nonpublic
information. (emphasis added)
Under newly implemented s.204 of the Investment Advisers Act 1940, the above
procedural policies are also applicable to prevent the misuse of nonpublic
information by Investment Advisers. In effect these procedures require, jj
, the establishment of Chinese Wall informational barriers to ensure that
inside information acquired by one arm of the firm is not transmitted and used
by another arm of the financial entity. The provisions represent the first
time that the Chinese Wall concept has been explicitly enshrined in statutory
language in the U.S.
26. It is interesting to note that in Congressional submissions some
members of Congress have stated that arbitrageurs are: "hiding behind their
Chinese Walls, rather than using them". See, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of
Telecommunications and Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (5 March, 1987)
(Statement of Representatives Edward J. Markey).
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Comment on the SEC's Use of the Chinese Wall Mechanism
In view of the forgoing it might appear that the SEC's position on the
Chinese Wall as outlined in the Slade appellate proceedings is now redundant.
Certainly the SEC has reappraised the use and validity of the mechanism. Its
use has been extended. Such store would in all likelihood be important in a
judicial ruling. But the Chinese Wall can in no way be regarded as a safe
harbour in every context. 27
	Even in those instances where, for example, in
theory the SEC sanctions the use of the 'naked' Chinese Wall, a common law
action brought on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty might oust the use and
reliance upon the mechanism if its adoption is not reasonable. However it
would seem that reliance upon the mechanism in an administrative action is a
more soundly based proposition, especially where a s pecialist28 is involved.
In the SEC's memorandum accompanying the introduction of the Chinese Wall in
respect of specialists there was no mention made that a 'naked' Chinese Wall
would be insufficient in the self-dealing scenario - the Wall merely needed to
be effective, the implication being that an effective Wall, and reliance upon
it, is reasonable. This may well establish the criteria to be applied to other
administrative Chinese WalL rules, reflecting a change in the way the U.S. aims
to trade-off its policy choices in the light of global deregulation. To what
extent the same analysis may be applied to an action brought under state or
federal law for breach of fiduciary duty is uncertain.
27. As Yarn observes su pra note 5 at p.234 "In its release accompanying
the formal adoption of rule 14e-3 the SEC took pains to note that the Chinese
Wall is neither mandated by the rule nor is a foolproof defence to a charge of
insider trading." But com pare this with Levine et al, "MultiService Securities
Firms: Coping With Conflicts in a Tender Offer Context" (1988) 23 Wake Forest
Law Review 41, (where it is argued (at p.61) that with Rule 14e-3 the SEC has
provided a Chinese Wall safe-harbour for firms).
28. See, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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In assessing the credibility of the Wall in the U.S. and comparing it
with the position in the U.K., it must be borne in mind that given the
segregation of commercial banking and securities business under the Glass
Steagall Act 1933, the Wall is not used in the context of situations which
regulators have traditionally considered to be very susceptible to abuse. In
addition the Wall in the U.S has not been given such explicit and extensive
regulatory and legislative recognition as is the case in the U.K. The
remainder of Chapter Seven illustrates this.
2. The UK. Official Recognition of the Chinese Wall
Developments Pre-Bi g Bang
Ci) The Takeover Panel
While financial conglomerates covering the full range of financial
services were peculiar to Big Bang, the mixing together of potentially
conflicting financial services was a common feature of the U.K. financial
services industry for some time prior to 1986. Merchant Banks in particular
were involved in providing a range of financial services which at times led to
undoubted conflicts of interest.29 The first self-regulatory endorsement of the
Chinese Wall concept in the U.K emanates from the Takeover Panel's Statement on
30	 . 31the Use of Confidential Information.	 The Panel said:
the risk of occasional abuse from the duality of function [ie.,
financial intermediaries operating in a number of potentially
conflicting capacities] is far outweighed by the manifold advantages
that duality brings
29. See generally, Rider, "Conflicts of Interest and the Chinese Wall" 81
in The Regulation of Insider Dealin g (Ed. Rider, Oyez 1979).
30. See, Annual Report 1970, Appendix I. The statement is reproduced
at AppertdixW at the end of this thesis.
31. , Annual Report 1970 p.12.
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Throughout the 70's the Panel continued to emphasise the importance of the
segregation technique in a number of its non-binding decisions. 32	However, in
its statement on the case of Mount Charlotte Investments Ltd and Gale Lister &
CO Ltd33 the Panel held that the merchant bank P.R. Grimshaw, which acted
as a financial adviser to the offeree company Gale Lister, could not dispose of
its own shareholding in Gale Lister in a way that conflicted with its advice to
to that company's shareholders. Though specific reference was not made to the
Chinese Wall it was implicit from the Panels statement that it would have made
no difference. Thus it would seem that while the Panel was willing to provide
general approaval of the Wall mechanism, it was reluctant to permit the
technique to operate unfairly against customers. Such an approach seems more
akin to the approach of a 'reinforced' Chinese Wall policy.
(ii) Clause 14(3) of the abortive C pmDanies Bill 1973
Clause 14(3) of what eventually proved to be the abortive Companies Bill
1973 sought to provide corporate entities with a Chinese Wall defence to both a
criminal and civil charge of insider dealing. It read:
A company should not be precluded ... from entering into any
transaction by reason only of, or having obtained, any information
in the possession of a director or employee of that company if-
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction was taken on its
behalf by a person other than the director or employee; and
(b) arrangements were then in existence for securing that the
information was not communicated to that person and that no advice
with respect to the transaction was given to him by a person in
possession of the information; and
32. See, L.Denning MR in Dunford & Elliot Ltd. v. Johnson & Firth Brown
L1, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Reports 505 (CA.). Speaking of the Code said (at p.
510): HAithough [the] code does not have the force of law, ... it does denote
good business practice and good business standards." See also, Palmer's ComDany
L	 Vol I (London 1982) (at p.1078) "It would appear that in those areas which
depend upon equitable considerations ... the Code may play an important role in
indicating commercial morality Panel Statement 1970".
33. Statement 30 January 1974.
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(c) the information was in fact not so communicated and advice
was not in fact given.
This was an ambitious proposal which sought to rely on an effective Chinese
Wall to rebuted any imputation that because certain individuals in the firm
were apprised of price-sensitive information the firm, as a whole, knew of that
information. As Rider points out, in subsequent companies legislation a
different approach was taken. In the Companies Bill 1978 (later to become the
Companies Act 1980, part V of which was to contain insider dealing prohibitions)
provision was made for only criminal and not civil liability.34
The Advent of Big Ban g and the Formation of Financial Conglomerates
Official Treatment of the Chinese Wall
(i) The Gower Report
Official recognition of the Chinese Wall approach was initially given in
the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 1983 (SI No 585) rr.2 and
8(2). Gower, in Part I of his Review of Investor Protection commented upon the
applicability of the mechanism. The tone more than hinted at scepticism.
Speaking of the resolution of conflicts by means of a Chinese Wall, he wrote:35
conflicts are, inevitably, endemic among those providing
financial services and are aggravated by the increasing tendency for
a wide range of such services to be provided by a single firm or
group. The wider the range the greater the risk of conflicts that
cannot be wholly avoided by erecting "Chinese Walls". City opinion
has been remarkedly complacent about this, apparently believing that
34. In view of this and the consequent fact that the insider must be
knowingly aware of the relevant facts, Rider, suora, note 29 at p.95 argues
that "it is extremely unlikely that the British courts would be prepared to
countenance any form of imputed knowledge in the case of a multi-functional
fiduciary." Thus, he concludes, that, "an effective Chinese Wall would be an
effective defence under the proposed [1978] legislation."
35. ReDort on Investor Protection Part I Cmnd 9125 at para. 6.30,
(hereinafter the "Gower Report").
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reputable firms can be trusted to resolve the conflicts in such a way
that if anyone suffers it will be they and not their clients."
(footnote omitted).
It is important to note that this growing range of financial services which
Gower talks about has become, in the wake of Big Bang, so wide as to be
virtually open ended.
(ii) The Government's White Paper
The Government in its White Paper 1985, likewise, discussed the role of
the Wall mechanism. It noted that in an environment where a range of financial
services could be provided by the one corporate entity (as is the case to-day)
it was not convinced that total reliance should be placed on Chinese Walls.35a
The reason for this, said the Government, was because information barriers such
as Chinese Walls restricted the flows of information and not the the conflicts
of interest themselves. Though the Goverment may have good cause to refrain
from placing total reliance upon Chinese Walls it could be suggested that the
reasoning given in justification of this approach is open to question. As
Gower and many others have pointed out, conflicts are inevitable.35b In fact,
as has been shown, it is not really the conflicts themselves that are of harm
but rather the abuse of those conflicts. 36 The question then reverts to whether
it is preferable to prevent or control conflicts. It would seem that the
former is too draconian in its effect to justify serious consideration.
Nonetheless there may be certain factual situations where the conflicts per se
may be of sufficient severity to merit segregation without the need to show
abuse - in this instance abuse is presumed from the very existence of the
35a. Financial Services in the U.K.: A New Framework For Investor
Protection, Cmnd. 9432, at para. 7.4.
35b. See, Gower Report Part I at para 6.30.
36.	 , infra Chapter Two at note 35 and accompanying text.
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conflict. An example of such logic may be found in the U.S. where the Glass
Steagall Act 1933 seperates, to a large extent, the Banking and Securities
37businesses.
(iii) Gower's Rejoinder
Part II of Gower's review came out following the Government's White
Paper. In it he passed further comment on the Wall technique. He wrote:38
The Government's scepticism about Chinese Walls as a panacea for
avoiding abuses of conflicts of interest (White Paper, paragraph 7.4)
is one that I share wholeheartedly; as I have said before, I have
never met a Chinese Wall that did not have a grapevine trailing over
it. On the other hand, unlike some commentators I do not interpret
the White Paper as seeking to ban Chinese Walls. They are a
legitimate device to protect individual members of a multi-functional
business from the risk of criminal liability from insider dealing.
(emphasis added)
Gower went on to explain that protection for the investor had to be found in
other ways and as such welcomed the Government's scheme to embrace, in the new
regulatory framework, a number of principles broadly aimed at ensuring that
investors were treated fairly.39
(iv) The Financial Services Act 1986
The ultimate statutory authority for sanctioning the Chinese Wall policy
is derived from s.48 of the Financial Services Act 1986. Section 48 empowers
the SIB to make Conduct of Business Rules regulating investment businesses.
These rules must satisy the requirements set out in Schedule 8 of the FSA 1986.
37. See, R S Karmel, "Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections" (1980)
97 Bankin g Law Journal 631; and Securities Industry Association, "Public Policy
Issues Raised by Bank Securities Activities" (1983) 20 San Diego Law Review
339.
38. Gower Report, Part II, at para. 4.13.
39. For a further explanation and critique of this, 	 , infra
Chapter Eight at note 51 and accompanying text.
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Under S.48 (2) specific provision is made for the making of Chinese Walls rules
or, as the legislation puts it, rules:
(h) enabling or requiring information obtained by an authorised
person in the course of carrying on one part of his business to
be withheld by him from persons with whom he deals in the course
of carrying on another part and for that purpose enabling or
requiring persons employed in one part of that business to
withold information from those employed in another part;
S.48 (2) (h) then, permits the SIB to issue rules concerning the implementation
of Chinese Walls. Section 47 introduces another important element. The section
covers misleading statements and practices. 4° It is a very broad anti-fraud
rule. In some senses it could be argued that a Chinese Wall is a device which
a conglomerate erects and relies upon while at the same time "intentionally"
making recommendations which the conglomerate as a whole knows are misleading,
false or deceptive. In other words one arm of a conglomerate could be making
recommendations about a company's securities which another arm of the
conglomerate knows is going into liquidation. But by virtue of 5. 48 (6):
(6) Nothing done in conformity with rules made under paragraph (h) of
subsection (2) above [ie. SIB Chinese Wall rules] shall be regarded
as a contravention of section 47 above.
Thus Chinese Walls operate as an exception, permitting conduct which would
40. The relevant part of s.47 reads:
47. (1) Any person who -
(a) makes a statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be
misleading, false or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material facts; or
(b) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement,
promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive, is guilty of an
offence if he makes the statement, promise or forecast or conceals facts for
the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to whether it may induce, another
person to (whether or not the other person to whom the the statement, promise
or forecast is made or from whom the facts are concealed) to enter or offer
to enter into, an investment agreement or to exercise, or refrain from
exercising, any rights conferred by an investment.
(2) Any person who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which
creates a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price or
value if any investments is guilty of an offence if he does so for the
purpose of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to
acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those investments or to
refrain from doing so or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights
conferred by those investments.
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otherwise be considered illegal or unfair.
Re gulatory Approval of the Chinese Wall
(I) The SIB's Use of the Chinese Wall Mechanism
In the U.K. the main responsibility for the implemention, operation and
functioning of the Chinese Wall mechanism in the post-Big Bang regulatory arena
has fallen to the newly formed regulatory rule-making body - the SIB. 41 The SIB
has clearly endorsed the use of the isolation technique in a number of its
42
conduct of business rules contained in the Agency's rulebook. 	 In November
1988 the SIB issued "Conduct of Business Rules a new approach". This was in
accordance with a growing consensus that the then existing rulebook had been
put together in a "piecemeal fashion".43 The object of the Agency's new
November review was "not to change the substance of the rules" but "to make
them clearer and enhance their effectiveness, and also to present them in a
more coherent and logical structure." 44 The SIB invited comment on the text
with the aim of having a full consultative text published in Februrary 1989.
This was closely followed by the actual "recast" Conduct of Business Rules
which came into force on 1 July 1989. In view of the time and funding
constraints involved in this research project it is proposed to base the
substantive legal analysis contained in this section on the SIB texts of
November 1988.
41. For a short summary of the SIB's powers,	 , infra Chapter Two at
note 9 and accompanying text.
42. See, infra at note 53 and accompanying text.
43. , SIB, Conduct of Business Rules a new a pproach Novemeber 1988, at
p. (i).
44. Ibid.
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Although none of SIB's rules either "require" or "specify" Chinese Wall
arrangements directly, (SIB purports to rely heavily on disclosure requirements)45
a number of its rules are "expressly disappplied when the business of multi-
functional firms are so arranged that those engaged in one function are
prevented from knowing the actions of those engaged in another function." 46 It
is upon these rules that attention is focused.
Before going on to review the scope and use of the Wall mechanism in the
SIB texts it is first neccessary to consider some of the broader issues
addressed by the rulebook. The rules are an indication of generally accepted
standards of good practice. 47 They are not, however, statutory instruments,
even though they have the force of statutory instruments.48 The crucial
question is, of course, to what extent the SIB rules add to or subtract from
obligations owed by firms at common law. 49 But leaving this aside for one
moment, the legal status of the SIB's rules it is also important to note that
the rules work in such a way as to afford different levels of protection
according to the nature of the client. This helps set the context of the
applicability of the rules. The SIB treats categories of investor or customer
differently. In one of its recent publications the SIB spells this out
clearly. In a section headed "Types of Customer" the booklet states:5°
As required by paragraph 12 of Schedule 8, SIB's rules distinguish
between customers according to knowledge, experience and
circumstance. In particular, they treat specially a number of
45. See, infra Chapter Eight at note 	 and accompanying text
46. See, SIB Draft: Sept. 1986 rulebook, Rule 1.02.
47. Rule 2.03 (November 1988 Text).
48. It will be remembered that the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry is given wide powers to make rules by virtue of s.205 of the Financial
Services Act 1986. These rules would be statutory instruments. However the
Secretary of State has delegated these powers to the SIB under s.114 of the FSA
1986.
49. This is discussed infra Chapter Nine: Summary and Conclusions.
50. See, SIB, "The SIB Rulebook An Overview" October 1987, at p.7.
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different categories of customer or investor:
(i) the market counterparty: a business doing the same kind of
investment business as the firm and with whom a firm does a
transaction;
(ii) the professional investor: another investment business (doing
investment business of any kind) for whom services are
provided;
(iii) the business investor: an investor which is a company (whethei
or not corporate) above certain size thresholds or a local
authority or other public body;
(iv) the experienced investor: the individual with such experience or
expertise in a particular kind of investment business as to
enable him for the most part to look after his own interests
conducting investment business of that kind;
(v) the execution-onl y customer: the customer who wishes simply to
deal, not to receive advice or a discretionary service;
(vi) the occasional customer: the customer who wants an advisory
service but on a one-off rather than on a continuing basis.
In essence, a great majority of customer relations rules5 ' and the
rules protecting customers from sharp practices ... do not apply to
relations between a firm and customers in categories (i) - (v)
Conversely, the customer relations and other investor protection
rules apply in their full rigour to the private individual or small
company, non-experienced customer without special experience or
expertise. (footnote added).
See also the term "private investor", which means:
a person who, in relation to the performance of any services for him
by a firm is not a business investor and, in relation to any
particular transaction5 n any particular investment, is not an
experienced investor.
A number of the SIB's rules embody the use of the Chinese Wall mechanism.
The term "Chinese Wall" is defined by the SIB:52a
A Chinese Wall, in relation to a firm, means arrangements within the
firm, or within a group which includes the firm, for securing that
information obtained by individuals employed in one part of the
firm's business or the group,s business, as the case may be, will be
withheld from individuals employed in another part of it." [The Old
SIB definition added "and, (b) those individuals are individuals from
51. Rules governing customer relations revolve around the requirements
of Schedule 8 and "ensure the achievement of best practice in the conduct of
firms' relations with their customers" (at p.6 of the SIB October 1987
document). Some of the most important of these rules require firms to know
their customer and to recommend only what is suitable (4:03). Firms must also
give best execution (4.02), risk warnings for example where the investment is
not readily realisable (5.11), disclosure of matrial interests (5:07) etc.
52. Supra, note 50 in Glossary at p. 9.
52a.	 at p.4.
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whom information about that interest or conflict is intended to be
withheld under those arrangements.]
The three most important rules given treatment here are Rule 3.04, 3.10 and
5.07. However, it is intended to consider, even if somewhat briefly, the other
"Chinese Wall" rules also. It is essential to spell out the broad remit of the
rule thus placing the analysis of the Chinese Wall exception! defence in its
proper context.
(i) Rules Coverin g
 Integrity and Fair Dealing
53
* Rule 3.04: Front Running
This Rule is aimed at preventing a firm, or a favoured customer, from
dealing ahead of a customer who really ought to have priority. Where a firm
ignores this priority the practice is known as front running. Presumably the
underlying rationale of the Rule is to stop a conglomerate from dealing in the
shares of a company in which one of (or a number of) its customers is a major
shareholder and whose trading activities are likely to affect the market for
those shares. The Rule limits a firm's trading when a customer has instructed
the firm to perform a transaction until that transaction has first been
executed. Equally the rule applies to the unexecuted orders of its
discretionary customers for whom trading decisions have also been taken.
There are, however, exceptions to the general prohibition against front
running. Under paragraph 4 where the firm knows or reasonably should know that
53. This is	 Rule 5.15: Limitation on firms' trading because of
customers' orders.
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an earlier buying (or selling) priority is that of a connected customer, 54 (Or
of someone acting for a person who would be connected if he where a customer),
then it must treat that priority as being deferred. Also the firm may deal
ahead of a priority customer for another customer if (a) the customer with the
priority has placed a limit on the price and the firm is not able to deal for
him at that limit, or at a more advantageous limit; or (b) where the the
customer's instruction cannot be executed immediately, and the terms of its
execution are unlikely to be influenced by dealing for the other customer; or
(c) if the firm is a recognised market maker in the investment and deals in
accordance with the rules of the relevant recognised or designated investment
exchange; or (d) if a Chinese Wall, in accordance with the SIB's understanding
of that term, is operated. 55 Thus front running is permissible for a
conglomerate provided an effective Chinese Wall is established with the
intention of preventing individuals involved in executing the transaction f
the other customer from knowing or from having a duty to know of the
priority. 56	In other words there is no duty to know of the priority if the
information which related to it is blocked of by the use of the Wall mechanism.
54. Connected customer is given a wide definition by the SIB. 	 ,
suDra, note 50 at Glossary. The term includes: a partner, employee or
appointed representative of the firm or an employee of the latter; and where
the firm is a company, a controller or officer of the firm. But a connected
customer is not to include a customer who is, or who is a person acting on
behalf of, an investment trust or a regulated collective investment scheme.
, paragraph 5 of Rule 3.04.
55. See, supra note 52a.
56. It would seem that the firm may deal only for "another customer" and
not for its own account ahead of a priority customer (save as a market maker -
see paragraph 7 (c)). The Rule does not seem to make this clear. This is
unusual as other rules allow self-dealing.
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* Rule 3.09: Fairness in use and dissemination of research
recommendations
Rule 3.09 stipulates, at paragraph 1, that it applies to any firm which
regularly publishes to its customer (or any class of customer) the results of
research which is likely to: (1) influence the future performance of
investments, and (2) result in recommendations to acquire, hold or dispose of a
security unless the firm states that the research or analysis was conducted for
its own benefit and that it may have acted on it. Paragraph 2 requires
evenhandedness in the publication of research material. In other words if a
firm has conducted research or analysis it is not permitted to publish the
results of the research or recommend a security in the light of the research
unless those results or recommendations are published simultaneously to all
customers to whom it regularly makes such material available. Paragraph 3
outlines an exception to this simultaneity stipulation. Simultaneity is not
required if a firm has made special arrangements with a customer and has
fulfilled them or "the medium of communication is such that it is not possible
to publish to all ... customers simultaneously, [and] those to whom prior
publication is made are not selected so as regularly to favour particular
,,5 7
customers.
Paragraphs 4 in effect contains the following prohibition: a firm is
unable to deal (for its own account or for a person whom it knows or ought
reasonably to know is a connected customer)58 on the basis of a.ny research or
analysis which it expects to publish to customers or on the basis of which it
expects to make recommendations to customers unless the results or recommend-
57. See, Rule 3:09 (3) (b).
58. See, su pra note 54 for the definition of a connected customer.
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ation have been published under the stipulations in paragraphs 2 and 3•59
Paragraph 5 extends this prohibition to a firm which is an associate 6° of
a firm prohibited by paragraph 4. According paragraph 9 the full force of
paragraph 4 does not apply if an effective Chinese Wall has been erected to
prevent individuals from knowing of the results or recommendations in question.
Moreover, the extent to which there is fiduciary duty to know of the existence
of the results or recommendation in question is neutralised by the existence of
a Chinese Wall which deliberately operates to conceal the pertinent information
from them.
* Rule 3.10: Insider Dealing
Rule 3•JØ61 brings into play a new legal disincentive to insider deal and
mirrors closely the substantive law as found in the Company's Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985. The point is, however, that the adoption by the SIB
of Rule 3.10 means that the firm is liable to the civil penalites under the
FSA. The rule reads:
(1) No insider dealing for the firm
If an officer or employee of a firm is prohibited by the Company
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 from effecting a
transaction then the firm shall not effect a transaction as a
principal on its own account unless:-
59. Rule 3.09 (6) allows firms to deal ahead of a research
recommendation if it has reason to believe that: (1) publication of a "buy"
recommendation, or, (2) the results of research or analysis which would suggest
a recommendation, "would result in customers wishing to buy from the firm in
quantities that it would require itself to buy amounts of that investment in
the market, then the firm may ... , before it publishes that recommendation or
those results, buy as much of that investment as it reasonably believes" is
necessary to satisfy customer demand and where such purchases would not "in
itself significantly increase the market price" of those securities. If a firm
does decide such a course of action is necessary then under Rule 3.09 (7) it is
necessary for the firm to disclose this to its customers when it publishes to
them the relevant recommendation or results.
60. An associated firm is defined supra note 50 at the Glossary.
61. This is the SIB's old Rule 5.21
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(a) the only reason why that officer or employee was so pro-
hibited was because of his knowledge of the firm's
intentions, or
(b) none of the officers or employees concerned in effecting or
arranging for the effecting of the transaction knew or ought
to have known of the circumstances giving rise to the
prohibition and none of them shall be regarded as having a
duty to know of the circumstances if information was
concealed from all of them by a Chinese Wall.
(2) No dealing with or for insiders
A firm will use its best endeavours to ensure that no officer or
employee of the firm effects a transaction on behalf of the firm
with or for any person if that officer or employee has reason to
believe that the effecting of that transaction by that person is
prohibited by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
According to Rule 3.10 a firm is prohibited from using inside information
when dealing on its own account in those situations where the CSA prohibits
individuals from insider dealing. Two exemptions are, however, allowed.
First, if the only reason why the employee is prohibited from dealing is
because he knows of the firm's intention. In other words, the fjj	 may deal in
securities (where its employee would be prohibited) if the dealing relates to
its intentions to perform or not perform some future act. The law does not
attempt to deny a firm from capitalising on a position of knowledge emanating
from itself which is in fact lucrative. However, individuals within the firm
may not deal for their own personal accounts on the basis of such knowledge.
Secondly, if the individual so prohibited by the CSA is "screened off" behind
an effective Chinese Wall so as to prevent that individual (or a group of
individuals) from being aware of the Circumstances giving rise to the
prohibition.
Paragraph 2 requires a firm to use its best endeavours to prevent
officers and employees from executing trades for the firm or for a customer
where they are aware of the illegality of the transaction under the CSA 1985.
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This gives rise to one intriguing question: what constitutes a firm's "best
endeavours" when preventing its employee from being aware of a breach of the
CSA. Because of the various intricate facts that must be known for a breach of
the CSA to have taken place, it seems unlikely that this prohibition will be
much utilised by the authorities. Undoubtedly the test is subjective - what
the individual firm in question thought were its best endeavours and	 what
the reasonable firm would consider the term best endeavours to mean.62
(ii) Rules Coverin g
 Issues of Skill Care and Diligence
* Rule 4.03: Suitability
Rule 4.03 deals with the suitability of investments and transactions in
them. The basic principle is that:
a firm must find out enough about the private investor's personal and
financial circumstances to enable it to act properly for him in
investment matters; and in making investment recommendations, in
exercising discretion and in advising about the customer's
instruction, it must ensure as far as it can that purchases and sales
are not unsuitable for any customer and that they are positively
suitable for him as a private customer.
A firm then has a positive duty to ensure that investments are suitable for
private investors and a positive duty to ensure that investments are not
unsuitable for any customer. Thus for all other customers, except private
investors,63 the firm is under no positive duty to ensure that investments are
positively suitable; merely to ensure that they are not unsuitable. The "know
your customer" doctrine as regards the private customer is spelt out in
paragraph 1 - the firm must take "reasonable steps" to conform to the doctrine.
Paragraph 2 outlines two exceptions to paragraph 1. First, where the firm is
62. See also, Hannigan, Insider Dealin g (London 1988) at p.152.
63. , supra note 52.
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dealing with an execution-only customer or providing services to persons
generally rather than to any particular private investor; and secondly, where
the firm has made enquiries and the customer has refused to answer them.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 specify much of what is said in the basic principle of
conduct with regard to the firm's other positive duty not to recommend
unsuitable investments for any customers.
Paragraph 5 deals with the experienced investor only. Under it a firm
ought not to recommend an investment which has features which it has reason to
suspect the investor may not fully understand, unless it also supplies him with
sufficient information as it reasonably believes will enable him to determine
the suitability of the investment. Paragraph 6 deals with the disregard of
advice, and allows the firm to perform the transaction even if it is regarded
as unsuitable for the investor provided the firm has warned the client that it
believes the investment to be an unsuitable one and the client has chosen not
to heed that advice. This is reminiscent of the underlying philosophy in the
Gower report ie. that the new framework was intended not to prevent the
investor from making a fool of himself but from being made a fool of.64
Paragraph 7 provides relief for the firm by virtue of reliance on the
Chinese Wall mechanism. In effect the paragraph states that although the firm
a whole might know that the particular investment is not suitable for the
investor, the lack of knowledge of an employee, who had no duty to know that
particular knowledge, is an exception to the general principle of the suitability
doctrine. In other words the firm may recommend, exercise a discretion, or
effect a transaction which it knows to be unsuitable if none of the individuals
involved knew or had a duty to know of the pertinent facts. And none of the
64. Gower Report Part I at para. 1.16
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individuals are taken to know or of having a duty know of these facts if a
Chinese Wall is erected. In one sense the Wall arrangements are intended that
those specific individuals should not know. To the extent that a firm operates
such Walls between department, as undoubtedly it will, the suitability doctrine
will be negated, thus offering the investor less protection than at first
glance might be supposed.
(iii) Rules Covering the Disclosure of information
As has already been shown, full and frank disclosure of a conflict by a
an agent to his principal and the consent therefrom is sufficient to negate
certain otherwise stringent fiduciary obligations. 65 The importance of
disclosure is emphasised strongly in the SIB rulebook.
The SIB divides disclosure into two parts: disclosure in general and
methods of disclosure. The general disclosure principle is set out in rule
5.01: disclosure should be clear and comprehensible." On the issue of methods
of disclosure, the rules "enable or require disclosure to be made by a firm in
three main ways: in the customer agreement, by communication to the customer
and the seeking of his express agreement, or by notification to the customer
with no provision for his agreement, express or implied.
The following rules deal with disclosure of information by an investment
firm or conglomerate.
65. See generally, Chapter Six.
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* Rule 5.05: Disclosure about dealing for oneself, and acting for both
66
sides
Rule 5.05 covers dual agency and self-dealing transactions. 67
 It contains
a general prohibition against a firm getting itself into conflict of interest
situations. The basic principle of conduct recognises that the firm will be in
a conflict of interest where it deals with a customer as principal for its own
68
account or as an agent for an associate of the firm
	 or acts for different
customers simultaneously who are on opposite sides of the same transaction.
The SIB recognises that this might erode the rights of customers. Exceptions
are however allowed. For example the firm may conduct otherwise prohibited
deals if:
(i) there has been fully informed consent of all the relevant facts of the
69transaction.
(ii) the investment is readily realisable and the customer agreement permitts
the firm to perform such transactions.7°
(iii) the transaction executed by the firm is part of a discretionary managed
portfolio and there has been disclosure of the possibility of such
transactions.
(iv) the firm is dealing off its own book as market maker and it (or its
associate) effects a contemporaneous matching transaction with another
66. It is important to read Rule 5.05 in conjunction with Rule 5.11:
Investments which are not Readily Realisable (see,below)
	 Rule 5.07:
Disclosure of a Firm's Material Interest in Transactions (old Rule 5.08) (also
see below).
67. This is old Rule 5.07.
68. See, supra, note 50 in the Glossary.
69. For what constitutes full informed consent, 	 , infra Chapter Six
at note 56 and accompanying text.
70. Rule 5.05 (ii).
71. Rule 5.05 (iii).
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(v) the transaction relates to an investment which is not readily realisable
then the rules relating to such types of illiquid investments apply.
These rules maybe found in Rule 5.11 (below). Inter alia they include a
Chinese Wall exemption.
Notwithstanding the general tenor of Rule 5.05 prohibiting conflicts of
interest and self-dealing, another major rule - Rule 5.07 - covering disclosure
of a firm's material interest in a transaction, undercuts much of the full
vigour of the disclosure required by Rule 5.05 and indeed the SIB's purported
general policy of disclosure. Rule 5.07 is now discussed
* Rule 5.07: Disclosure of Firm's Material Interest in Transactions
Rule 5.07 (formerly old Rule 5.08) deals with conflicts that might
disadvantage a client when a firm (or another "arm" of the conglomerate) has a
material interest in a transaction. The Rule deals with conflicts of interest
in general; whereas rule 3.10 covers one particular conflict - insider dealing.
It is important to set out the Rule in full:
Principle of conduct: a firm should not deal or recommend dealing
when it has a material interest of its own in the business or where
it has a conflict of interest, unless there has been adequate prior
consent.
(1) Disclosure of material interest. A firm shall not effect a
transaction with or for a customer (other than an execution only
customer) or recommend the effecting of a transaction with or for a
customer if the firm has directly or indirectly any material interest
in the subject matter or the effecting of the transaction (other than
the interest arising solely from the firm's participation therein),
or has any relationship with another person which causes its duty to
or its interest in relation to that other person to conflict with its
duty to the customer, unless there has been disclosure of the
relevant information with the informed consent, or in the case of a
recommendation by notification.
72. Rule 5.05 (iv).
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(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if none of the individuals involved
in the transaction or recommendation knew or ought to have known of
the interest or conflict in question, and none of them shall be
regarded as having a duty to know of it if the information was
concealed from all by a Chinese Wall
Thus essentially the firm has two options: either it must disclose to its
customers the nature of the conflict in which it finds itself or it must
establish a Chinese Wall to stop knowledge of, and about, the conflict from
being transmitted throughout the firm. An example of a firm having a material
interest in a transaction might be where the firm recommends to a customer the
purchase of an investment which has been underwritten by a different "arm" of
the conglomerate. In this way a conglomerate may breach traditional fiduciary
duties at common law by putting itself in a conflict of interest. This is also
a position, under the SIB rules, from which the firm may self-deal, provided,
it operates an effective Chinese Wall between the relevant departments.
* Rule 5.11: Investments Which are not Readily Realisable
Rule 5.11 has a very narrow reading. It deals only with not readily
realisable investments, otherwise known as illiquid investments. The general
prohibition here is that a firm should not recommend to a customer an
investment which is not readily realisable unless various disclosure
requirements are met. Paragraph (1) (a) requires a firm to first warn a
customer that an investment might be difficult to dispose of and that the
proper information for determining its current value may not be available.
Under paragraph (1) (b) a firm may not recommend a customer to buy an illiquid
investment at a time when the firm or an associate of the firm 73 has a long
73. See, supra note 50 at Glossary.
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position in that investment unless it first discloses that fact to the
customer. Equally under paragraph (2) a firm shall not recommend a customer to
dispose of an illiquid investment if, when the recommendation is made, the firm
or any associate of the firm has a short position in that investment unless the
firm discloses that fact to the customer.74
	Paragraph (3) meanwhile prohibits
a firm from acquiring "for a discretionary managed portfolio an investment which
is not readily realisable unless there has been a warning and disclosure as in
paragraph (1) by informed consent."
Paragraph (4) states that unless either: (1) the firm is acting as a
discretionary portfolio manager; or, (2) it (or its associate) is a market-
maker in the investment, the firm then cannot arrange for a customer "to buy
from or sell to it (or any associate) an investment which is not readily
realisable, unless: (a) the customer is not [in any case] entitled to best
execution, or (b) the firm has disclosed to the customer the mark-up (or, in
the case of a sale, the mark-down) or if there is no calculable mark-up or
mark-down how the price (or the proposed price) has been arrived at."
These then are the rigorous conditions imposed on a conglomerate who
wishes to execute orders for customers in illiqid investments. However the
prohibitions in paragraph (1) (b) and paragraph (2) do not apply if the
individuals involved in the transaction were unaware or had no duty to be aware
of the long or short position. Employees of a conglomerate are regarded as not
being aware or of having an obligation to be aware if information about the
long or short position was concealed from them by a Chinese Wall.
74. This paragraph is subject to paragraph 5 under which the firm may
derogate from its responsiblity under paragraph (1) and (2) if it has reason to
believe that the customer is a business investor.
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(iv Rules Covering Publications Containing Recommendations
The purpose and application of part 12 of the proposed rulebook is to
make "further provision concerning publications which contain recommendations
which are published about investments." 75 The rules are intended to operate in
conjunction with other related rules and to supplement those rules. For
example Rule 12.02 is directly related to Rule 3.09 which covers fairness in
the use and dissemination of research recommendations. Thus a firm may in
certain cases be required to accompany recommendations with other material such
as the firm's material interests.
Rule 12.01, though not directly applicable to the operation of the
Chinese Wall, helps to indicate the context of this section of the SIB
rulebook. In relevant part it reads:
This part applies to any journal, tipsheet, broker's circular or
other publication (including publication by sound broadcasting or
television) containing recommendations to buy, sell or hold any
investment which is issued regularly or occasionally by or on behalf
of a firm.
Given this frame of reference, the following Rule 12.02 addresses the issue of
the Chinese Wall in relation to publications containing recommendations.
*	 Rule 12.02 Disclosure of Material Interest etc.
This Rule is aimed at the situation were a firm is capable of benefiting
from transactions which it recommends. The benefit may arise because: (1) it
has already or may in due course deal as principal in the shares which it
recommends or (2) because it has some other "outlying material interest" in
75. Supra note 50 at Part 12.
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those shares. The Rule requires that where such a benefit will accrue to the
firm then it must include in the publication the proper disclosure of the
source of the benefit. Notwithstanding this, there is a Chinese Wall exception
from the general principle of conduct stipulated by the rule. The exception
reads:
2 Exception. Paragraph I [specifying disclosure] does not apply if
none of the individuals involved in the making of the recommendation
knew or ought to have known of the interest; and none of them shall
be regraded as having a duty to know of it if the information about
it was concealed from all of them by a Chinese Wall.
(II) The Takeover Panel's Use of the Chinese Wall Technique:
Post-Big Bang
The growth of financial conglomerates and the consequent move towards
dual capacity with its increase scope for conflict abuse, spelt out the
necessity for some adjustments to the Panel's rulebook, the City Code on Take-
overs and Mergers. The outcome of these changes are embodied in Part 2(b)
Appendix 3 of the Code. In pertinent part this reads:
It is incumbent upon the multi-service financial organisations to
familiarise themselves with the implications under the Code of
conducting other business in addition to, for example, corporate
finance or stockbroking. If one part of such an organisation is
involved in an offer, for example, in giving advice to the offeree of
the offeror company, a number of rules of the Code may be relevant to
other parts of that organisation, whose actions may have serious
consequences under the Code. Compliance departments of such
organisations have an important role in this respect and are
encouraged to liaise with the Panel in cases of doubt.
Despite the fact that neither the Panel's Rule-book nor its case rulings
have the force of law, its rules and rulings are nonetheless accepted as
statements of good practice, representing the "regulatory force" in those areas
238
which strictly speaking lie outside the SIB's regulatory jurisdiction.76 In an
official statement issued on 29 May 1986, the Panel made it clear that it was
aware of the problems that conglomeration and dual capacity created. Therein
the Panel expressed its intention to introduce detailed measures directed at
the new market regime.77 In its 6 October 1986 statement the Panel went on to
78
outline these proposed new amendments. 	 They addressed two specific areas of
concern. First, the circumstances in which a market-maker is to be regarded as
acting in concert with: (i) an offeror - where the offeror is being advised by
the corporate finance arm belonging to the same multi-service financial
organisation as the market-maker; and (ii) an offeree - where the offeree is
being advised by the corporate finance arm of the same conglomerate as the
market-maker. Secondly, the position of dealings by Fund Managers on behalf of
discretionary clients in the securities of companies concerned in an offer,
when the fund managers are part of the same organisation as the financial or
other adviser to an offeror of the offeree company.
76. See, sura note 32. See also, The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers
(1) (c) Enforcement of the Code: "The Code has not, and does not seek to have,
the force of law. It has, however, been acknowledged by both government and
other regulatory authorities that those who seek to take advantage of the
facilites of the securities markets in the United Kingdom should conduct
themselves in matters relating to take-avers in accordance with best business
standards and so according to the Code.
Therefore those who do not so conduct themselves may find that, by way of
sanction, the facilities of those markets are withheld. In particular, the
SIB and SRO's may require that those subject to their jurisdiction should
not act in a take-over for any person who does not appear likely to comply with
those standards. Moreover, if a person authorised by the SIB or an SRO to
carry on an investment business fails to comply with the Code or a ruling of
the Panel, that may lead to the withdrawal of authorisation.
77. Panel Statement, Multi-service Financial Or ganisations and the Code
29 May 1986.
78. Panel Statement, Multi-service Financial Or ganisations and the Code
6 October 1986.
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(i) Dealing as Principal: Market-Making
The question here is on what basis any part of a conglomerate is
permitted to continue trading as principal, whether as Market Maker or
otherwise, in the securities of companies involved in a takeover, when one arm
of the conglomerate is acting as financial adviser to either the offeror
company or the offeree company. The following two diagrams illustrates the
issues involved:
Fig. I
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PART OF THE ONE CONGLOMERATE
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The general rule as laid down by the Panel is that when one arm of a
financial conglomerate is advising an offeror, then all principal 	 dealings
in the offeree's securities by any part of of the conglomerate will create a
presumption that the conglomerate is acting in concert with the offeror. This
could also have repercussions for compliance with other Panel rules. 8° There
is, however, one important exception to this basis principle. The exception
operates where, before dealing in the offeree's securities the market-maker
first obtains an "exempt market maker status" in accordance with the Panel's
definition of that term. The Panel has stated that it
accepts that in general it is the intention of multi-service
financial organisations to run their market-making operations wholly
independently and, in particular, without regard to the interests of
clients of the corporate finance arm of the organisation. In
addition the panel has been particularly concerned to avoid damage to
79. Note that the conglomerate may act as agent for other customers. It
is only self-dealing that is prohibited.
80. Such dealings are most likely to affect the mandatory bid rule as
well as the obligation to make a cash offer.
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the liquidity of the market in relevant securities which might other-
wise arise from a forced withdrawal of a significant market-maker at
the time of the announcement of an offer because of its connection
with the offeror. Accordingly, the Code is to provide for a category
of exempt market-makers to whom t above mentioned presumption will
not normally apply. (emphasis added)
The market-making arm of a conglomerate seeking to acquire an exempt
status must inter alia establish an effective Chinese Wall between itself and
other arms of the conglomerate. The Panel has stated that:
[A]n applicant market-maker will have to demonstate to the Panel that
the organisation in question has in place arrangements satisfactory
to the Panel relating to the separation of the market-making side
from otr relevant parts of its business, in particular, corporate
finance.	 (emphasis added).
According to new Rule 38, in the situation where an Exempt Market-Maker
(EMM) is connected with an offeror or offeree company involved in a take-over,
it will, notwithstanding its exempt status be precluded from using that status
to act in such a way as to assist clients of the corporate finance arm. 83 Thus
restictions are still placed upon an EMM when a part of its organisation is
connected with the offerer or offeror. These restrictions, or, 'reinforcements'
as the Panel calls them, are threefold:
(1) Rule 38.2 prohibits dealings between an offeror (or any other party
in concert with the offeror) and EMM in the securities of the offeree company
during the offer period.
(2) Rule 38.3 prohibits an EMM that is connected with an offeror "from
assenting relevant securities owned by it to the offer until the offer has been
declared unconditional as to acceptances."84
81. See, Panel Statement Multi-service Financial Organisations and the
Take-over Code 6 October 1986, at p.2.
82. Ibid.
83. Rule 38.1. Discussed	 .
84. Su pra note 81, at p.3.
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(3) Rule 38.4 prohibits an EMM from voting with the offeree or offeror
company in the context of a takeover or a possible takeover.85
(ii) Discretionary Fund Management
Prior to the Panel's new rules, the Panel acknowledged the legitimate
separation of the management of discretionary investment accounts by one part
of a multi-service financial firm when another part of the organisation, for
example the corporate finance arm, was acting as an adviser to an offeror or an
offeree company. However, once the involvement of the corporate finance arm
became public, fund managers were "required by rule 7.2 of the Code to consult
with the Panel where purchases of the securities could, if the purchasers in
question were to have been made by the offeror or the potential offeror itself,
,86have consequences under certain rules including rules 6,9 or II of the Code
Under the new proposals the position of the discretionary fund manager in
respect of the period prior to the involvement of the corporate finance arm
becoming public remains unchanged. Thus, there is no presumption that a fund
manager connected with a corporate finance arm who is involved in advising an
offeror/ce in a bid is acting in concert with the offeror with regard to the
discretionary investment accounts in the situation prior to that involvement
being made public.87
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Of course this is only a presumption and if it is rebutted and
actual concertedness is found then the usual concert party consequences under
the Code apply.
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However, once the connection of the corporate finance arm with the
offeror/offeree becomes public knowledge 91
 fund managers may gain exemption
from certain consequences of the Code that would otherwise follow provided the
DFM applies for and is infact granted exempt status. To do so the DFM: "must
satisfy the Panel that the Fund Manager operations are run entirely
independently and without regard to the interests of the rest of the
[conglomerate] ... including the advisory side." 89 ie. it must operate a
Chinese Wall under the same criterion as applies to exempt market makers.9°
Thus, where exemption is granted, the Fund Management arm, notwithstanding the
fact that another part of the conglomerate is advising the offeror, will not
normally91
 be presumed to be acting in concert with the offeror in relation to
its discretionary accounts, provided, that is, there is no actual concerted-
92
ness.	 Instead the Fund Management arm will be free to deal, without fear of
breaching the Code, for discretionary clients93 in securities relevant to the
94takeover.
However, no such freedom exists where (in the unusual case) an EFM is
88. Note that the DFM's connection to the offeror/ee only arises through
the connection of the corporate finance arm with the offeror/ee.
89. Supra, note 81, at p.4. The rationale of this approach is, accord-
ing to the Panel: (at p.4) "prompted by the recognition that the investment
management sides of many banks and other institutions operate wholly
independent businesses and, in these cases, the effect of continuing to treat
them as if they were acting in concert with the advisory sides would be to
prejudice unfairly the interests of the clients whose funds are under that
management.
90. See, supra note 79.
91. Note the wide discretion the Panel gives itself by the insertion of
this word.
92. And no concertedness is presumed by virtue of the fact that a DFM
holds exempt status ie. operates an effective Chinese Wall between the relevant
departments to prevent knowledge in one department from being transfered to
another.
93. Note the DFM, notwithstanding his exempt status, cannot deal on its
own account ie. it cannot self-deal. Again presumably this is because of the
scope for abuse.
94. Accordingly, Rule 7 has been amended to accommodate the new
measures.
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connected95 with the offeror (or offeree company) rather than the financial
adviser or other adviser (as is the usual case).
Recent Panel Rulings
That the Panel is prepared to give the Chinese Wall mechanism a secure
place in its arsenal of regulatory techniques dealing with potential conflict
abuse in the new post-Big Bang arena is not only evident from its new rules,
but also from some of its recent rulings. Three cases in particular highlight
the Panel's willingness to endorse a Chinese Wall segregation mechanism.
In United Newspapers ( plc) and the Extel Grouo (plc) it was held that an
investment company could continue to deal in the shares of an offeree company
while the director of the investment company was also director of the offeror
company provided independence of operation was assured by reliance upon the
Chinese Wall criteria as normally applied to exempt market makers and that an
independent board of the investment company excluded any "infected" members
from making decisions relating to how the interest in the offeree's shares was
96to be handled.
In that case, United Newspapers (the offerors) sought to acquire the
Extel Group (the offerees) in a takeover. A director of UN was simultaneously
a director of a fund management company (MIM) which managed accounts on a
discretionary basis. MIM owned 7.2 %. of Extel's shares. However only 0.2 %
of these shares where actually held in its own account. The Panel was
95. Meaning in the same group as the offeror/ee.	 , supra note 81 at
p.5.
96. Panel Satement on United Newspapers p lc.! Extel Grou p p lc.. May 18,
1987.
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satisfied that prior to the offer being made public neither UN nor MIM were
acting in concert. The issue essentially revolved around whether, after the
announcement, MIM's internal procedures were sufficent to rebut the presumption
that, owing to the joint Chairmanship between UN and MIM, they were acting in
concert. The Panel decided to apply the same test as when deciding whether to
grant exempt fund manager (EFM) status under the code ie. whether effective
Chinese Wall arrangements were in place. Although neither UN or MIM were part
of the same conglomerate (the situation in which EFM status strictly appLies)
the Panel thought it appropriate to apply the same criterion (ie. the Chinese
Wall text) because the underlying principles were consistent. The Panel went
on to find that the precautions taken were sufficient. In fact it was further
swayed by the fact that at MIM there operated an independent non-executive
committee of the board to decide on investment trust holdings. Such a
practice, if preserved, constituted an effective Chinese Wall.
In Tpzer and Moulin an even more extensive reliance was placed on the
Wall technique. 97 There the issue arose as to whether a Chinese Wall
arrangement was sufficient in the situation where one department in a merchant
bank acted on two different occassions in relation to a company which had at
both times been the subject of a takeover and had during the course of the
first relationship acquired confidential information about the company. In a
non formal ruling, the Panel answered the question in the affirmative.98
The facts of the case where as follows. In May 1987 Tozer consulted
Schroders, a firm of financial advisers, concerning a possible offer for
97. Panel statement, on Tozer, Kemsley and Milibourn (Holdings) PLC
("Tozer")/ Moulins PLC ("Moulins"), 30 June 1987.
98. Morse notes that the tone of the new statement amounts to a de facto
ruling, (1987) JBL 480, at p.483.
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Moulins. The problem was that Schroders had previously acted for a management
buyout consortium which in the normal course of business received material
confidential information relating to Moulins. The confidential information
concerned, inter alia, long-term projections about Moulins. The management
buyout did not proceed and following that Schroders had no material involvement
with Moulins. The question then became whether Schroders should act for Tozer
in view of the material information it had previously acquired about Moulins.
Three crucial factors swayed the Panel in allowing Schroders to act for
Tozer:
1. Tozer initiated the new takeover proceedings and Schroder did not carry out
any analysis of Moulins for Tozer prior to that time.
2. the Schroders personnel acting for Tozer were substantially different from
those who acted with regard to those who acted with in the buyout
transaction.
3. Schroders took steps to isolate confidential documentary information
previously obtained so that it could not be available to those advising
Tozer.
The Panel thought that although the facts of the dispute did not fall directly
within the the General Principles of the code or of the Rules of the code the
issue did relate to good standards of business behaviour with which the Panel
in its introduction to the Code had stated was its concern.99
In a Panel ruling given on 10 October 1988, stockbroking/market-making
firm Smith New Court was found to have breached Rule 38.1 of the Takeoever
99. See, supra, note 97.
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Code.'°° The ruling suspended the firms exempt-market making status for a
three-month period.' 0 ' Under the suspension Smith New Court were required to
satisfy the Panel that there were in place effective procedures to ensure that
a repetition of the breach would not occur.
The facts of the case are as follows. Ruberoid, a roofing materials
company, was faced with a hostile bid from Raine, a house building company, and
a recommended bid from Tarmac another building company. SNC, who acted as
broker for Ruberoid, owned a market-making arm which had a 2% holding in the
company. The market making arm sold its holding to Tarmac, thus frustrating
Raine's bid. When the Panel discovered that Tarmac had purchased its shares
from an organisation which was also corporate broker to Ruberoid, the Panel
began an investigation. The investigation brought to light two main concerns:
First, it transpired that a matter of days before the pertinent transaction
SNC's EMM arm was considering selling half of its long position in Ruberoid to
Hoare Govett, who were acting for Raine. The advice of senior personnel was
sought. It was advised that they should not sell to Raine because this might
reflect badly on the position of the SNC organisation who acted as brokers to
Ruberoid. The Panel held that "In light of Rule 38.1, this was clearly a
consideration which should not have been taken into account and therefore
amounted to a breach of the Rule".102
Secondly, SNC'c broking arm were aware of EMM's wish to reduce its
holding. It was arranged that the shares would be purchased by a broker who
was acting on behalf of a then unknown party. This later was found to be
100. See, Panel Statement 19 October 1988. See also, suDra note 83
101. The suspension was thought unlikely to cause any significant
financial loss to the company.
102. , Panel Statement suDra note 100, at p. 5.
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Tarmac. It was argued that the SNC's broking arm had used the EMM's book to
assist Ruberoid and that the broking arm should never have been given the
opportunity to see that the excess shares were purchased by a party friendly to
Ruberoid.
The Panel held that despite the fact that the broking arm had acted
wrongly, "where the barrier between the market making arm and the corporate
finance arm of an organisation is breached, with the result that the corporate
finance arm sets out to facilitate the purchase of shares held by the market
maker by a party friendly to the offeree, then the corporate finance arm
becomes party to the activities of the market-maker ... the activities of all
those in the corporation can be taken into account in deciding whether a breach
has occurred."°3
In reaching its decision the Panel reaffirmed its commitment to the
proper working of the Chinese Wall technique stating that:104
In a market where organisations are permitted to act in several
capacities, the Rules aim to allow sensible working of the market
whilst preserving the integrity of separation between the various
arms of organisations. Strict compliance with the Rules is crucial.
It is necessary for those responsible for the overall management to
make certain that an appropriate system is in place to ensure that
the Rules are observed. It is also necessary for compliance to
ensure that in actual practice that system is strictly adhered to.
It is imperative that those acting in the market should know what the
rules are and should exercise the most rigorous self discipline to
stick to them. This task is no easier because of the potential close
contacts between various members of the same organisation. But
precisely because of such contacts, the systems and the checks
enforced have to be strict. While physical separation, wherever it
can be obtained, is important, the system ultimately depends on
individuals being aware of the Rules and complying with them
strictly.
103. Ibid., at p.6.
104. at p. 3.
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In arriving at an appropriate sanction the Panel took a number of factors
into consideration: SNC's full cooperation with the investigation, its
reimbursement of Raine at considerable cost to itself and finally its pledge to
adopt more stringent measures to ensure that there is no similar breach in the
future. Taking a diplomatic approach the Panel concluded that "this case
demonstrated inexperience and incompetence on the part of a number of people
within SNC in an area which is of the utmost importance to the integrity of the
market."'° 5 Nonetheless a three-month suspension was ordered.
While similar breaches of Rule 38.1 have recently occured Smith New Court
is the first EMM to have its status suspended. The ruling therefore marks the
end of the Panel's honeymoon period for to adjust to the new rule changes.
This is surely as it should be for despite the Code's non-statutory nature it
would seem incumbent upon the Panel to impose penalties at least as severe as
those in governmental semi-statutory domains.
Summary
Chapter Seven reviews the official acceptance of the Chinese Wall
mechanism in the U.S. and in the U.K. The merits of the device have been
recognised by authorities on both sides of the Atlantic for some time now. In
contrast to the largely pragmatic footing upon which the mechanism rested in
both jurisdictions in the early years of its use, the recent trend has been to
place the device on a more formal basis. In some senses this is an example of
the regulatory paradox mentioned earlier in Chapter One: in Britain, at any
rate, the one financial house may offer a full range of financial services;
in the process regulatory barriers are being broken down (the trend towards
105.	 Ibid., at p.6.
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deregulation) the Chinese Wall as an abstract concept is a flexible market-
based regulatory mechanism (fitting conveniently within a deregulatory
philosophy); yet its use is now being embodied in formal regulatory and
statutory codes (the trend towards re-regulation). Despite the fact that this
paradox is evident in both the U.K. and the U.S. there are, nonetheless, marked
differences in the use of the mechanism by the authorities in both countries.
In the U.S recognition has been granted in a narrow but growing range of
situations, capable of being expanded under the SEC's discretionary rulemaking
powers. The first formal embodiement of the Chinese Wall concept in statutory
language in that jurisdiction is found in the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act 1988. The implementation of the mechanism is in most, if
not all, instances subject to a reasonableness test. Therefore to what extent
a 'naked' Chinese Wall will suffice is difficult to assesss. Rule 14e-3,
covering take-overs, is probably the most significant arena within which the
SEC has permitted the use of Chinese Wall. But even here there is no complete
safe harbour provision for a 'naked' Chinese Wall whereby the firm can self-
deal. Nonetheless, there is no prohibition against self-dealing for
specialists operating effective 'naked' Chinese Walls, perhaps illustrating the
point that the SEC now believes that such Walls, if effective, are, by
definition, reasonable and constitute a neccesary by-product of deregulation in
general. It is suggested that a 'naked' Chinese Wall defence is more likely to
succeed in an administrative action than in a court action for breach of
fiduciary.
In the U.K. statutory sanctioning of the Wall emmanates from s.48 (6) (2)
(h) of the Financial Services act 1986 which gives the SIB broad based powers to
implement Chinese Wall rules at its own discretion. In contrast to the SEC,
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and in an arena where Glass Steagall does not operate, the SIB have made
liberal use of this discretion. According to the principle of equivalence
SRO's must make rules affording investors at least equivalent protection to the
SIB rules. Thus Chinese Walls are also embodied in the SRO rulebooks. The SIB
rules and those made thereunder are a defence to actions brought against
conglomerates under the SIB rulebook (or SRO rulebooks) alleging: insider
dealing, concealment of a conflict of interest, non disclosure of material
interest and self-dealing. Of course to what extent this reflects the position
at common law is a very moot point.
Closely linked to the SIB rules, but covering issues specifically related
to take-overs, the City Panel on Take-overs Mergers has in the context of fully
blown conglomerates endorsed the use of the Wall techniques in both its new
rules covering dual capacity and in some of its recent case rulings. However
the Panels 'naked' Chinese Wall approach will not permitt self-dealing in every
106instance.
106.	 , for example, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TIlE CHINESE WALL - A POLICY APPRAISAL
In Britain the policy assessment of the Chinese Wall has been shallow,
failing to highlight clearly the crucial issues upon which adoption of the
mechanism rests. Comments in the Gower Report' and the Government White Paper2
implied that although it would be wrong to treat the mechanism as a panacea to
the problem of increased access to inside information it was not to be
discarded as wholly useless. This initial tentative approach would not seem to
have been borne out by the current regulatory regime in the U.K. 3 nor by the
evolving regulatory framework in the U.S. 4 As shown in Chapter Seven the
widespead use of the Wall mechanism by the regulatory authorities in the U.K.
has made the isolation technique the regulatory linch-pin of the financial
conglomerate regulatory system. By not permitting Chinese Walls the operation
of financial conglomerates would be severly impeded.
In the light of these facts it is now proposed to review some of the
policy questions surrounding the Wall. The aim is to see whether there exists
an adequate basis for confidence in the continued use of the technique,
especially where banking and securities houses have merged together. For the
purposes of analysis, the debate is couched in terms of a tension between
economic issues of efficiency and legal issues of fairness, thus giving rise to
a regulatory dilemma. How is this dilemma to be resolved? The application of
strict legal principles? An economists cost-benefit approach? Or on the basis
1. See, infra Chapter Seven note 35 and accompanying text.
2. , infra Chapter Seven note 35a and accompanying text.3. S, The Securities and Investments Board's A pDlication for Des-
ignated Agency Status Under the Terms of the Financial Services Act and the
Revised Rule Book Dated Februar y 1987, Explanatory Statement, at p.14 section
(e) entitled Chinese Walls. Discussed infra at note 59 and accompanying text.
4. See, for example, s.3 of the recently adopted U.S. Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. Discussed infra Chapter Seven at
note 26 and accompanying text.
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of a policy hunch, making value judgements about the relative weights to be
attached to the issues involved? Thus the difficult question of deciding which
option best resolves this dilemma is addressed.
The Regulatory Dilemma: The Benefits of Conglomeration v. The Costs of Conflict
Abuse
Regulators are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, there are certain
benefits or "economies of scope" to be had from conglomeration6 but on the
other hand, there are also costs: both safety and soundness issues and conflict
of interest problems.7 The safety and soundness issue revolves around what the
economist calls externalities. 8 The activities of any one bank which over-
extends itself may impose costs not only on its own depositors (in that they
lose their savings or a proportion thereof) but may also impose costs on other
banks, because the failure of that one bank could jeopardise the viability of
others. Regarding conflicts of interest, there is a strong tendency for
conflict abuse to result in a misallocation of scarce economic resources, while
at the same time creating a perception of unfairness in the provision of
financial services. Given that there are both economic benefits and attendant
costs associated with permitting the formation of financial conglomerates, a
balance between the competing needs of both efficiency and fairness must be
found, It is crucial to bear in mind that the stricter the regulation (in
other words the greater the compartmentalisation) - the more the economies are
reduced. In this way there is what might be called a regulatory dilemma.
6. See, note 15 and accompanying text.
7. For a fuller discussion of conflicts of interest see generally,
Chapters Two and Three.
8. The standard textbook example is the polluter who pollutes the
environment for the rest of the community. The cost imposed is called the
social cost because society rather than the polluter bears it. An externality
may however create positive benefits.
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.9Professor Goodhart has put it:
The difficulties do not occur so much in assessing the case for
regulation, but in designing how regulation can best meet the cost-
benefit criterion, so that the marginal costs 1 8f regulation do not
exceed the marginal revenues to be gained. 	 (footnote added).
What are the Economic Benefits of Conglomeration?
(i) Benefits from Enhanced Competition
The merits of competition over and above restricted entry would appear to
be well settled in neo-classical economic theory. It is generally assumed that
increased competition will result in social benefits in the form of lower
prices, increased choice, better customer service etc. It is axiomatic that
the potential social benefits of competition will be greatest in those areas of
financial services where there already exists a large degree of imperfect
competition due to legal barriers or restrictive entry controls.
One U.S. commentator argues that investment banking exhibits a high
degree of imperfection. Consequently a relaxation of the legal prohibitions on
commercial bank entry into the investment banking domain would increase
competition and in turn reduce underwriting fees.1'
9. Goodheart, "What is the Purpose of Regulating Financial Services?"
(1986) mimeo., London School of Economics, at p.26.
10. Marginal cost, in this context, is the economist's terminology for
expressing the change in total costs brought about by adding one more unit of
regulation (or protection) to the regulatory framework. Marginal revenue,
again in this context, would represent the change in total revenue induced by
adding one more unit of regulation to the regulatory framework. Obviously it
is very difficult to divide regulation into specific units and assess the
relevant costs in the way envisaged in the quotation.
11. Robert Litan, What Should Banks Do?, (Brookings Institute 1987)
p.61-74.
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(ii) Diversification reduces risk thereby enhancing the safety and
soundness of the financial system
It may be argued that conglomeration, far from jeoparding the safety and
soundness of the financial system through the threat of systemic risk and
contagion, actually stabilises it. According to one authority:12
Available evidence suggests that new activities such as underwriting
corporate securities, general insurance underwriting, mutual fund
operations are actually less risky than conventional lending
activities of banks.
The underlying principle here is that diversification actually reduces risk
because the risks borne by one arm of the conglomerate are partially or fully
offset by the activities of another arm of the conglomerate. According to
Pierce securities business, particularly underwriting provides a good example
of this. He writes:13
Available evidence indicates that the returns to securities firms are
negatively correlated with the returns to banking in general. This
means that, on average, when returns to banking are relatively low,
the returns to securities activities are relatively high, and visa
versa.
From this point of view it may be in the mutual interests of both banks and
securities firms to merge so as to form conglomerates. The total risks of both
would thereby be reduced. The stability engendered would result in consequent
social benefits too, since the financial system would be less open to systemic
risk.
Other studies would seem to dispute such a conclusion. On reviewing
12. See, J.L. Pierce, "On the Expansion of Banking Powers" Deregulating
Wall Street: Commercial Bank Penetration of the CorDorate Securities Market
(Ed. Ingo Walter, Wiley-Interscience: 1985), at p. 26. See also, Anthony
Saunders, "Bank Safety and Soundness and the risks of Corporate Securities
Activities" (at p.171) in Deregulating Wall. He concludes that greater
diversification may actually contribute to greater institutional stability.
13. ,	 26-27.
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availiable research in the U.S., one set of commentators found that
diversification did not appear to have any significant effect in reducing the
overall risk of an organisation.' 4 In a study cited by them, the correlation
between commercial banking and investment banking was found to be positive (ie.
a fall in the returns to one was not offset by a an increase in the other) thus
indicating that there was little benefit from combining the two activities.
(iii) Economies of scope or synergies 2 + 2 = 5
Although the literature isolates the above benefits, the following
analysis concentrates essentially on the economies of scope, or synergies
issue. Economies of scope are "cost savings derived from delivering multiple
goods and services jointly though the same organisation rather then through
specialised providers". 15 Essentially synergies arise when a firm achieves
lower unit costs as a result of the joint offerin g of different financial
products. Thus they accrue if the combined cost of providing financial
services is less than would be possible if the same packages were offered
separately by different firms. 16 In this way, economies of scope can be
distinguished from economies of scale. The latter arise when an increase in
the scale of production gives rise to a more than proportionate increase in
output, thus lowering average costs.
14. Fischer et al, "The Securities Activites of Commercial Banks: A
Legal and Economic Analysis" (1984) 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 467, at p.505-506 and
sources cited therein. See also, Litan, supra note 11, at p.97 who lists some
of the methodological weaknesses in the studies he cites to support the
contention that cohesion of banking and securities business would reduce risk.
Notwithstanding these he concludes: "the evidence suggests that financial
product deregulation would offer potential significant opportunities for
reducing risk for the typical risk-averse bank".
15. Litan, supra, note 11, at p. 75.
16. , Hall, The City Revolution, (MacMillan Press 1987) at p.90,
footnote 43 & 44.
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How Do Economies of Scope Materialise in Conglomerates?
Synergies could be said to materialise where a conglomerate has the
ability to apply its economics inputs - capital, labour, financial inputs,
intangible assets such as information - to a variety of related activities.
This is referred to as fungibility in the literature. The more fungible the
inputs the more likely that economies of scope will ensue.
It is difficult to specify the exact benefits that arise from
conglomeration and whether in fact they lead to increased sales and lower unit
costs, especially in the short run. Few if any studies have shown conclusively
that synergies in large scale financial conglomerates really exist. However it
is possible to isolate four examples where synergies are likely to arise.17
First, financial conglomerates should be able to use their extensive
network of customer relationships to match up buyers and sellers of different
financial services. For example, customers of the banking arm of a
conglomerate seeking underwriting services could be paired up with the
securities arm.
Secondly, conglomerates could use the processed information stored on
computer facilities which is required for the delivery of banking services
generally to perform the same functions for the provision of other financial
services. As a result, this might lower search/transaction costs in making
credit ratings for customers or acquiring and analysing other financial data.
17. See, Robert Litan, supra note II, at p.76-81; See also, Alan Gart,
Insiders Guide to the Finanical Services Revolution, (McGaw-Hill Book Company
1984 U.S.) at p. 37.
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Thirdly, conglomerates should be able to realise economies in marketing
and delivering services jointly. This is sometimes called cross-selling.
Finally, a financial conglomerate should be able to realise economies if
customers purchase a number of different but related financial services from
the one financial house. The ability of customers to obtain all finanical
services - banking, insurance, securities, etc., - through the same
organisation would be an attractive convenience. The same argument applies to
supermarkets where groceries are sold along with other household goods.
The use of information and inside information in particular is likely to
be an important resource available to conglomerates from which synergies are to
be derived.' 8
 Ironically, this - the commodity which is most valuable in
capturing synergies in conglomerates - is the sort of information which the
conglomerate is by law prohibited from using. It is interesting to note that
the likelihood of ascertaining whether the conglomerate did use such
information is very slim indeed.'9
18.	 , David Harper, The Financial Services Industr y: The Effects of
Regulatory Reform (N. Z. Institute of Economic Research Wellington, New
Zealand, Research Paper No. 35) and the literature cited therein. He believes
"Economies of scope are likely to be significant in the provision of financial
services because several inputs, pjicularIv information, can be used in many
different applications without their value in any one application being
substantially impaired." (at p.81, emphasis added). Unfortunately the
discussion developed in the literature he cites is premised on the fact that
the synergies will arise from information (and no doubt people - the two being
very much linked in the financial services industry) and the application of
information to "alternative productive activities" within the conglomerate (see
p.63). Harper, and much of the literature he cites, ignores the fact that both
Chinese Walls and legal proscriptions frustrate the use and diversion of price
sensitive information (the sort of information from which economies are most
likely to accrue) into alternative applications. It might be argued that the
impact of a Chinese Wall which is higher than that which is necessary, could
block out legitimate information, leading to both inefficiency and unfairness
to customers by not using information that ought really to be used.
19. Some cynics have suggested that Chinese Walls are there to provide
merely a superficial gloss of fairness so that conglomerates can benefit from
the real economies of scope to be had by using inside information and
management expertise on both sides of the Wall. See, The S quare Mile, John
Plender and Paul Wallace (Century Publishing: London, 1985) at p.15.
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Limitations on Economies of Scope
It is too early to tell whether real synergies will accrue from
conglomeration. In any case, the extent to which economies of scope can
actually be realised is dependant on two factors: (i) how far resources can be
shared or utilised without there being complete congestion, eg. there could
come a stage in the sharing of resources where, say, financial files get lost
or get mixed up with other files, or where internal chains of command get
confused etc.; and (ii) the extent to which the use of certain resources -
namely information - is within the law. 2° It may be that because of the complex
internal structures of conglomerates, the nature of the functions they perform
and the regulatory arena within which the services are packaged, economies are
largely illusory and cannot actually be realised. Moreover, if we take, for
example, managerial expertise or corporate advisory skills, the provision of
which is largely fixed at any given time, then an increase in the demand for
these skills will lead to excess demand and insufficient supply to meet that
demand, at least in the short run. A factor which compounds this problem
further is that according to existing legislation and the statute backed
regulation of the SIB and its SRO's, once employees are apprised of inside
information they are no longer able to take decisions which are related to the
information held. In addition, costs are incurred in coordinating a large
volume of activity associated with the integration of services involved in
diversification, the revision of the firm's organisational structure and the
20. Other limits are noted by Hall, su pra note 16, at p.90. These
include natural limits to the extent of diversification such as consumer
resistance, intense competition, managerial diseconomies and cultural barriers.
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outlining of the parameters of authority for a large number of personnel.2
Ultimately if economies of scope really are denied due to the effects of
Chinese Walls and the existence of a legislative proscription on the transfer
of price-sensitive information, there would seem to be an argument for
capturing the synergies by abandoning both the Wall mechanism and anti-insider
dealing legislation. This then takes us full circle to the question of whether
insider dealing is a good or bad thing.
Conflict Resolution and the Regulatory Dilemmz
A. The Nature of the Problem
An analogy may help to illustrate the issues involved here. Assume a
self-contained community suffering from vertigo and claustrophobia. A stretch
of road exists between factories "A" and "Z". "A" supplies raw materials to
factory "Z". The road is in constant use. The less hold-ups the more
efficient is the output of both factories. Virtually every one in the vacinity
is to some extent dependant on the competitive efficiency of both plants.
Unfortunately children from the residential "East sidet' need to cross over the
road to get to the school which is on the "West side". There have been a few
nasty accidents.
20a. See, Harper, supra note 18, at p.85. He is also of the opinion that
the limits to diversification stem from managerial diseconomies of scope. His
ultimate conclusion however (without mentioning Chinese walls or proscriptions
at law on the use of certain categories of information) is that "cost
advantages can be derived from providing a diversified range of financial
sevices ie., economies of scope are significant." p.90 (emphasis added)
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The people of the area are in a dilemma. In analysing this dilemma it
is easy to see that there are efficiencies to be had by Continuous road use;
but this has to be traded off against the need for safety and fairness. What
should be done? All realise that there are no problem free solutions but
different groups beleieve some solution are more free of problems that others.
The Trade Unionists and factory owner say that nothing should be done.
Action would make them less efficient, put up their costs and make them less
competitive than foreign counterparts. Jobs would be lost. Living standards
would fall. In addition, the community would have to divert some of its
productive resources to installing the new traffic lights or other measures.
20b.They agrue that these resources would obviously have an opportunity cost 	 in
as much as they could be put to use elsewhere. They say - let the crosser
beware (the market forces argument - see below). Their argument runs as
follows: there are always slight gaps in the traffic - people can cross then;
the odd life or limb must be balanced with the economic well being of the
community as a whole. The Union will warn its drivers to be more careful in
future.
Some of the community think that "modified" traffic lights should be
installed - but with only a green and a red light; ie. no amber or green man
('naked' Chinese Wall). This would stop the trucks momentarily while allowing
people to cross. Since the people would never know when the lights would
change they would rush across as best they could and not waste time. They
argue that under the modified traffic lights system a truck driver could be
trusted not to run over an "Aunt Agatha" or a young child because of the social
20b. All resources have alternative uses. Opportunity cost is the next
best alternative forgone by using the resources in the particular way they have
been.
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stigma and/or moral guilt attached to such conduct. Furthermore, truck drivers
would not have to endure the extra wait of an amber light and therefore the
loss in efficiences would be less. As well as this, the "modified" traffic
lights system with no amber or green man would use up less resources in
construction.
Others want "traditional" traffic lights as used in other communities
(full and frank disclosure of the conflict). They don't want to be caught out
in the middle of the road with the lights against them and be dependant upon
the goodwill of truck drivers who get bonuses for extra fast delivery. Their
lives are more important than extra efficiences.
Still others want traditional traffic lights plus a 'lollypop' person for
added protection at especially dangerous times, such as when the children are
coming home from school (the "reinforced" Chinese Wall). Some even want a
zebra crossing so that the pedestrian is always given the right of way (de-
conglomeration). This would seriously impede the operation of factories A and
Z and result in a marked economic decline in the region.
In the same way as the community in the above analogy must seek an
appropriate solution to the problems they face by balancing up the costs and
benefits of the action they take; 2	so too must policy makers, consumer groups
and the financial community balance up the efficiency and fairness issues at
stake when regulating financial conglomerates. Financial conglomerates, as we
have seen, bring many social and economic benefits; but they also bring costs.
It is essential that an a ppropriate regulatory solution is found, for it is
20b. Of course the above analogy only demonstrates the nature of the
dilemma; it does not show us how to solve it.
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possible to have undesirable increases in protection, resulting in
overprotection and imposing undue costs.
As mentioned in Chapter Five the options fall into either of two
categories; either the conflicts can be controlled through a range of measures,
or the risk of their abuse can be eliminated through de-conglomeration. Again
it is crucial to bear in mind that the stricter the regulation - the greater
the compartmentalisation - the more the economies are reduced. The regulatory
options, which are considered in order of the strength of compartmentalisation,
are (I) market forces; (2) "naked" Chinese Walls; (3) full and frank disclosure
of the conflict; (4) "reinforced" Chinese Walls and (5) de-conglomeration.
These are examined below.
B. Resolvin g the Regulatory Dilemma?
But necessary as it is to isolate the regulatory dilemma and list the
regulatory options, this does not resolve the problem. If the aim is to find
the most appropriate regulatory solution, two preliminary questions must be
adressed: first, how do we assess the costs and benefits of the above competing
regulatory techniques and how are they to be weighted against one another?;
and, second, and very much related, who is to bear the costs of adopting one
device as opposed to another? ie. a distributional question. Economists would
claim that these issues can best be assessed by appying economic analysis, by
using a cost-benefit approach. But are the costs and benefits really
quantifiable? As Kate Mortimer, Director of Policy at the SIB suggests:21
[I]t seems sterile to argue about the precise level of costs being
impose by the systeme coming into place under the Financial Services
Act. The SIB and the Government are being criticised for failing to
21.	 , K. Mortomer, "The Securities and Investments Board", in
Financial Re gulation - or Over-regulation? (lEA: 1988) 45, at p.45.
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subject the new system to a a cost-benefit analysis before adopting
it. I question whether such ex-ante analysis would have been worth
the paper it would have been written on, given the number of
imponderables involved.
Indeed Professor Goodhart, accepts that such a cost-benefit approach, while
still of value, is "notoriously difficult to undertake, and certainly cannot be
undertaken in an purely objective, value free manner." 22 It might be that the
economists approach is rather too narrow and theoretical to prove which option
is the most suitable, it being argued herein that the answer cannot be proved.
It is suggested that the answer to this question essentially comes down to
making a policy choice based on the fairness of a regulatory option and the
ability to enforce it rather than on the basis of strict cost-benefit analysis.
Gower, in a passage which casts a rather jaundiced eye on the economist's cost-
benefit approach, sums up the issue well:22a
[I]nevitably there is a tension between market efficiency and
investor protection which often pull in different directions. It may
be that the most efficient market is that which is wholly free from
regulation but it is unlikely that such a market would afford
investor protection which anyone today would regard as adequate. One
has to make a value judgement on the relative weight to be attached
to market freedom and to investor protection.
In this way, rather than argue that the legal approach is superior to strict
empirical economic analysis, it is argued that strict economic analysis is
certainly not better than legal analysis. Nonetheless a tentative import of
economic analysis is herein applied to assess the moral, legal, and economic
incentives which would make a financial conglomerate conform to certain
regulatory regimes. This approach ought to be beneficial in arriving at an
appropriate policy choice. In this way, it may be possible to isolate a
mechI5,v
reulatorYwhich is more free of problems than others.
	
22.	 , "The Costs of Regulation", in Financial Regulation - or Over-
regulation?, jj, at p.31
	
22a.	 the Gower Report Part I at para.l.16.
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C. The Regulatory Options Considered
1.	 Allow	 Market	 Forces	 To	 Regulate	 Potential	 Abuses Within
Conglomerates
It is important to remember when considering this regulatory option that
it is set within the context of insider dealing as an economic bad and the
operation of overall - or blanket - anti-insider dealing legislation as well as
other common law prohibitions. Thus, it is important to emphasise that the
question at issue here is not whether society ought to proscribe insider
dealing but whether once proscribed society needs s pecial additional anti-
•	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .
	 23insider dealing regulation directed specifically at conglomerates.	 Advocates
of the market forces argument outlined here are in effect saying: "Take no
extra offical action, let market forces control insider dealing in
conglomerates: we don't need special costly regulation." 	 The essence of the
philosophy is captured in the maxim caveat emptor. The underlying premise upon
which the argument is based is that the rigours of competition can turn
inherent conflict situations into productive and profit maximising pressures.
Such a system of regulation, or rather "non-regulation", would, at first
blush, appear attractive to conglomerates. First of all, conglomerates would
not have to comply with costly regulations. They would also, in theory at
23. This "free market" argument is quite distinct from the earlier
discussion infra Chapter Three where inter alia the case for unfettered insider
dealing was outlined. It is not pure Chicago School economic analysis which is
being applied in this section. Here the costs of allowing insider dealing are
still considered to be higher than the benefits. The issue here is whether
conglomerate directed regulation is required over and above general anti-
insider dealing legislation covering inter alia conglomerates. The discussion
is based on whether market forces will provide sufficient incentives for
conglomerates to conform to existing anti-insider prohibitions without the need
for policy makers to resort to new costly regulation.
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least, be able to capitalise on legitimate economies of scope. Moreover,
conglomerates might also be able to capitalise on "illegitimate" economies.
There would be substantial potential returns from the use of inside information
and the abuse of other conflicts. Nonetheless there would also be potential
costs ie. the possibility of detection and the consequent damage to their
reputations in the market.
Leaving conglomerates to abide by the dictates of the markets is an
argument favoured by economists with a pervasive view of market forces.
Implicit in this reasoning is the existence of an economic calculus. Goodhart
offers an example. He writes:24
The public may ... support a regulatory proposal that actually harms
them on balance, (because the restraints on competition, the
deadweight costs of compliance and administration may considerably
outweigh the extra likely losses in an unregulated state).
Thus the degree of conflict abuse will reflect the relevant costs and benefits.
In other words in determining the short term incentive to exploit a conflict of
interest by, say, abusing inside information given in confidence by corporate
finance client Company X, a financial conglomerate will consider very carefully
the attendant risks of losing: (i) a lifetimes business from Company X, (ii)
the loss of business from other customers which results from a loss of
reputation within society because of publication of the abuse 25 , (iii) the loss
of premiership within the industry, (iv) the severity of sanction imposed by
the regulatory/judicial authorities, and (v) the effort, or cost of acquiring
and exploiting the information abused. Where potential conflict abusers
perceive the benefits of the illegal conduct to outweigh the costs to them then
24. See, suora note 22, at p.9.
25. Since both Company X and the other customers of the conglomerate
will in all probability be in receipt of other conglomerate financial services,
the conglomerate will also have to take in to consideration the future loss of
these other services in the economic calculus.
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conflict abuse will be rationally beneficial.26
There is however one further consideration to take into account. Insider
dealing is not only a civil offence but also a criminal offence. Although a
firm may in principle participate in insider dealing it cannot under the
Company Securities Act 1985 be made criminally liable for it, except in very
limited circumstances. 27 Instead, the individuals who perform the deal on
behalf of a conglomerate are vunerable to conviction. Thus a profit-maximising
individual who contemplates insider dealing for a conglomerate will have to
devise his own economic calculus. He will weigh up the value of the haul (with
the return which will filter through to him) with the probability of getting
caught. The time spent in jail will have an opportunity cost, namely the loss
in salary, reputation and status, future job prospects, loss of family life
etc. If the risk of getting caught is commensurate with the end return he, as
a rational maximiser, will indulge in insider dealing.28
According to those with a strong view of market forces, not only would
market forces deter abuses; they would also help uncover them. The two are
very much inter-related. Probably one of the most effective ways in which
competition can discourage the abuse of conflicts of interest, and in
particular insider dealing, is through the incentive it creates for
institutional counterparties to "blow the whistle" on miscreants. For example,
26. See Chapter Two at note 52 and accompanying text.
27. See, Chapter Four at note 18 and accompanying text. Of course a
company may be civily liable under the Financial Services Act 1986 (see, s.61
and 62.) and the rules made thereunder (eg. Rule 3.10, discussed infra Chapter
Seven at note	 and accompanying text) and also under common law principles(see
see generally Chapter Four : "The Regulation of Insider Dealing at Common Law".
28. See, Posner, Economic Anal ysis of Law (2n ed. Little-Brown 1977)
pp.164-65 where he writes: "[A] ... growing empirical literature on crime has
shown that criminals respond to changes in opportunity costs, in the
probability of apprehension, in the severity of punishment, and other relevant
variables, as if they were the rational calculators of the economic model".
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X Company (on the basis of some inside information it has acquired about Y
Company) buys shares in Y company. It buys those shares through a market-
maker, say, at a price which significantly rises in value soon after the
purchase - the market-maker suspects something and refers the matter to the
regulatory authorities. The incentive to inform arises from two factors:
first, the market maker is arguably the victim of the insider dealing 29
 and
second, the market maker may not want to be associated with suspected insider
dealing.
There are, however, a number of factors that might militate against the
sucessful operation of a 'whistle-blowing' or 'supergrass' system. First of
all the financial markets have been traditionally close knit preferring to wash
their own dirty linen in private rather than to hang it out for public airing.
The innate cohesion of the community in times of close public scrutiny, whereby
there is a tendency to close ranks could make people with relevant evidence
30
reluctant to inform.	 Then secondly, and very much related, parties will not
want to be labelled with the stigma of passing information to the authorites,
especially when they may not have clean hands themselves.
Admittedly, the above reasoning may have become rather dated. There is
no doubt that the composition of the markets has changed radically over the
last few years making the old club-like system of control inappropriate if not
32	 .defunct.	 The new international character of the market place and the increase
in competition has brought with it a new willingness to ensure that no one has
an unfair advantage. Indeed in the Geoffrey Collier case in the U.K in 1986
29. See, Chapter Three at note 112 and accompanying text.
30. A cohesion well illustrated by the recent County Nat West Affair
where there has been a distinct reluctance from certain Sections of the
financial community to put the blame on specific individuals.
32. See, Veljanoski, "Introduction", supra note 21, at p.3.
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the regulatory authorites were alerted of Collier's insider trades by a
counterparty to the deals.33
In the U.S. the informant system has been successfully tried and tested
by the SEC. In 45 enforcement actions brought in 1985 and 1986 informants were
instrumental in providing information in 15 cases. 34 Moreover, the U.S.
authorites have now given express approval to the use of an informant system
with the recent passage of the the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988. Section 3 of the new Act adds a new section 21A to
section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. Ss (e) of the newly inserted
section in part reads:
(e) ... there shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under
this section and recovered by the Commission ... such sums, not to be
exceed 10% of such amounts, as the Commission deems appropriate, to
the person or persons who provide information leading to the
imposition of such a penalty.
By approving the Act, Congress has given express sanction to a novel practice
hitherto carried out on a largely pragmatic and informal basis. To what extent
it would be politically feasible for the U.K. authorities to operate a paid
'supergrass' system whereby the like of a British "Ivan Boesky" could receive
payments or immunity in return for providing the authorities with valuable
information relevant to the prosecution of others is highly questionable.
The now institutionalised "informant" system in the U.S. developed
because circumstantial evidence - the most common form of proof available to
33. Collier, who was head of securities at a Merchant Bank in London,
was called in to advise Hollis on the proposed take-over of AE. Before the bid
was announced publicly, Collier bought shares in AE for his own account.
	 ,
"Collier's Rise and Fall", The Inde pendent, 2 July 1987.
34. , GAO, Re port to the Chairman. Subcommittee on Oversi ght and
Investi gations. Committee on Ener gy and Commerce. House of Representatives:
Securities Re gulation - Efforts to Detect. Investi gate, and Deter Insider
Tradin g , August 1988, at p.5. (hereinafter "GAO Report").
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the authorities - tends not to meet the "beyond all reasonable doubt" standard
required in criminal trials, while the use of informants is arguably a more
useful way of obtaining direct evidence of insider dealing. 35 In any case an
economist with a strong view of market forces would argue that a "whistle-
blowing" regime operating through market incentives would not need to be
perfect. The underlying concern would be to relieve conglomerates from
unwelcome additional regulatory constraints at a cost of having some
informational abuse.
Reliance on market forces to control the accentuated misuse of inside
information in the conglomerate context would also have benefits and costs for
society too. Society would benefit in that few if any direct resource costs
would be involved in setting up the regime (except, perhaps, in dismantling the
pre-existing one). Nonetheless the costs imposed on society by relying on
market forces might be considered to be too high. Caveat em ptor may seem fine
in theory, but in an industry replete with information assymetry how does the
emptor caveat? After all customers have great difficulty in discerning either
in advance or after the event the quality of the service that has been
performed. Moreover the benefits of the market philosophy are illusory to the
extent that market forces do not work. The value of market forces will be to a
35. "SEC ... often use tips from the public and cooperating witness to
prove the evidence necessary to prove insider trading ... [P]ersuading
individuals who are aware of insider trading or involved in it to provide
information to the SEC can be important to successful investigations." See, GAO
Report, at p.56. The report goes on to quote (at p.57) the findings of a SEC
Roundtable debate where it was said that a "... a reward program could enhance
market efficiency if structured to target deceptive internal corporate activities
that are otherwise difficult to discover ...". The Report concludes: "Others
from the securities industry and academia expressed views both favoring and
opposing the idea. In general, negative comments related to concern about the
number of informants who might provide hearsay evidence or information of
questionable value."
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large extent dependant on the degree to which uncovered abuses are publicised
to others who require similar services. It is only when abuses are widely
publicised that there exists the requisite knowledge for consumers to make
reasoned choices. Costs would even be imposed if the public perceived that
market forces were not strong enough to create a fair financial system.
In addition, a calculus such as that outlined by Goodhart is arguably too
narrow. Notably it does not take into account risk aversion. For example
there is a possibility that a large financial loss caused by conflict abuses or
over-diversification would be so unacceptable that society might prefer tougher
regulatory measures such as industry imposed Chinese Walls, disclosure etc.
The benefit, in terms of peace of mind, may be far greater than any "narrow"
calculus of "expected loss" to the community at large. Thus the regulatory
equation runs something like this: the potential for abuse or financial
mismanagement + the perceived notion that abuse occurs fairly regularly +
e p isodic abuses that come to light + the need for confidence in the financial
markets, points towards the search for a real regulatory response.
2.	 The "Naked" Chinese Wall
The theoretical attractiveness of the Chinese Wall is that ostensibly
conglomerates can function in such a way as to enable them to capture synergies;
yet at the same time the screening mechanisms that go to make up the Wall block
out illegal inside information, thus avoiding potential abuses. 36 By employing
the WaIl mechanism, compartmentalisation is only slight and thus does not
unduly burden or hamstring the operation of the conglomerate. In this way the
36. Of course, the economic argument that Chinese Walls are useful in
conglomerates and prohibit insider dealing, must ultimatley rest on the basis
that insider dealing is an "economic bad". See generally, Chapter Three.
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Chinese Wall facilitates competitive benefits and efficiencies for the
conglomerate itself and for society as a whole.
Is the Chinese Wall Effective?
The extent to which the Wall is an attractive regulatory mechanism is
dependent upon its effectiveness in stopping the flow of unpublished price
sensitive information within the corporate entity. This inevitably leads us to
the important question of how the Wall is policed and how breaches are
detected. Undoubtedly the mechanism's greatest defect lies in ensuring that it
is effectively enforced. Chinese Wall rules can be easily broken and breaches
are apt to go undetected.37
 Moreover, the Wall may well be "paper-thin" in
small conglomerates 38 in that one individual may be operating in two separate
capacities.38a
The effectiveness of a Chinese Wall will depend upon the incentives!
disincentives which exist to breach/enforce it. The enforcement mechanism upon
which the Wall depends is to all intents and purposes the market forces
37. Despite the fact that the Chinese Wall has been used extensively by
banks and other financial institutions in the U.S. for over two decades there
has been difficulty in establishing how effective the mechanism actually is.
Owing to the very nature of the device and the context within which it operates
it is virtually impossible to make any real assessment. Certainly the absence
of lawsuits is no indication either way. In an examination of function of the
Chinese Wall in the commercial banking context, Hunnsicker suggests that: "[I]t
has not been established that a functioning wall is the reason [for the absence
of lawsuits]. It is likely that the secrecy surrounding ... transactions
coupled with other problems of proof, has more often been the proximate cause.
Neither the tippor nor the tippee will have any reason to disclose the abuse of
information. (footnore omitted)" See, Hunnsicker, "Conflicts of Interest,
Economic Distortions, and the Separation of Trust and Commercial Banking
Functions", (1977) 50 Southern California Law Review 611, at p.641.
38. See, Wood, "Financial Conglomerates and Conflicts of Interest" in
Conflicts of Interest in the Changing Financial World, (Ed. Goode, The
Institute of Bankers, London, 1986) at p.69.
38a.	 , Solomon & Wilkie, "Securities Professionals and Rule lOb-5:
Legal Standards ..." (1975) 505 Forclham Law Review at p. 532, footnote 85.
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incentives discussed earlier backed up by in-house compliance personnel and
general regulatory overseers, such as the SIB, SRO's and the Takeover Panel.
Given that the Wall is dependant upon self-enforcement in an arena where self-
interest is so prevalent it would seem unrealistic to assume a completely
effective wall.
Once more an individual! corporate distinction needs to be drawn. It
would appear that detecting corporate insider dealing will be dependant upon
the strength of market forces plus general regulatory oversight, since the
conglomerate's compliance personnel will be acquiesing in the crime. The
corporate calculus will therefore be as before. 39 However the Chinese Wall and
its accompanying procedures may be more effective in detecting the maverick
individual in a firm who misues inside information. The powers of the
regulatory authorities and in particular the attentiveness of in-house
compliance personnel will reduce abuse. Assuming that the powers of the former
are limited (as most probably they are) while the latter, although still faced
with difficult detection problems, are in the best position to observe and
monitor the Wall and detect breaches, a great deal of the enforcement mechanism
will depend on in-house compliance. It follows that the level of enforcement
will vary from firm to firm depending on the skill of the compliance officer
and his team and the cooperation from work personnel. The more skilfull the
compliance team the greater the risk of detection and prosecution.4°
39. See, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Evidence from the U.S. suggests strongly that the likelihood of
legal sanction is a relatively ineffective deterrent.	 , Cottrell, "Insider
Dealing in the United sates - I: The Law" (1986) Janurary 31 jjjJ 88, at p.90
where she argues that although civil sanctions are more likely than criminal
actions (because of the lower burden of proof), even this does not seem to
exert a significant legal deterrent. This would be probably even more true in
the U.K. where prosecutions for insider dealing have been very rare. There is
no reason to believe that civil actions, under s.6l and s.62 of the FSA 1986,
will prove any more successful in showing that insider dealing has occurred.
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However the difficulties associated with reliance on in-house compliance
personnel are compounded by the high degree of interaction between employees
•	 .	 .	 41
within the group , in that:
the forces of common interest, close physical proximity and the ties
of personnel loyalty could be overcome only by an extremely strong
wall.
Indeed, information may be picked up by personnel over lunch, or in the lift, -
basically anywhere they congregate. Thus it would appear that to the extent
such interaction takes place the efficacy of the Wall is most probably
compromised. What might be a more effective deterrent is dismissal by the firm
or by the SIB for not being "fit and proper" 42. This would put future employ-
ment prospects and general livelihood in jeopardy, factors which would have to
be seriously weighed up by a profit-maximising individual.
Another factor which is likely to reduce the efficacy of the Wall is the
difficulty in telling whether information is really price-sensitive or not.
This may cause an individual to inadvertently pass or receive inside
information because he or she is unaware that the information is price-
sentitive. Similarly, the nature of the corporate structure itself frustrates
the departmental isolation of inside information. Board meetings will comprise
top corporate personnel who head departments with different conflicting
functions. Almost certainly, when devising group policy as a whole they will
be apprised of relevant insider facts.
Having discussed some of the broad principles upon which the
effectiveness of the mechanism rests, it is now intended to consider some of
41. See, Hunnsicker, supra note 37, at p.643.
42. For example, Geoffrey Collier was suspended for 10 years.
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the more detailed institutional arrangements relevant to policing the device in
the U.K.
(a) How are Chinese Walls Enforced?
Enforcement should in theory be conducted by the firm because of the
secrecy and complexity of a vast number of deals which makes it enormously
difficult for a central enforcement agency to ensure that abuse is not taking
place. The costs involved in setting up, training and operating such an agency
would be high given the likelihood that few convictions would result. Thus,
the current regulatory regime with its emphasis on Chinese Walls has not tried
to establish such an agency but has sought instead to leave much of the day-to-
day enforcement of the Wall in the hands of the individual firms. At most,
regular or random checks are conducted to inspect policies and procedures,
relying more on the Stock Exchange surveillance network to provide 'regulatory
oversight' on a regular basis.
Thus in Britain, the Chinese Wall, despite being given statutory backing
is, in effect, a self-regulatory mechanism. The SIB and other regulatory
authorities rely on firms to establish systems and procedures which will
"block" inside information. All firms are required to have compliance officers
who are responsible for drawing up written compliance manuals suitable for the
needs of each particular firm. 43	These manuals must give investors the
standards of protection laid down in the Financial Services Act. The SIB may
inspect the validity and effectiveness of these procedures at any time though
quite obviously the proper operation of a Chinese Wall depends on the integrity
43. Unless, that is, the firm has 10 or less employees.
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of the people who work on either side of it.44 The Takeover Panel, for example,
requires firms who ask for exempt status (on the basis that they operate
effective Chinese Wall procedures) to provide among other things details of the
business structure of the firm both in terms of its physical location and in
terms of the type of business undertaken. With only a small number of staff it
inspects every firm. How feasible this policy really is and more importantly
how effective it is, could be anyone's guess.
(b) How are Breaches Detected?
Ultimately it would be unrealistic to assume that regular and random
checks by the regulatory authorities could adequately cope with the detection
question. There are two possible ways in which breaches of the Chinese Wall
could be uncovered. The first, which involves the use of computers, is
applicable to both monitoring by the regulatory authorities (external
monitoring) and by an individual firm's compliance team (internal monitoring).
The second, involves the use of an informant or "supergrass" system.
(i) Computerisation
Computerisation has brought greater "transparency" to the market place
making it easier to prove that insider trades have taken place, and that a
Chinese Wall has been breached. In theory regulators can discover transactors
at a moment's notice. The result is that the authorities' powers of detection
have increased as have the ability of the compliance team to detect serious
44. , Yellon, "Trust Investments: Problems Regarding Exchange of
Information between the Trust Department and Other Departments Within the
Bank", (1973) June, Chica go Bar Record 405, at p.414-415.
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breaches of in-house rules. 45 Thus, for example, where conglomerates are seen
to be consistently dealing in sucessful new shares issues underwritten by its
securities division it might seem reasonable to assume that a Chinese Wall is
being breached. The limitation, however, of computerised systems is that they
operate only with regard to deals made in the U.K. Thus, if insider traders
are clever enough to use "off-shore" routes and nominee accounts their dealings
may be more difficult and perhaps impossible to detect. As well as that,
computers are only capable of identifying suspicious trading patterns; it is a
much more difficult task to prove that inside dealing has taken place.
Both regulatory officials (either SRO's or SIB) and in-house compliance
teams are able to use computers to monitor regularly the reported 50,000
bargains which are put through the Stock Exchange every day. Since Big Bang it
has become obligatory to report the time of striking a bargain. The
authorities can therefore discover whether a deal was made before or after a
company disclosed major news to the markets. The Stock Exchange, for example,
operates the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations system (SEAQ) system and the
Talisman system. It also conducts regular and random checks on three main
45. Internal surveillance of individuals suspected of breaching a
Chinese Wall is essential to maintain the integrity of the mechanism.
According to John Mayo, Chairman of the Mercury International Group Compliance
committee: "it is essential for any financial services organisation both to
have Strict staff dealing rules and to monitor staff dealings to spot any case
where a deal raises the possibility that advantage might have been taken of
unpublished price-sensitive information, What is more, monitoring needs to
extend for dealings for the account of firms or its customers. Since those
within one Chinese Wall should have no knowledge of confidential transactions
from those within another Chinese Wall, monitoring of dealings to guard against
abuse of insider information needs to be a central function to be handled by
the Compliance Department with the appropriate Compliance Officer ... Our
staff dealing rules are detailed and strict and apply to employees and their
spouses and children, including trusts, companies and funds which they
effectively control. All dealings have to be handled in-house. Particular
dealings require advance clearance and some staff, such as in Corporate
Finance, need advance clearance for nearly all their dealings."	 , Mayo, "The
Role of Compliance", (1987) June The Treasurer 47, at p.47.
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areas: (1) whether the 'best execution' price was made; (2) whether there has
been dealing in restricted securities and (3) any relationship between price
and volume jumps. The authorites concentrate on trying to establish material
links which might suggest suspect trades.46
Compliance departments also monitor deals via computers. Some teams
study records of their firm's involvement in public takeovers. They get
computer print-outs that go back 6 weeks or more before the public
announcement. These are checked for: staff dealings, dealings for both
discretionary and non-discretionary customers, changes in the market-making
book and dealings for the firm's own account. 47 The trend emerging among both
internal surveillance teams and the regulatory authorities is for the adoption
of increasingly complex computer systems which draw attention to 'oddities'
rather than on systems which provide only random checks.
(ii) Through Informants
It would seem that one of the most likely means of detecting breaches of
Chinese Walls is through the informant or 'whistle-blowing' network described
48
earlier.
46. According to Lindsay Thomas ) the Stock Exchange's computer
surveillance systems project manager, "Establishing links is the key, between
people, between businesses, between deals ... We are considering applying
artificial intelligence to this so that, for example, we can connect people who
have worked together, relationships between a particular client account, an
individual, a firm advising in a takeover - it may just be a coincidence of
addresses." William Owen, "Looking for breaches in Chinese walls", (1987 May)
Communications in the Cit y 25, at p.28.
47. , Mayo, suora note 45, at p.47. Elisabeth Nicholson, head of
compliace at Natwest Investment Bank, in looking for breaches of the Chinese
Wall concentrates on "price movements, collusion between market makers and
broker dealers, between one client and a broker, and also at the market makers'
bear and bull positions." See, Williams, supra note 45, at p.28.
48. See, supra note 34 dealing with the market forces argument.
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The Wall mechanism is then a systems of checks primarily from within the
conglomerate to prevent inside information flowing to the various departments
in the corporate entity. Accordingly, the Chinese Wall as a preventive device
can be viewed in two ways: first as a means of resolving a conglomerates
obligations by providing investors with the requisite degree of protection; and
second, as a protection for conglomerates against allegations of insider
dealing. These are now considered.
(a) As an additional safe g uard over and above market forces to prevent conflict
abuse - in particular prohibiting insider dealin g - and provide Investor
Protection
Gower rejects the Wall's investor protection function. Such a view is
49based on the fact that Chinese Walls:
[A}re not a protection to investors and may, indeed, be a detriment
to them as depriving them of the benefit of the knowledge and
expertise that they will expect from a financial supermarket.
Similarly he believes the Wall to be inherently defective. As noted earlier,
50he has written that he has:
never met a Chinese Wall that did not have a grapevine trailing over
it.
If in his experience Chinese Walls do not work, it is a serious claim to make
and hardly great praise for a mechanism which represents the regulatory linch-
pin of the financial conglomerate regulatory system. That the Chinese Wall is
a device that does not afford investor protection is an argument which needs to
be explored further.
49. Gower Report, Part II, para. 4.13.
50. Gower Report Part II, at para. 4.13.
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Although the ability of firms to invoke the Chinese Wall defence in an
action brought under the SIB or SRO rulebooks probably leaves investors with
less protection than that which they would have at common law, Schedule 8 of
the Financial Services Act 1986 tries to redress this fact. 51 Therein a number
of guiding principles are offered, which originally stem from paragraph 7.5 of
the Government's White Paper. They are summarised below.
First, there is the princiDle of fair dealin g whereby rules are
instituted to prohibit unfair practices and requiring investment firms to be
conducted in accordance with good market practices.
Secondly, a duty of skill care and diligence is required in the provision
of investment transactions. Consequently, anyone purporting to give investment
advice is under a duty of care commenserate with their responsibilities.
Thirdly, there is a dut y to disclose any material interest which a
conglomerate has in a transaction, the capacity in which it is acting, the fees
it would charge and the renumeration which it might receive from other parties
interested in the the transaction and any connection it might have with other
parties interested in the transaction.
Moreover the White Paper holds that whenever an investment business finds
itself in a conflict of interest situation it must act in accordance with the
general rules of agency and fiduciary law as explained earlier. In particular
the firm must abide by:
i. a best execution principle, whereby all instructions from the
51. See, Appendix I.
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clients must be executed to the clients best advantage. Thus no
investment business should deal with a client from its own account
or book unless this results in better terms for the client.
ii. p subordinatiom of interest requirement, so that the clients
interests are paramount. Thus clients should be given priority in
the execution of orders when an investment business is also
dealing on its own account, and there should be no "churning" of a
managed portfolio to generate commission income.
iii. a "know your customer" rincile requiring an investment business
to satisy itself that a particular recommendation or transaction
is suitable, bearing in mind the "expertise, needs and resources
of the customer". This should amount to nothing more than a duty
of skill care and diligence.
All these are indeed powerful safeguards, for they are rooted in strict
fiduciary law. However such principles cannot be looked at in isolation. They
must be considered in conjunction with the scope of the SIB's rule making
powers, especially in relation to Chinese Walls. This becomes clear later.52
Professor Gower places great faith in the above principles. Indeed it
would appear from Part II of his Review of Investor Protection that he sees
them as the solution to the Chinese Wall conundrum. As already shown at the
centre of his analysis of the Chinese Wall are two factors which militate
against wholehearted endorsement. First there is the possibility that the Wall
will "leak" and therefore result in unfairness to investors; and secondly,
52.	 , below at note 56 and accompanying text.
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there is the alternative possibility that it will work and result in unfairness
to investors - or some investors at least. These are significant hurdles to
overcome. Gower believes they are surmounted by the adoption in the FSA 1986
of the safeguards mooted in the White Paper and outlined above. Immediately
after noting the ways in which Chinese Walls could well be a detriment to
investors, he writes:53
[investor protection is] afforded in other ways and I warmly commend
the "principles" summarised in paragraph 7.2 [of the White Paper] and
the elaboration of them and of the resulting "rules" in later
paragraphs of the Chapter (presumably see, 7.5 and 7.6, also
summarised above - emphasis added)
The counter argument presented here is simply that these principles are
not compensatory in the way Professor Gower supposes them to be. 54 It is
submitted that the safeguards which he commends come into effect too late in
the day for the investor to take comfort from them. Take the familiar scenario
where one arm of a conglomerate has adverse inside information about company X
while the other arm is recommending customers to buy company X's securities.
Under the SIB's rules once a Chinese Wall has been erected there is, for
example, no duty to disclose any material interest. The recommending arm may
recommend that customers "buy company X" with impunity, despite the resultant
detriment to those customers. All that the legislation requires (implementing
the "safeguards" of the White Paper, which Gower commends) is that the
recommending arm provide the customer with company X shares at the best price
ie. best execution, or even that the deal should be taken with a duty of skill
and care. In other words the fact that the advice is inconsistent with
53. Gower Reoprt, Part Ii, at para. 4.13.
54. Admittedly they would be a lot more compensatory if the use of
Chinese Walls were circumscribed to cover only very limited situations or even
if they were compulsorily reinforced. However, because this is not so, the use
of the Chinese Wall in the U.K. drives, as it were, a cart and horse through
the White Paper/Schedule 8 purported safeguards.
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knowledge held by another arm of the conglomerate is totally irrelevant. One
is prompted to ask: "is this really investor protection?"55
It is submitted that the issue of the efficacy of the safeguards
contained in the Schedule are really quite important. This is not advocacy
against Chinese Walls ner se but merely a rejection of any argument that
suggests that the safeguards contained in schedule 8 counter-balance any losses
in investor protection caused by the adoption of the Wall mechansim. It is
submitted that the SIB's stance on the Wall mechanism over the last few years
56	 . 57has been somewhat contradictory and confusing. 	 In 1985 the SIB said:
The Board believes that ... [Chinese Wall] arrangements may be
helpful, but does not believe that their existence alone should
relieve the firm from a duty to disclose.
When the SIB rulebooks first appeared, Rule 5.08 (now Rule: 5.07) introduced an
either "erect a Chinese Wall or disclose" option. 58	This was then followed in
591987 by a statement which said:
Chinese Walls are not actually required, but the absence of such
arrangements within a firm or a group may well attract such severe
disclosure requirements to a firm - because otherwise knowledge in
55. Loss puts it well:
I would not like to be in the witness chair before the congressional
subcommittee and be asked this question, which inevitably would be asked:
You mean, Professor, that Merrill Lynch or some other large firm could know,
because it was looking into an underwriting, that company X was on its way to
bankruptcy, but by setting up ... a Chinese Wall several thousand Merrill
Lynch employees could sell that stock to a lot of widows and orphans?' I
would not like to answer that question"
Quoted in Yarn, "The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New
Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code", (1984) 63 Nebraska Law
Review 197, at p.245.
56. The issue of Chinese Walls has always been fudged by the
authorities. In the Gower Report and the White Paper the response was lukewarm
and skeptical (see, infra, Chapter Seven at note 35 and accompanying text).
Now the tide has turned to virtually wholehearted acceptance.
57. SIB, Regulation of Investment Business: The New Framework, December
1985, at p.30.
58. Rule 5.07: Disclosure of Firm's Material Interest in Transactions,
discussed infra Chapter Seven.
59. The Securities and Investments Borad's Application for Designated
Agency Status Under the Terms of the Financial Services Act and the Revised
Rule Book Dated February 1987, at p.14.
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any one part of a firm is imputed to the whole - that it is essential
for it to erect and police them.
Thus a firm will almost always opt for erecting a Chinese Wall rather than
choose disclosure. The impression given is that the investor is given better
protection today than ever before. This may be true in some senses, especially
with regard to incompetent investment advisers. But an investor now runs more
of a risk of being offered investment advise which, as far as the common law is
concerned, is inconsistent with knowledge known by the firm as a whole. The
investor is not given the option of having the conflict not the nature of the
conflict disclosed to him. This is what one would expect to happen under
common law principles. Instead the SIB rules say: "there is a duty and
therefore there are fiduciary responsibilites to act in the appropriate manner
(ie. (i) to avoid conflict of interest situations and (ii) a prohibition
against self-dealing); but no dut y exists if the firm erects a Chinese Wall in
those situations (a very large number) were they are catered for in the
rulebook. For example rule 5.07 paragraph (1) says that if a firm has a
material interest in a transaction then the firm must disclose the the nature
of the material interest (this duty is the same as the common law fiduciary
duty) iii paragraph (2) goes on to say:
And for this purpose none of those individuals shall be re garded as
having a duty to know of the interest or the conflict if a IChinese
Wall] is established. (emphasis added)
The erection of Chinese Walls in such and similar situations negates the
protection given by fiduciary principles. Admittedly a firm might choose not
to erect Chinese Walls and instead opt for disclosure. However as we have seen
this is unlikely to happen, otherwise heavy disclosure requirements will be
60	 .incurred.	 Thus, although Chinese Walls are not actually required by the SIB,
60. Ibid.
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the overwhelming incentive is to erect them. Once erected there is no duty to
disclose any conflicting material interest as is required by common law. The
Schedule 8 safeguards operate in tandem with the SIB's Chinese Wall rules,
however they apply only to the extent to which the Chinese Wall rules reduce
their effectiveness. That is to say the Schedule 8 principles can only start
to be applied after the point to which they have been eroded in the first
place, since the initial and important duty to disclose no longer exists. The
safeguards come into play too late in the day to offer investors the protection
they would at first glance seem to give.
Similarly, Gower's standpoint on the Chinese Wall appears to have been
overtaken by regulatory events. In his report he stated any rules of conduct
61
should be subject to basic principles of law, including the rule:
that an agent cannot act as a principal unless there is full
disclosure to, and informed consent by, the client.
In Part II of his Report it was his opinion that the "solution proposed [in the
White Paper was] ... that whether acting as principal or agent the investement
business must comply with ... a duty of disclosure." 62 However the rules of
conduct now specified in the SIB's Conduct of Business Rules are peppered with
Chinese Wall rules which in effect say no disclosure is required if a Chinese
61.S, the Gower Report Part I, at para. 6.30. See also, speech by Sir
Kenneth Berrill, then head of the SIB, who at the time shared Gowers's view
point. There he said:
"Chinese Walls can promote confidence in the integrity of a firm and the
trend now is for such arrangements to be multiplied and strengthened as
clients become increasingly consious of potential conflicts. I do not wish
to discourage this process. But I am not persuaded that the arrangements
themselves should give rise to an exemption from disclosure requirements."
(at p.7, emphasis added)
This is a somewhat peculiar statement. It would impose a double cost. The
cost of disclosure and the cost of erecting Chinese Walls. Within a matter of
months it was old hat. The SIB introduced the rule as outlined infra the text
above. Now it is either disclosure or establish a Chinese Wall. Not both.
Another example of the authorities (in particular the SIB's ) use of the
Chinese Wall by stealth?
62. See, Gower Report, Part II, at para. 4.14.
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Wall is established. Thus Gowers suggested premise has been ignored. The
system adopted to regulate multi-functional firms is not disclosure
requirements. It is Chinese Wall arrangements.
For these reasons it is contended that traditional fiduciary duties are
significantly eroded by the Chinese Wall. A corollory of this is that investor
protection is also weakened. The schedule 8 safeguards operate as a gloss on
this fact. Should then regulators abandon Chinese Walls? Undoubtedly not.
The loss of investor protection caused by operating Chinese walls, if that
really is the case, must be weighed up against the other potential benefits of
having conglomerates.
(b) As a protection for con glomerates against allegations of insider dealing
The Chinese Wall also fulfils a specific legal function in relation to
the segregation of informational flows in financial conglomerates. As Herzel
63
and Colling note:
Chinese Walls can be an important evidentiary aid in lawsuits
involving allegations of insider trading and other conflict-of-
interest abuses by making more believable a defence that personnel in
the trust department made their decisions without knowledge of
information that may have been in the possession of another
department.
The following example illustrates the issues involved: A and B are partners in
a dual capacity firm. A offers financial advice to companies during which he
often learns inside information. B manages discretionary accounts for clients.
A learns favourable inside information about Company X. In and around the same
time B independently buys heavily on Company X's securities for his clients and
63. I-Ierzel & Coiling, "The Chinese Wall Revisited" (1983) 6 Corporation
Law Review 116 at p.119.
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for his arm of the firm.
It seems very much that B did trade on the basis of inside information
held by A. And in fact in such a situation there is a presumption at law that
B	 know of the information, because the information is imputed to the firm
as a whole. However the fact that B is operating behind a Chinese Wall rebutts
the presumption that he knew of the inside information possessed by A and
therefore that he dealt on the basis of it. In view of this rebuttal it would
be difficult to convict B with a criminal charge of insider dealing which
requires a high degree of proof. However B (or the firm) would be in a more
vulnerable position if the SIB (or a private investor) brought a civil claim
against B (or the firm) under s.61 (SIB) (or s.62 for a private investor).
Here the standard of proof is much lower: namely, was it more likely that B
dealt on the inside information than he did not? Of course B's defence that
there was an effective Chinese Wall will be useful but it may not be sufficient
because the SIB have only to prove the lower standard. The SIB's main task
will be to prove that the procedures that go to make up the Wall were defective
in some respect. Once this is established the Wall as a defence to the firm or
the partner will be of little use.
That Chinese Walls are a defence in law suits involving allegations of
insider dealing is a view which would seem to be shared by U.K. academics.
Professor Gower, for example, suggests64 that the Chinese wall should not be
thought of as advice for protecting investors, rather it should be limited to a
defence in legal disputes. In the second part of his report on investor
protection Gower wrote: 65
64. See also, Rider, "Conflicts of Interest and the Chinese Wall" in Ih
Regulation of Insider Dealing (ed. Rider, Oyez, 1979) at p. 95.
65. , suora note 49.
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Chinese Walls ... are a legitimate device to protect individual
members of of a multi-functional business from the risk of criminal
liability from insider dealing.
Although at this stage Gower limited his use of the Chinese Wall to a defence
at criminal law, in a subsequent comment (following the introduction of s.61
and s.62 of the FSA 1986 and ther SIB rules, which inter alia made firms
civilly liable for insider dealing) he stated:66
Chinese Walls were invented by firms to protect themselves against
accusations of insider dealing. They are legitimate for this
purpose.
Whether by this Gower meant to extend the use of the Chinese Wall to a defence
in civil trials, where, of course, the standard of proof is much lower, is
uncertain.
But what is certain, is that Gower rejects the Wall's investor protection
function and advocates its use as a defence in criminal trials (and perhaps even
civil trials) even though, by his own admission, he has never before come across
a fully watertight Chinese Wall. It would appear somewhat inconsistent to
advocate legal legitimacy - in the form of protection from liability - for what
is obviously a dubious mechanism. Admittedly the mechanism is defence only if
it works. But it is asking the courts to perform an almost impossible task.
They must find out whether it was effective. Such proof is extremely difficult
to procure. The mechanism depends on trust and self-discipline. It is an
incestuous problem. In any case if the Chinese Wall is as inherently defective
as Gowers cliams, it might seem reasonable to suggest that the legislature and
the regulatory authorities ought to have been more reticent about granting it
legal validity.
66. Gower, "Big Bang' And City Regulation", (1988) 51 MLR 1, at p.17.
(emphasis added).
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On the other hand, the fact that the Chinese Wall operates as a defence
does not necessarily mean that it will automatically be accepted by the courts
on every occasion. On the contrary, the strength of the procedures, previous
breaches, and the resources devoted to monitoring the wall and detecting
breaches will all be considerations. Obviously, because of the nature of the
device, it can never be certain whether the Chinese Wall was kept intact. In a
criminal trial the defence counsel will find it easier to raise the Chinese
Wall defence because the courts will be reluctant to impute inside knowledge to
the defendant.67 In a civil dispute the defence will find the burden much more
difficult to discharge.
It is of course the effectiveness of the Wall mechanism which poses the
key difficulty, because, notwithstanding the fact that an effective Wall would
reduce investor protection, this would seem to be cost worth bearing in view of
the efficiencies to be gained from conglomeration. However there are also
other costs associated with operating Chinese Walls. These are now
considered.67a
A.	 Direct Resource Costs
Initially there are what might be called the direct resource costs in-
volved in the implementation of the Chinese walls. This would include:
67. See, Rider, supra note 64, at p.95.
67a. Though a great deal has been written on the economics of information
in general, the broad principles upon which such studies are based have never
(as far as this writer is aware) been applied specifically to the Chinese Wall
mechanism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt a detailed
presentation on a par with the standard economic literature in respect of the
economics of information. On the contrary, the analysis outlined herein can at
best only be described as tentative and exploratory.
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*	 The costs of compliance officers - who are usually top management in small
and medium sized firms. Here the cost for the firm is not only salary but
also the alternative use to which the firm could put such people by re-
deploying their skills elsewhere.68
*	 The cost of compliance manuals for employees
*	 The time Spent on having these procedures explained and up-dated.
*	 Duplication of facilities: libraries, wordprocessing facilities,
photocopying etc
B. The Cost of a Non-Optimal Chinese Wall
We have already seen that one of the strongest rationales underlying the
move towards conglomeration is to capture synergies - particulary those of an
informational nature. Ironically the aim of the Chinese Wall is to block out
information. Furthermore in view of the fact that there are no standard Wall
procedures specified in the regulations, the height and strength of the Chinese
Wall will vary from firm to firm. The question then becomes what ought the
optimal height of the Wall to be? There are two concerns here both of which
involve costs: first, a firm which operates a Wall that is too low and which
allows inside information to pass through it will risk being charged with
insider dealing with the consequent costs in loss of reputation plus civil or
criminal penalty. Secondly, firms wanting to avoid being charged with insider
dealing offences through a breach in their Chinese Walls will perhaps adopt
over rigorous controls. This would block out unpublished price-sensitive
68. Wood remarks that, "[S]enior executives in charge of monitoring (the
compliance officers) must be excluded from certain decision-making or
communicating conflicts to other executives. This may strike at the whole
concept of collective board responsibility and involve a split of management
control." Supra note 38, at p.69.
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information plus information which the conglomerate really ought legally to be
using when making investment decisions. Thus economies of scope are reduced.69
Moreover the firm would be exposing itself to civil liability for not using all
legitimate information.70
C. The Cost of Legal Uncertainty
Even if the height of a Wall is such that it stops price-sensitive
information but allows legitimate information through, the fact remains that
the erection of a Wall in the circumstances outlined by the SIB means that what
would at common law constitute a duty to know or disclose what is known by the
corporate entity as a whole is, in fact, removed. Whether this will relieve a
financial conglomerate from its fiduciary duties at common law in every case is
far from certain. In as much as this risk of civil liablity exists the
conglomerate will be forced to strengthen or reinforce the Wall. This
reinforcement imposes greater compartmentalisation and other costs, thus
reducing the synergies.
D. Compartmentalisation Costs
Ironically fully effective Chinese Walls militate against the original
rationale for having conglomerates by erecting information barriers which
segment and compartmentalise the selling of financial products. This leads to
69. It might, however, be argued that a Chinese Wall which is too high
is not a realistic scenario.
70. When the author mentioned this point to both the TSA and the SIB,
they admitted that a Wall which would be too high had not been envisaged and no
rules had been included to cover the situation in the Rule book(s). This is
indicative, perhaps, of the fact that the regulatory authorites had never
entertained the thought that firms would operate over rigorous Chinese Wall
procedures! However Walls which are too high also unfairly prejudice the
customer.
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inefficiencies. Segmentation will increase search costs to the consumer since
Chinese Walls will force consumers of financial services to "shop around" for
better prices and quality of service, even when the purchase of two services
from the same house might be advantageous.
3. Full Disclosure
Securities Laws in both the U.S. and the U.K. are based on a philosophy
of full disclosure. This impact of this philosophy differs slightly in
relation to insider dealing in particular and conflicts of interests in
general. Obviously the best way to eliminate insider dealing in conglomerates
and indeed insider dealing per se is to have companies disclose significant
corporate developments to the public as soon as is feasible, allowing market
participants to evaluate and use this information accordingly. While the under
the Stock Exchange listing requirements, known as the "Yellow Book", such
disclosure is already called for it is not always as immediate as it might be.
Disclosure may be delayed if "the directors consider that disclosure of
information to the public might prejudice the company's business interests."7'
It could be argued that financial conglomerates ought to be under a duty to
make full disclosure on the client's behalf 72 or to notify the regulatory
authorities when the corporate client has failed to make prompt disclosure.73
71. LSE Admission of Securities to Listin g (1987) 5.08-5.10.
72. See, Linville, "A Crack in The "Wall" Against lOb-5" (1975) 44, UMKC
Law Review 105, at p.117. See also, Woolfson, "Investment Banking" in Abuse on
Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities Markets (1980) at p.413.
73. Millar, "Every Market Player Deserves to be in on Insider Trading",
Wall Street Journal 2-3, December 1988.
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Of course a policy of immediate disclosure of all material corporate news
would itself raise a number of problems not the least being how to determine
when a piece of corporate news is material.74
As far as conflicts of interest generally are concerned, full disclosure
of the facts of the conflict could be made. For example, where a client asks
his broker to buy some ICI shares, the broker ought to be required to disclose
the fact that he also makes the market in IC! shares. The conflict arises
because the broker could sell off his own book when a better price may be had
elsewhere. On discovery of the nature of the conflict, the client is better
able, in theory at least, to decide whether to proceed with the transaction or
go elsewhere. Disclosure requirements are the most traditional means of
resolving conflicts of interest.
Disclosure needs to be made in such a way that an ordinary investor can
understand the relevance of the information being disclosed to him - we have
already seen in Chapter Six Part I that it is required to be full and frank.
Essentially there are three facts that ought to be disclosed if this method of
conflict control is to work effectively:
(i) the existence of any material interest a conglomerate has in a particular
75transaction.
(ii) the capacity in which the conglomerate is dealing. In the above example
74. , Canton & Fischel, infra Chapter Three, who, at note 52 and
accompanying text, list some other difficulties associated with prompt
disclosure.
75. For a definition of material interest, 	 , Rule 5.07, infra Chapter
Seven.
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it is dealing both as principal and as agent for its own account and most
probably for another customer's account.
(iii) when acting as agent for the customer the secret profit made on a deal.76
Here the golden rule is that a conglomerate must never put itself in a
position where its duties to a client conflict with duties owed
elsewhere unless, that is, the client is made aware of the conflict and
assents to it. The conglomerate must notify the client of any "secret
profit" made on the deal irrespective of whether it was made at the
expense of the client.
However, using disclosure requirements is expensive and is very often
confusing for ordinary customers who are most in need of protection.77
Disclosure imposes a financial burden on the firms required to comply. This
cost is ultimately passed on to the consumer of financial services. If, as is
supposed, the demand for financial services is elastic, then a small increase
in price will lead to a more than proportionate decrease in the demand for
those services. 78
 Therefore, it could be argued that the financial intermed-
iaries will themselves be the ultimate losers if such a regulatory route is
chosen.
76. , infra Chapter Six at note 56 and accompanying text.
77. , Kay, "The Forms of Regulation" in Financial Re gulation - or
Over-Regulation? (lEA: 1988), at p.38.
78. , Goodheart, suDra note 22, at p.20.
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4.	 The Reinforced Chinese Wall (the Drohibition of "in house" deals
Prohibitions on "in-house" dealing, while retaining a large degree of
fairness and not totally abandoning the Wall concept, nonetheless runs against
the true rationale of conglomerates - synergies79 - and seriously impedes
the ability of firms to perform proper financial; serviucew for client if they
are unable to deal or recommend certain categories of shares. Furthermore
there are the signalling effects of the mechanism to be considered and costed.
80These are probably high.
However in situations where it is likely that the "naked TM Chinese Wall
will leak there are strong reasons for adopting a process of reinforcement.
Reinforcement may take a number of different forms, each one more stringent and
thus, by degree, undercutting the synergies to be gained by conglomeration:
(a) No recommendation Policy
Here, when one arm of the multi-functional firm legitimately acquires
inside information from a client, all other arms are prevented from
recommending the security to which information pertains. However the firm may
continue to deal for its own account. The logic here is that if one arm of a
conglomerate legitimately acquires adverse news about Company X it will not be
placed in the invidious situation where its discretionary fund management arm
is, because of a Chinese Wall, unwittingly recommending dud Company X shares.
Thus with a no-recommendation policy, the conglomerate is under no risk of
79. For a fuller discussion of this in the context of de-conglomeration,
see, below at footnote 85 and accompanying text.
80. C/f. Chazen, "Reinforcing the Chinese Wall: A Response" (1975) 51
N.Y.U.Law Rev. 552; and Slade v. Shearson Hamill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1974) discussed infra Chapter Six, at note 78 and accompanying text.
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being sued for breach of fiduciary duty for having acted for two different
customers. It may, however, place itself in an undisclosed conflict-of-duty
type situation by dealing for its own account. The crucial question is at what
stage in the relationship with company X the no-recommendation policy should
apply - when the Company becomes a client? or only after a confidential
relationship has been established and the possibility of the acquisition of
inside information becomes much more probable?
(b) Restricted List
A restricted list incorporates a no-recomendation policy. However a
conglomerate is not allowed to deal on its own account.8 ' Again it is uncertain
whether a confidential relationship must exist before the restricted list
applies. The firm may still continue to carry out unsolicited orders. In other
words if the department is apprised of inside information about company X, it
cannot trade nor can it recommend, but it may execute a deal for a customer who
rings up and asks for "100 Company X" shares.
(c) Stop List
Under the Stop list procedures the firm may not carry out even
unsolicited orders for customers. Again the question arises as to when the
list applies: once the relationship is initiated; or only when inside
information is conveyed?
81.	 the Slade case iJ2L See also, the First Boston Case discussed
jja Chapter Seven at note 20 and accompanying text.
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Signalling Costs Associated With Operating a "Reinforced" Chinese Wall
The very inclusion of a company's shares on a conglomerates restricted
list could itself be considered to be price-sensitive information and could
therefore constitute a breach of confidence in respect of the company. The
indication that something is about to happen with regard to the company would
mean that informed traders could easily draw correct conclusions as to whether
the financial conglomerate knew the of adverse or favourable information. This
would impose a cost in that it would compromise the underlying purpose and
deterrent effect of anti-insider dealing legislation which is to achieve a fair
and efficient market. In an attempt to by-pass the problem the SEC in its
amicus curaie brief in the Slade case said that a firm should withdraw any
outstanding recommendation on a security when the firm enters into an
investment banking or other type of relationship. This would represent a
severe obligation, and one which would further erode synergies because it
requires the firm to place the security on the restricted list before inside
information is actually received. However even the restricted list is far from
fuliproof, as the First Boston Case shows.82
5. De-conglomeration
One of the most effective and fullproof ways of dealing with conflict
abuse in the conglomerate context is to eliminate it. This would involve
breaking up existing conglomerates through the adoption of formal Glass
Steagall type legislation or a return to pre-Big Bang days with the adoption of
self-imposed constraints on the range of financial services offered by the one
82. Ibid.
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house. Many consider such a policy option to be too draconian. Goodhart
83
writes:
In so far as separation involves additional costs, there will tend to
be pressures to avoid, or to evade, such limitation; in particular,
(international) competition with markets not subject to such high
cost regulation will lead to pressures for de-regulation, fhoweverj
if economies of scale and scope are such that the option of
single capacity operation is too expensive, or otherwise
unattractive, ... there remains the option of trying to limit
conflicts of interest, eg "Chinese Walls", prosecution of the use of
insider information, etc.
It would seem that the logic in the second part of Goodhart's quotation has won
the day and that the authorities have opted for Chinese Walls, prosecution of
insider dealers etc. rather than the heavy handed approach of breaking up
conglomerates.
However, even the SIB advocate de-conglomeration of a sort in respect of
the insurance business, where they have adopted a policy of "polarisation" to
avoid the creation of conflicts, rather than regulate their potential abuses.
Under this policy, neither disclosure rules nor Chinese Walls are considered
sufficient to ensure fair practice. As the SIB states:84
The Board have been relucant to deal with potential investor
protection problems by restricting the provision of a service as
such. In one area in particular, however, it considers this to be
essential for the protection of investors. The Board considers that,
if firms are permitted to advise on and sell life assurance policies
and units in collective investement schemes otherwise than either on
a fully independent basis	 as the representatives of a single
company or group, the investor will be confused as to the nature of
the service available to him and as to the position of the person
advising him and accordingly liable to make decisions abased on
erroneous assumptions.
Thus the SIB recognises areas of financial services which are so prone to abuse
that restricting the provision of such a service in a financial house, which
would otherwise provide a full range, is mandatory.
83. Goodhart, supra note 9, at p.26.
84. , SIB, su pra note 3 at p.13.
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In the aftermath of Big Bang in Britain some firms have in fact purposely
chosen not to form conglomerates or have de-conglomerated and have become
instead niche suppliers of financial services peddling the virtues of
independence and the absence of conflicts of interest. The break-up of
conglomerates might be precipited by natural market trends which indicate that
the purported synergy argument is largely illusory. As one commentator
85
states:
Critics of this strategy [ie. conglomerationl argue that the policing
of all the complex boundaries (the "Chinese Walls") between the
different departments forced together has become so burdensome, and
the risk of losing clients so great when breaches are published , as
to outweigh any syneries or returns to scale from putting together
conglomerates.
Almost all firms have admitted that in any case the synergies have
been much more difficult to extract than they anticipated. Those
firms which stuck to their original niches or made more limited
diversifications ... have retained or increased Itheirl market shares
at the expense of the more ambitious conglomerates and new entrants.
The break-up of conglomerates would also engender greater fairness in the
market by reducing the number of conflict of interest situations, thus
curtailing conflict abuse especially in the form of insider dealing.
Despite the attendant benefits of de-conglomeration in terms of increased
fairness, it is unlikely, in the current deregulatory environment, that the
forces pushing for the break-up of conglomerates are sufficiently strong to
have much of an impact.
85. Clive Wolman, "Loopholes in the Chinese walls", The Financial Times
17 August 1988.
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Summary
Chapter Seven attempts a policy analysis of the issues surrounding the
use, by regulatory authorites, of the Chinese Wall in regulating both conflicts
of interest and duty in financial conglomerates. The analysis is couched in
terms of a regulatory dilemma. On the one hand it is shown that there are
certain economic benefits to be had from conglomeration; namely, enhanced
competition, risk diversification and synergies. On the other, there are the
increased costs of conflict abuse in general and insider dealing in particular.
Thus the regulatory dilemma paradigm: the stricter the regulation, the greater
the compartmentalisation, the more the economies are reduced. A proper trade-
off or balance is required. It is argued that a strict cost-benefit analysis
would be extremely difficult, and that the decision about which option ought to
be chosen rests ultimately on the basis of a policy hunch.
The various policy options are considered, ranging from one extreme -
reliance on market forces; to the other extreme - de-conglomeration. The
Chinese Wall, disclosure requirements and the reinforced Chinese Wall lie
somewhere in between. Again the Wall mechanism is signalled out for special
treatment.
The acceptability of the Chinese Wall as a valid policy instrument for
regulating financial conglomerates is a highly controversial area. The Wall is
considered within the context of its effectiveness as a device which restricts
the flow of inside information within a financial conglomerate. The
preventative function of the mechansim is important when reviewing it both as a
form of investor protection and as a defence at law. It is shown that Wall
does not provide investors with added protection, far from it, the mechanism
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actually works to their detriment at times. When raised as a defence at law,
it is not certain what criterion the courts will apply when endeavouring to
determine its effectiveness. However, there would seem every reason on the
basis of public policy for approving the use of an effective Chinese Wall in a
criminal prosecution where the standard is "beyond all reasonable doubt". In
such an instance the device might be capable of casting a doubt into the minds
of the jury. In a civil case, the fact that the mechansim can be easily by-
passed must be a weighty adverse consideration. This carries through to
discredit the device's validity as (i) a form of investor protection and (ii) a
fuflproof defence at law. The Wall has other associated economic costs. These
are also considered.
In view of the overwhelming adoption of the Chinese Wall rules in U.K.
securities law, it would seem that policy makers have decided that the costs of
the device compare favourably with other competing mechanisms. As events
unfold and scandals are uncovered this policy calculation may well have to be
adjusted to take into account any loss of confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the financial markets.
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CHAPTER NINE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
PART L SUMMARY
Deregulation, financial conglomerates and conflicts
The trend towards deregulation in the form of financial diversification
is best illustrated by recent events which have transformed the provision of
financial services in the U.K. The most important outcome of this process has
been the development of a new corporate creature, the financial conglomerate.
These conglomerates are the result of a desire by market participants to expand
rather than limit the range of financial services on offer. It is now possible
for a single financial house to provide a range of financial services including
stock-broking, market-making, banking, and corporate corporate finance. Most
importantly the traditional self-imposed separation of banking and securities
business has now been broken down. But by embracing banking and securities
activities within the one firm, 	 inter-related problems arise. First of
all, the safety and soundness of a financial institution is potentially put in
jeopardy. Secondly, consumers of financial services run the risk of being
treated unfairly because of the increased likelihood that conflict of interest
and duty situations will be abused.
There is nothing inherently wrong with conflict situations; the issue is
whether such situations have been handled properly. If the conflict situation
is treated impartially then there is no problem; if, however, the situation is
abused, this gives cause for concern. Governments have continually regarded
the existence of conflicts in the financial sector with more concern than those
in the non-financial sectors of the economy. Financial institutions are seen
as being "special institutions" - this is particularly true of the banking
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sector. The view is also prevalent that the nature of financial services are
themselves inherently special. However, before pressing for regulation, it
must be borne in mind that not every conflict of interest is of equal
importance.
With the merging together of banks and securities houses to form
financial conglomerates nine conflicts have traditionally been isolated.
Arguably insider dealing is the most important since it is easy to forsee the
situation where, under the new "Big Bang" arrangements, a banking and
securities house become affiliated, with the securities "arm" underwriting a
share issue for X Company. During the course of the underwriting "unpublished
price-sensitive information" - say a future earnings report about the company -
is obtained. There is ample opportunity for this information to be acquired
and used by the banking "arm" to the advantage of favoured customers or indeed
for the bank's own account.
There is currently a heated debate between "regulators" and
"deregulators" over the social and economic costs and benefits of insider
dealing and whether the practice ought to be left unfettered by regulatory
constraints. The regulators seem to have won the day. At a general level,
legal constraints operate to prohibit insider dealing in almost every advanced
nation. In the U.K. these are embodied in the Companies Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act 1985. In the U.S. anti-insider dealing law has developed on a
more ad hoc and pragmatic basis. But in both jurisdictions this legislation is
aimed at all forms of insider dealing and has no special emphasis on financial
conglomerates. Conglomerates however pose special problems which arguably
require special solutions and specific regulations. Not only is there an
increased flow of price-sensitive information in the conglomerate context but
also there is a greater potential for this information to be misused and for
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the misuse to go undetected. What then ought regulators to do?
Conflict Resolution and the Regulatory Dilemma
It is important to note, before considering the regulatory options, that
regulators are faced with a dilemma. Essentially this dilemma revolves around
the fact that on the one hand there are certain benefits to be had from
conglomeration, namely diversification and synergies; but on the other hand
there are also costs, both safety and soundness issues and conflict of interest
problems. Some form of regulation (or protection) ought reasonably to be
imposed. However the stricter the regulation the greater the compartmentalis-
ation. The greater the compartmentalisation the less the efficiencies derived.
So there is, as it were, a regulatory dilemma. A balance therefore has to be
struck between the competing forces of fairness (in the form of strict legal
duties) and efficiency (in the form of important economic interests). The key
question underlying the discussion of the regulatory options is this: which
option strikes the right balance?
What are the Regulatory Options?
I. Greater Reliance on Market Forces
First of all regulators could place greater reliance on the use of market
forces to regulate potential abuses within conglomerates. The underlying
principle here is that the long-term incentive to exploit a conflict of
interest may not exist. A financial conglomerate, so the argument goes, will
not risk the long-term profits bound up in honest work and good reputation for
the short-term gains to be had through insider dealing or other conflict abuse.
However market forces may not provide sufficient incentives to induce
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conglomerates to act within the existing insider-dealing legal framework since
most buyers will not be in a position to assess the quality of the services
they receive and as a result will not be in a position to withdraw their custom
if financial institutions are acting unfairly. Therefore new regulatory
measures may be needed as a back-up to existing anti-insider dealing
legislation.
II. The "Naked" Chinese Wall
Secondly, "naked" Chinese Walls could be used. The theory behind the
Chinese Wall mechanism is that adequate controls over access to inside
information will stop misuse, thus allowing the firm to act in its multiple
capacities without incurring liability. The Wall comprises a number of
policies and procedures designed to prevent the misuse of inside information
within conglomerate structures and to neutralise the conflict of interest and
duty dilemma.
The Government's 1985 White Paper recognised a role for the Wall
mechanism in the newly reconstituted financial markets. Professor Gower
likewise gave it his tentative approval. However both parties emphasised the
inherent weaknesses and inadaquacies in the use of the device to regulate
financial conglomerates. Notwithstanding this the Chinese Wall found statutory
endorsement in s.48 (2) of the Financial Services Act 1986 which, in giving
general powers to the SIB to make Conduct of Business Rules regulating
investment businesses, made specific provision for the implementation of
Chinese Wall rules.
The SIB have made liberal use of this authority by endorsing the use of
the isolation technique in a number of its conduct of business rules.
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Interestingly the SIB does not require firms to erect Chinese Walls. However
the absence of them within a firm, or a group, will attract severe disclosure
requirements. A firm will not want to bear this costly burden of disclosure.
Therefore the overwhelming incentive is to erect Chinese Walls. Disclosure
operates as a penalty if the firm does not. The two most important SIB rules
indirectly "sanctioning" Chinese Walls are Rule 3.10 - covering insider dealing
and Rule 5.07 - dealing with the disclosure of a firm's material interest in a
transaction. Basically the firm, if it operates an effective Chinese Wall, is
furnished with a defence from an action brought under the rulebook alleging the
misuse of inside information if arm A of the conglomerate is in possession of
inside information and arm B deals in the security to which the information
relates. The Wall therefore rebuts the presumption that information held by
arm 'A' is imputed to arm 'B'. By implication an action would not lie under
the SIB rule-book for breach of fiduciary duty for operating an effective Wall.
The Chinese Wall as a preventive device can be viewed from two distinctly
separate angles. First, as a defence for conglomerates against a charge of
insider dealing; and secondly, as a means of investor protection over and above
market forces. The crucial question is that of enforcement - does the Wall
work? Essentially the Chinese Wall is a self-regulatory mechanism. The proper
functioning of the device is therefore strongly reliant on the conglomerates
themselves to establish and monitor systems and procedures which will "block"
inside information. It is here that the skill and thoroughness of the
compliance personnel is crucial. But ultimately the proper operation of a
Chinese Wall will depend on the integrity of the people who work on either side
of it. Breaches of the mechanism may be detected either through an informant -
whistle-blowing - network or through the sophisticated computerised systems
operated by the leading regulatory bodies.
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With regard to the second perspective from which the Chinese Wall can be
considered, doubts may be expressed as to whether the mechanism really can be
viewed as granting investors protection. Either the device may operate in such
a way as to relieve a conglomerate of traditional disclosure responsibilities,
previously recognised as a stalwart of any investor protection system; or it
may cause one arm of a conglomerate to recommend a share which is inadvisable
in the light of knowledge known by the conglomerate as a whole. Moreover a
Wall which is too high will block out legitimate information therefore
depriving investors of all legitimate information in investment decisions.
Investors are, however, unlikely to be able to gain the requisite degree of
proof for an action to be taken. These deficiences in the mechanism ought to
be considered as part of the public costs associated with having conglomerates
and gaining their competitive efficiencies.
III. Full Disclosure
Disclosure operates at two levels. At the outset corporate clients must
be encouraged to publically announce material price-sensitive news as quickly
as possible, in order to restrict the opportunity of individuals within the
client company and the conglomerate itself, from dealing ahead of the market.
There are many drawbacks with this approach as shown in Chapter Three.
Regulators could also rely more on the principle of full disclosure to
regulate conflict situations in conglomerates. In this way a client is made
aware that the firm holds a material interest in a transaction and the nature
of the material interest. Thus the customer is, in theory, able to assess the
risks involved and either give his assent by proceeding with the transaction or
revoke his custom by going elsewhere. To the extent that customers perceive
the risk of abuse to be high and duly withdraw their custom, conglomerates will
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have an increased incentive to break up business into separate independent
units. Of course disclosure requirements are the most traditional means of
regulating conflicts and represent general position of the common law in this
area.
IV. The "Reinforced" Chinese Wall
Another alternative would be to reinforce existing Chinese Walls by
preventing any arm of a conglomerate from dealing in or recommending to
customers the securities of a company about which another arm has inside
information. Reinforcement varies in nature and form. But essentially the
result is an erosion of the synergies to be had through conglomeration. A no-
recommendation policy for example would prevent the firm from recommending a
security to customers if another arm was apprised of inside information
pertaining to the security. However the firm could deal on its own account and
could execute unsolicited orders. A more stringent procedure is that of a
restricted list which incorporates a no-recomendation policy but also prevents
the conglomerate from dealing on its own account. Under a stop list a
conglomerate is prevented from carrying out even unsolicited orders for
customers where another arm of the conglomerate is apprised of inside
information relating to the execution of the unsolicted order.
V. Prohibit Conglomerates
The most effective solution to the conflict problem is of course the
break-up of conglomerates through a process of de-conglomeration. Either the
de-conglomeration of gfl conflicting functions or the separation of those
functions most susceptible to abuse, namely banking and securities business.
This would be costly in terms of the synergies lost by the fragmentation of
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financial service participants. Nonetheless it would significantly reduce the
risk of insider abuse - both coporate and individual - and would do much to
restore confidence and fairness in the markets. This solution is, in all
probability, too draconian to be taken seriously in relation to the provision
of all financial services. Yet in the U.S, regulators have seen fit to
segregate to a large extent banking and securities business by means of the
Glass Steagall Act 1933 - thus preventing conglomerates "U.K.- style".
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PART IL CONCLUSION
An Assessment of the Legal Validity of the Chinese Wall
When does the Wall successfully rebut the presumption that information
acquired by one arm of a conglomerate is imputed to another? Does the answer
depend on the effectiveness of the Wall? And even if the Wall is effective
will this give rise to an action at common law involving a breach of fiduciary
duties? Indeed, is there an inherent and irreconcilible tension between the
dictates of Statute law (and the rules and codes thereunder) and common law
concerning the Chinese Wall? In other words has statute law endorsed a view
of the device which is in conflict with the fulfillment of traditional
fiduciary duties at common law?
It is a vague though nonetheless important response to all the above
questions to say that the position is not entirely clear. However, it would
appear that an effective Chinese Wall operates as a defence against an alleged
breach of the SIB rule-book (and the other SRO rule books derived thereform) in
those instances where the Chinese Wall is expressely endorsed in the rules as a
valid regulatory option. Similarly where the Wall is effective it cannot, by
implication, lead to an action under the SIB rule-book for breach of fiduciary
duty. If this were not the position with regard to actions brought under the
SIB rule-book, the SIB would in actual fact be setting a trap for firms by
encouraging them to operate effective Chinese Walls while at the same time
permitting clients to bring actions under the rules for breach of fiduciary
duty on the basis that the Wall 	 effective. It is then implicit under the
SIB rule-book that an effective Chinese Wall is unimpeachable within the
context it is utilised.
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The issue of the Chinese Wall at common law is, however, not so clear.
It has never before been squarely faced and therefore remains unresolved.
Owing to this absence of authority at common law it is impossible to give a
definitive statement of whether a Chinese Wall can be relied upon as a
corporate/individual defence to insider dealing or as a suitable means of
neutralising a firm's conflicting interests and duties by absolving the
conglomerate from the threat of a common law action for breach of fiduciary
duty. The SIB rule-book does not exclude a remedy under agency law. As we
have seen, an effective Wall might well be the cause of an action brought at
common law on the basis of breach of fiduciary obligations.' On the other
hand common law might not hold the Chinese Wall to have breached fiduciary duties.
Yet although some U.S. cases2 dealing with financial market transactions
do support this line of argument none of them would necessarily convince the
U.K. Courts given the closely intergated nature of the market players in this
jurisdiction.
This dilemma has created great uncertainty among conglomerates operating
in the U.K. financial markets. The question they must decide is twofold:
whether, first, to erect a "naked" Chinese Wall governing conflicting functions
and risk (i) having inside information imputed to other arms of the
conglomerate and as a consequence being sued for breach of the Companies
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (or Rule 3.10); or (ii) being sued under
common law agency principles for breach of fiduciary duty (even though the Wall
would be a legitimate defence to an action brought under an alleged breach of
the SIB or SRO rule-books); or, second, to erect a "reinforced" Chinese Wall
1. For U.S. authority see the Slade and Black cases infra Chapter Six.
2. See especially, the Connell, Washin gton Steel and American Mendicorp
cases discussed infra Chapter Six.
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and avoid both the risks outlined above but suffer the ensuing constraints on
the operation of their business.
Right from the very outset of the reforms to introduce a new regulatory
framework for the City, the conglomerates were well aware of the problem caused
by this "double layer of law". 3 Prior to the run up to Big Bang and the
introduction of the Financial Services Act a considerable degree of lobbying of
parliamentary opinion was much in evidence. Ostensibly three views were
mooted. On the one hand the Labour party rejected any contention that the
"safeguards" enshrined in the new Rulebook would oust traditional common law
agency principles. 4 On the other hand the large conglomerate groupings were
especially eager to be exempted from the Strict common law rules 5
 on the basis
that to do otherwise would hamstring their operations and offset many of the
economic reasons for conglomeration. In the middle ground was the view that
the common law rules should be maintained but that a new code should be drawn
up. The new code was to include Chinese Wall rules which would operate as a
3. See, Sir Kenneth Berrill (then SIB Chairman), "Conflicts of Interest:
The SIB's Approach", extracts from a speech given to The Society of Investment
Analysts, 28 November 1985 who, in trying to allay City fears, was correct when
he said:
Recent financial mergers appear to have given rise to ... [the fear] ... that
the new conglomerates will run foul of ... agency law ... This ... has lead
to suggestions that the new Bill should, in some way, waive or modify agency
law as it applies to financial service companies ... I do understand these
concerns, but I think I have said enough to suggest that our rules, far from
disapplying the law of agency, will in fact be making clearer and more
detailed provision to help in resolving potential conflicts of interest. In
no sense are we prepared - even if we were able - to undermine the protection
that agency law gives to the clients of an investment business. My firm
intention is that our rules will do a thorough job of tackling the same
concerns. If they do, it ma y well be that the court, in a pplying the
principles of agency in this field. will conclude that its repuirments are
not too dissimilar from those of our rule. In that case the fears that have
been expressed about the implications of agency law will prove unfounded. If
our rules do not make ade quate provision in this area then the courts may
quite properly take a different and less welcome view. (at p.2 emphasis
added).
4. See, Commons Debates 24th April 1984 p.956 Vol 64, Bryan Gould.
5. , Berril, supra note 3.
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defence to actions brought under them but not necessarily for actions brought
at common law. It was upon this middle ground that the Government ultimately
6trod.
A Question for the Courts to Decide
When faced with the Chinese Wall conundrum, the courts at common law have
three possible options. First, they could take an exDpnsive view of the
Chinese Wall and accept the mechanism (if effective) in the eight situations
provided for by the SIB rulebook. Despite the fact that this would involve a
severe curtailment of strict fiduciary principles (for the reasons already
explained in Chapter Six), it would be more in tune with the current regulatory
climate. Thus, under this view, if an investor claimed breach of fiduciary
duty, whether under the SIB rule-book or at common law on the basis that a
financial conglomerate operated a Wall which actually worked, the action would
fail.
Secondly, the courts could take a narrow view of the Chinese Wall,
holding that at common law strict fiduciary principles oust the Wall defence.
Such a route, if followed, would cause significant problems for the operation
of conglomerates who would, as a result, be forced to erect "reinforced"
Chinese Walls, with restricted lists and no-recommendation policies, in an
attempt to avoid civil liability. This would also impose costs in the sense
that firms would lose out on many of the purported synergies to be derived from
conglomeration.
The third or "intermediate route" is one which is advocated hereafter as
6.	 , The Financial Times, 16 Dec. 1985.
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the position which the courts ou ght to adopt. It is contended that strict
legal reasoning must be balanced with sensible legal and economic outcomes. In
pursuit of this endeavour, there must be a trade-off between what is percieved
as the prerequisites of fairness and those of economic efficency. In many ways
this takes the discussion full circle - to the various policy objectives
underlying the remodelling of the U.K.'s securities codes and investor
protection laws. Balancing the objectives - striking the right blend or mix -
is an extremely difficult task. The current approach favours deregulation in
the form of greater competitive freedom. As was shown such developments are
not only true of the U.K. but also of other financial centres too. In view of
this, and upon summary of the economic costs involved, there seems little point
in running against this tide of change. At least, not without good reason. In
such a deregulatory, multi-capacity environment, Chinese Walls are not an
option, they are a necessity. The question is merely one of degree. Where and
when ought they to be used and accepted by the courts? The SIB have made
liberal use of the mechanism, reflecting, no doubt, their own and
practitioners' expansive views of competitive freedom.
It is submitted that the thrust of the SIB's approach - pragmatic, and
based on the fundamental realisation of deregulation - is ostensibly correct.
If the Chinese Wall works in a way which erodes traditional common law
fiduciary obligations, then the common law must accommodate these new market
structures and consequent market practices. By looking back to its own legal
precedents in order to achieve a set of logically consistent principles, common
law serves to thwart the reaching of a truely just outcome in the decision
demanding adjudication. The courts should be encouraged to look further than
the justice of the particular parties before them. They must be made to see
the dispute as part of a wider movement of change affecting the operation of
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the financial markets. This being so, it is clear that it is the impact of a
decision that is crucial; not the decision's logical consistency with previous
outdated legal precedents. Common law should not be allowed to frustrate major
(and to a large extent beneficial) developments affecting the U.K.'s standing
as an international financial centre.
That the law should not be allowed to remain static is a view advocated
by one of the most influencial judges this century. As Lord Denning says:7
New days may bring the people into new ways of life and give them new
outlooks: and with these changes there may come a need for new rules
of law, to control the new order and reflect the new outlook. The
old rules must then be modified or else the society itself will
stagnate.
This must surely be true in the financial markets - an environment which of
necessity requires flexibility to keep pace with the development of ideas and
developments in technology.
What Factors Mi g ht Influence a Court to Accent the Chinese Wall?
What then are the factors that ought reasonably to prompt the courts to
accept a Chinese Wall as (i) effective in rebutting the presumption that
information held by one arm of a conglomerate is imputed to another; and (ii)
acceptable as a means of resolving strict fiduciary duties owed at common law?
I. Statutory and Regulatory Accep tance of the Mechanism
The fact that there has already been significant statutory and regulatory
acceptance of the mechanism is a strong indication that the courts would be
7. See, Lord Denning, The Famil y
 Story , (Butterworths 1981), at p.176.
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influenced by such developments. Today it is not so much a question of
deciding whether Chinese Walls actually fit in with the underlying policies of
the new legislation governing the U.K.'s financial services industry; on the
contrary, the Chinese Wall is actually sponsored by it.
That in the past the courts have in the part been reluctant to interfere
in the regulation of the financial markets is suitably illustrated by the case
of Dunford & Elliot Ltd. v. Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. 8 . This should provide
some help in pointing to how the courts, when faced with a Chinese Wall-type
9dispute, might adopt a pragmatic or intermediate route. 	 In that case the
plaintiffs' company made steel. Owing to severe losses it was decided to
launch a rights issue to the shareholders. 43% of the company's shares were
owned by institutional shareholders. At a meeting arranged by the plaintiffs
the institutional shareholders agreed to underwrite the new issue. The
plaintiffs prepared a confidential report on the company and gave it to them.
The institutional shareholders, of their own accord, decided to invite the
defendants, a rival steel company, to help underwrite the issue. The
institutional shareholders allowed the defendants to see the confidential
report even though it was not available to the other shareholders. The
defendants decided not to underwrite the issue but instead made an offer to the
shareholders in the plaintiffs' company. The offer was 35p compared with a
market price of 17p. The plaintiffs issued a writ claiming an injunction to
forbid the use of the confidential information in pursuit of the bid.
The Court of Appeal allowed the bid to continue. In a judgment adopting
8. [1977] Vol.1, 505 (C.A.)
9. It is probably worth noting that the case arose before the current
wave of re-regulation. Thus to-day the courts would have more Parliamentary
and regulatory indication of what is the preferred policy approach.
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a "hands-off" approach Roskiil L.J. held:'°
As Lord Denning, M.R., has already said, there was some discussion
during the argument regarding the the difficulties that could arise
in relation to the giving of information to those who are invited to
underwrite issues. We were told, as a matter of City practice, that
underwriters do insist upon getting information which may from time
to time not be available to shareholders. If that be the practice, so
be it: it is not for us to criticise, and certainly nothing is
further from my intention
Without for one moment presuming to criticise - other people are
far better able to judge the rights and wron gs of such a situation
than any
 judge can possibly be - ... the problem of confidential
information ... has to be solved if it possibly can be solved. Above
all any solution must surely rest on some principle which secures
fairness to all shareholders whether institutional or private so that
all are dealing and are dealt with on the same terms. (emphasis
added)
If the courts adopt this attitude, they will be looking heavily to the
regulators to set the pace. The only caveat, as Roskill L. J. himself says,
will be a "solution ... which secures fairness for all". This leads on to the
second factor.
2. The De gree of Unfairness Caused by the Use of the Mechanism
As has been argued the Chinese Wall gives rise to two areas of concern: where it
leaks and provides opportunities for insider dealing; and where it works and
erodes strict traditional fiduciary duties. The degree of unfairness resulting
from the use of the mechanism is dependant upon the nature of the transaction
where the Chinese Wall deployed. It is important to reiterate that whilst
there are no problem-free solutions, some are less problematic than others. In
determining the most appropriate policy route regarding acceptance of the
Chinese Wall, it is argued that the use of a tentative law-economics approach
may validly be applied. By this method then, it is possible to analyse the
appropriateness of the SIB's policy approach in relation to the the legitimacy
10.	 at p.515.
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of the Chinese Wall.
The fact that the Chinese Wall relieves a finanicial conglomerate from
the burden of fulfilling certain otherwise obligatory fiduciary duties must be
weighed up against the degree to which non-use of the mechanism (and the
adoption of another option) has an adverse effect on other policy goals such as
competition, efficiency, liquidity, flexibility. Thus it would seem reasonable
to suggest, when balancing (on a broad more or less basis rather than on any
precise economic cost-benefit scale) the various policy interest underlying the
recent regulation of the financial markets, that an effective Chinese Wall
ought not, bar certain special circumstances, to be ousted by common law. Put
another way, despite the fact that an effective Chinese Wall encroaches upon
strict traditional fiduciary duties (as outlined in Chapter Six) this ought to
be a cost accepted by society in view of the other benefits of the use of the
mechanism. However, that being said, the courts should adopt the guiding
principle that the common law ought flQ.
 to accept the Chinese Wall as an
effective corporate defence to insider dealin g nor as an viable means of
reconciling disDarate fiduciar y duties in those situations where the self-
interest of the firm is so strong as to make a reasonable man conclude that the
Wall has in fact been breached or where it would be inappropriate in the light
of surrounding policy considerations to accept the device as suitable in
fulfilling fiduciary obligations.
Where this conclusion is reached the inside information held by one
department in the firm ought to be imputed to the rest of the conglomerate and
an action would lie for breach of the CSA 1985 and under common law for breach
of fiduciary duty. But where this conclusion is not reached (ie. where the
Wall is deemed not only to have worked but also to have relieved the
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conglomerate from the threat of a common law action for breach of fiduciary
duty) the conglomerate ought to be allowed to Continue business in the normal
way.
The crucial question then is: in what circumstances is the firm's self-
interest so strong as to make a reasonable man conclude that the Wall has not
been effective or that it would be inappropriate as a means of neutralising a
conglomerates conflicting interests and obligations?
(i) Self-interest and Own Account Trading
The answer expounded here is that a conglomerate should not trade for its
own account in the securities of a firm about which arm another of the
conglomerate holds inside information. Thus if the securities arm has inside
information about Company X then any other arm of the conglomerate may not deal
in shares in company X for its own account. If it does, then common law ought
to hold that the firm is dealing on the basis of inside information in breach
of the CSA 1985 owing to the strong self-interest to directly benefit from the
use of such information. Thus a restricted list solution ought reasonably to
apply whereby Company X is placed on a restricted list which is circulated
throughout the firm and on the basis of which departments are not permitted to
perform deals for their own accounts. Moreover it would seem highly
inappropriate to accept a Chinese Wall as a valid regulatory option in these
circumstances owing to the highly sensitive nature of the fiduciary duties owed
compounded with the strong incentive to breach the Wall.
While there will almost always be a degree of self interest in every
transaction which the conglomerate performs, a direct self-interest is more
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likely, on balance, to be abused. Indeed where the firm has a direct self-
interest the incentive to abuse the position is increased significantly because
the firm is the direct beneficiary. Nonetheless, the conglomerate ought to be
able to perform (i) unsolicited orders from customers seeking to purchase
shares in Company X1 I; and (ii) normal market-making functions. This latter
proposition is a shade more difficult to justify. However attention is drawn
to the word "normal" and to the fact that market-makers perform a crucial
liquidity function which traditionally has given them special exemption from
certain activities on the basis of "good faith".' 2 Despite this, it would be
difficult to permitt such an exemption if, for example, a market-making arm of
a conglomerate held a position of 500,000 XYZ shares when over the previous six
months it had only held an average position of 50,000 XYZ shares with no
significant fluctations. If this were the case, the market-making arm's
holding of 500,000 XYZ shares could not be construed as "normal". Therefore in
the absence of any other contradictory evidence, such facts would constitute a
breach of the Chinese Wall.
(ii) Self-interest and the Performance of Deals for Customers
Consider, however, the situation where arm 'A' of the conglomerate holds
inside information about Company X and behind a Chinese Wall arm 'B' of the
conglomerate is recommending Company X to customers. There is, on balance, no
overwhelming policy reason why the Wall should not be construed as being
anything other than effective in prohibiting insider dealing and at the same
time reconciling seemingly disparate fiduciary duties. In this instance the
Wall option would fulfill a positive policy function. Admittedly, in such a
II. Given the earlier discussion in Chapter Eight, there is no overiding
policy reason why the conglomerate ought not to be able to execute such orders.
12. See, infra Chapter Four at note 62 and accompanying text.
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situation there remains an incentive for the recommending arm to base decisions
on inside information held by another arm. However, the incentive is less
strong in that the conglomerates stands to benefit only indirectly by
maintaining custom. That being said, the situation could arise where, for
example, the market-making arm is long on Company X shares, the corporate
finance arm being aware of the fact that the company is going into liquidation.
At first blush the incentive is to unload the shares into the discretionary
accounts of customers or even to recommend Company X to customers. Does then
this distinction between a direct self-interest and an indirect self interest
hold?
What the above scenario fails to take into account is the long-term
incentive against abusing the conflict situation. The incentive to abuse is
diffused to the extent that it will be in the firm's own self-interest to avoid
any legal liability or self-regulatory sanction; in effect it will have an
overiding desire to protect its integrity and reputation in the market-place.
Moreover the extent to which a "whistling blowing network" is effective will
reduce abuse within the context outlined. Again it is worth noting the Collier
incident where a counterparty to the deal alerted the regulatory authorities.
The recent incident at County Nat West (CNW) is another example in point.
There Mr. Dobbie was a managing director at CNW in its corporate finance
stockbroking arm. Grand Metropolitan were a corporate client of the CNW arm.
Grand Metropolitan informed Dobbie that it was going to sell its hotel chain.
The information was highly price-sensitive and was likely to have a favouravble
impact on Grand Met.'s shares. Dobbie then passed the information on to an
equity saleswoman specialising in Grand Met. shares. In turn she made a
telephone call to an analyst, part of which was heard by two market makers in
the CNW market making arm. Already they had agreed to sell about Llm Grand Met
322
shares which had not as yet been actually bought. The potential loss to CNW,
when Grand Met.'s shares rose, was as much as L50,000. One of the market
makers being new to the job and wishing to avoid an embarassing loss so close
to his appointment decided to buy L2m-Grand Met. shares from four different
market makers. The deals were executed only minutes before the news was
announced publcily and were consequently picked up by the Stock Exchange
surveillance department. As well as that other market makers complained about
13the deals.
Even if the forgoing analysis is wrong, there	 be a greater cost
involved in imposing alternative, more restrictive, regulatory constraints than
the actual cost of the abuse caused by the conglomerate's underhanded and
illegal activities. After all not all conglomerates will indulge in illegal
activity. One might ask what is the real likelihood that such underhand
activity will take place and will not under the existing policing regime be
detected? Undoubtedly the current emphasis of the policy makers on preventing
abuse must, in view of the extensive use of the Chinese Wall device, be matched
with a willingness to provide investors with remedies if abuses are uncovered.
Perhaps an "informant" scheme with a percentage of the recovered illicit
trading profits going to the informant. This will provide a further incentive
for conglomerates to ensure that their Walls are effective. No doubt the Wall
will undergo tremendous pressures in a "bear" market, but then even in the
recent crash, a rash of Chinese Wall scandals did not come to light. It would
seem therfore that the implementation of the Chinese Wall to regulate the use
of inside information by a thjj, in the situation where it is not trading for
its own account has a certain merit.
13.	 "Loopholes in the Chinese walls", The Financial Times 17 August
1988.
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The position of individuals within financial conglomerates has been
deliberately neglected. While on balance a Chinese Wall approach to regulating
conglomerates is likely to enhance the opportunity for individuals to indulge
in insider dealing, the phenomenon would remain whatever regulatory regime was
adopted. This is so given that there is (and has always been) the potential to
"swap" inside information within the financial community whether it be over the
telephone or in a London wine bar.
Final Remarks
The increased misuse of inside information and abuse of other conflicts
of interest and duty is likel y as a result of the merging together of the
City's financial institutions into what have become known as financial
conglomerates. While a number of regulatory alternatives are available in
resolving this problem they in effect boil down to two choices: either
conflicts in conglomerates can be prevented by deconglomerating or they can be
controlled through a range of regulatory options. The Chinese Wall is one
means of control that has been isolated for use by regulators.
In Britain and the U.S the Wall has received regulatory and legislative
backing. From a theoretical point of view it remains an attractive mechanism
for preventing the misuse of inside information while at the same time allowing
conglomerates to capture socially and economically beneficial economies of
scope. However, serious flaws exist when theory is set aside from practice.
The relative ease with which the wall is by-passed makes the effectiveness of
this mechanism in isolating inside information, at best, suspect. Equally the
fact that the use of an effective mechanism could leave a firm open to an
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action at common law for breaking fiduciary duties to clients places a cost on
firms in the form of legal uncertainty.
If the aim of conglomeration is to capitalise on informational
synergies, while the intention of the Chinese Wall is to act as an effective
information blocking device, then the question may be asked as to the whole
rationale of combining corporate finance, broking jobbing, fund managment etc
within the one corporate entity. A Chinese Wall thus frustrates many of the
purported advantages which might well accrue from conglomeration - such as
pooled expertise and other shared resources. A cynical suggestion would be
that Chinese Walls merely provide a superficial gloss of fairness so that
conglomerates can benefit from the real economies of scope to be had by using
inside information and management expertise on both sides of the Wall. If this
is so might then another solution be adopted? Authorities have suggested that
the Wall should be "reinforced" by either a no-recommendation poLicy or a
restricted list, or indeed, even both. But such a "reinforced" Wall would
introduce the further danger of internal Glass Steagall-type barriers so that
there is separation of functions in fact even if not in name. This would, in
effect, amount to de facto Glass-Steagall, stopping a banking arm from, for
example, recommending a certain share or self-dealing on its own account where
the securities arm is undewriting that issue.
It would seem that given the flaws in the Chinese Wall system, these are
pertinent questions to ask. However one must bear in mind the totality of the
issues which regulators face. Weighing up the costs and benefits of efficiency
with the costs and benefits of fairness. The underlying current is that of
deregulation by breaking down barriers governing the types of business that
firms may conduct and implementing new more suitable regulations. This new
325
wave of change offers regulators the choice of moving away from barrier-type
solutions to those based on competitive freedom. It is a new realignment of
the policy objectives that is required. In seeking to achieve this it is
argued that regulators do best by adopting "naked" Chinese Walls to regulate
the situation where the conglomerate finds itself in a traditional conflict of
interest/duty. But a "strengthened" Wall so that a cbnglomerate cannot self-
deal in those situations where another arm of the conglomerate has a material
interest in a transaction.
This reasoning is pragmatic and is not necessarily proposed as a long-
term solution. The financial markets are in a process of change. In this
deregulatory environment Chinese Wall systems come close to being a necessity.
It has been advocated here that the courts ought to recognise, and to an extent
embrace, the changes in evidence in the financial markets. It could be that
before long (or in the wake of new scandals), deregulation and financial
conglomeration may go out of fashion. In that case the regulators should
adjust their rule books and the courts ought equally to adjust their sights and
accommodate these changes. In the meantime the Wall will, most probably,
facilitate abuses even where (under the argument presented herein) it is not
required to be strengthened. But that is a risk, given the benefits of
conglomeration, society ought to take. If abuses are detected violators ought
to be punished very heavily indeed,as a form of effective deterrent.
In sum then, regulators have in large part been correct to adopt "naked"
Chinese Walls to regulate conflicts in conglomerates. However it is to be
recognised that the Wall is not a panacea and may in some instances need to be
strengthened. The Government indeed recognised this in their White Paper but
in practice the lead regulator - the SIB - has adopted the 'naked' Chinese Wall
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as the regulatory linch-pin for the regulation of financial conglomerates.
This is not sufficient. The Wall needs to be strengthened, especially where
the conglomerate has a direct self-interest in the transaction. Where,
however, it has only an indirect self-interest no strenghthening is required.
At law, conglomerates ought reasonably to rely on the SIB's codes and the
Chinese Wall rules derived thereunder. While there remains uncertainty at
common law about the validity of the Wall device, it is unlikely that an action
will get as far as the courts. If, indeed, one does, it will be interesting to
see whether the Courts will hold a bona fide Chinese Wall to have reconciled
what can only be described as the irreconcilable.
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APPENDIX I
FINANCIAL SERVICES AD' 1986
SCHEDULE 8
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO DESIGNATED AGENCYS RULES AND REGULATIONS
Standards
. The rules made under section 48 of this Act (in this Schedule referred to as "conduct of business
rules') and the other rules and regulations made under Part I of this Act must promote high
standards of integrity and fair dealing in the conduct of investment business.
2. The conduct of business rules must make proper provision for requiring an authorised person to act
with due skill, care and diligence in providing any service which he provides or holds himself
out as willing to provide.
3. The conduct of business rules must make proper provision for requiring an authorised person to
subordinate his own interests to those of his clients and to act fairly between his clients.
4. The conduct of business rules must make proper provision for requiring an authorised person to
ensure that, in anything done by him for the persons with whom he deals, due regard is had to
their circumstances.
Disclosure
5. The conduct of business rules must make proper provision for the disclosure by any authorised
person of interests in, and facts material to, transactions which are entered into by him in the
course of carrying on investment business or in respect of which he gives advice in the course of
carrying on such business, including information as to any commissions or other inducements
received or receivable from a third party in connection with any such transactions.
6. The conduct of business rules must make proper provision for the disclosure by an authorised
person of the capacity in which and the terms on which he enters into any such transaction.
7. The conduct of business rules, or those rules and rules under section 51 of this Act, must make proper
provision for requiring an authorised person who in the course of carrying on investment business
enters or offers to enter into a transaction in respect of an investment with any person, or gives any
person advice about such a transaction, to give that person such information as to the nature of the
investment and the financial implications of the transaction as will enable him to make an
informed decision.
8. Rules made under section 48 of this Act regulating action for the purpose of stabilising the price of
investments must make proper provision for ensuring that where action is or is to be taken in
conformity with the rules adequate arrangements exist for making known that the price of the
investments in respect of which the action is or is to be taken (and, where relevant, of any other
investments) may be affected by that action and the period during which it may be affected; and
where a transaction is or is to be entered into during a period when it is known that the price of
the investment to which it relates may be affected by any such action the information referred to
in paragraph 7 above includes information to that effect.
Protection
9. The conduct of business rules and any regulations made under section 55 of this Act must make
proper provision for the protection of property for which an authorised person is liable to account
to another person.
10. Rules made under sections 53 and 54 of this Act must make the best provision that can reasonably
be made under those sections.
Records
11. The conduct of business rules must require the keeping of proper records and make provision for
their inspection in appropriate cases.
Classes of Investors
12. The conduct of business rules and the other rules and regulations made under Chapter V of Part I of
the Act must take proper account of the fact that provisions that are appropriate for regulating
the conduct of business in relation to some classes of investors may not (by reason of their
knowledge, experience or otherwise) be appropriate in relation to others.
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APPENDIX II
Statement of Policy
This Statement of Policy is adopted to
provide more effective protection against
di5closure of confidential information.
Material information obtained from a cor-
poration by the Underwriting Division in
Connection with the consideration or nego-
tiation of a public or private offering of its
securities and which has not been disclosed
by the corporation to the investing public,
and conclusions based thereon, shall not be
disclosed by any member of the Under-
writing Division to anyone outside that
Division except to
(a) senior executives of the firm and
its Legal Department;
(b) lawyers, accountants and other
persons directly involved witb the under-
writers in connection with the proposed
offering;
(c) appropriate personnel of the Re-
search Division whose views in connec-
tion with the proposed offering are to be
sought by the Underwriting Division; and
(d) members of the buying depart-
ments of other firms wbo are prospec-
tive members of the underwriting group
for the purpose of enabling such other
firma to decide whether, the extent to
which or the price at which, they will
participate in the proposed offering.
Any employee of the firm who receives
such information pursuant to the foregoing
shall not disclose such information or any
conclusions based thereon except as pro-
'nded above for members of the Under-
writing Division.
Material information, as used herein, re-
fers to matters relating to a corporation
which would be important to a reasonable
investor in deciding whether he should buy,
sell or hold securities of the corporation or
which would be likely to have substantial
market impact. Any such information which
has not been disclosed by the corporation
to the investing public, communicated in
accordance herewith, shall be clearly iden-
tified as non-public information which is
to be used by the recipient solely for the
purpose of carrying out his responsibilities
in connection with the proposed offering
and which is not to be disclosed orally or
in writing for any other purpose.
Any question as to the applicability or
interpretation of this statement of policy or
any portion thereof should be promptly re-
ferred to the Legal Department or Department
of Supervision and Guidance, is appropriate.
The above statement of policy shall be
promulgated by a bulletin which shall be
distributed to all senior management per-
sonnel, all Division Directors, all Depart-
ment Managers, all Office Managers, aU
members of the Underwriting Division, all
Research analysts and all Account Execu-
tives and shall be included in the firm's
Operations Manual.
It shall be the duty of each Department
and Office Manager to review periodically
with the personnel subject to his super-
vision the provisions of this statement of
policy.
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APPENDIX III
THE SYDNEY STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
	
SEPTEMBER 26, 1985
CIRCULAR TO MEMBERS NUMBER 8
RULE 3.14 - PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT -(CHINESE WALLS)
A recent survey of Chinese Walls in Member Organisations has indicated that
many Member Organisations have not formalised Chinese Walls or are, in
fact, unsure as to the necessity of installing Chinese Walls.
Any Member Organisation, whether it has 20 partners/directors or is a sole
trader, is at some time liable to be in possession of price sensitive
information within the meaning of Rule 3.14(1). The effect of Rule 3.14(1)
and (2) is to prohibit a Member Organisation which has such price sensitive
information from giving advice to other clients where the advice would be
prejudicial to one client or another, unless the Member Orgariisation has
established Chinese Walls. For the purposes of this Rule, "Client"
includes a shareholder in a Member Corporation.
To ensure Member Organisations are not unnecessarily restricted in advising
clients, it is es5ential that they erect Chinese Walls between those areas
likely to be in possession of price sensitive information e.g.
underwriting, corporate advising, market making departments, and those
investment/client advisers who advise or trade in public securities
markets.
The recommended procedures for irstalling the walls are set out in the
Interpretation to Rule 3.14 (attached), whilst under Rule 3.14(4)(b)(ii)
advice must be provided to the Exchange when Chinese Walls are erected or
any change is made to existing Walls.
In smaller Member Organisations, either being partnerships or sole traders,
it is common practice for one or more partners or employees to be in
possession of sensitive information and, at the same time, to advise
clients. The Exchange strongly recommends that Member Organisations in
that situation erect Chinese Walls by completing the administrative
procedures set out in the Interpretation to Rule 3.14, including
formalization of documentation required by paragraphs (a), (g) and (j) to
that Interpretation, and then advise the Exchange as required by Rule
3.14(4) (b) (ii).
Any enquiries on this matter should be referred to Manager, Regulation and
Compliance.
PETER W. MARSHNAN
MANAGING DIRECTOR
No resPnsibility is accepted for any .naccuracies in the matter published

STANDARD PROCEDURES
FOR
CHINESE WALLS
For:
Member Orgariisation name
Issued:
Date
Return completed Agreement/Acknowledgement to
To be issued to all staff of all branches
Prepared by Regulation & Compliance Dept.
The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited
D L.
PROCEDURES RELATING TO CHINESE WALLS
All staff are required to take note that this Member Organisation of The
Sydney Stock Exchange Limited has instituted "Chinese Walls" in accordance
with the Rules of tre Stock Exchange. This procedure applies to all
branches of our Member Organisation.
The following information is included in this document:-
Rule 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited.
Rule Interpretation 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited.
Two declarations:
Staff or License holder Agreement
Principals Agreement - For Partner/Member Director or
Non-Member Director.
The Basic elements of Chine8e Walls, which must be adhered to at all times,
are:-
1. Communication of non-public information to investment officers who
advise or trade on benalf of clients or this firm is strictly
prohibited.
2. Access to documents, including computer records, which may contain
non-public information will be restricted and the restriction
monitored.
3. No member of staff who is in a position of knowing non-public
information may participate in any investment committees or similar
discussions.
4. Departments likely to be in possession of non-public information will
be physically separated from advisory and trading departments.
5. Should any member of staff come into possession of non-public
information he/she must immediately report the matter to the Senior
Partner/Director and cease to advise and/or trade in the relevant
securities.
In addition, Section 229(3) of the Companies Code prohibits improper use of
information, not only by employees but also by former employees.
229(3) Llinproper use of information] An officer or employee of a
corporation, or a former officer or employee of a corporation, shall
not make improper use of information acquired by virtue of his position
as such an officer or employee to gain, directly or indirectly, an
advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to
the corporation.
Penalty: $20,000 or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
All staff and principals are required to agree to be bound by the
procedures and provisions contained herein and should signify their
agreement by returning the second part of their Agreement to
Signed ......................................
Partner/Director of Member Organisation
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RULE 3.14 OF THE SYDNEY STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED.
"3.14 PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT
(1) Where as a result of its relationship to a client, a Member
Organisation is in possession of information that is not
generally available in relation to a Security and which would
be likely to materially affect the price of that Security if
the information was generally available, the Member
Organisation shall not give any advice to any other client of
a nature that would damage the interest of either of those
clients.
(2) A Member Organisatiori shall not be regarded as tiavtng
possession of information that is not generally available in
relation to a Security where the Member Organisation has
Chinese Walls in place and the person advising the client is
not in possession of that information.
(3) A Member advising a client tnat the member Organisation is
precluded from giving the client advice shall not, for the
purposes of this Rule, be regarded as giving advice.
(4) (a) For the purposes of this Rule, "Client" includes a
shareholder in a Member Corporation which constitutes
the Member Orgariisation.
(b) For the purposes of this Rule a reference to Chinese
Walls in place means an arrangement has been established
by a Member Organisatiori -
(i) whereby information known to persons included in
one part of the business of the Member Organisation
is not available (directly or indirectly) to those
involved in anotner part of the business of the
Member Organtisatiori and it is accepted that in each
of the parts of the business of the Member
Organisation so divided decisions will be taken
without reference to any interest which any other
such part or any person in any other such part of
the business of the Member Organisation may have in
the matter; and
(ii) the Member Orgariisation has advised the Exchange in
writing that -
(a) it has created Chinese Walls;
(b) those Chinese Walls which have been created
are in accordance with the guidelines
prescribed by the Exchange;
(c) the Chinese Walls as created will not be
removed or tltered without prior advice being
given to the Exchange; and
(d) it requires the Exchange to place its name on
the register of Member Organisations
maintaining Chinese Walls which is made
available by the Exchange for public perusal."
RULE INTERPRETATION 3.14 OF THE SYDNEY STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED.
"Chinese Walls Procedures prescribed by the Exchange pursuant to Rule 3.14
The basic elements of Chinese Walls procedures are:-
(a) the Member Organisation shall, prepare, for the instruction of its
staff, a written policy statement forbidding communication of
non-public information to investment officers who advise or trade
in public securities markets. The flow of general market
information from investment and trading departments to the
underwriting and corporate advisory departments would not be
inhibited,
(b) access to documents including computer records likely to contain
non-public information is restricted and this restriction be
monitored,
(c) frequent transfers of personnel between underwriting, corporate
advising and market making departments and other departments be
avoided,
(d) prohibition of corporate advisory, underwriting or market making
staff from sitting on investment committees,
(e) pnyaical separation of underwriting corporate advisory and market
making departments from investment advisory and securities trading
departments,
(f) continuing education programmes to give staff a commonsen8e
understanding of insider trading and other conflicts of interest
situations,
(g) partners and directors to acknowledge in writing that they agree
to be denied information regarding the Member Organisation's
business activities where the communication of that information
would be in breach of Chinese Wall procedures,
(h) in the event that insider information is inadvertently
communicated to personnel in breach of Chinese Wall procedures the
recipient be immediately pronibited from initiating dealings in
any securities the market prices of which are likely to be
affected by the disclosure of that information,
Ci) arrangement must be in place for the internal and external
auditing of the Chinese Wall procedures, and
(j) all. employees shall acknowledge in writing that they have read and
understood the policy statement referred to in (a) above, and the
Member Organisation shall retain this acknowledgement."
) -,
STAFF OR LICENSE HOLDER'S COPY
STAFF OR LIçEN_H9LDER ANOWLEDGEMENT -
PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT
I, __________________________________, hereby state that I have read
1. the Procedures Relating to Chinese Walls,
2. Rule 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited, and
3. Rule Interpretation 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited
and agree to be bound by the procedures and provisions contained
therein.
Signature	 Date
(Detach here)
COPY TO BE HELD BY
MEMBER ORGNISATION
STAFF OR LICENSE HOLDER ACXNOWLEDGEI4ENT -
PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT
I, __________________________________, hereby state that I have read
1. the Procedures Relating to Chinese Walls,
2. Rule 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited, and
3. Rule Interpretation 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited
and agree to be bound by the procedures and provisions contained
therein.
Signature	 Date
PARTNER/DIRECTOR' S COPY
PRINCIPALS ACCNOWLEDGE?4ENT
FOR PARTNER/MEMBER DIRECTOR OR HON MEMBER DIRECTOR
PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT
I, _________________________________ acknowledge and agree to be denied
information, the communication of which would be in breach of Chinese Walls
procedures. I also state that I have read
1. the Procedures Relating to Chinese Walls,
2. Rule 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited, and
3. Rule Interpretation 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited
and agree to be bound by the procedures and provisions contained
therein.
Signature	 Date
(Detach here)
COPY TO BE HELD BY
MEMBER ORGANISATION
?RT.NCIPALS AOCNOWLEDGEI4KNT
FOR PARTNER/MEMBER DIRECTOR OR NON MEMBER DIRECTOR
PROHIBITION OF ADVICE TO CLIENT
I,	 -	 acknowledge and agree to be denied
information, the communication of which would be in breach of Chinese Walls
procedures. I also state that I have read
1. the Precedures Relating to Chinese Walls,
2. Rule 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited, and
3. Rule Interpretation 3.14 of The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited
and agree to be bound by the procedures and provisions contained
therein.
Signature	 Date
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APPENDIX IV
1 Clients of Corporate Advisory and of Investment Advisory
Departments should be made aware of the existence of the other
Department and understand that in order to avoid conflict of
interest these aclivhieL ace confidenjial and segregated, and they
cannot expect to receive any advantage nor need fear.any
disadvantage from the fact that the house conducts both.
2 Privileged price-sensitive information which a House may hold
about a company which is a client or on whose Board some
member of the House may sit mav_ntJn an y case be taken into
account for the purpose of forthing an investment decision.
3 Special knowledge available to a House abouta client company or
one upon whose Board some member or the House may Sit is only
lobe used for the purpose of forming investment decisions if it is or
woulifEe equally available in an indenendent investment analyst
or stockbroker unon reasonable enquiry lromlhc..comoany or
other sources.
4 Whilst (subject to the rules of the Code on Take.oversand
Mergers)24
 Houses are not precluded during the public transaction
of a take-over from purchasing for their own account securities of
a company for which they arc actin;. they must not purchase such
securities for their discretionary investment clients except by
reference to ordinary invcslmcnt criteria and in no case simply to
support the market in their client company's shares. Nor may they
in dvance of the public announcement of a take-over advise
investment clients to accumulate shares in the offeree company in
order to secure acceptance of the offer. 	 -
5 Equally investment clients need not
necessarily be
deprived of the advantage of transactions based on ordinary
market criteria simply because the House is acting for a party to
the take-over transaction, although it is realised that some Houses
prefer to operate a stop list.
6 The number of persons in the House made privy to an impending
take-over transaction or other confidential or price-senstive
information should be as restricted as practicable.
7 Houses should periodically review their security arrangements.
8 Houses should prohibit members of their staffs from dealing in
any securities on their own account except through the 1-louse
itself.
9 The standard by which the propriety and therefore permissibility
of any proposed line of action in relation to deals in securities, the
subject of price-sensitive information or of a take-over transac-
tion, is to be judged is whether the House is prepared subsequently
to justify at a public enquiry the action taken.
)
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